Section 1.
Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by: (1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or (2) A constitutional convention.
Section 2.
Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. Section 3.
The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention.
Section 4.
Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision.
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.
Distinguish constituent power from legislative power: Constituent power:
Power to formulate a Constitution or to propose amendment or revisions and to ratify such proposal
Exercised by:
o Congress by constitutional conferment o Constitutional convention
o Ultimately by the sovereign people Legislative power:
Power to pass, repeal or amend ordinary laws Exercised by:
o Congress
o The sovereign people through initiative and referendum Distinguish between amendment and revision:
Amendment – alteration of one or a few specific and isolated provisions of the constitution; improve or add provisions or suppress existing ones
Revision – fundamental alteration; re-examination of the entire document or of an important cluster of provisions with the end result affecting several provisions of the constitution
Members elected from representative districts to propose amendments Nature of the Constitutional Conventions:
a) 4th branch of gov’t
b) supreme over other branches of gov’t (the people themselves in their sovereign capacity) c) Inferior to Congress (creation of Congress) – MOST ACCEPTABLE
Procedure: Amendment:
a) Proposed by Congress upon a ¾ vote of all of its members b) A constitutional convention
c) The people upon petition of at least 12% of the electorate with each legislative district represented by at least 3% of its registered voters
Revision:
a) Proposed by Congress upon a ¾ vote of all of its members b) A constitutional convention
Constitutional Convention:
a) Called by Congress by a 2/3 vote of all its members
b) Congress may submit the decision to the people by a majority vote of all its members Ratification:
Proposal for amendment/revision by Congress/constitutional commission
Valid when ratified by majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held 60-90 days after approval of the amendment or revision.
Proposal for amendment by initiative
Valid when ratified by majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held 60-90 days after certification by the COMELEC of the sufficiency of the petition.
IMBONG V. COMELEC (CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY)
In 1967, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 2, which called for a concon to propose amendments. There were to be two delegates from each representative district who must have the same qualifications as congressmen. Congress, as a legislative body, then enacted RA4914, implementing Resolution No. 2.
In 1969, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4, which amended Resolution No. 2 by providing that there shall be a total of 320 delegates apportioned among the districts in accordance with the number of inhabitants. It also provided that any detail left to be filled shall be done so by implementing legislation. RA6132 was then enacted, repealing RA4914 and implementing Resolutions 2 and 4.
Gonzales and Imbong assail the constitutionality of RA6132.
HELD: Congress validly enacted the implementing legislation pursuant to a delegation by itself acting as a Constituent Assembly.
1.Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, has full authority to propose amendments or call a convention for the purpose. Resolutions 2 and 4, which called for a concon, were passed with the required 3/4 vote.
2.The power to call a concon includes by implication all other powers essential to its exercise such as powers to fix qualification, number, apportionment, and other details.
3.Though it is Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly which has the power to call a concon, the power to enact implementing details is not restricted to the Constituent Assembly – this may be done by Congress acting as a legislative body. Legislative power encompasses all matters not withdrawn by the Constitution.
4.Where there are detail left to fill, Congress as a legislative body may fill them up. This was expressly recognized by Resolutions 2 and 4.
5.That the president can veto the implementing details is inconsequential because the veto may be overridden or the Constituent Assembly may reconvene and fill the details itself.
A. Representation: There are to b 320 delegates, apportioned among districts in proportion to their population with each district having at least two delegates.
This is constitutional. Though it is not exact, and some small districts may be in theory over- represented, does not make the representation unproportional, because absolute proportional representation is not required. The constitution does not even require that representation to a concon be proportional. What cannot be done, however, is apportionment which is inversely proportional, as was ruled in Macias.
B. Deprivation of liberty without due process / denial of equal protection: Delegates are disqualified from running for office or assuming appointive positions until the adjournment of the concon.
Constitutional exercise of police power. The overriding objective of the challenged disqualification, temporary in nature, is to compel the elected delegates to serve in full their term as such and to devote all their time to the convention, pursuant to their representation and commitment to the people, otherwise, his seat in the convention will be vacant and his constituents will be deprived of a voice in the convention. Plus, it is only temporary. The equal protection clause is not violated because the discrimination is based on substantial conditions.
