Netfilter: iptables

Facts:

1948: Plaintiff Maramba files a complaint for the collection of a sum of money from spouses Nieves and Pascual Lozano. This was granted by the court. 1960: Not satisfied with the judgment, LOZANO appealed to the CA who dismissed appeal because it was not filed on time.

Record of the case was then remanded to the court a quo and a writ of execution was issued.

Aug. 18, 1960: a levy on a parcel of land in the name of Nieves Lozano was made. A notice of a sale at a public auction was also made and scheduled for Sept. 16, 1960.

However, Lozano had made a partial payment by then and asked for an adjournment of the sale to October 26.

During this time, her husband died. She then prayed for a restraining order on the sale of the lot for sale being her paraphernal property. She also prayed that her liability be then fixed at ½ of the amount awarded in the judgment.

The sale proceeded anyway.

June 28, 1961: trial court grants the motion of Nieves Lozano. The sale on her property was allowed to proceed to satisdy her liability which is only half now from the original. (from P3,500.07 to P1,750.04) Issues/Held/Ratio:

W/N the decision of the trial court last 1959 could still be questioned.

NO. SC states that a decision that is final and executory can no longer be amended or corrected by the court except for clerical errors or mistakes. W/N the judgement was joint or solidary.

JOINT. General rule is that when a judgment does not order the defendants to pay jointly and severally (as in this case), none of them may be compelled to satisfy the judgment in full.

W/N the judgment debt could be satisfied from the proceeds of the properties sold at the public auction. It cannot. This is only on properties acquired during the marriage. In this case, it is established that the property is paraphernal to the wife alone. The court has previously stated that the construction of a house at conjugal expense on the exclusive property of one of the spouses does not automatically make it conjugal.

The ownership remains the same until the value is paid but payment can only be demanded in the liquidation of the partnership. Since there was no liquidation yet in the conjugal partnership of Nieves and Pascual, her exclusive property cannot be made to answer for the liability of the other defendant. While they may both use the building constructed in paraphernal land, ownership is still with her until liquidation of partnership pays for it.

Embrado v. CA 233 SCRA 335 Facts:

Lot 564 was sold to Lucia Embrado, as can be proven in a Venta Definitiva‖ by spouses Carpitanos. The deed was prepared and signed on July 2, 1946, although it was effective since 1941.

1943: Petitioners got married to each other.

Feb 13, 1948: The sale was registered and Transfer Certificate No. T-99 was issued in her name alone. Originally, her status on the Title was single, but it was changed to ―married to Oreste Torregiani‖ by the CFI of Zamboanga del Norte.

The couple established their home on the lot and in 1958, constructed a residential/commercial building. 1971: Lucia sold for P1000 Lot 564 to her adopted daughter, Eda Jimenez.

Jimenez proceeded to selling parts of the lot to Cimafranca and Salimbagat.

Petitioners instituted an action for declaration of nullity of contract, annulment of sales, reconveyance and damages against private respondednts.

Alleging that the initial sale of Lucia to Eda was void because of lack of consideration and Oreste did not consent to the sale of the conjugal property.

Lucia was misled into signing the deed of sale. She thought that the lot was only intended as a security for a loan of the Jimenez spouses.

They also believe that Cimafranca and Salimbagat are buyers in bad faith.

CA ruled for the respondents, saying that Lucia does not need the consent of Oreste because the lot is her paraphernal property. CA also believes that Cimafranca and Salimbagat are buyers in good faith.

Issues/Held/Ratio:

W/N Lot 564 was paraphernal property of Lucia or conjugal property.

Conjugal.

First of all, the sale was not completed until the DELIVERY of the object to the creditor. (Art 1496 of the Civil Code)

The construction of the building on the lot was done during the marriage already and according to Art. 158, the land becomes conjugal upon 2 conditions: Construction of building was at the expense of the partnership

Land is owned by one of the spouses. W/N sale to Jimenez was valid. Not valid.

Evidence shows that the Jimenez spouses had no sufficient means of livelihood so it is questionable how they were able to obtain the money for the property.

Eda never proved also how she obtained the money to pay.

Also, based on the decision in the first issue, the land beng conjugal needed the consent of Oreste as well. The sale is void ab initio being contrary to law. Thus this also applies to Cimafranc and Salimbagat – quod nullum est, nullum producit effectum

W/N Cimafranca and Salimbagat are buyers in good faith. If this is so, the sale to them is valid.

NO. The relationship of Cimafranca and Salimbagat to the Jimenez spouses show that it would be impossible that they did not know of their financial situation. It is a general rule that a buyer of real property must be wary before buying property and invstigate the rights of those in possession of a certain property. The fact that they looked in the Register of Deeds to see the title is not an excuse, especially if they know about the bad financial status of the Jimenezes.

