The second chapter empirically showed that Turkey’s Kemalist laicism resembles what it critiques (religion). However, I stated in the previous chapter that such a contention is not
sufficient to make the point that laicism in general is problematic because defenders of laicism, or secular states make general theoretical arguments that do not depend on a particular context. Therefore, a theoretical discussion that goes beyond empirical critique, and discusses the desirability of laicism on the basis of political theory literature is necessary.
In this discussion, the major criterion I will take to evaluate the legitimacy, and desirability of laic states will be the concept of neutrality. I take the concept of neutrality as a criterion for assessing the legitimacy of laic states because of the fact that a significant strand
within Western liberal political theory attributes the legitimacy of states to their being neutral towards conceptions of good. And certain liberal theorists think that a state that does not endorse a religion is a neutral state, and therefore for liberal theorists a secular state that disestablishes religions in state institutions is neutral (Laborde 2008, 85; M. C. Nussbaum 2008, 20).
It should be stated that the differences57 between states that declare themselves as laic, and that do not employ this term but still separate religion and state is not of concern of this dissertation because despite their differences both states in the end require a separation of religion and state. Therefore in this chapter, I will take the common definition of secular state (a state that separates religion and state), and discuss its neutrality. But I think my criticisms will be applicable to states that espouse laicism because if I can demonstrate the non-neutrality of secular states that are more accommodating of religion58, the non-neutrality of laic states, which are more restrictive of religion59, would be a foregone conclusion.
For tackling this question of the neutrality or lack thereof of secular states, an in-depth examination of the concept of neutrality is necessary, as neutrality is far from being an
unambiguous concept. Much has been written about it in the liberal political theory literature, and hence uncritical uses of the term are not warranted. Therefore, in this chapter, I will thoroughly examine the concept of neutrality within liberalism, and discuss its possibility and desirability.
57 For an exploration of these differences see, (Kuru 2009; Kuru and Stepan 2012)
58 According to Kuru, the United States separates religion from state, but nevertheless it allows “public
visibility of religion” (Kuru and Stepan 2012, 96), in that sense it is accommodating of religion compared to what he calls “assertive secularist” states that exclude religion from the public sphere.
59 It should be stated that Kuru and Stepan show that even though laicism is generally associated with
policies that exclude religion from the public sphere in the case of France, and Turkey, in Senegal a different model of laicism that is more accommodating of religion can be observed (Kuru and Stepan 2012). They also mention the differences between France’s and Turkey’s laicisms. Hence, they underscore that laic states are not homogenous in state religion relations. But with respect to the case (Turkey) my dissertation focuses, as I mentioned in the introduction of the dissertation, Kuru considers it an “assertive secularist” state.
In terms of the organization of the chapter, as a way of introduction to the debates about the possibility and desirability of neutrality, I will first spell out the common definitions, and interpretations of neutrality, and then explain the importance or the theoretical virtues of the neutrality for liberalism, and for that purpose, I show how liberals justified the principle of neutrality. After this primarily descriptive, and expository part, I will discuss the possibilities of neutrality, I will argue that states take sides between different conceptions of good in their aims, justifications, and effects in significant ways, and it does not seem possible to talk about
neutrality within the confines of existing states.60 Second, by drawing on the so-called
genealogical school about secularism that relies on the work of Michel Foucault, I will point out to the structural aspects of modern states (i.e. courts’ monopoly to define what is religious and secular) that make neutrality impossible. Overall in this section, I will point out to the
impossibility of liberal state’s being neutral with respect to religion, as religious neutrality is a major claim of secular states (Laborde 2008, 85; M. C. Nussbaum 2008, 20). The implication of the conclusion that the neutrality is impossible will be that the choice between secular states and religion-based states cannot be made on the basis of which one is more neutral or not. Neutrality is not a useful concept to compare these different types of states. Through these analyses, I aim to rebut the arguments of Kemalists in Turkey who present laicism as if it is simply the neutral political arrangement that every rational person would endorse. Also, by showing the
impossibility of neutrality within the confines of existing states, I aim to rebut the arguments of liberal academics in Turkey who defend state neutrality as a way of reforming Turkey’s Kemalist laicism.
60 By existing states, I mean the modern nation-states as we know them, which has sovereignty over
certain borders, tax us to implement certain domestic and foreign policies, makes certain years of compulsory education mandatory, and implement many policies for the sake of advancement of the interests of the state (however those interests are understood), and promote patriotism within its borders.
Despite my contention about the limits of neutrality within the confines of existing states, I also argue that neutrality may be possible in extremely decentralized political conditions, which requires restructuring of existing states and perhaps their abolishment. In other words, I will show that liberal ideal of neutrality may be possible only if we let everyone live according to the conceptions of good they espouse under any political, social, economic structure they want. In other words, we strive to establish what Chandran Kukathas calls a liberal archipelago
(Kukathas 2003) so that followers of different conceptions of good live according to their own normative ideals in their own islands. Therefore, my claim is that neutrality is indeed possible but only under extremely decentralized political structures.
With respect to the desirability of neutrality, following political theorists Stephen Macedo and William Galston I will argue that liberalism cannot be defended on the basis of the idea that liberal state should be neutral about conceptions of good. I will state that defending neutrality would be self-defeating for liberal theorists in so far as such a stance makes liberalism one option among many. In my view, a consistent defender of neutrality should give up the whole idea of universal norms, rules, and moralities. I do not think that liberals would be willing to face the consequences of this anti-universalist stance that I believe is necessitated by a commitment to neutrality. On the other hand, precisely because of its relativizing implications, other worldviews (i.e. communitarians or other worldviews that base their ideas on a particular religion) may also have reservations about neutrality. With respect to the issue of desirability of neutrality, in this section I also discuss whether liberals can answer communitarian arguments, which state that states cannot be neutral about measures that would ensure their survival and stability. After discussing communitarian arguments, I state that liberal neutrality would not be desirable for any politician who is interested in the survival and stability of his country. On the basis of the
analysis of this second part, I aim to show to the liberal academics in Turkey who defend neutrality/impartiality that there are certain anti-universalist consequences of defending
neutrality that would pose challenges to normative claims of their understandings of liberalism. Also, I show that communitarianism has a strong appeal to many politicians across the world due to the fact that neutrality may undermine states’ stability and survival.
Despite all these objections, I will also state that certain ideals associated with neutrality can be appropriated for different societies for the sake of securing stability and reducing
polarization between different groups. In that sense, I will contend that even though ideals associated with neutrality may not be desirable intrinsically, they may be desirable
instrumentally. In this regard, I will make the point that my perspective resembles the so-called “modus vivendi liberalisms” as they also justify certain liberals ideals by appealing to the self- interest of the individuals.
Overall, in this chapter, by offering a general critique of the neutrality’s possibility and desirability, I show the problems and limits in Kemalists’, and liberals’ visions of laicism in Turkey, and in general liberal political theorists’ conceptions of ideal state. And I also show that despite all the problems with neutrality’s possibility and desirability, the “modus vivendi
liberalisms” may be attractive to societies, which do not endorse liberalism intrinsically but nevertheless deal with the problem of ensuring peaceful coexistence of different groups.