Marco Institucional Ambiental

After the Collapse of the West Indian Federation, the Eastern Caribbean countries had approached Dr. Eric Williams of Trinidad to reconsider his position and hold the federation together, but he decline opting to seek independence as Jamaica had done.

But Trinidad & Tobago having had its independence, the Caribbean felt isolated and vulnerable. Dr. Eric Williams tried to get Trinidad & Tobago to play a lead role in the way forward for the region in its international relations after its fractured image. He approached the French to seek a relation with it through its overseas territories of Martinique and Guadeloupe⁷⁶. When that attempt failed he approached Canada, but was quietly rejected on the question of an association between Canada with the region.

But by April 1963 Dr. Eric Williams again began to look inwards and expressed his frustration at trying to organize the region⁷⁷.

its own. The suggestion gained momentum which led to the referendum in Jamaica in 1961 and Jamaica’s  future in the Federation. N.W. Manley asked for a yes vote while Alexander Bustamante his opponent asked  for a no vote. The no vote prevailed in the September 1961 referendum and Jamaica left the Federation,  Trinidad followed shortly.   

75  Williams, Eric: From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean (1492­1969) Deutch, London, (1970)  p. 116. 

76 Payne, Anthony. The Political History of CARICOM, Ian Randle Publishers, Kingston, (2008) pp. 18‐19. 

77 Ibid. The difficulty of articulating the regional unity was best expressed by Dr. Eric Williams when he  argued that the colonial imperial legacies in the region were quite pronounced and was inhibiting. He argued 

However while Williams searched for answers, on the 6th July 1965 Barbados and Guyana announced that they would establish a free trade area by January 1966 and that other territories of the region were welcomed to join. The announcement had a monumental impact in the region more so in the other Eastern Caribbean Countries because they were at an advanced stage of discussion with Barbados to enter a federal arrangement. Even Dr. Williams was indeed taken by surprise and the initiative was seen as an effort to snob the Trinidadian Prime Minister, but this was later denied and clarified by Forbes Burnham Premier of Guyana.⁷⁸However, as the discussions to form the free trade association gathered momentum Trinidad & Tobago became concerned that they would be left out and eventually decided to come on board.⁷⁹ Jamaica stayed out for reason which was not unconnected with the events leading up to the demise of the West Indian Federation. However, Barbados and Guyana firm in making sure that the political rivalry between Trinidad & Tobago and Jamaica did not undermine the initiative to the establishment of the Free Trade Association within the time schedule.

The anxiety of Caribbean leaders became heightened when Britain made another application to join the EEC as the future of preferential trade arrangement for sugar and banana was threatened. This event consolidated the region’s resolve to act to protect its vital interests and so the joint initiative of Barbados and Guyana to establish a free trade area took on added importance which bought both Jamaica and Trinidad fully on board        

that when you speak to Suriname they say they cannot associate with Puerto Rico because Puerto Rico is an  American colony, when the French are approached they do not want to be in association with Puerto Rico  because to do so would mean that American State Department and Puerto Rico take the view that they do not  want to be in any arrangement with Martinique because to do so would mean to deal with President de  Gaulle. See also Dr. Eric Williams’ Speech at Woodford Square, Port of Spain, Trinidad, 22 April 1965, Nation,  Vol. 7 No. 32 30th April 1965. 

78 Forbes Burnham, A Destiny to Mould: Select Discourse by the Prime Minister of Guyana,  Africana Publishers,  London,(1970) pp. 56‐7. 

79 The announcement to establish CARIFTA was seen at the time as a primary political move by many as being  an anti‐Trinidad manoeuvre designed to snob Dr. Eric Williams. However, this was refuted by Forbes 

Burnham who argued that the Agreement to set up CARIFTA was not intended to be exclusive. F. Burnham 

“Report to the Nation” in Forbes Burnham, A Destiny to Mould: Select Discourse by the Prime Minister of  Guyana London, (1970) pp. 56‐7.

with the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CAFITA) in 1968. CARIFTA was established on the 1st of August 1968 and all the Associated States with the support of the United Kingdom signed the Treaty. However, the Bahamas and British Honduras (Belize) stayed out. Forbes Burnham, the Premier of Guyana who was one of the pioneers of the CARIFTA movement offered to host the headquarters for the Association was accepted and Georgetown, Guyana became the official headquarters.

