Precedente vinculante

Socrates’ long-term public image presumably played a decisive role in the trial and its outcome, since it would have aroused further suspicion at the end of the fifth century B.C. Though other factors such as the arrogance of Socrates’ court speeches or the superior rhetoric of the accusers might well have contributed to his conviction and execution, it is almost impossible to know exactly the effects of their court performance on the jury, since the speeches of the accusers are lost, while the substantial part of Socrates apology cannot be reconstructed beyond reasonable doubt from the writings of Xenophon and Plato. Furthermore, we simply cannot measure precisely in what direction and to what

46 _{Xen. Ap. 1-2, 14, 31-2; Pl. Ap. 21a, 30c.} 47 _{Xen. Ap. 23.}

48

Pl. Ap. 35eff, 38c.

49

Diog. Laert. 2.42.

50 _{Pl. Ap. 38c ff; Xen. Ap. 24.} 51 _{Hansen 1995: 18; Millett 2005: 26.}

extent the individual opinions of the jurors changed because of the speeches. By contrast, there are more sources for a sufficient understanding of the political development of Athens at the end of fifth century B.C., during which public opinion of Socrates was shaped , eventually becoming a decisive element of his fate. Besides, Socrates, rather than being an ordinary private citizen, was a public figure so well known that he was made into a major figure for comedy long before his trial.52 His name was also often associated with some of the wicked oligarchs. Therefore, it is most likely that, before entering the court, the jurors knew of him and had formed certain judgements from his eccentricity and alleged involvement in the destructive political struggle of the past decade. The public image thus formed, probably too fixed already to be altered by a few speeches in the court, must have played a major part in the jurors’ condemnation,

especially in an Athenian court where a litigant’s character was important evidence.

i. The Classification of Religious and Political Causes

The causes for the trial and conviction of Socrates discussed by most scholars fall into the two categories of religion and politics: Socrates was condemned because he was

considered a religious danger or a political threat.53 There are two problems with this classification. First, what is meant by “political and religious causes” in the discussions of scholars’ is not always clear and consistent. There are in fact three different references for the religious accusation and another three for the political one. The three specific religious charges are (1) Socrates’ denial of Athenian religious beliefs, (2) his

introduction of new divinity and (3) atheism. Political reasons are meanwhile (1) partisan

52

For Aristophane’s Clouds as a demonstration of Socrates’ public reputation, see Millett 2005: 28.

53 _{For Scholars adopting this distinction, e.g. Hackforth 1933: 12-13; Finley 1985: 129; Stone 1988: 138-9;}

enmity, (2) his criticism of democracy and (3) his threat to the general established orders. It is better to be more specific in the discussion of these issues as to which of the six causes are mentioned, rather than referring to them generally as the religious and political causes.

The second and more serious problem is the false separation of Athenian politics and religion that seems to be presumed in the classification of the religious and political causes. This is not a proper presumption for understanding the trial. First, there were five hundred and one jurors whose considerations were very likely different from one to another. Some may have made their decisions according to certain political reasons, others may have been persuaded by the religious arguments, and many more may have cast their votes following various combinations of different motives. It is unlikely that the majority of them voted for the same reason, no matter whether religious or political.54 Second, many scholars have pointed out that, to the Athenians, politics and religion, rather than being separated, were interpenetrated to an indistinguishable level. The state assumed its imperative responsibility to maintain the religious rituals and belief, while religion was considered an essential element for the flourishing or decline of the political community. A religious enemy was, therefore, a political threat, and vice versa.55 Finally, the accusation of corrupting the young, as we can see in Aristophanes’ Clouds, referred not only specifically to Socrates’ religious or political crimes, but also to their destructive effects on all the basic established orders -- that is, the Athenian norms in the realms of religion, politics, morality, etc.

54

Parker 1996: 151. Burnyeat 1995: 135; McPherran 1996: 165.

55 _{Finley 1985: 115; Montuori 1988: 82; Parker 1996: 155-6; Wallach 2002: 96; Parker 2005: 89-90; esp.}

However, as long as we do not make an either-or choice between them, the classification of the six causes is useful for exploring the jurors’ opinions of Socrates.

ii. The Religious Causes

The Religious motive is the more obvious reason, since the religious accusation of impiety is the focus of both the accusers’ formal indictment and the defences of Plato and Xenophon. There were three religious charges against Socrates: the denial of the

Athenian gods, the introduction of new gods and his atheist belief.

