Influencia del entorno de medidas en el canal de propagación off-body UWB

Corporate disputes involving non-payment of taxes occur frequently in the Russian business environment. The number of such disputes reported in 1998 was substantially higher than in 2006. However, similar to ownership and misimplementation disputes, the amount of newspaper coverage of these disputes increased noticeably in the more recent year of the investigation (see graph 4.12).

Graph 4.12: Tax Disputes

In 1998 instances of corporate disputes connected with non-payment of taxes were determined by two factors. The first factor related to a massive budget deficit that the government had to close by means of a very aggressive tax-collection policy (which did not spare even strategically important joint ventures and partnerships). Reported conflicts arising as a result of such practice suggest that the government was keen to impose additional tax liability on cash rich firms. The second factor was a product of a malfunctioning system where tax authorities were used as an instrument for diverting claims, assets and competitiveness from less protected (connected) corporate entities. Further details of such disputes pertaining to 1998 are presented hereunder:

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Russia‘s dependence on International Monetary Fund forced authorities to scale back on the tax breaks promised by the presidential decree to the Gaz – Fiat joint venture (Gaz).

The Russian tax police specifically targeted the KIA venture in Kaliningrad.

The seizure of assets was not authorised by the courts and it was suggested that the tax authorities were in cahoots with the local used-cars importers who tried to disadvantage their direct competition (KIA).

The Russian tax police seized assets of two Gazprom subsidiaries. This was an order by the new taxation chief, Boris Fyodorov who was charged with the task of improving tax collection rates. The bank accounts and property of Orenburggazprom and Uraltransgaz were ordered to be seized⁵⁸ (Gazprom).

The local authorities enlisted the services of the unions to enhance their negotiating power with Yukos officials over disputed taxes. It was unclear whether the claimed tax arrears actually existed. The local administration together with union representatives tried to get more money out of Yukos; it is possible that the motive was to represent the interests of the population and ordinary workers of the company, but in the environment of 1998 a more pragmatic interpretation would suggest indirect expropriation of shareholder wealth (Yukos).

Tomskneft, a subsidiary of Yukos, was facing bankruptcy because it owed 400 million rubles ($21 million) in taxes to the federal budget and another 200 million rubles to the local budget and the pension fund. It also owed 300 million rubles to its staff in back wages. A Yukos spokesman said that the court that ruled in favour of bankruptcy had ignored a proposal from Yukos to cover its subsidiary's debt without giving reasons (Yukos).

The city of Omsk saw its regionally gathered tax revenues fall from 65 percent of its budget to only 38 percent. Omsk Mayor Valery Roshchupkin responded by raising local taxes - adopting a 2 percent city tax on turnover (not profits) that prompted 30 of the Omsk's largest businesses, including many with ties to the governor, to reregister "offshore," just outside the city limits. When Sibneft was re-registered outside the city, the Omsk mayor's office introduced a 35-ruble-per-ton tax on crude oil processed by the refinery, a tax Sibneft contested in court (Sibneft).

58 The State Duma protested loudly claiming that the action would cause a threat to national security.

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With reference to Sidanko, the government came up with a resolution whereby oil companies were denied export quotas if they fell behind on tax repayment terms (Sidanko).

Irkutsk‘s regional administration sought to take control over a refinery (Sidanko‘s subsidiary) on the back of tax allegations by installing external managers further to a ruling made by the regional arbitration court. Sidanko responded by stopping deliveries of crude oil to the refinery. It had been suggested that the motive behind the proceedings was of a political nature, i.e. preserving jobs and enterprise in the region. The task was not of a commercial character because otherwise the entity would have been declared bankrupt as it was seen as unprofitable without the Production Sharing Agreement which the government was unwilling to grant (Sidanko).

The government had to boost tax collection in order to close a substantial budget deficit. In this particular case the decision was made to recover some of the tax debt through a bankruptcy of Norilsk Nickel‘s subsidiary. The company appealed the decision in an arbitration court arguing that the tax debt of $40m was calculated incorrectly (Norilsk Nickel).

An unidentified party was using tax authorities to exert pressure on Knauf to either surrender control, or simply share profits. The arbitration court ruled in favour of the decision made by the tax authorities⁵⁹ (Knauf).

