FRIGORÍFICOS Y CONGELADORES
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Knowledge of dog-fighting tactics prepared a pilot to destroy enemy aircraft and survive aerial combat. British pilots acquired modified tactics of aerial warfare through the dogfights they fought during the Battle of Britain. Pilots discovered new fighting methods: tricks such as approaching enemies out of the sun to catch them by surprise, swooping in from above to maximize speed, and utilizing sharp banks and loops to evade an attacker.108
The original Royal Air Force Flying Training Manual, issued in 1939 to RAF pilots in its revised form, updated the fundamentals of air combat tactics, illustrated and explained a series of maneuvers. These included, but were not limited to, the barrel, continuous, climbing, gliding, flick, the upward rolls the cartwheel, the flick turn, and the falling leaf exercise.
RAF pilots frequently used deflection shooting and with great success. This tactic coordinated shooting at an enemy in relation to the speed and angle of the shot. Another shooting skill included leading the target, which involved the distance the enemy traveled before the bullets reached his plane. The shooter aimed and fired ahead of the target to score hits.
109
108 Henry L. Walton. Instructors Handbook of Advanced Training Air Publication 1732b (London: Air Ministry, 1943), 220.
109
Air Ministry. Royal Air Force Flying Training Manual Part I-Landplanes. (London: Air Publications 129, Revised November 1937) Chapter 3, G1.
These exercises required specific control, speed, attitude, and altitude conditions. Through experience, both the RAF and the Luftwaffe improved their performance effectiveness in aerial combat. As the Americans remained neutral until the end of 1941, their pilots lacked such opportunities to practice and develop tactics in
combat. This was one reason why American air units lacked basic tactical skills for Operation TORCH.
The German Luftwaffe included superior fighter pilots, who refined combat tactics developed during the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939. The Luftwaffe saw this as an opportunity to experiment with different maneuvers. As stated earlier, the British also developed seasoned veteran pilots during the Battle of Britain in 1940. Such experienced pilots were an extremely important asset in aerial combat.
The RAF utilized, initially, a specific fighter formation. Its pilots flew in “vics,” a compacted, close, flying formation of upside Vs of three planes. This actually proved to be a disadvantage because the pilots lost situational awareness in this close formation. The British improved their tactics by studying German flight patterns utilized in the summer of 1940. The Luftwaffe fighter formation provided better coverage and
flexibility for dog fighting, compared to Allied aerial patterns. Germany utilized a “finger of four” formation aligned in which they called a Schwarm, where planes lined up
staggered in parings. This formation, called the Rotten, set the leader of each independent pair on the left side of the paring. The two fighters could maneuver independently, allowing for flexibility and maximum potent attack options.110
One advantage the Allied ace fighter pilots enjoyed over their Axis counterparts was that the number of sorties flown was limited to one hundred before they were reassigned to instruct new pilots. The Americans adopted this practice later in the war.
The difference between a
Schwarm and a Rotten is that the latter is an enforced version with two independents
pairings working together as larger unit formation. The flexibility of the Schwarm and
Rotten gave Luftwaffe pilots a slight edge over the RAF.
German pilots did not enjoy this luxury. Rather, the policy for German fighter pilots was “fly-till-you-die.” They stayed in continuous service unless killed or injured in a way that inhibited their flying. Erich Hartmann, the war’s top fighter ace, flew 1,250 combat sorties in which he scored 352 kills.111
America’s folly when it entered operations in this desert, contrasted with the RAF’s operational transition from the British homeland to the Mediterranean and North Africa. Decisions relative to leadership, aircraft usage, facilities, and air tactics benefited its adaptation to their new theater. The RAF made use of existing tactics and developed new ones. These included torpedo bombing, night fighting, and aerial interception. I believe these additional conventions hardened the RAF into an elite air force, one with a greater attack and defense capacity. British air power made a difference in the outcome of
For this reason, Luftwaffe pilots accumulated as many as one thousand sorties; successful super ace fighter pilots claimed an astonishing numbers of kills. The Axis threat in North Africa caused the British to devise new methods of aerial warfare.
