In this category, it is important to distinguish between strategies and tactics. The strategy is the grand scheme of how a party wants to accomplish his end goal through negotiations. Tactics refer to certain methods of- or maneuvers in diplomacy to get the most desirable outcome (see section 1.3.4.4.).
The strategy of the MILF was mostly consistent throughout the phases. However, some changes occurred in phases two and four. The grand strategy since the 1980s was based on four pillars: Islamization, military build-up, organizational build-up and self-reliance (Jubair, 1999). Self- reliance, organizational build-up and Islamization came together in the shadow government structure which centered on the sovereign camp areas. Military build-up was based on its grassroots structure and recruitment in local villages, and the connection to the global jihadi network. Islamization was also influenced by the latter. For the MILF, diplomacy was another way of fighting the struggle. Both military strategy and diplomacy were intricately related, because the MILF negotiation strategy required a position of strength and credible deterrence. The group relied on both a diplomatic path and a military path. Within this military path, the group had to choose whether to remain a part, at least overtly, of the global jihadi network when a credible threat of FTO- listing was made. The FTO listing would undermine its primary goal, recognition and legitimacy of their secessionist struggle. The MILF chose to cut ties and cooperate with the AFP under AHJAG in 2005. Within the diplomatic path, two shifts occurred. After Estrada had reneged on all former agreements and had declared all-out war (March 2000, section 2.3.1.), the MILF needed to seek international protection. International involvement would make it harder for the GRP to renege on previous agreements and would provide an excellent stage for the MILF to communicate its views to the world. The second shift came after the Kato split (July-August 2008, section 2.5.1.). Because of failed reconciliation attempts, the MILF leadership had to distance itself from the BIFF. Because a new, more radical generation came up, and popular support somewhat dwindled, two steps were taken. The first was a firmer commitment to the diplomatic path, and two, the relinquishment of its official independence goal under the leadership of Murad. These were factors that contributed to peace.
The GRP had different strategies during the different presidencies. These ranged from a total military victory to a diplomatic convergence strategy of the three major issues in Mindanao. All administrations had in common that peace would be desirable for economic development of the
117 Philippines and the presidential prestige. In this respect an autonomous region was a good outcome, provided that the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Philippine state would be untouched. Also, all administrations wanted to get a deal which did not need any constitutional amendment.
Fidel Ramos thought he could deal with the MILF in the same way as he did with the MNLF. He therefore offered a proposal like the FPA with some minor changes. Naturally, this was rejected by the MILF. Why else would they have fiercely resisted the FPA? Estrada continued most of Ramos’ his policy until he decided, forced by terrorist attacks and bloody violations of the ceasefire, that military force was the only viable policy solution. Although this significantly harmed the MILF, this did not work, as the MILF went underground and dispersed. Arroyo changed to an all-out peace, and adopted a more comprehensive approach. She identified four paths: military, diplomatic, cultural and economic (Ressa, 2003). Overall, only the military part gained some success, although endorsed by AHJAG, a diplomatic tool. By separating the MILF from JI and ASG, both the group and the state had gained considerably more freedom to negotiate on non-military affairs. On the diplomatic track, her administration failed to deliver. This was due to many internal and external pressures (conservatives, dissatisfied military commanders, people power revolution and the communist insurgency). The MOA-AD completely misfired. Where this should have sealed her success in reaching peace, it failed and became a clear MILF victory instead. Moreover, because the administration had not consulted important stakeholders, the breakdown of the MOA-AD led to a lot of chaos. On culture, Arroyo’s frame of the war on terror only worsened antagonism. Economically, poverty levels in the ARMM rose. Aquino applied a different strategy, focusing on inclusiveness. His convergence strategy of 1) the MILF peace process, 2) the MNLF review process and 3) engaging with local stakeholders in the ARMM, paid off. It worked to create trust and limit the influence of spoilers on the peace process. So what tactics did the parties use?