The denial of the Athenian gods: This charge might mean specifically Socrates’ lack of respect for the rituals and beliefs of the established religion.56 The accusation of neglecting the rituals can be surmised from Xenophon’s defence that Socrates offered sacrifices regularly to the gods both at home and at the public altar.57 Ritual misconduct could sometimes turn out to be one of the most serious public offences, as evidenced by the popular outcry against the mockery of the Eleusinian Mysteries in 415.58 However,

56 _{There is a debate whether the accusation of not recognizing the gods means only lack of respect for the}

religious rituals, or also refers to the denial of the religious belief. For the argument that the charge referred only to the religious practice, see J. Burnet 1924: note on Pl. Ap. 24 c1; for the more convincing view that it includes the both aspects of religion, see Tatt 1936: 3-5; Montuori 1988: 64n116; Brickhouse & Smith 1989: 30-36. In any case, it is more likely that the accusers made a general attack on Socrates’ religious life without constraining themselves by this subtle distinction of religious practice and belief.

By the same token, the view of Brickhouse and Smith (1994: 182-186) that atheism is the only religious charge by the accusers seems an overstatement. In addition to their fundamental problem of using freely the defences of Xenophon and Plato as the historical evidence, it would be odd if the accusers had attacked Socrates as an atheist without mentioning his religious misbehaviour as the supporting evidence since, as Brickhouse and Smith themselves argue at another place (1989: 31; cf. 1994: 188-9), ‘practice and belief are inextricably tied together’, that is, one’s attitude toward religious practices reflects one’s religious belief or disbelief. Besides, while assuming the accusers were at least men of average intelligence, (1994: 186) Brickhouse and Smith in fact turn them into a ludicrous group of fools as Plato did in his Socrates’ Apology (26e -27a). They (1994: 183) made the accusers contradict their atheist indictment of Socrates with the insistence that he was also a believer in his private daemon, by saying that ‘the ancient authorities speak in one voice: Plato and Xenophon both clearly identify the charge of innovation as motivated…by his claim to have a private “divine sign”.

57 _{Xen. Ap. 11, Mem. 1.1.2.}

there seems to be no evidence other than Xenophon’s that suggests the charge of

violating the religious rituals. The alleged violation of religious beliefs, on the other hand, might have something to do with Socrates’ philosophical pursuit, which, according to Aristotle, was a persistent quest for the universal in the ethical realm.59 As Vlastos argues, when regarding religious affairs, Socrates continued his task with the

presumption that the gods must be perfectly moral without any exception.60 This was an extremely radical concept, for, as Vlastos indicates, to ask the Athenian gods to measure up to this requirement was as good as to destroy their traditional identities.61

The introduction of new divinities (daimo/nia): The accusers’ use of the plural term,

daimo/nia, might be a genuine expression of their belief or a prosecuting strategy to exaggerate the systematic scale of his crime.62 However, most scholars agree, the alleged reference of this charge was Socrates’ daimonion that was perceived by no one else but Socrates himself.63 How serious could a charge like this be in a pantheist society such as Athens? Parker argues that, though less serious than the denial of the gods of the state, private worship would not be tolerated if it turned out to be a challenge to the established

59

Arist. Met. 987b1.

60 _{Vlastos 1991: 162.}

61 _{Vlastos 1991: 166. For more detailed discussion, see McPherran 1996: 141-167. The Plausibility of}

Vlastos’ explanation is based upon the radical implication of Socrates’ philosophical activity in the religious realm. It would not be refuted simply because, as Brickhouse and Smith (1994: 182-7) argue, his moralistic concept was not directly mentioned by Aristophanes, Plato and Xenophon. The reports of Plato and Xenophon, almost needless to repeat, were problematic. Aristophanes and the accusers, having their own ways of describing Socrates religious activity, surely would never accuse anyone of making their gods

perfectly moral. However, two things are noteworthy. First, this religious concept of Socrates, as Vlastos (1991: 114, 167 n46) admits, had no guarantee of a new religious doctrine, rationalistic or not. That is, his religious idea remained a destructive power rather than a positive one. Therefore, as Nussbaum argues (1980: 102), he was partially liable to his own condemnation. Second, Socrates’ motive behind his moralistic claim of gods was not necessarily altruistic, as Vlastos (1991: 176-7) takes for granted.

