8.3.1 Theoretical implications for Ethnic Competition Theory and Contact Theory from Part 1
Theoretical implications from Chapter 2
Within the framework of Ethnic Competition Theory, actual competition between members of ethnic groups presumably induces perceptions of ethnic competition. These perceptions increase feelings of ethnic threat, which in turn reinforce ethnic hostility. Chapter 2 shows that acculturation to less hostile attitudes is more likely (or easier) than acculturation to more hostile attitudes regarding ethnic outgroups. I attributed this to the fact that ethnic tolerance (not ethnic hostility) is the dominant social norm within Dutch society. More generally, I posited that acculturation to dominant social norms is more likely to occur than acculturation to less accepted or deviant norms.
Building on these results, we may expect other effects of the dominant social norm regarding ethnic outgroups on the development of ethnic hostility among individual members of society. I would argue that individuals are more prone to perceive ethnic group competition when there are more individuals within society that express or seek to legitimise their negative thoughts, feelings or behaviour towards ethnic outgroups. Hence the prevalence of ethnic hostility within a society may condition the correlation between actual ethnic group competition and perceptions of it. Scholars have previously shown that, as a certain norm-violating behaviour becomes more common, it will negatively infl uence conformity to other norms and rules (Keizer, Lindenberg, & Steg, 2008). In line with these empirical fi ndings and given the rationale given above, I expect that when there are more people violating the social norm of ethnic tolerance, ethnic hostility in all its different guises will spread more easily. The fi rst hypothesis I posit which needs to be tested by future research is:
Actual competition between ethnic groups – induced by socio-economic, socio-cultural or socio- historical circumstances, whether at the individual or the contextual level – will have a stronger positive effect on perceptions of ethnic competitive threat and hence on ethnic hostility in countries where ethnic hostility is more prevalent.
This is of course not to say that there will always be a trend towards more ethnic hostility within society; there are other factors infl uencing such hostility (e.g. educational attainment, religiosity). Moreover, I just discussed results showing that acculturation to less hostile attitudes is easier than acculturation to more hostile attitudes, as long as the dominant social norm is one of social tolerance. Thus, in societies with a culture of tolerance there may very well be two counteracting self-strengthening mechanisms.
Theoretical implications from Chapters 3 and 4
There was an important inconsistency between the results of Chapters 3 and 4, which I have not mentioned before explicitly. In Chapter 3, I found that for native Dutch with an educational degree below average, the size of the outgroup in the neighbourhood was positively related to opposition to ethnic intermarriage, in line with Ethnic Competition Theory. For the relatively higher educated this relationship was reversed, as could be expected given selective residential mobility. In sharp contrast, in Chapter 4 I found that for native Dutch the size of the outgroup is negatively related to rejection of neighbours from a different race, as would be expected on the basis of Contact
Theory, but this negative relationship was weaker (not stronger) for the relative rich.7
The two datasets used in Chapters 3 and 4 were collected after different sample selection procedures. The dataset used in Chapter 4, CV04, contained an oversampling of ‘bad neighbourhoods’, and compared to the dataset of Chapter 3, NKPS02, has far more respondents living in neighbourhoods with a substantial proportion of ethnic minorities. Hence, within the CV04, the actual relationship between outgroup size and ethnic hostility within neighbourhoods with relatively high proportions of ethnic minorities has more infl uence on the estimated effect of outgroup size on indicators of ethnic hostility than within the NKPS02. I now expect the following hypotheses to hold:
1a. When outgroup sizes start to increase (beginning with zero per cent), outgroup sizes within neighbourhoods will decrease levels of ethnic hostility for the rich and higher educated. 1b. After a certain threshold, outgroup sizes will start to reinforce ethnic hostility for the rich and higher educated.
2a. When outgroup sizes start to increase (beginning with zero per cent), outgroup sizes within neighbourhoods will increase levels of ethnic hostility for the poor and lower educated. 2b. After a certain threshold, outgroup sizes will start to diminish ethnic hostility for the poor and low educated.
Of course, these hypotheses have been induced from my results and not been theoretically deduced. This is because the relevant theories, Ethnic Competition Theory and Contact Theory, are simplifi cations of reality and do not take into account possible relevant conditional nonlinear relationships. A possible reason for this omission is that to theoretically deduce hypotheses – which I strongly adhere to – without formalised theoretical models is far more diffi cult with (conditional) nonlinear relationships. We thus need to formalise our theoretical frameworks. A nice example of a
formal sociological model is the Breen-Goldthorpe model, which I applied in Chapter 6.
At what outgroup size this ‘certain threshold’, or tipping point, occurs ideally follows from this formalised model. It is however more likely that it has to be determined by empirical investigation. For example, Gijsberts and Dagevos (2007) showed that the more ethnic minorities there are in one’s neighbourhood the more contact native Dutch have with ethnic minorities, at least as long as the proportion of ethnic minorities remains below 50 per cent. After this tipping point contact decreases again. But note that these authors do not take into account a possible
conditional curvilinear relationship. Moreover, their sample of respondents from ‘concentration
neighbourhoods’ is relatively small. Consequently, their predicted relationship between the presence of ethnic minorities in a neighbourhood and contact of native Dutch with members of ethnic minority groups is likely to refl ect more closely the actual relationship among the rich and higher educated than among the poor and lower educated.
Contact with members of ethnic outgroups and selective residential mobility may explain a negative relationship between outgroup sizes within neighbourhoods and ethnic hostility, perceptions of ethnic threat may explain a positive relationship. Consequently, if the above propositions meet corroborative empirical evidence, these explanatory mechanisms operate differently for the rich and higher educated than for the poor and lower educated (see Figure 8.1). I expect that residential mobility is sooner a viable option for the rich than for the poor. The poor need a stronger push factor. I would also argue that the higher educated and rich will have relatively more positive contact experiences when outgroup sizes are small within the locality, compared to the lower educated and poor. The reason being that they are not in direct competition with members of ethnic outgroups and are as a consequence more likely to meet (or select) members of ethnic outgroups under favourable circumstances (shops, sportclubs, etc.). In contrast, the low educated and poor will start to experience competitive threat and negative contact experiences immediately with rising outgroup sizes. Once outgroup sizes reach a specifi c threshold, the poor with negative views towards ethnic outgroups will start to leave their neighbourhoods as well. But the ones who remain may start to experience some positive contact experiences as well, which deteriorate their prior existing ethnic stereotypes. In contrast, with larger ethnic outgroup sizes, positive contact experiences will not become more likely for the rich and high educated, negative contact experiences will be harder to avoid, and as a consequence the threat mechanism may start to dominate the selective residential mobility and positive contact mechanism. A possible situation in agreement with this rationale is depicted in Figure 8.1.