The regional unity was forged as a result of external threat, but the initiative to unite was propelled by the need for the region to craft its own destiny. The suspicion surrounding Britain’s motive for promoting the Federation of the West Indian islands had permeated the region which came to believe that the federal initiative was nothing more than an administrative convenience for Britain which was finding it burdensome to deal with so many small countries as Independence approached. Indeed, Britain had encouraged the establishment of the federation, but later failed to provide the financial and technical support for its success. It is commonly believed that Britain effectively undermined the federal experiment by suggesting to the Premier of Jamaica, Norman Manley, that Jamaica was qualified to gain its independence⁸⁰ .Realizing Britain’s intention, the region had to find a way forward which could sustain after Britain joined the EC. A situation had developed in the Caribbean similar to the experience of the Africans and the Yaoundé Agreement. Because, Britain had granted Associated statehood to the non independent Members of CARIFTA, so that these countries were in a position to benefit from the EC trade and aid arrangement by virtue of Protocol 22 and this was acceptable by the EC because their impact on the EC internal agricultural arrangement would be negligible as the United Kingdom (UK) imported banana and limited supply of sugar, rum and tropical spices.So, Britain was assured of adequate supplies of sugar, rum and tropical fruits just as France and the Netherland had through their Caribbean holdings.

80 For a detailed discussion on the federation of the West Indies see Payne, Anthony. The Political History of  Caricom Ian Randle Publishers, Kingston, (2008).  pp3‐30. 

These arrangements were of mutual strategic importance to those European former colonial and imperial rivals which reinforced equality and pride of place among themselves. For purposes of the negotiation, prima facie, the U.K had not accepted anything less than what its former rivals, now become partners had retained for themselves. This factor offers some support to the argument, that the arrangements under the Lomé regime was not intended to benefit the ACP States in the main, but instead was so crafted to suit the European interests and the question of fairness on the issues concerning the developing countries was not part of the primary construct of Europe. However the ACP States though not fully satisfied with the outcome had to be content with what they had negotiated give the circumstances of asymmetry between the parties.

In July 1969, Caribbean trade ministers and a delegation went to London to present the region’s case to the British government concerning the trading arrangements. They returned with a new conviction that the way forward for the Caribbean in dealing with the issue of trade would have to be collective negotiation as one unit⁸¹. Their experience of Britain’s new focus and their own sense of purpose drove that conviction.

But even though, they decided to negotiate as a single unit, the next three years were mired in debates as to the substance of the deal to be negotiated. The debates were highly divisive and intensely contested in the period leading up to negotiations with Europe. The problems were very complex. Firstly, for a region which had just forged a unity given its very recent experiences with the failed federation, secondly, it had no substantive or long history of collective bargaining of trade terms on this scale at the international level and thirdly, there were deep divisions among Member States on the type of relationship the region should have with the EC after Britain became a Member.

81 By September 1970 when the Conservative government in power in Britain Jamaica Trade Minister, Robert  Lightbourne led another mission to London to put its case to the British government, the result of the visit  was disappointing. Lightbourne was then a member of the JLP government which was politically allied to the  conservative party in Britain. 

Britain, in preparation for its final bid to join the EC, created the status of Associated Statehood for some of its Caribbean OCTs namely: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, and St. Kitts & Nevis, all of which adopted the status in 1967 while St. Vincent and the Grenadines did so in 1969. Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Montserrat and the Turks and Caicos Islands remained as British OCTs. A pattern of behaviour of post war European colonial powers that was exposed in the making of the Treaty of Rome by France and the Netherlands in respect to Guadeloupe and Martinique which are French OCTs, and the Netherland Antilles which are Dutch OCTs in the Caribbean was followed by Britain, all designed for long-term strategic purposes. The way was now paved for Britain to renew its application to join the EC at the 1969 Hague Summit meeting of the EC where Britain’s application was unanimously accepted for it to become a full Member by January 22^nd, 1972. So, while the dissentions and political divide were being exposed in Africa by opposition to the acceptance of the Yaoundé Convention by the AASM in Africa in 1969, a similar debate was bearing down heavily on the Caribbean region on the question of the type of deal that the region should seek when Britain joined the EEC.