62 _{Cf. Brickhouse & Smith 1989: 35-6.} 63

Pl. Ap. 31c, Euthphr 3b; Xen. Ap. 12, Mem. 2-3. Brickhouse & Smith 1989: 34-36. Contra. Burnet 1924: 95. Burnet rejects the worship of the daimonion as part of the religious charge for the reason that two of the witness, Euthyphro and Xenophon, were not philosophically talented. However, there is no need for philosophical sophistication in understanding the public charges of Socrates.

political authority. He points out that in principle it was only under the recognition of the demos that the worship of new gods, whether private or public, was introduced into the city.64 Socrates’ daimonion, by contrast, was by no means recognizable to the demos, since it was revealed to Socrates alone.65 What was even worse is that in the name of this unrecognized deity Socrates, according to Plato, despised the authority of the Athenian court,66 or, as reported by Xenophon, dared to exert great influence upon his

companions.67 Both of his pupils’ reports suggest the probability of serious conflict between Socrates’ private deity and the public authority.68

Atheism: Considering the religious diversity and flexibility in the Athenian society, its citizens seemed capable of expressing their opinions of gods with considerable freedom. Therefore, some scholars argue that atheism, though not mentioned in the indictment, was likely to have been one of the main reasons for the conviction of Socrates, since the denial of the existence of gods might appear much more irritating than his quarrelling with the mortal kindred over the intention of divinity, and finally must have crossed the boundary of Athenian religious tolerance.69 Though Plato has pointed out the logical contradiction between the charge of atheism and that of introducing the new deities,70 it is understandable in the common usage of language to call someone an atheist if he

64 _{Parker 1996: 156.}

65 _{See also the discussion of Xenophon’s and Plato’s religious defence of Socrates’ religion in chapter 5}

and 6.

66 _{Pl. Ap. 40a-c.} 67 _{Xen. Mem. 1.1.4.}

68 _{McPherran (1996: 135) suggests that Socrates’ personal cult could have constituted a threat to the society}

in the following ways: ‘(1) the source of the daimonion may be an unlicensed deity to whom Socrates pays unlicensed cult; (2) his characterization of this sign puts him on special, private terms with a deity; and (3) this sign and the deity behind it may be illusory or the deity may have hostile intentions toward Athens.’

69

See Parker 1996: 152; Brickhouse & Smith 1998: 30-34, 1994: 188; Finley 1985: 129; Chroust 1945: 47- 8.

substitutes the traditional gods with new ones that are not only strange but also indiscernible to anyone else.71 How serious could the charge be? Socrates did have a well-established reputation as a natural scientist who doubted the divinity of the natural world through his alleged exploration above the sky and below the earth, 72 an image which reminds us of the prosecution of Anaxagoras as reported by Plutarch.73 Although, as argued above, the law by which Socrates was accused is unlikely to have been the one in the case of Anaxagoras, it might be true that there was a long-term tendency of popular suspicion towards natural research because of its atheist implication. However, this hostility could not be deadly serious if, as Plato’s Socrates says, the atheist theory of Anaxagoras was still available on the street at a very low cost.74

iii. The Political Causes

There are three possible political charges: personal enmity, subversion of the democracy, and corruption of the Athenian tradition. The first is different from the rest in its lack of genuine considerations of ideology or public interests. Compared with the second charge, the charge of corrupting the traditional orders extends the range of crime from the

administrative realm to all the basic norms of the Athenian society.

Personal enmity against Socrates: One of the most plausible reasons for bringing Socrates to the court is the hostility that Socrates had incurred directly out of personal conflicts between him and the accusers or indirectly from rows between his companions

71 _{See also Stoke (1997: 137): ‘It is amply clear that atheism and a belief in strange gods or novel daimones}

or superhuman beings could co-exists happily in the popular conception of sceptical intellectuals. Disbelief in the normal gods was for practical purposes atheism.’