FC 121

Mariano vs CA 174 SCRA 59 Facts:

1) Respondent Daniel Sanchez‘s wife (Esther Sanchez) files an action before the CFI of Caloocan for the recovery of the value of ladies dresses allegedly purchased and delivered to Petitioner Lourdes Mariano. 2) Writ of preliminary attachment is issued upon

the posting of an P11,000 bond by the яESPONDENT‘s wife for the seizure of ℗‘s property to the amount of P15,000.

3) After ℗‘s motion to discharge attachment denied, she files for certiorari with CA. 4) CA orders Trial Court to receive evidence on

WON the attachment had been improperly issued.

5) TC rules that the attachment was improperly issued. Renders decision in favor of ℗: -℗ to pay the P15,000

-Я to pay Total of P32,500 in damages.

-P11,000 bond used to pay damages w/ the remainder to be levied on the conjugal property of я and his wife.

6) Thus я files for annulment of execution w/ CFI as the administrator of the conjugal partnership reasoning that ―conjugal assets could not validly be made to answer for obligations exclusively contracted by his wife 7) QC CFI orders hearing orders sheriff to desist in the auction. ℗ motions to dismiss the action and is DENIED.

8) ℗ files w/ the CA a certiorari and is upheld by the 7th div. but is later dismissed by the 8th division. Thus she goes to SC.

Issues:

WON the conjugal partnership of the я is liable for his wife’s liability in connection with her business.

Held:

YES, there is no dispute to the fact that the я consented to the business of his wife and that their family benefitted from this business. As such this income was used to maintain their family and is within the coverage of the liability incurred upon the conjugal property. (see FC ART 121 par. 2)

Ayala vs CA 286 SCRA 272 Facts:

1) ℗ assails the CA decision affirming the RTC decision holding the Conjugal partnership of я Ching not liable for the debt‘s incurred.

2) Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) takes a P50,300,000 loan from ℗ AIDC, я Ching EVP in said company executes security agreements for the loan.

4) CFI holds PBM and я Ching jointly and severally liable to pay.

5) Pending appeal CFI issues Writ of execution upon the putting up of a P8m bond. 6) The sheriff poses a notice of sale on 3 of я

Ching‘s conjugal properties.

7) Я files injunction on ℗ with CFI arguing subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

8) CFI rules for я issues TRO on auction and sale.

9) ℗ petitions for certiorari w/ the CA, CA issues TRO on the CFI decision.

10) Auction of the properties takes place and are sold to ℗AIDC who are the only bidders. Certificate of sale is issued and the redemption period expires w/o being claimed by я.

11) In the meantime while the CA decided that CFI decision w/ TRO be set aside, the Civil Case should push through.

12) ℗ AIDC motions to dismiss the case for being moot and academic w/ the consummation of the sale. DENIED by CFI.

13) TC declares the sale on execution null and void. ℗ appeal DENIED.

14) ℗ appealed to CA. DENIED agreeing with the я contention that PBM rather than the conjugal partnership of я Ching was benefitted by the loan. (FC ART 121 Par. 2) moreover the burden of proof of the fact that the conjugal partnership benefitted in this case lies with the creditor party (℗AIDC) who did not prove this fact of beneficience sufficiently.

15) On appeal ℗ argue that there is no need to prove the benefit since the mere nature of the transaction is sufficient to prove liability of a party.

Issues:

WON a surety agreement entered into by the husband in favor of his employer incurs civil liability on the conjugal partnership of the former.

Held: NOT NECESSARILY, given that the agreement was entered in to not primarily to benefit of the family of the husband it cannot be said that his conjugal partnership is automatically liable, in any case the burden of proof to confirm the benefit and subsequently the liability of the conjugal property rests with the debtor who in this case did not sufficiently prove the said fact.

- Art 121 of FC shows that conjugal partnership shall be liable for all debts and obligations contracted during marriage by the designated admin-spouse for benefit of conjugal partnership of gains

o Read together with Art 161 where benefit is understood to not actually accrue but to be the reason for the admin-spouse to enter into such a deal

o Difference between one where husband contracted obligation for his own business that is for benefit of his family and where the husband merely acted as surety ofr loan contracted by another for the latter‘ business (MAIN reason for obligation is not for family)

Benefits contemplated in Art 121 is one resulting directly from the loan and not just a by-product of it which the latter example is.

Ching vs CA 423 SCRA 356 1) Same Chings in Ayala vs. CA properties

wrongfully levied. Same deal another loan not paid and conjugal partnership not held liable.

2) PBMCI (Philippine Blooming Mills Company, inc.) takes a P9m loan from Allied Banking Corporation (ABC) Ching signs a promissory note.

3) As added security Ching w/ Tanedo and Kiat Hua executed a continuing guarantee w/ ABC binding them to guarantee the payment of all PBMCI obligations amounting to P38m (w/ subsequent loans of 12m and 13m).