First, we can distinguish between official and unofficial negotiations. Official negotiations give the group a degree of recognition and legitimacy. The MILF managed to force the government to engage with them on an official level because of their popular support base and military strength. This can fast-track the negotiations to a more substantive and serious level. Already during the Ramos administration, this produced the Coordination Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH). Unofficial contacts, or back-channel diplomacy, were used throughout the phases. These were necessary to manage expectations or search for opportunities to restart the negotiations.
Second, there are the different tracks of diplomacy that the parties can use. Some differences can be discerned. From the third phase onwards, when international involvement also increased, more grassroots diplomacy was undertaken. Until then, the parties had mostly held
118 exploratory talks and official meetings. The grassroots diplomacy proved useful to increase the links between the parties and build mutual understanding and validation (Mastura, 2015). Within track one, there are some differences between the administrations. For example, the amount of changes in the peace panel and whether leaders used their personal leverage to fast track the peace process. The literature is divided on the latter, some arguing that leadership is necessary at tough moments (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2011; Cronin, 2009), and others, such as Powell (2014), that leadership engagement can have ambiguous effects. Powell argues that leaders often think they can force a breakthrough, either by engaging in summitry or by making threats and deadlines (Powell, 2014). With Estrada, who put down a strict deadline, and threatened with military action, this did not work. The deadline was too artificial and could be easily ignored by the MILF. Aquino though, engaged in summitry by meeting Murad in Tokyo on the fifth of August 2011. This meeting had a more pressing invisible deadline. Both leaders knew that if they did not agree, the situation would deteriorate. Aquino managed to make a push at a decisive moment. This is a clear example illustrating that the way leadership is timed and implemented is crucial to its success.
Third, there are different tactical maneuvers which the parties have used. In the beginning, mainly because of low levels of trust and bigger internal pressures, both in the group and state, negotiations were mostly used as a moment to regroup, or to divide the opponent. On the latter issue, only the Aquino administration wanted to include all stakeholders and increase unity. The troop movements around the frontline at the Buliok complex, Buldon or camp Abu Bakar caused continuous suspicion. Until 2005, diplomatic efforts were mainly made to serve the military cause. An exception holds for the recognition of the camps at the end of the 1990s, which had clear political purpose. A maneuver which was made was the ‘departing train tactic’. Both the MILF and GRP engaged other stakeholders in the fourth phase to commit to the peace process, by making clear that this would be the main vehicle for change in the Bangsamoro. Rejecting participation or actively spoiling the process would certainly fail and leave them empty-handed.
Finally, there are ways of influencing the process. Both Estrada and Arroyo aimed at reaching a fast, comprehensive deal within their term. This had several reasons, for example the internal political pressures that kept looming over the peace process. Ceasefires could collapse so the time- frame for reaching a deal was perceived as short. Also, to ensure implementation of the deal within a single presidential term, the time-frame was shorter. The Aquino administration chose to take smaller steps. This was good for confidence-building, and the intermediate agreements were less vulnerable to legal proceedings and other types of spoiling. The MILF also preferred this strategy. The group aimed at making small, but irreversible steps in their secessionist struggle. Only in phase three, when the quite comprehensive and detailed MOA-AD, was so favorable to the group, they deviated
119 from this. When the MOA-AD was cast down, it proved a valuable lesson and the MILF went back to the policy of smaller steps. The FAB is a good example. Since it consists of more principled agreements and less detail, it was less vulnerable. During the follow-up phase, technical negotiations were less likely to be spoiled. Consequently, in this case, smaller steps proved successful. The frames that parties use are another factor of importance. The war on terror frame that Arroyo adopted was considerably less trustworthy for the MILF than the Aquino frame of national healing and reconciliation. Similarly, the frame of a duty for every Muslim to engage in jihad that Hashim Salamat used was less trustworthy than the more moderate frame, emphasizing the importance of peace, of Murad.
In summary, negotiation strategies and tactics have been used with varying success. The willingness of both parties to compromise (GRP: granting far-reaching autonomy; MILF: relinquishing independence goal and associative relationship), grass roots diplomacy and small step strategy have been positive factors in this respect. In this respect, the effect of different leaders both for the GRP (different presidents) and MILF (Hashim Salamat to Murad) has been crucial, as these often signaled policy changes.