72

Ar. Clouds, 225 ff; Pl. Ap. 18b-c; Xen. Mem. 1.1.5.

73 _{Plut. Per. 32;} 74 _{Pl. Ap. 26 d-e.}

and theirs. The accusers were not necessarily ashamed of claiming their personal hostility toward Socrates, for personal enmity by itself was an acceptable reason for bringing a public case to an Athenian court.75 This kind of enmity is also what Plato and Xenophon claimed to be the accusers’ true motive and the cause of the jury’s verdict. In Plato’s version, the accusers were the agents of those reputedly wise men such as poets, craftsmen, politicians and orators who had been publicly humiliated by Socrates’ exposure of their ignorance. Their persistent slander was said to be a more important cause that led the jury to convict and execute Socrates.76 According to Xenophon, Anytus indicted Socrates as revenge for Socrates’ bold interference in the education of his son.77 Finally, the association of Socrates and some notorious oligarchs such as Critias and Alcibiades might have raised some people’s hatred toward him.78 Though his oligarchic association appears in the context of the ancient sources mainly as evidence of his danger to Athens and the democracy, it could also stir the memory of many people for their personal sufferings brought about by some of Socrates’ companions.

However, the effect of personal hatred should not be exaggerated.79 It was far from a sufficient reason for the success of a public suit. Personal hatred was acceptable in the court mainly because it proved that the accuser had a stronger motive than to exact money by blackmailing, which was serious misbehaviour.80 To win the jury’s approval or merely to avoid the heavy penalty for failing to acquire at least a fifth of the votes, the appeals of ideology or public interests were still essential. Obviously, to claim that the

75 _{H.M. Hansen 1991: 195.} 76 _{Pl. Ap. 23c-24b.} 77 _{Xen. Ap. 29.} 78

Xen. Mem. 12-13; Aesch. 1.173

79

This caution has been argued as early as at the end of the eighteenth century and accepted since then by many scholars. See Zeller 1885: 204-211.

accusers had no other reasons than their personal hatred toward Socrates, as Plato and Xenophon did in their defences of Socrates, was a strategy not for justifying, but for discrediting, their accusation. Besides, as mentioned above, the Athenian mechanism of sortition made the jury more or less a fair sample of the citizenry. Though Socrates was notorious, it is unlikely that he had been involved in so many private quarrels that he had become a personal enemy of most Athenians. Even Plato and Xenophon only claimed that the accusers, not the jurors, had direct or indirect personal conflict with Socrates. The jurors were said to have convicted Socrates not because of their own personal conflicts with Socrates, but because they were deceived by the long-term slander of his enemies who were reputedly wise and therefore by definition a small minority of the citizenry and the jury. Moreover, the effects of the law reform and the reconciliation should be taken into account. Their success, as the previous two chapters argue, strongly suggests a popular commitment to leaving behind the hatred of past partisan conflicts for the future of a law-abiding Athenian community. Finally, the oath all jurors had to take bounded them to cast their votes according to the laws or their sense of justice, instead of indulging their personal enmity.81 Transgression of this principle, according to the oath, would incur grave misfortune to the wrongdoers themselves and their families.82 The oath would have carried some extra weight in religion-connected trials such as the one of Socrates.

81

Hansen (1999: 182) reconstructs the oath as follows: ‘I will cast my vote in consonance with the laws and with the decrees passed by the Assembly and by the Council, but, if there is no law, in consonance with my sense of what is most just, without favour or enmity. I will vote only on the matters raised in the charge, and I will listen impartially to accusers and defenders alike.’

82

Dem. 24. 149-151. Harrison 1971: 44; MacDowell 1978: 43-44; Hansen 1991: 182-3. cf. Todd 1993: 54- 55, 59-60. Todd points out the difficulty for the jurors to reach a decision following the oath because of the probable confusions among the laws, but his scepticism that there is no evidence for the jurors’ observance of the oath seems to pay little attention to the importance of religion in the Athenian society.

Subversion of the democracy: Socrates might have been accused because of his own alleged anti-democratic thought83 and his social association with the oligarchs who had overthrown the democracy. Though often viewed as a violation of the amnesty of 403, this kind of charge was not necessarily so, since Socrates’ past behaviour could still be