For example, Jenkins (2014) considers an analysis that declares linguistic facts as irrelevant. Yet, by ruling that linguistic facts are never relevant, the analysis is susceptible to counterexamples of substantive, verbal disputes, such as whether ‘coffee’ is a noun. Intuitively, two individuals can substantively disagree on whether ‘coffee’ is a noun. However, this disagreement will be
linguisticdisagreement. Hence, if linguistic facts are never relevant to disputes,
then it follows that the dispute is deflatable: the wrong result.
To reiterate, then, the problem with ‘deeper’ analyses of mere verbality is that they handle globally what should be local. Whether or not a given fact is relevant is relative to the dispute at issue. Furthermore, it is often a controversial issue whether or not a fact is relevant, or even whether that fact exists. Trying to stipulate globally when a fact is relevant therefore invites incorrect results and controversy into the analysis.
Rather than providing analyses of mere verbality, I propose that the defla- tionist is better served finding heuristics for when a dispute is merely verbal. These heuristics should be used to persuade the neutral observer that a dis- pute meeting their conditions are merely verbal. As heuristics, these conditions needn’t be sufficient nor necessary. Furthermore, they may admit of exceptions, such that some substantive disputes meet the heuristic conditions. The impor- tant thing is that the heuristics are reliable guides to whether a dispute is merely verbal. If they are, then these heuristics can take their place in defla- tionist, local arguments against disputes. Though they may not conclusively
prove that a dispute is merely verbal, this reflects the reality that it is often
controversial to call a dispute merely verbal.
The next three chapters consider some heuristics, provided by Hirsch (2005, 2009, 2016), Chalmers (2011) and Thomasson (2009, 2015, 2016) respectively. In the next section, I consider a more general threat to these deflationary methodologies: the threat of hyperintensional manoeuvres.
2.3
Introducing Hyperintensional Manoeuvres
Hyperintensional manoeuvres constitute a direct threat to deflationary heuris- tics. In brief, they work as follows. The deflationist plausibly argues that there is no disagreement over any relevant extensional or intensional fact in a dispute. They therefore suggest that the dispute should be deflated. The substantivist
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CHAPTER 2. DEFLATIONARY METAPHYSICS AND HYPERINTENSIONAL MANOEUVRES – making a hyperintensional manoeuvre – argues that there is disagreement over relevant hyperintensional facts. This maintains the substantivity of the dispute.
Consider the following example. The dispute pertains to the metaphysics of free will. The compatibilist argues that free will is compatible with the truth of determinism. The incompatibilist argues that free will is incompatible with the truth of determinism. Suppose that a deflationist demonstrates that the compatibilist and the incompatibilist agree on all relevant extensional and intensional facts. For example, it may be argued that the disputants mean something different by ‘free will’. Once we interpret the disputants accordingly, it may be that there is no extensional or intensional disagreement between the compatibilist and the incompatibilist. The deflationist thus suggests that the dispute should be deflated.
To this, the substantivist makes a hyperintensional manoeuvre. She appeals to disagreement over whether the compatibilist’s or incompatibilist’s notion of free will is really free will. Given the compatibilist and the incompatibilist mean something different by ‘free will’, the substantivist argues, there is room for substantive disagreement over which property best aligns with the structure of objective reality: which property is the more fundamental.
Different variants of hyperintensional manoeuvre work with different no- tions of fundamentality. In the case we have just considered, the issue comes down to which property is more fundamental. A substantivist might analyse this in terms of Lewis’s (1983) naturalness, such that:
Fundamentality as Naturalness: A property α is more fundamental than
another property β iff (1) α is more natural than β; or (2) α is perfectly natural and β is not perfectly natural.
Additionally, other hyperintensional manoeuvres might appeal to disagree- ment over whether one fact is more fundamental than another. A substantivist might analyse this in terms of metaphysical grounding, such that:
Fundamentality as Grounding: A fact p is more fundamental than an-
other fact q iff (1) p grounds q; or (2) p is not grounded by any fact and
2.3. INTRODUCING HYPERINTENSIONAL MANOEUVRES 35
Consider a dispute about the existence of tables. The setup of the dispute is as follows. There is a world, w1, at which there exist simples arranged
‘tablewise’ and no other simples. A van Inwagen-style (1990, 1994) mereological
nihilist, who believes that only simples exists, asserts that there are no tables
at w1 (as tables are non-simple objects). A Lewis-style (1983) mereological maximalist, meanwhile, believes not only that composite objects exist, but also
that any collection of simples forms an object. Consequently, they assert that there is a table at w2: the fusion of those simples arranged tablewise.
