La mentalidad del hombre primitivo

Indonesian Muslim groups have, generally speaking, harboured fewer concerns about Kosovo compared to their interest in Bosnia, even when the Kosovo crisis reached its peak in the 1990s. The Kosovo issue might reasonably be expected to command the same attention among Indonesian Muslim groups as the Bosnian plight, as both suffered the effects of ethnic cleansing (Sihbudi, 2001a).

What made a difference between Kosovo and Bosnia according to Indonesian Muslim groups was first that the West was more responsive to the Kosovo crisis than to the Bosnian conflict. The West made efforts to halt ethnic cleansing or human rights abuses by

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the Milosevic regime against the Albanian Kosovars. Therefore, the atrocities by Milosevic were halted relatively sooner in Kosovo than had occurred in Bosnia (Sihbudi, 2001a). The West's quick response helped diminish the suspicion of Indonesian militant Muslims towards the West. In Indonesia, hostile sentiment towards the West, mainly the US, was an effective tool for mobilising mass responses from Muslim groups.

Second, the peak of the Kosovo conflict at the end of the 1990s coincided with Indonesia’s severe economic crisis, which in turn led to political turmoil within the state (Sihbudi, 2001a). Therefore, at the height of the Kosovo crisis, all efforts were concentrated on overcoming domestic problems; including Indonesian diplomacy which was directed at supporting the country’s economic recovery. Consequently, Indonesian Muslims and the government were less attentive to international issues, including the Kosovo conflict which ordinarily would have raised their concerns. In addition, in 1999 Indonesia was occupied with a popular referendum on East Timor, and problems related to this referendum dominated its diplomatic efforts.

The presence of the US and other Western states in Kosovo sparked a notable contrast between Indonesia and Malaysia, the two Southeast Asian countries with the largest Muslim populations. The West’s assistance to Kosovar Muslims in their fight against Christian Serbs appeared to stir up mixed feelings among Muslims internationally. These circumstances might have managed to reduce perceptions that the West was anti-Islam. Against such a background, Malaysia supported NATO's air strikes to prevent further threats to Kosovar Albanians. Malaysia regarded these strikes as distinct from US-led military actions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan which the Malaysian government had criticised. Malaysia's stance was described by Ambassador Hasmy Agam, Malaysia's Permanent Representative to the UN, as “a reluctant exception” to its traditional stance that all international security issues including those in Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan should be addressed in the UN Security Council. Despite Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad’s sceptical feelings on the West’s keenness to protect Muslims, Malaysia supported NATO's military actions in Kosovo (Vinocur & Richardson, 1999).

Meanwhile, Indonesia issued a statement condemning the bombing and urging the two parties to refrain from the use of force, discontinue violent actions, and to return to negotiation. Indonesia stressed the importance of negotiation as a way to settle the

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problem, instead of through the use of weapons (Jakarta-Post, 1999a). Indonesia’s position seemed to be consistent from the beginning in the sense that the country emphasised the importance of renegotiation and respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Jakarta-Post, 1999a). Kosovo had not come under the spotlight in the Indonesian press and it had not been a serious concern for Indonesian Muslim groups, thus there was little pressure from society contributing to the shape of Indonesian policy on this issue. In this case, the government had relative freedom in shaping its position regarding NATO's airstrikes in Kosovo.

Indonesia's position also reflected its concern over the violence and riots in the aftermath of East Timor's referendum which happened concurrently with the Kosovan crisis. In this regard, Jakarta had interests in shielding this violence from outside intervention (Vinocur & Richardson, 1999). Therefore, Indonesia's position and statement regarding NATO's bombing in Kosovo was in line with its national interests.