AssiDoman was charged with back taxes pertaining to the paper mill they had purchased. The fact that a solution to the tax and bankruptcy issues depended on the heads of the respective agencies⁶⁰, and not an objective criteria suggests a very arbitrary approach. Also, pledges made by the president were not an indication of what was right or wrong, but simply populist exclamations during foreign visits. Meanwhile the state bankruptcy and tax authorities froze the accounts preventing the company from investing in capital improvements (AssiDoman).

In 2006 reported tax disputes were almost exclusively connected with the government‘s drive to re-establish control over strategically important assets.

These disputes (although fewer in number in comparison with 1998 data)

59 Although the tax police were formally right as Knauf made an accounting mistake, the former refused to consider the evidence (receipts) supplied by Knauf.

60 The company sought to establish personal relationships with key individuals in the position of power such as Chubais and Mostovoi. Their efforts were cancelled out by the reshuffle.

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generated a large amount of press coverage and in that sense had a significant impact on investor perception of the deterioration of the rule of law in the country.

In 2006 manifestation of the latter point took the form of arbitrarily imposed tax charges. Further details of reported tax disputes pertaining to 2006 are presented hereunder:

The Russian Court system bounced criminal charges against AvtoVaz from court to court, but eventually returned all of the cases to the prosecutor‘s office which decided to cancel the investigation into the alleged non-payment of $8m in back taxes. No explanation was given as to why the investigation had been closed. However, analysts suggested that the government was seeking to re-establish control over the car manufacturer by opening and closing criminal investigations and bringing in a symbolic suit against the joint-venture partner (General Motors) (AvtoVaz).

The government detained Barinov (Nenets Governor) on suspicion of fraud and embezzlement allegedly after/because he complained against Rosneft‘s subsidiary which failed to pay taxes to the local budget and broke ecological standards. Rosneft claimed that the company was acting in accordance with all signed agreements and had nothing to do with the detention of the governor (Rosneft).

The Russian government charged Yukos with a massive back-taxes bill in an effort to seize control over the viable company‘s assets. The decision was also linked to Khodorkovsky‘s support of political opposition and had very little to do with the way the company was managed (Yukos).

TNK-BP learnt from the Yukos experience and did not challenge an imposed back taxes claim too aggressively in the Russian courts. The fact that the company did pay the questionable back-tax has been viewed as a relationship building opportunity with the Russian government and key stakeholders of the company (TNK-BP).

The Audit Chamber felt it was wrong for Evraz to use off shore traders in order to minimize taxes. The Chamber ruled against the company (Evraz).

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2.1.5.1 Implications for the Rule of Law with Reference to Tax Disputes

From analysing cases of tax disputes reported in the two years of the study, both positive and negative trends with regard to the perceived change in the rule of law can be revealed.

On the positive side, the Russian government does not need to resort to ‗fire-fighting‘ measures of tax collection in order to close a loophole in its budget. In 2006 there were no reported instances when a cash-rich firm was compelled by the tax authorities to ‗donate‘ its resources to the federal tax fund. Conversely, in 1998 there were 6 examples of such practice (Gazprom, Fiat-Gaz, Yukos, Sibneft, Sidanko, Norilsk Nickel). Secondly, instances when tax authorities acted on behalf of a private group of individuals in order to target a specific venture were not reported in 2006. Therefore, as far as investor perception is concerned there has been a positive change within the environment which is seen as more protected from the crude abuses of the tax system. In 2006 there were no equivalent disputes to what happened to Knauf, KIA and AssiDoman in 1998 when tax authorities acted as a tool for self-centred private stakeholders.

Nevertheless, 2006 was dominated by situations when the government used the tax system to achieve its political and economic goals. Examples involving AvtoVaz, Yukos and TNK-BP expose the arbitrary nature of this interaction. The tax dispute involving Rosneft also shows that the government is prepared to resort to the use of other formal institutions such as the courts in order to punish those who do not act in accordance with its de facto agenda. In 2006 it was these disputes that received a great deal of the newspaper coverage and hence considerably influenced investor perception of the rule of law in the country.