4) PBMCI fails to pay. ABC files the complaint to recover the unpaid loans with a preliminary attachment against PBMCI and sureties Ching, Tanedo and Kiat Hua. 5) RTC initially denies preliminary attachment later agreeing after a bond was posted on the argument by private я that the defendants were disposing of their properties w/ intent to defraud their creditors.

6) On July 26, 1983 the deputy sheriff of the trial court seizes 100,000 common shares of Citycorp stocks belonging to ℗ Alfredo Ching.

7) On Nov 16, 1993. ℗ Encarnacion Ching (the wife) files a motion to set aside the levy on the attachment alleging that the 100,000 shares of stocks levied were from her conjugal funds and that the debt incurred by her husband due to suretyship to PBMCI through the unpaid loan did not redound to their family.

8) ABC files motion to Quash

9) Trial Court rules for ℗ ordering the return of the stocks.

10) CA on appeal by private я ABC nullifies the TC order citing that ℗ was a third party claimant w/o legal personality in the matter and that art 160 of the CC does not apply here where ℗ spouses failed to prove the source of the money (whether from the wife or the husband as a means of establishing ownership) used to acquire the stock and that they belonged exclusively to ℗ Alfredo.

11) ℗ spouses file for instant petition claiming that the source of the funds used in acquiring the stock is of no moment to the claim under art. 160 of the CC given that the conjugal partnership and such ownership of the shares is presumed even if the stocks are under the name of only one spouse.

12) Я contends that CA was correct in ruling so since the debt incurred by ℗Alfonso through his suretyship was in pursuit of his

profession and thus incurs liability on his conjugal partnership.

Issues:

1) WON the wife of the husband indebted has standing to oppose the attachment of property while being a third party to a suit.

2) WON incurring debt in pursuit of one’s career as an executive via suretyship incurs civil liability on one’s conjugal partnership.

1) YES, when the sheriff wrongfully levies on attachment and seizes the property of a third person in which said sheriff holds no right the authority of the court which authorized the levy may be invoked by the third party to determine whether the levy was proper or improper.

NO, no presumption can be inferred from the fact that the husband enters in to suretyship that the conjugal partnership would thereby be benefitted. Even arguing that such involvement in a suretyship would thus further the husband‘s career in a corporation or in this case sustain the corporation and perpetuate his income thus translating to earnings for his family, such a cause would still be indirect and not privy to the conditions set by ART 161 of the NCC which contemplates direct benefits to the family. (similar to 121 of FC) Moreover being that the loan was issued PBMCI the private respondents had the burden of proof to establish the liability of ℗ spouses conjugal partnership to the debt.

Homeowners Savings and Loan vs. Dailo G.R. No. 153802, Mar.11, 2005 Facts:

1) Я Miguela and her husband deceased Marcelino Dailo were married on Aug 8, 1967.

2) D

uring their marriage they purchased a house and lot in San Pablo city from Sandra Dalida the deed of absolute sale is issued to Marcelino.

3) On Dec 1, 93‘ Marcelino authorizes a special power of attorney (SPA) in favor of a Lilibeth Gesmundo authorizing her to obtain a loan from ℗ bank to be secured by the spouses house and lot. The loan of P300,000 is obtainedmortgaging the я property to ℗ bank.

4) All these transactions were enacted w/o the я knowledge and consent.

5) Upon maturity of the loan ℗ foreclosed the property and bought the said property in auction and consolidated ownership on June 6, 96.

6) Marcelino dies in Dec 20, 1995. In a visit to the property я Miguela discovers that a caretaker is already residing in her house and that her car w/c was parked in the property was razed by a boy under the caretakers watch.

7) Claiming her ignorance of the mortgage and sale of the property and being that it was conjugal in nature she filed a case for the nullity of real estate mortgage and certificate of sale affidavit of consolidation of ownership, deed of sale, reconveyance w/ a prayer for preliminary injunction and damages against℗.

8) ℗ prayed to dismiss citing the fact that Marcelino was the exclusive owner. 9) TC sides w/ я and grants all prayers w/

damages. 10) CA affirms TC Issues:

WON the conjugal Partnership is liable for the payment of the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo the same having redounded to the benefit of the family.

Held: Not Necessarily, the adherence to Art. 121 par. 3 which the ℗ use to incur liability on the я property places the burden of proving the benefit given to the family of the debtee on the

the debtor alleging such a benefit. In the instant case this fact was not sufficiently proven. The sweeping conclusion furnished by the ℗ that the loan Marcelino acquired was utilized to construct housing units to the benefit of his family, is unfounded in the absence of proof of the matter. Moreover the matter of benefit to the family was only raised on appeal and is thus not well founded and even less proven.

Also discussed here is the lack of consent where consent of both parties is necessary when one is selling land (art 124 of FC)

Javier v. Osmeña