At the very onset of this inquiry and its accompanying research design, I as the „chief architect‟ (however terrifying this role can be) had to take a critical decision. This necessitated a choice of the intellectual paradigm(s) that needed to both situate and clarify the forthcoming study. This use of the term “paradigm”, which derives from the work of the historian of science Thomas Kuhn, refers to a set of very general philosophical assumptions about the nature of the world (ontology) and how we can understand it (epistemology) (Maxwell, 2005). Ontological and epistemological assumptions tend to be shared by researchers working in a specific field or tradition, typically informing specific methodological strategies (ibid.). Generally, and abstractly, Maxwell considers paradigms as philosophical positions that may embody very different ideas about (the construction of) reality, and how we are to study it.
Despite Maxwell‟s intentions of concretising the role of a research paradigm, I find it less of a critical decision, and more of an embedded reflection. I am not adept at practising different ontologies for different varieties of research. I do recognise the Kuhnian view of gradually evolving practices that shape scientific disciplines at certain points in time (see Kuhn, 1996). In their pioneering work on naturalistic inquiry, Lincoln and Guba (1985:15) suggest that paradigms represent a distillation of what we think about the world, but cannot prove. Our actions in the world, including those we take as inquirers, cannot occur without reference to those paradigms: “as we think, so do we act” (ibid). They maintain, thus, that while paradigms are enabling, they are also constraining:
A paradigm is a world view, a general perspective, a way of breaking down the complexity of the real world. As such, paradigms are deeply embedded in the socialization of adherents and practitioners: paradigms tell them what is important, legitimate, and reasonable. Paradigms are also normative, telling the practitioner what to do without the necessity of long existential or epistemological consideration. But it is this aspect of paradigms that constitutes both their strength and their weakness – their strength in that it makes action possible, their weakness in that the very reason for action is hidden in the unquestioned assumptions of the paradigm (Lincoln & Guba, 1985:15).
I see this analysis, in terms of what has been presented and of what is to follow, as a phenomenological perspective that may balance opposing philosophies and paradigms. The tradition of phenomenology can more correctly be described as a metatheory of social science. The term “metatheory” is normally used interchangeably with such terms as “philosophy of science”, “metascience” and “epistemology of science” (Babbie & Mouton, 2001:20). All of
74 these terms refer to critical reflection on the nature of scientific inquiry, often with a variety of methodological implications (ibid.).
The phenomenological tradition is based on a predominantly „mental‟ metaphor – the centrality of human consciousness (Babbie & Mouton, 2001). Within this paradigm, the aim of the human sciences is defined as understanding (not explaining) people. People are conceived, not primarily as biological organisms, but as conscious, self-directing, symbolic human beings (ibid.). The phenomenologist emphasises that all human beings are engaged in the process of making sense of their (life) worlds. Individuals continuously “interpret, create, and give meaning to, define, justify and rationalise [their] actions” (Babbie & Mouton, 2001:28). This epistemological position links closely with a naturalistic ontology, underpinning the experiential construction of knowledge, and the significance of meaning.
The leading thinker and architect behind the phenomenological tradition is Alfred Schutz – Austrian social scientist and philosopher. Schutz‟s social phenomenology (1967) is a descriptive and interpretive theory of social action that explores subjective experience within the taken-for- granted, “commonsense” world of the daily life of individuals (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006:81). Schutz‟s theory emphasises the spatial and temporal aspects of experience and social relationships. Social phenomenology takes the view that people living in the world of daily life are able to ascribe meaning to a situation and then make judgments (ibid.). With its emphasis on the socially constructed nature of the social world, Schutz‟ phenomenology offers an epistemological „resolution‟ to a naturalistic ontology. According to this position, the fact that people continuously construct, develop, and transform the everyday interpretations of their worlds, should become critical to social science research (Babbie & Mouton, 2001).
Although not strictly part of this tradition, I consider symbolic interactionism as a metatheory with sufficient similarities to phenomenology. The generally accepted principle of interactionism holds that meaning frameworks and interpretive processes influence social behaviour. This principle accords with Schutz‟ emphasis on the subjective point of view. It follows from this, that there are an infinite number of orders of social realities, each with its own special and separate style of existence (Babbie & Mouton, 2001). For Herbert Blumer, these realities were forged in the experiential worlds of meaning-making and –sharing. For Schutz, these orders converge in the world of “daily life” as an intersubjective domain which all humans share. In both views, the socially constructed nature of the social world is emphasised, and this position, essentially, informs my epistemological foundation.
75
Methodology
In light of the above, I assume a naturalistic ontological stance, which denotes my overarching research paradigm. This paradigm holds that there are multiple realities, internally and interpretively constructed by the social actor. From an epistemological perspective, knowledge is constructed collectively and experientially, and this underpins the role, value, and content of „meaning‟. These positions offer a number of methodological implications, which distinguish it from a more rationalistic paradigm (see Kinash, 2010). In terms of a naturalistic framework, ultimately, I have pursued a methodology that has relied on a process of fluid emergence (see Lincoln & Guba, 1985). This has been achieved by exploring an empirical case within the discipline of ICT4D.
At this point, it is worth noting that the selected research case is not a mere example from the field, utilised to solidify my research objectives. Rather, it is an actual academic project that I have taken part in as researcher, field worker, data analyst, trainer, and practitioner. In terms of my experiences as researcher and project manager on this case, a research argument gradually evolved. This was the result of axial and inductive inquiry, sometimes pursued instinctively (as opposed to intentionally). This research, though informed by the scientific process, grew organically and sporadically as a methodological pursuit.