Trinidad &Tobago and Guyana were not in favour of the Yaoundé model of associations as they were of the view that it was inimical to the region’s sugar and banana export.

Jamaica, under a conservative and the pro-western Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) administration had wanted the Yaoundé model because of the financial aid and technical assistance it offered. In its resistance to go with the others, Jamaica had broken ranks with its Caribbean partners and went to Brussels to get support for its case. Jamaica’s attitude further complicated matters as it created suspicion among the rest of the Caribbean and added pressure on the fragile infrastructure of the new CARIFTA movement because by then, the EC had agreed to commence negotiations in 1973. Jamaica’s problem was its insularity and unilateral tendencies. It had to convince the other Member States to go with the Yaoundé Model, but Jamaica had a further credibility problem not unrelated to its role in the demise of the West Indian Federation,

a problem which was further compounded by suspicions surrounding its visits to European capitals to get support for the Yaoundé model.

But, Jamaica’s problems in the region were further exposed when in February 1971, Geoffrey Rippon, the then British Minister responsible for negotiating with the EEC had visited the Caribbean with an agreement from the EEC to protect the economies of those countries which were solely dependent on export of sugar and primary products⁸². By June, 1971 Robert Lightbourne, Jamaica's Minister of Trade and Industry visited London and in a meeting at Lancaster House, he sought Britain’s commitment to support the Caribbean’s request to continue export of sugar on favourable terms vis-à-vis all other developing countries and in doing so, was unequivocal about the region displeasure on the issue of the EEC’s assurances of protecting the economies of the region⁸³. Sir Kamisese Mara, Prime Minister of Fiji was in attendance at the Lancaster House meeting in London. He observed that what Britain had intended was to ask the sugar producing Commonwealth States to do was to give up the security of the sugar agreement and made a strong case for the sugar suppliers to take Britain at its words that it would protect the sugar market. Fiji decided to “…put its trust in the UK’s assurances and go in”⁸⁴.

The region had taken note of the treatment they received regarding their requests at the meeting of the EEC Ministers of Foreign Affairs on the 7^th of June 1971. There, the region’s declarations on the issues that affected their interest were only noted, but no reference or record was made of them in the deliberations of the meeting. In addition, the Caribbean had an even more fundamental problem caused by the Associated       

82 Mr. Geoffrey Rippon in the House of Commons, 17 May 1971 (Hansard, Volumes 385‐6) cited in Central  Office  of  Information,  Britain  and  the  Developing  Countries:  The  Caribbean,  (London,  HMSO,  1973).  p.  21. 

83 By September 1970 when the new Conservative government came in office in Britain, Jamaica’s Trade  Minister, Robert Lightbourne led another mission to London to put its case to the British government, the  result of the trip was disappointing. Jamaica was therefore forced to look to the Caribbean for compromise. 

84 Mara, Kamisese:  “The Pacific Role in the ACP” The Courier No.93 (September to October 1985) p.80.See  also Communiqué: The Lancaster House Statement Consultations with Developing Countries .2‐3 June1971.  

Statehood granted to the majority of the Member States of CARIFTA. This problem was not only unique in law and practice, but was of historic magnitude as it threatened the very existence of the CARIFTA regional grouping. The Associated States found themselves in an invidious position due mainly to Britain’s incoherent policy towards the region based on its own self interest as it move forward to join Europe and refocused its policy towards the Industrial North. It intended to treat the Associated States in a similar manner as the French had treated its OCTs and ASSM under the Yaoundé regime and the Treaty of Rome. The Caribbean did not want that type of arrangement⁸⁵

