Elección más óptima para el diseño final

As I noted in the introduction to the thesis, the general shape of Rawls's moral psychology, and the use to which he puts it, does not significantly alter between A Theory of Justice, and Political Liberalism and beyond. In this section, I outline how the roles of moral psychology are essentially the same in Rawls's later theory as in his earlier.

In Political Liberalism, Rawls refers to his continued reliance on the moral

psychology.⁴⁴⁷ The moral psychology is again referenced, summarised this time in slightly more expanded detail, in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement.⁴⁴⁸ In this second discussion, Rawls states that he “would not change ... substantially” the earlier account.⁴⁴⁹ It should be noted, however, that he only makes reference to §§70-72 and §§75-76 of Theory. The sections missing are those that discuss the moral emotions, the moral sentiments, and the natural sentiments. I am unsure whether this omission has any deeper significance. Given the brief account of the moral psychology Rawls presents here, it may be that he thought these sections unnecessary to cite. Alternatively, he may have believed there were more fundamental problems with his views on these matters. I do not here investigate this matter, though it is of obvious significance regarding debates surrounding what sort of role both the early and late Rawls saw (and should have seen) the emotions having in politics.⁴⁵⁰

I have earlier noted in subsection 3.1 that the content of the moral psychology is broader than just the account of the sense of justice. It is clear that these further elements are also included within the moral psychology in Rawls's later views. The concept of the person is the same there, and the account of the ability to revise and develop a conception

447 PL, p. 143 fn9. Confusingly, this psychology is only summarised at pp. 86 and 163. See also CP, p.

445

448 JF, pp. 195—197, esp fn17 449 JF, pp. 195—197

450 On this debate, see, for example, Solomon (1995), Nussbaum (2003) pp. 489—499, Held (2006) pp.

83—84, Krause (2008), pp. 28—37

127 of the good is largely the same.⁴⁵¹ Indeed, I made use of this material in chapter 4.

In his later works, Rawls calls his moral psychology “a reasonable moral psychology.” Regarding this, he writes that “this name is appropriate since the idea of reciprocity appears both as a principle giving its content and as a disposition to answer in kind.”⁴⁵² I think the “principle” referred to here is most likely a normative principle. The

“disposition” by contrast corresponds to the psychological principles of reciprocity: see Appendix II.

We can reconstruct from Political Liberalism and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement a subtly new account of the stability argument. It will be seen to employ moral psychology once again in its roles of demonstrating the realisability and stability of the well-ordered society, and also playing the justifying roles of avoiding futility and arbitration.

The “question of stability”⁴⁵³ is answered in the following stages. First, the moral psychology of the sense of justice is again presented in order to demonstrate that, living under the institutions of Justice as Fairness, citizens acquire a sense of justice and the corresponding motivation.⁴⁵⁴

It can then be argued, as discussed in chapter 2, that the sense of justice generated by Justice as Fairness wins out against competing moral psychologies, developed this time from rival political conceptions. As has been made clear, political liberalism rejects the idea that a straight comparison between the strengths of the sense of justice associated with different comprehensive moral conceptions can serve in an argument for the stability (for the right reasons) of a liberal democracy, given the fact of reasonable pluralism. As previously noted in subsection 4.5, however, Rawls does not appear to stress such

comparisons in the various restatements of the argument from stability in his later works.

In addition, he cites the “relative stability” section of Theory as one of those which indicates that it assumes an unrealistic, monistic conception of well-ordered societies and their comprehensive doctrines.⁴⁵⁵ It may be that he meant to indicate that assessing the comparative stability of different conceptions should be dropped from the argument in the original position, and hence also the role of arbitration. Yet the passage just referenced does not say this, but simply observes that this is one place in Theory in which Justice as Fairness is assumed to be a partially comprehensive doctrine, in contradiction to Rawls's later formulation of his theory. This does not rule out the comparison of different political

451 See, for example, PL, pp. 81—86, 176—178

452 PL, pp. 195—196. The name is introduced at CP, p. 445 453 PL, p. 140

454 See PL, pp. 140—143, JF, pp. 195—197 455 JF, pp. 186—187. See also CP, p. 489

128 conceptions along these lines.⁴⁵⁶ And when we consider it, why should the parties in the original position deprive themselves of such potentially relevant considerations? I do not think it is obvious that Rawls needs to drop relative stability comparisons from the argument from the original position entirely, provided they are understood to be

comparisons between the psychologies associated with rival political conceptions.⁴⁵⁷ But I leave it open that he may have decided not to stress this element of the stability argument in later work.