The situation in Kosovo sparked a heated debate among Ministers attending the ASEAN Regional Forum in Singapore on July 26 1999. Among non-Western members of the ARF, some were concerned about NATO’s unilateral military operations in Kosovo. They were afraid of the erosion of basic international principles that possibly resonated in their region. The debate caused ‘a last minute hitch’ in finalising the Chairman’s Statement (Jakarta-Post, 1999b). Many compromises were achieved. Instead of expressing ‘regret’ for NATO's bombing, the statement only mentioned “concern with its wider implications”. Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas's intervention helped overcome the standoff on how the issue should be addressed in the ARF Chairman's Statement. Alatas made additions to the statement to specify that NATO's military action was intended to halt war crimes and crimes against humanity. Therefore, the issue was moved away from sole reference to the bombings against Yugoslavia, and toward concerns regarding human rights violations. The ARF Chairman's Statement affirmed support for the UN Charter and international law and called for a political settlement. The Indonesian delegation argued that in Kosovo's case, the UNSC had been pushed aside and that international society should pay attention. Besides acknowledging the human rights abuses by Yugoslavia, the Indonesian delegation firmly stated that NATO's military action was not in accordance with the UN Charter (Jakarta-Post, 1999b).

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Ali Alatas's efforts to bring together opposing sides on the Kosovo issue for the sake of drafting the ARF Chairman's Statement were typical of Indonesia's point of view. The country has always tried to adopt a mediating position as long as the ideas have not directly touched its basic national interests. Many Indonesian observers have argued that Indonesia’s positions have not been firm enough. Indonesia’s non-confrontational or non- hostile views were reflected in its position responding to NATO's bombing in Kosovo. Instead of using the word ‘condemn’, Indonesia chose ‘regret’ to express its disagreement with the US and its allies’ actions in Kosovo. Indonesia disagreed with these actions, arguing that they violated the basic principles of international law. Aside from criticising NATO, Indonesia also acknowledged the existence of human rights violations committed by the government of Yugoslavia (Jakarta-Post, 1999a, 1999b).

To this point, the interplay between Indonesia’s state and society on the Kosovo issue has not been considered. In such a situation, the Indonesian government looked free to pursue a policy on the Kosovo crisis without any significant pressure from public opinion. The absence of a critical view from society with regard to NATO’s bombing in Kosovo placed the government as the sole or dominant actor in the foreign policy decision making process.

This situation was very different from Indonesia's foreign policy behaviour in responding to the Bosnian crisis, in which pressures from Muslim groups were so strong. At that time, even the authoritarian regime of Suharto seemed, to some extent, to accommodate Indonesian Muslims' aspirations. The government was seen to have conducted some policies and actions which were in line with, or even pleasing to, domestic Islamic groups. With regard to the Bosnia issue, Indonesia supported the adoption of the OIC resolution calling on the UN to impose economic sanctions and also take military actions to bring an end to the war initiated by Serbia against Bosnia-Herzegovina. As the Chair of the 10th NAM Summit in Jakarta, from 1-6 September 1992, Indonesia spearheaded the issuance of the NAM Final Document which called for respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The same point was made in President Suharto’s intervention in the meeting on the necessity of upholding sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as preserving the cultural heritage of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Suharto himself instructed that Indonesia should adopt a more concrete policy toward

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Bosnia-Herzegovina. Subsequently, the country recalled its ambassador to Yugoslavia, Sunjoto Pamungkas (Perwita, 2007). Further measures taken by Indonesia included sending 20 military observers and a 200-person medical detachment under the UN peacekeeping force (Suryadinata, 1995). Moreover, the visit of Suharto to Bosnia- Herzegovina to offer good offices to conflicting parties and to help build a mosque in Sarajevo was hailed and celebrated by Indonesian Muslim groups as a manifestation of Indonesia’s strong support for the struggle of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Budiwanti, 2001; Perwita, 2007). Suharto’s policies on Bosnia-Herzegovina were interpreted and remembered as a form of accommodation of Muslim aspirations (interview with Mahfudz Siddiq, 25/11/2003).

The post-Suharto regimes from Habibie to Megawati apparently did not have any concerns or clear policies towards Kosovo and Bosnia. A study by Budiwanti (2001) who conducted field research in Surabaya, Padang, Bandung and Yogyakarta in 2001 has confirmed this view. According to Budiwanti (2001), respondents realised that the government had been preoccupied with domestic problems politically and economically in the aftermath of the 1998 political and economic crisis. Rather than observing or playing a role in crises or conflicts abroad, Indonesia was busy handling its own separatist and communal conflicts in Aceh, Ambon, Kalimantan, Poso and other regions. Consequently, Indonesia under Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid afforded less time to considering regional and international concerns, including the Kosovo crisis, and focused instead on domestic concerns.