For the purposes of clarity, furthermore, it is necessary to differentiate between the employed methodologies at project level (MELISSA) and those at meta level (dissertation). At a project level, MELISSA studied disadvantaged educational contexts through mixed-method research, incorporating both quantitative and qualitative approaches. I am not making direct use of these methodologies or approaches. For the purposes of a doctoral qualification, presented through this dissertation as a meta-analysis of MELISSA, I pursued an emergent, multi-sited fieldwork approach. As indicated in Chapter I, this materialised as the combination of rapid (or „snapshot‟) ethnography, participant observation, thick description, and subjective interpretation (reinforced by self-reflection).
Multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork, then, would constitute the predominant methodological framework employed throughout this analysis. Whilst not literally residing in any of the field sites, I stayed in Cape Town for the duration of the fieldwork. I thus remained in close proximity to the case settings. For MELISSA, this required that I regularly travel from Switzerland to South Africa, and again from Cape Town central to surrounding „sites‟. I spent significant time at each of these sites, to allow for the sufficient exploration of the many dynamics at hand.
76 Discussion, observation and reflection
For a meta-level exploration of MELISSA, I do rely on much „data‟ that was collected at project level during my participation as project team member. I joined the MELISSA group in March 2010 – by this time, the project had already run for one year. The project was officially completed in October 2011, and I travelled to Cape Town for a final dissemination event. Between March 2010 and March 2012, I spent a total of six months doing fieldwork in six primary schools and one non-affiliated school (for augmentation purposes; see the Appendix). At the time of writing, I am still involved in developing the MELISSA extension phase, which concerns higher education and technology integration. This is hoped to continue beyond 2013. Augmentative information was obtained from follow-up discussions with project team members, community stakeholders, and affiliates of the broader MELISSA network.
This study relies on those ethnographic experiences that manifested as in-depth discussions, (participant) observations, and reflections (see the Data Collection Framework and Protocol in the Appendix). These are the principal methods in anthropological research (Bernard, 1998; Babbie & Mouton, 2001) and allow for the study of social dynamics in a technological landscape. Research participants – interlocutors, respondents, informants – were selected based on their involvement in various institutions, and of their association with the primary school communities concerned. Local primary schools were already accessible to the project team; the respective research participants were selected purposely from this point, following a process of non- probability sampling (see Babbie & Mouton, 2001).
I met with participants through local contact points (school, university, office, laboratory) – non- neutral environments that provided the respondent with a sense of comfort and safety. Participants were generally well informed and amiable, and were able to suggest other individuals for me to approach. This created a snowball effect of interviewee selection: study participants were met, continually, through daily encounters, leading to even more encounters. This process might appear disorganised. In fact, I can barely recall the number of people I spoke with! It is considerably valuable, however, in meeting a diverse range of characters, with differing backgrounds, experiences, stories, and viewpoints (see Van Zyl, 2010). The process of selecting interviewees coincides with the criteria presented by Spradley (1979) for selecting respondents: Enculturation – those individuals that are familiar with the local context, and accustomed in
77 Current involvement – respondents that are active or knowledgeable in issues concerning the
study;
Time – sufficiently allocated time for conducting the interview or for having a general discussion.
The majority of respondents met the aforementioned criteria and were not approached or pursued otherwise. I attempted to remain as minimally invasive as possible, despite the fact that I was a conspicuous stranger in otherwise acquainted settings. It was not easy, therefore, to hide my enthusiasm or willingness in speaking to as many people as my own time and resources availed. That said, discussions were generally informal, and did not always abide by clear, pre-determined structures. Questions were governed via the flows of conversation and the interpersonal dynamics between the respondent and myself. In this manner, I followed the approach of basic individual interviewing (open, flexible, iterative) as well as depth individual interviews, focusing more on the context of the interview (see Babbie & Mouton, 2001:291; Van Zyl, 2010). Essentially, the interview process depended on local dynamics, contexts, and interactions. In this sense, the research methodology was dictated through the research field (ibid.).
Primary data was supported by archival and desktop research, where I examined a variety of on- and offline media: journal publications, books, news articles, blogs, and formal reports. Finally, and as is evident throughout the preceding chapters, the data collection process was reinforced by the practice of self-reflection. The reflexive turn in anthropology emerged in the 1970s, problematising the production of ethnographic texts. As Bob Scholte aptly observed:
Anthropological activity is never only scientific. In addition, it is expressive or symptomatic of a presupposed cultural world of which it is itself an integral part…Epistemological reflection (the assessment of “ethno-logical” assumptions entailed in the possibility and constitution of any anthropological knowledge whatsoever) must complement, if not precede, scientific activity proper. (Scholte, 1972:431)
In this vein, I attempted to reflect on my own position in terms of the research context. In MELISSA, I helped curriculate a training programme to be implemented in South African primary schools. I was also the local facilitator of this programme, and had trained educators on the use of technology for pedagogical purposes. My role as project coordinator intended to explore development priorities. Together with the project team, I helped create methodological inquiries for „solving‟ these. It has become part of my professional, contracted duty to explore the possibilities for technological integration in marginalised communities. Through a process of self-reflection, I gradually unearthed some of the assumptions in ICT4D practice that I did not
78 challenge in the past. This activity itself reveals much of the practitioner, of the recipient community, and of the surrounding and supposedly „underdeveloped‟ environment.
In light of these roles, it is important to locate my personal influences, experiences, and relationships in terms of the research environment. Scholte argued for anthropology‟s emancipatory and normative interests. He called for anthropologists to reflect on those power relations created through the practice of ethnography (1972). I pay heed to these calls, and will attempt to express my own identity in line with the evocative encounters I intend to uncover. In this case, I am obliged to abandon ordinary self-understanding, and immerse myself within the process of understanding others. The understanding of others not only contributes to our emancipatory interest, but also presupposes, in turn, at least a partial self-emancipation (Scholte, 1972:447).
The table below summarises the data collection process, and indicates the respective project- and meta-level data concerned.