C. Prohibition on any candidate or delegate from representing a party; prohibition on organizations from supporting candidates.
Constitutional exercise of police power. The objective is to have delegates who are independent and thus representative of the people and not of his organization or party. The right of affiliation is very narrowly restricted and the candidate may still seek support of his relatives within the 4th degree. Ratification and date of effectivity
Gonzales v. COMELEC (nature of power to amend the Constitution)
Assailed here on the grounds of unconstitutionality are RA 4913 (submitting to the people for approval amendments proposed by Congress) and House Resolutions 1 and 3 pursuant to which the RA was passed (the amendments are for an increase in seats in the House, the removal of the rule on apportionment every three years, and the removal of the rule stating that delegates to a concon forfeit their House seats).
Gonzales filed an action for prohibition to restrain the COMELEC, the Director of Printing, and the Auditor General from complying with the RA. Philconsa simply seeks a declaration of unconstitutionality.
Gonzales asserts that: (1) ratification should be at a special, not a general election; (2) the RA was not passed with 3/4 vote required to propose amendments to the constitution; (3) the ballots should show the current provisions and the proposed amendments.
HELD: Constitutional.
Justiciability: Though in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, the question of whether a 3/4 vote was obtained to submit the proposed amendment for ratification was held to be a political question, the doctrine has since then shifted. The nature of the power to propose amendments is not legislative – it is inherent power of the sovereign people exerciseable only by Congress because the Constitution allows it. Authority emanating from the Constitution, it must be exercised in accordance with the same, and this may be inquired into by the court. In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress - acting as a constituent assembly - violates the Constitution, is essentially justiciable, not political, and,
hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the extent that this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, the latter should be deemed modified accordingly.
Merits: (1) Special election – All the constitution requires is that ratification be at an election. It does not qualify. Though it may be better if such an important matter had the undivided attention of the people, such an issue concerns the wisdom of the law. (2) 3/4 vote to pass the RA – A 3/4 vote is needed to propose amendments. Congress, as a Constituent Assembly, complied with this requirement when it passed the resolutions. The RA deals only with submitting the amendments to the people. The Constitution is silent on this matter and it is deemed to be within the residual powers of Congress. It being a law, majority vote is sufficient. (3) Due process – There is no need to indicate the present wording of the Constitution. The people are conclusively presumed to know it. Though it might be better, this again refers to the wisdom of the law.
Tolentino v. COMELEC (Single election)
The 1971 Constitutional Convention came into being by virtue of two resolutions by Congress sitting as a Constituent Assembly. The delegates were elected by virtue of the law enacted to fill in the details of the two resolutions (see Imbong).
The concon passed Organic Resolution No. 1, which proposed an amendment to lower the voting age to 18. It was stated in the resolution that this was a partial amendment and without prejudice to other amendments to be proposed in the future by the concon. President Macapagal asked the COMELEC to support this plebiscite and the COMELEC complied.
This petition for prohibition was filed to restrain the COMELEC from holding the plebiscite on the ground that the concon’s resolution is void.
HELD: Void.
Justiciability: The justiciability of this controversy was upheld on the same reasoning used in Gonzales v. COMELEC. The concon owes its existence to the Constitution and its acts must be in accordance with the fundamental law.
Merits: The language of the constitutional provision is clear. It says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called for the purposes may propose amendments to this Constitution," thus placing no limit as to the number of amendments that Congress or the Convention may propose. The same provision also as definitely provides that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt. as to how many "elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the provision unequivocally says "an election" which means only one.
The wisdom behind having only one election is so that the people may see the whole of what they are being asked to ratify. Piecemeal amendments do not allow the people to see the big picture because an earlier amendment may completely change in meaning and effect by the ratification of a subsequent one.
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
Foreign Military Bases, Troop, or Facilities Bayan v. Zamora
1947 – Military Bases Agreement between RP and US formalized the use of Philippine territory by US personnel.