The RAF found it necessary to expand its tactics beyond fighter and bomber interception. It needed to develop successful methods of attacking enemy ships from the air. It was also important to gather vital reconnaissance information in order to give the ground forces better situational awareness of the location and intentions of the enemy. The RAF utilized the protective cover of night to organize its fighters. The British utilized information learned about the capabilities of its aircraft to apply their planes to new uses as they shifted units and operations to the Mediterranean and the North African desert.
111 Wilkinson, 31.
the campaign, as they diminished enemy supplies and provided situational awareness of the battlefield from the air.112
After Great Britain’s survival in the Battle of Britain, the Royal Air Ministry shifted gears as it re-assigned units to North Africa and the Mediterranean. Sir Hugh Dowding pointed to his pilots’ advantages over the Luftwaffe during the 1940 Battle of Britain. He said that the home advantage allowed for easier repair and recovery of most of the planes and pilots shot down. As the British replaced or repaired the planes, their surviving pilots undertook other missions.
113
In contrast, the vast distance over
inhospitable terrain in the desert was equally hard on both sides, especially when aircrews survived crashes and the harsh desert conditions. Pilots carried desert survival gear; if they lived they either ended up in POW camps or were rescued by their ground forces. Dangers like scorpions, sandstorms, and heat exhaustion faced downed pilots on the vastly barren North African mainland. Well-trained pilots shot down often crash landed their planes in such a way that the trivial damage sustained by the plane could be repaired and it could be put back into service. As the British replaced or repaired their planes, their surviving pilots flew new missions.114
The Royal Air Force began to perform offensive maneuvers in mid 1941 and, simultaneously, balanced defensive and offensive operations on Malta and over the Mediterranean.
North Africa tended to be different as crash sites were, frequently, too remote for retrieval and repair.
115
112
Lieutenant-General Sir John Glubb. War in the Desert: An R.A.F. Frontier Campaign (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1960)
113Robert Wright. The Man Who Won the Battle of Britain. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1969),,124.
114
Wright, 24. 115
Fighter planes are predominantly used for defense and interception while the bombers, torpedo bombers and sometimes fighter bombers are used for offense.
Africa through U-boat infested waters of the Mediterranean. At this time, it needed to find new leadership after the Air Ministy fired Sir Hugh Dowding. Dowding had proved that he was an exceptional leader of the Royal Air Force; however, his defensive
strategies and policies were not suitable to the North African front. In addition to new leadership for the monumental task of implementing an effective attack strategy, the RAF also needed logistical support. These called for a leader with the ability to organize and run the operation of securing and operating makeshift, under-supplied, desert air bases that constantly changed location with the forward advance. This was a logistical and operational nightmare. London appointed Air Chief Marshal Arthur Longmore to resolve it.116 Longmore focused on improving the maintenance and serviceability of airplanes and vehicles. He put together tactical units of fighters.117 Longmore faced an inherent problem in the command structure in place in the Middle East. Delay of orders from London slowed down the efficiency of the Desert Command. Political command required implementing war decisions quickly enough to be effective. To solve this problem, London on June 28, 1941, appointed Oliver Lyttelton as Minister of State in the Middle East. This allowed the war cabinet to be represented in the Middle East and their decisions to be executed without delay.118
Operations in the desert continued to create challenges for the command staff. Longmore encountered problems due to limited supplies and did a poor job of
coordinating his attacks. While his forces faced poorly performing Italian units,
Longmore failed to provide British ground units enough air cover. They struggled also
116 A.H. Narracott. Air Power in War. (London: Frederick Muller, 1945), 66. 117
Playfair, I.S.O. Major General. The Mediterranean and Middle East Volume II “The Germans Come to
Help of their Ally” 1941. (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1956), 239.
against the Afrika Korps led by Erwin Rommel, the “Desert Fox.” Longmore’s first Deputy Air Operations Chief was Air Marshal O.T. Boyd, who met an unexpected fate. When he flew to North Africa in November of 1940 to assume the deputy command, his plane came under attack by Italian fighters and crashed in Sicily. He survived, but became a POW.119
119 Narracott, 66.
The deputy position was vacant until filled by Air Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder. Tedder had an important role to play, for he unseated Air Chief Marshal