Principio de necesidad de probar los hechos que las partes alegan en el proceso

98. This section outlines the “whole program” evaluation. The quality of ADB’s program was assessed using similar criteria to those used for the assessment of strategies.41 _{However, in this}

case, the assessment was carried out for the entire program as one entity over the 20-year period of 1985–2004.

99. Overall the 20-year program in support of the social sectors was rated as 32%—not a particularly satisfactory outcome. The analytical basis of the program was assessed as low. The amount of supporting ESTW and the use of available information are considered insufficient to underpin the program. Although PPTA was used extensively, this often did not include a sound problem analysis. A deficiency in terms of analytical underpinning is a lack of consideration of alternative means to achieve desired ends. The balance of the program (among lending, TA, ESTW, policy dialogue, and implementation support and supervision) was rated as low. Given the difficult policy and political economy context, there was an over-emphasis on lending with too little attention to ESTW, capacity building, and policy dialogue. As routinely identified in ADB, there was insufficient allocation of ADB staff time for supervision and support. This is particularly a problem for social sector operations in Pakistan where there are numerous factors constraining success and low capacity within executing agencies (exacerbated by a high staff turnover). More sector and project management specialists are needed, to support the program, particularly in the PRM. The continuity of the program was assessed as moderate. The program has demonstrated continuity in terms of its focus on primary education, in particular, girls’ basic education. However, this continuity of theme has not been matched by geographic continuity. Projects operating in selected districts have generally not provided follow-up support so the desired impacts have not been fully achieved and/or sustained. There have been wide swings in the amount of funds allocated to the social sectors in general and to individual sectors indicating a lack of continuity.

39 _{ADB. 1998. Anticorruption Policy. Manila.}

40 _{Transparency International. 2002. Corruption in South Asia: Insights and Benchmarks from Citizen Feedback}

Surveys in Five Countries. Available: http://www.transparency.org/

41 _{The 20 criteria are analytical rigor, balance, continuity, credibility, critical mass, demonstrated learning, efficiency,}

flexibility, impact/results, innovation, needs-based, partnership, playing to strengths, political awareness, responsiveness to opportunity, results-management, selectivity/focus, sustainability, synergy, and value-for-money. The program was rated as low (score of 0–1), moderate (score of 2–3), or high (score of 4–5) on each criteria.

100. The credibility of the program was rated as moderate. Having more in-house sector experts and reducing the reliance on consultants could further enhance credibility. The program was rated low in terms of its critical mass. The program attempted to tackle some very important issues (e.g., girls’ education and women’s health) but the resources ADB could assign to the task in relation to the size and complexity of the problem were insufficient to produce the desired impact within the planned timeframe. More modest objectives and a more focused program were needed. The program was rated as low for its demonstrated learning. Some of the shifts made in the program (e.g., from investment projects to policy-based loans) reflected a recognition of things not working, and the need to try something different. However, insufficient problem analysis and consideration of political economy aspects, coupled with an emphasis on lending, means that learning has not occurred as fast as it should.

101. The efficiency of the program was rated as low. A general rule of not undertaking financial and economic analysis for social sector projects has had the unfortunate consequence of ensuring that not enough consideration has been given to questions of financial and economic efficiency. This is an important deficiency that has contributed to low sustainability. Flexibility is assessed as low. The project mode of development financing and the business processes of both the Government and ADB are not inherently flexible. This reality, coupled with generally inadequate (quantitatively) implementation support (by both ADB and the Government), means that risk management that responds in a timely fashion to changing circumstances is not adequate. The impact or results from the program are assessed as moderate. Most projects have delivered planned physical outputs (albeit often inefficiently). However, the conversion of these into desired outcomes has been disappointing (indicating design deficiencies in some cases and inadequate consideration of risks and assumptions in others). The achievement of impacts has been modest—again reflecting an inadequate consideration of assumptions and risks, particularly those of a political nature.

102. The level of innovation in the program was rated as moderate. Support for SAP was a significant innovation with its emphasis on incremental public funding and achievement of a better balance between salary and nonsalary expenditure. Recent and planned policy-based loans aim at debt restructuring and public sector financial management reform to create fiscal space for greater social sector lending. A key objective of devolution is to support district-level service provision. However, these more macro examples of innovation have not been accompanied by a similar level of innovation at the micro level, despite attempts to support private sector provision, public–private partnerships, and NGO involvement. These have mostly not managed to overcome bureaucratic and political resistance. The program was rated high in terms of being needs-based. The program has focused on areas of major need, e.g., the creation of a better-educated and healthier workforce, or overcoming major areas of inequity. However, as discussed under critical mass, the available resources have not matched the identified needs. Greater focus is needed. The level of partnerships evident in the program was assessed as moderate. SAP was a major example of a partnership approach, although a very unequal one with the World Bank being the dominant partner. More recently, partnerships have been developed with United Kingdom’s Department for International Development. More could be done to develop partnerships with a range of local organizations, the United Nations specialized agencies, and other bilateral agencies.

103. The program was rated as moderate in terms of it playing to ADB’s strengths. ADB’s program is largely supply-driven so it will reflect what ADB has to offer and its priorities. However, it is not considered that ADB has any particular comparative advantage in the areas of education or health, whereas it is more likely to have relative strengths in the areas of water supply, sanitation, and urban development, as these are more closely related to its core

infrastructure expertise. The program was rated as low in terms of its political awareness. The long-term poor performance of the social sectors in Pakistan can only be understood in terms of political economy considerations. These dimensions must be better taken into account in developing and managing a social sector program. Alignment with policies as stated in FYPs and other such documents is an insufficient test of Government commitment. The program has shown mixed results in terms of adapting to the role of provinces and now districts in social service delivery. The program was rated as being moderately responsive to opportunity. SAP was an example of responsiveness. The rapid growth in policy-based lending post-11 September 2001 was also responsive to an opportunity to increase lending. On the other hand, the opportunity to support private sector social service provision using, among other resources, ADB’s private sector operations was not sufficiently promoted.

104. The program is rated as low in terms of results management. The focus is on approval and implementation management. Staff have little time for managing for development results. High-level decision makers on the Government side, who should be interested in the results being obtained, are not sufficiently involved. The selectivity and focus of the program is rated as low. Attempting to cover education, health, population, water supply and sanitation, and urban development with the resources ADB has available indicates a broad lack of selectivity and focus. Although there is some focus within sectors (e.g., girls’ basic education and women’s health), this is of such a high order that it is not particularly meaningful. Selectivity and focus need to be considered in relation to the resources available and the challenges faced. The sustainability of the results from the program is rated as low. A lack of political continuity, critical mass, design soundness, and inadequate financial and economic analysis are all contributory factors to this. The program is rated low for synergy among sectors. The intent has been present, but realizing synergy has proven difficult. Nowhere is this more clearly illustrated than in population welfare and health. Overall, the value-for-money of the program is rated as low.