1951 – Mutual Defense Treaty – Parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, etc.
1991 – Senate rejected the extension of the MBA. 1998 – Ramos approved the VFA; Estrada ratified
1999 – Senate concurred with VFA
The VFA provides for the mechanism of regulating the circumstances and conditions under which US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present in the Philippines.
Sec. 21 of Art. VII provides: “No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.”
Sec. 25 of Art. XVIII states that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.”
Petitioners brought this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Standing – though no injury; not a taxpayers suit – transcendental importance Merits – The VFA is valid.
Art. XVIII applies. The VFA deals with foreign military troops being allowed in the Philippines. Hence, the requirements must be met: (1) treaty; (2) concurred in by 2/3 of the Senate [applying the general provision on treaty concurrence]; (3) if Congress requires, ratified by the people; (4) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.
The existence of a treaty and its ratification by the Senate by a 2/3 vote are not disputed. A referendum is unnecessary because the Congress did not require it.
The last requirement is that the agreement be recognized as a treaty by the United States. Petitioners contend that the VFA must have passed the constitutional processes for treaty making in the US and should not be considered merely an executive agreement.
But as long as the agreement possesses the elements of an agreement in under international law, it can be treated as a treaty. Under the VCLT, a treaty is an international written instrument between states, governed by international law, embodied in one or more instruments, whatever its designation. There are many other names used for a treaty, such as agreement, convention, declaration, exchange of notes (which was what happened here, I think). Thus, in international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned.
In the Philippines, the Executive, and not the Congress, has the power to enter into agreements and even ratify treaties. Congress’ role is merely to give or withhold concurrence. And even if concurrence is withheld, the treaty will be binding, according to generally accepted principles of international law. Sequestration orders
Republic v. Sandiganbayan (powers of the PCGG)
On the basis of prima facie evidence, PCGG issued an order sequestering the Philippine Integrated Meat Corporation (PIMECO). The Republic, through the PCGG, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint against the Marcoses, respondent herein Sabido, and other individuals for reconveyance, restitution, accounting, etc. involving PIMECO, alleging that PIMECO was illegally acquired by the defendants. Sabido denied the charges.
Sabido, upon hearing that PIMECO’s management, control and possession would be transferred by the PCGG to the Meat Packing Corporation of the Philippines, a subsidiary of the PCGG, filed a motion with the Sandiganbayan to determine whether the rumors were true. Without waiting for PCGG’s response, because of a news article stating that the transfer had been made, Sabido petitioned the Sandiganbayan to declare the transfer void for being without authority – a TRO was issued, and Sabido’s application for injunction was granted on MR.
PCGG filed this petition. HELD:
The projected transfer of management of PIMECO to MPCP is unwarranted and was effected or done by petitioner beyond the scope of the powers vested upon it by law. Such turnover made by the PCGG
is equivalent to the performance of an act of ownership which PCGG cannot exercise. The PCGG is merely a conservator or caretaker and can exercise only powers of administration over sequestered properties. Thus, it can only do acts necessary to fulfill its mission to conserve sequestered assets. In certain cases, such as business enterprises which were taken over by the Marcoses and their cronies, the take-over by the PCGG connotes more than mere physical custody; it may exercise some measure of control in the operation of the business. But in his special situation, the intrusion into management should be restricted to the minimum degree necessary to accomplish the legislative will, which is 'to prevent the disposal or dissipation' of the business enterprise. There should be no hasty, indiscriminate, unreasoned replacement or substitution of management officials or change of policies, particularly in respect of viable establishments. In fact, such a replacement or substitution should be avoided if at all possible, and undertaken only when justified by demonstrably tenable grounds and in line with the stated objectives of the PCGG. And it goes without saying that where replacement of management officers may be called for, the greatest prudence, circumspection, care and attention should accompany that undertaking to the end that truly competent, experienced and honest managers may be recruited.
There is no need to replace PIMECO’s management to prevent wastage or dissipation. In fact, the current management has steered the company from inoperation to a top 1000 corporation. PIMECO was even awarded the best managed PCGG sequestered firm.