Next, the special psychologies are again considered, and it is argued that, in the well-ordered society of Justice as Fairness, these psychologies will not be so powerful as to overwhelm our motivation to act justly and civilly as citizens.⁴⁵⁸ Note that the reason that Rawls is able to include the discussion of the special psychologies here, rather than in the discussion of the overlapping consensus, say, is that he ties them closely to a variety of conflict which it is not political liberalism's job to specifically address. These are conflicts from “citizen's status, class position, and occupation, or from their ethnicity, gender and race.”⁴⁵⁹ It is a deeply complicated issue as to how far disputes between comprehensive doctrines can be disentangled from these further disputes, at least in our non-ideal

circumstances. It may be that they cannot, and hence perhaps that political liberalism takes the wrong approach to these problems.⁴⁶⁰ It is an important issue as to how successfully Justice as Fairness is able to deal with these issues, and if it is not successful, what this means for Justice as Fairness, and liberal theory generally. But I do not address this here.

To return to our current topic, arguments regarding the congruence of the Right and the Good are now reprised.⁴⁶¹ These sections are the ones most frequently cited as

responsible for Rawls's revisions of his work in Political Liberalism.⁴⁶² I have reservations about the way such claims are usually put. But there is undoubtedly something correct about them – Rawls himself frequently calls attention to the difference between political and comprehensive conceptions of the good of liberal society.⁴⁶³ But I will not air my reservations here, as noted in section 12 above. But it is clear that Rawls puts forward several arguments for the good of political justice, at least when viewed from the

456 As suggested by the reference to the relevant section at JF, p. 196 fn17

457 See, for example, places in which the account of the original position argument in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement may be referring to comparative stability considerations, e.g. pp. 124—130. I only say “may”: recalling the various complexities chapter 2 highlighted about the interpretation of this material.

458 JF, pp. 184—185 459 JF, p. lviii

460 For an example of such a critique, see Okin (1994) 461 See PL, pp. 140—141 fn7, 142—143 incl. fn9

462 See, for example, Barry (1995b) pp. 885—890, Freeman (2003) pp. 303—308, (2007b) pp. 167—

172, 178—186, Quong (2011) pp. 163—164.

463 See, for example, PL, pp. 97—99, 455—456 CP, p. 586 LP, p. 146

129 perspective of Justice as Fairness as a political conception.⁴⁶⁴

It is only after all these elements of the stability argument from A Theory of Justice have been reprised, now as elements of a political conception of justice, that the argument for the possibility for an overlapping consensus is taken up. This argument uses the same moral psychology of the sense of justice (and reasonableness) which has been used throughout the stability argument.⁴⁶⁵ If it can be shown that an overlapping consensus is a reasonable possibility, given the wider social situation of the well-ordered society, then Justice as Fairness will be a stable political conception, and hence be justified all-things-considered.

It is important to note here is that the argument does not proceed by arguing that, given its moral psychology, Justice as Fairness will develop an overlapping consensus around itself. Rawls clarifies this in the introduction to the paperback edition of Political Liberalism. That book

makes no attempt to prove, or to show, that [an overlapping] consensus would eventually form around a reasonable political conception of justice. The most it does is to present a ... liberal political conception that does not oppose comprehensive doctrines on their own ground and does not preclude the possibility of an overlapping consensus for the right reasons. PL does note certain historical events and processes that seem to have led to [a more limited]

consensus, and others that may take place, but observing these commonsense facts of political sociology does not constitute proof.⁴⁶⁶

The idea of an overlapping consensus does not complete the stability argument by arguing that the institutions of the well-ordered society will lead to such a consensus, given the moral psychology of Justice as Fairness. Rather, it completes the stability argument by showing that it is not a foregone conclusion that the public acceptance of a liberal conception of justice is incompatible with the reasonable pluralism which basic liberal institutions inevitably give rise to.

