Planificar el proceso de administración de los requerimientos

introduction

As the organizations involved in global governance have acquired more authority over time (see e.g., Hooghe and Marks 2015), some have increasingly come under political attack. From the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom to President Donald Trump’s attacks on international institutions like the United Nations (UN), both political elites and the public seem increasingly hostile toward governance efforts beyond the nation-state. And while public opposition toward bodies such as the European Union (EU) or the World Trade Organization (WTO) is by no means a new phenomenon, it appears as though opposition is no longer confined to specific organizations, but rather extends to the system of global governance writ large. This has led some observers to frame this development as the ‘populist backlash’ against liberal internationalism and the global legal order (e.g., Posner 2017; Rodrik 2017).

Such backlash has consequences. Buchanan and Keohane’s (2006: 407) seminal work on the legitimacy of global governance institutions proffers that “[d]etermining whether global governance institutions are legitimate — and whether they are widely perceived to be so — is an urgent matter” and that such “institutions will only thrive if they are viewed as legitimate by democratic publics.” Expanding on this point, Tallberg and Zürn (2017) argue that, inter alia, organizations require legitimacy to remain focal institutions for global cooperation, to be able to propagate rules and regulations, and to ensure compliance with said rules and regulations. Thus, political backlash, politicization and the de-legitimization of global governance can undermine global governance efforts and impede

cross-national and supranational collaboration aimed at addressing some of the world’s foremost coordination challenges (e.g., environmental or financial regulation).

But how and why does the public come to oppose the organizations involved in global governance in the first place? The majority of the evidence on this question comes from the literature on support for the EU, and while it was initially concerned with only that organization, more recent work has sought to derive generalizable hypotheses that can be applied to any organization involved in global governance. Research emanating from the study of the EU’s politicization has proposed a central hypothesis suggesting that citizens have sincere preferences against delegating authority to supranational organizations. This work, coupled with normative studies of institutional legitimacy, has pointed to features and procedures that should enhance the legitimacy of global governance organizations, chiefly institutional rules that constrain these bodies and vest powers in democratic nation-states (in addition to more general ideals such as participation of civil society organizations and transparency). Recently, scholars of the EU have also started looking at the role that national elites (especially populist and far-right political entrepreneurs) play in driving opposition to global governance. That said, this approach suggests that elites are merely mobilizing attitudes that naturally develop as a response to authority being ceded from national governments.

This chapter sets out to test the key claims of the authority transfer literature. More importantly, however, I argue that the primacy of institutional factors as underpinning support for global governance is overstated. By contrast, I contend that elite rhetoric providing affective cues suggesting the organizations are illegitimate are key drivers of attitudes toward global governance. Importantly, I suggest that these cues will not merely resonate with co-partisans, but rather that these cues will affect opinion more broadly. While, I afford that these cues may be moderated by partisanship such that the effects are larger for cues from co-partisans, I also contend that out-party cues should also depress support. This expectation stands in contrast to work on partisan resistance or partisan motivated reasoning (Lodge and Taber 2013; Zaller 1992) and is rooted in the belief that the dimension of conflict here is between existing domestic governing institutions and new institutions that may threaten national sovereignty. Thus, I argue, attitudes toward the myriad organizations involved in global governance are not driven by sincere preferences over their

institutional designs, but instead by domestic cues claiming that these institutions are legitimate or not. Hence, extending the work in the third chapter, I proffer and test the hypothesis that elite rhetoric providing affective cues can depress support, irrespective of the known facts about the organizations.

In addition, I investigate whether attitudes toward these organizations are truly a function of their global or international nature, or whether non-governmental domestic rule-making bodies would receive the same reactions. While implied in much of the existing literature, the impact of the international character of these organizations has not been tested empirically. Therefore, I test whether support for non-governmental regulatory bodies follows a similar trajectory when the organizations are described as operating at the domestic level.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I define the class of organizations that I seek to generalize to in this chapter. Second, I provide an overview of the literature on public support for global governance organizations. Third, I outline my theoretical approach and hypotheses. Fourth, I introduce the conjoint experimental design that I use to test my hypotheses and discuss results from a pre-test validating key conjoint attributes. Fifth, I discuss results from a conjoint experiment that was fielded on two samples. Finally, I conclude by drawing attention to the implications of the study for work on global governance and its politicization more broadly.