These small states were indeed self- governing colonies but in their external relations they had no competence in law, as Britain had retained such authority. But their decision to join CARIFTA was supported by Britain. They, having become Associated States prior to Britain joining the EEC were expected to follow the path taken by the ASSM under the Yaoundé regime. A position with which most of them were quite comfortable⁸⁶ but that in and of itself had exposed three major difficulties. Because, unlike the AASM under the Yaoundé Convention, these Caribbean Associated States were then Members of a regional arrangement with other partners which carried legal obligations and required specific procedure to removed themselves from membership if they so desire. The unanimity rule of governance was applicable which meant that decisions had to be made in unison and Britain could not force them to leave, having given them consent to join in the first instance. So therefore, any decision to leave would have to be made by them with the active support of the other Member States, or in the alternative, they could renounce the arrangements, but such an option seemed remote as the political fall out in the region would be beyond what they would have wanted on in light of the history of the failed West Indian Federation of which most of them were members and the trauma of those events was still very fresh in their minds.

So, in as much as the Associated States had majority in numbers, and would have       

85 Interview‐ PJ Patterson, Kingston, Jamaica, March 3, 2009. 

86 Ibid

preferred to go along with Britain, Jamaica which was by then a newly independent Member failed to convince the other willing and larger Memberships to go with it and take the Yaoundé Model, though prima facie the Yaoundé offer had very appealing financial and technical features.

Trinidad & Tobago however, had a credibility problem not unconnected to the failed West Indian Federation which was further compounded by the subsequent rivalry between itself and Jamaica which had overshadowed the establishment of CARIFTA.

So, as in the case of Nigeria’s efforts in uniting Africa, it was therefore left to Guyana to hold the Caribbean group together and staved it from being undermined and the divisions being exploited by the EEC leading up to the negotiations. The task to get consensus on the issue was extremely challenging difficulty. So difficult and protracted were the debates at the regional trade ministerial meetings and at the Heads of Government level that one participant, P.J Patterson of Jamaica observed that, so heated were those discussions that to reach consensus was more difficult than to get all of Africa to negotiate with the Caribbean and Pacific as a single unit.⁸⁷

A significant turning point for the region came with the election of the Peoples National Party (PNP) lead by Michael Manley on the 29^th February, 1972. Manley by then had proclaimed his commitment to the regional integration movement⁸⁸. But even then, the task of convincing the Associated States of the region to walk away from the arrangements Britain had in place for them was much more difficult to deal with than that which was posed by Jamaica and Trinidad. Tackling of these issues hinged closer to being resolved at the 15^th meeting of Council of Ministers of the Caribbean Free Trade Association held in Roseau, Dominica on the 10^th - 12^th July 1972.

87  Interview‐ PJ Patterson, Kingston, Jamaica, March 3, 2009. 

88 For an articulation of the Regional Integration Movement see Demas, William: From CARIFTA to Caribbean  Community, (Georgetown, Guyana 1972). 

The meeting⁸⁹ resolved that it was essential for CARIFTA countries to seek a Group relationship with the enlarged EEC base on the need to obtain the best possible terms at minimum cost through joint bargaining and the collective power of the countries of the region. It reaffirmed its recommendation to governments made at the 6^th meeting in November 1970 that all the CARIFTA governments should decide to seek as a group, a relationship with the enlarged EEC with special arrangements to safeguard vital exports commodities, without prejudice to the status of respective states consequent on the listing in the Treaty of Brussels of the Associated States. Belize and Montserrat were eligible for association under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome. There was some need to determine the arrangements for the effective representation of the non-independent countries for satisfactory implementation of the decision, especially in a context where

The meeting⁸⁹ resolved that it was essential for CARIFTA countries to seek a Group relationship with the enlarged EEC base on the need to obtain the best possible terms at minimum cost through joint bargaining and the collective power of the countries of the region. It reaffirmed its recommendation to governments made at the 6^th meeting in November 1970 that all the CARIFTA governments should decide to seek as a group, a relationship with the enlarged EEC with special arrangements to safeguard vital exports commodities, without prejudice to the status of respective states consequent on the listing in the Treaty of Brussels of the Associated States. Belize and Montserrat were eligible for association under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome. There was some need to determine the arrangements for the effective representation of the non-independent countries for satisfactory implementation of the decision, especially in a context where