This limitation on the stability argument is not imposed simply because it would be impossible to determine whether, psychologically, the institutions of Justice as Fairness give rise to an overlapping consensus. Rather, making such an argument would require us

464 See JF, pp. 198—202, PL, pp. 201—206, CP, pp. 465—470 465 PL, pp. 86 fn34, 141

466 PL, pp. xlv—xlvi. The same idea is much more subtly suggested by phrasing at JF, pp. 190—191

130 to go outside the limitations of public reason.⁴⁶⁷ There may be several reasons for this. I give one here. To make such an argument would require a quite extensive social and political psychology, which would give a general theory regarding how liberal political institutions and a range of comprehensive doctrines with certain features generally interact.

Such a psycho-social theory would no doubt be beyond the limits of public reason. Such a theory would not describe how comprehensive doctrines come to endorse the political conception in their own terms, but by reference to the psychological theory. But obviously, the advocates of such comprehensive doctrines couldn't accept the theory's explanation for their behaviour without abandoning their own views.⁴⁶⁸

In Theory, the moral psychology is restricted to demonstrating how, in a well-ordered society, individuals would acquire a sense of justice over the normal course of development. In Political Liberalism, Justice as Fairness:A Restatement, and the

preceding article “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus”, the psychology is also used as part of an argument for how a society initially characterised by a modus vivendi between its different comprehensive doctrines may, given favourable conditions, develop into a well-ordered society.⁴⁶⁹ This might surprise us. Why doesn't Rawls simply illustrate the possibility of various comprehensive doctrines within an well-ordered society endorsing the political institutions of that society for their own sake?

I speculate that this historical just-so story may be presented in order to help better justify political liberalism to ourselves. In our historical situation, Rawls believes the United States, and certain other democracies, to have achieved what he calls a

constitutional consensus. But he perhaps believes that by telling a certain psychological story of how we might have come to such a consensus, and how we might, by the same kinds of social changes, come to an overlapping consensus, is enough to show that an overlapping consensus is not an incoherent or obviously outlandish idea, and hence is “not [unrealistically] utopian.”⁴⁷⁰ This allows Justice as Fairness, and the idea of political liberalism more generally, to be of practical relevance.

467 PL, p. 387 suggested this interpretation to me, though it is talking about justification, and not directly about stability.

468 It may be worried that Rawls's own moral psychology may face similar problems. Against this, there are two considerations. The first is that the moral psychology is required to be framed only using publicly accessible psychological claims (see subsection 13.2 below). The second is that it is to be presented as reasonable and not as true. Individuals are hence free to come up with their own explanations as to why they have been psychologically moved to endorse one of the liberal political conceptions, or even why everyone else has as well. I believe there may remain problems with Rawls's own presentation in this regard. In particular, Rawls sometimes talks as if the account of the overlapping consensus shows how the society of Justice as Fairness 'adapts' comprehensive doctrines it itself, as noted above in 12.1 (see also PL p. 219). I am unsure whether this kind of phrasing is compatible with the limitations of public reasoning.

469 Rawls's initial account occurs in CP, pp. 440—446 and . This is expanded in PL, pp. 158—168. See also JF, pp. 192—195

470 See JF, p. 192. See also PL, p. 158

131 With the presentation of the possibility of an overlapping consensus, the stability argument in the original position is now, once again, complete. The first, second, third and fourth roles of moral psychology are all found within this argument. I will close this subsection by noting that the fifth and sixth roles of moral psychology are still present in the later philosophy as well. Our capacity for the moral powers is still taken to be the criterion for being owed justice, as the next chapter will examine at length. Moral psychology may possibly still be partially constitutive of Justice as Fairness as before – though of course it can now only be asserted to be a constitutive element of a political conception.