Suppose that we apply to this dispute a deflationary heuristic. We may find that the mereological nihilist, with some complications, is willing to interpret the mereological maximalist’s ‘there are tables at w1’ as true in the mereo-
logical maximalist’s own language. For example, the mereological nihilist may interpret the offending sentence ‘there are tables at w1’ (in the mereological
maximalist’s language) as ‘there are simples arranged tablewise at w1’ (in the
mereological nihilist’s language). On this basis, we might move to deflate the dispute.
However, what we might call a ‘fundamental nihilist’ might make appeal to the following hyperintensional manoeuvre. In response to the threat of deflation, she backtracks and accepts that there exist tables at w1. On the
other hand, she insists that her point is that the existence of simples arranged tablewise is more fundamental than the existence of a table at w1. We can
analyse fundamentality here in terms of grounding. The weaker mereological nihilist asserts that the fact that there are simples arranged tablewise at w1
grounds the fact that there is a table at w1. We can also suppose that the
mereological maximalist also wants to preserve the substantivity of the dispute, and denies this grounding claim: she argues that there is no hyperintensional distinction between tables and simples arranged tablewise. This reformulates the dispute as about whether there is such a hyperintensional distinction to be found. This dispute, we can imagine, admits the existing, metaphysical arguments of the mereological nihilist and mereological maximalist. Hence, this hyperintensional manoeuvre has prevented the dispute from being deflated.
This represents a grounding-variant of hyperintensional manoeuvre. More generally, the thought is that disagreements over the priority of certain facts can be appealed to with grounding-variants of the manoeuvre.
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CHAPTER 2. DEFLATIONARY METAPHYSICS AND HYPERINTENSIONAL MANOEUVRES vre in Schaffer (2010b). Schaffer proposes that ‘the most interesting question is not the question of what exists, but is rather the question of what is fundamen-
tal’ (2010b, 157, his emphasis). He adds that ‘not everything that exists is fun-
damental. Some entities are grounded in others’ (2010b, 157). These thoughts can form the basis of a grounding-variant of hyperintensional manoeuvre. Sup- pose that a deflationary heuristic argues that an ontological dispute should be deflated. The substantivist mounts a hyperintensional manoeuvre, taking the dispute about what exists, and reformulating it into a dispute about what ex- ists fundamentally. They add that an individual a exists fundamentally iff the fact that a exists is ungrounded. Hence, we analyse ‘fundamentality’ in terms of grounding, and we have a grounding-variant of hyperintensional manoeuvre. Additionally, it may be that many hyperintensional disputes about con- cepts or properties can be reformulated as hyperintensional disputes about the priority of facts. As such, grounding-variants may sometimes be nothing more than grammatical variants of other hyperintensional manoeuvres. That there is this grammatical flexibility may be important. Consider this the- sis. I argue that both naturalness and grounding-variants of the hyperinten- sional manoeuvre can be defanged. The substantivist might find my arguments against naturalness-variants to be persuasive, but find reason to reject my argu- ments against grounding-variants. Being able to reformulate disputes as about grounding claims might therefore preserve disputes that would otherwise be de- flated. It is therefore important for my purposes that I challenge both variants of hyperintensional manoeuvre.
In this thesis, I focus on naturalness and grounding-variants. It should be admitted here that there may be alternative variants of hyperintensional ma- noeuvre, corresponding to different analyses of fundamentality. Wilson (2016), for example, suggests that we might take fundamentality as primitive, whilst Sider (2011) suggests analysing fundamentality in terms of his primitive struc- ture. My thesis is incomplete in this sense. However, the thought is that these alternative treatments of fundamentality are in relative infancy. More work elucidating such notions is needed before I can apply analogous arguments to their respective variants of hyperintensional manoeuvre. Naturalness and grounding, by contrast, have received much contemporary interest. This aids the conceptual grasp of these notions upon which my arguments rely. Conse- quently, my position is that I will be able to provide analogous arguments only