Principios para la gestión administrativa de decor hogar

(i) Developing the unity principle: imitation and the ‘shared manifold’

Nietzsche thinks that imitation is innate, automatic, largely unconscious, and central to the formation of values. Recent research offers considerable support for these views. The contemporary evidence for innateness comes largely from the pioneering work of Meltzoff and Moore (1985), who observed newborn babies of even a few hours old mimicking movements of tongue and lips.20 _{As for}

‘automaticity’, there seems no reason to attribute any intentional or instrumental motivation to this activity: infants don't copy movements as means to any further ends, imitation is just what small children do. Further evidence comes from the well-documented studies of the ‘delayed imitation paradigm’ featuring infants of a few months old (Meltzoff and Moore 1999; Bauer et al. 2000; Nelson 2007:94). Here the psychologist presents to the child, usually with a number of repetitions, a series of three- or four-step action sequences, e.g., moving a number of toys in order. Some time later, the baby is brought back to the laboratory and given the same toys to play with. She may be encouraged to play, but is not prompted into any particular activity pattern. Nine month old children tend to repeat some part of a sequence they were shown a month ago, but not if the gap is three months long. However, children who were 20 months old at the start of the experiment can still repeat a sequence they observed two years ago. It seems unlikely that any

conscious recall is involved in these repetitions: they do seem to be cases of

20 Not all researchers accept these observations as evidence of newborn imitation – see, e.g., Cecilia Hayes' (2005) alternative associationist account of the development of infant imitation.

unconscious mimesis becoming incorporated over time.

Facial imitation, which appears to be the first imitation of all, poses a particular puzzle to traditional psychological accounts of perception and action. Imitation involves translating, as it were, a perception of the movements of another's body into a relevantly similar bodily performance of my own. But how is this translation effected? It might be thought that imitation involves a sequence something like the following: I observe another's movement (e.g., a hand gesture, or an utterance); I attempt to reproduce it; I can compare the model performance with my copy; I can refine my copy in light of this comparison; through a series of repetitions, copy converges on model. But, in the case of infant facial imitation, there is no basis for perceptual comparison: the baby cannot see her own face.

This ‘correspondence problem’ has prompted both a wave of empirical research on imitation mechanisms, and the development of theoretical approaches which strongly recall what I have called Nietzsche's unity principle.21 _For

instance, Meltzoff and Moore (2005) argue that imitation is underpinned by a deep cognitive mechanism for what they call ‘active intermodal mapping’ (AIM). In this mechanism, activity across different ‘modes’ – including visual perception (seeing), auditory perception (hearing), and motor activity (doing) – are

cognitively equivalent, processed as the same.22

Encouragement for this approach comes from both observational

experimental psychology and from recent neuroscience. The neurological backing

21 Much of this research is represented in the two volume collection ‘Perspectives on Imitation’, edited by Susan Hurley and Nick Chater (2005); the editors' introduction gives a

comprehensive review, which I draw on here.

22 In the standard language of cognitive science, we might say that these activities are represented

in the same way in the information processing system of the infant brain. As Wolfgang Prinz (2005) puts it: the different modes share a ‘common coding’. I am trying to avoid these locutions because I don't want to assume that we must think of minds (especially infant minds) as representational or information-processing.

is the discovery of what are called mirror systems (see Hurley and Chater (2005) . ‘Mirror neurons’ are observed to fire both when a) an individual performs a particular action or movement pattern; and when b) she observes someone else performing the same activity. Although this research – which, I want to make clear, is based on forced experimentation on captive monkeys – has prompted considerable debate and various interpretations which I can't begin to discuss here, the general suggestion is that mirror neuron systems instantiate cognitive systems in which actions are not distinguished from perceptions of actions.23

Further support comes from a copious literature in adult experimental psychology on phenomena such as ‘priming’, ‘interference’, ‘perceptual induction’, and ‘chameleon effects’. Observing another perform an activity can have many noticeable, but unconscious, imitative or quasi-imitative effects on your own actions. These effects are widespread in ‘low level’ micro-actions – as in ‘imitative interference paradigms’, where performance of simple gestures is affected by how you are ‘primed’ by previous observations of others' actions (Wolfgang Prinz 2005). And also at ‘higher’ or more complex levels of social cognition as, e.g., in experiments conducted by Ap Djisterkhuis and colleagues where ‘youthful participants who are subliminally primed with words associated with the elderly, such as “gray”, “bingo” or “sentimental”, subsequently walk more slowly, perform worse on memory tasks, and express more conservative attitudes than age-matched participants’ (Hurley and Chater 2005: volume 1, 36).

Pulling some of these ideas together, we can in fact identify two dimensions of unity in such imitative mechanisms. The first is intermodality,

23 One issue is whether the mapping is between bare movement patterns, or patterns that are identified as, in some sense, intentional or goal-directed activities (Meltzoff 2005).

proper: such a mechanism makes (or finds) an equivalence between (a) bodily movement that is enacted by the perceiver's body, and (b) movement that is perceived. As Vittorio Gallese, one of the researchers involved in the

identification of mirror neurons, puts it, such systems identify an ‘essentially intertwined character of action, perception, and cognition’ at a pre-intentional level (2005:109). The idea of intermodality here draws on the tradition in cognitive science that emphasises ‘embodied cognition’, or ‘enactive perception’.24

The second is (for want of a better term) intersubjectivity: the mechanism identifies (a) movement of an individual's own body with (b) movement of other bodies.25 _{Gallese conceptualises this equivalence with his hypothesis of a ‘shared}

manifold’. He writes: ‘the physical space occupied by inanimate objects and bodies of adult others is connected to the body of the infant to compose a blended, shared space’ (ibid:106). In this ‘space’, just as no distinction is made between perception or activity modalities, there is no attribution of self or others as the doers of deeds. Such cognitive processes do not ask ‘“who did it”, “who is it”’ (ibid), but realise ‘a thinner content state, which specifies what kind of interaction or state is at stake’ (ibid).

I should make clear that what we are talking about here are very largely

hypothetical mechanisms. Ideas of intermodality, and the shared manifold

hypothesis, certainly do not answer all the questions raised by the correspondence problem.26 _{Indeed, they raise further questions. For example, just how does a}

24 Now classic statements of ‘embodied’ or ‘enactive’ approaches to cognitive science include Hendricks-Janssen (1996) and Clark (1997). I should also note, intertwining with this lineage, Hubert L. Dreyfus' (1990) reading of Heidegger, and development of the idea of ‘coping’. 25 Such infant bodies would not be subjects in the Nietzschean view I develop in the next chapter. 26 Gallese gives a functional explanation of the shared manifold, arguing that it ‘provides an

human infant recognise movements (e.g., pushing out the tongue) of various bodies – its own, and others’ – as activities of a kind? If such equivalences are made only across similar bodies, how does an infant identify the bodies that matter? Imitation researchers do not currently have answers to these questions. In short, they do not (as yet) fill in all the gaps in Nietzsche's account of drive unity and imitation.

(ii) The nutrition principle: scripts and script memory

Bringing together Nietzsche with contemporary psychology must involve relating quite distinct terminologies and conceptual apparatuses. One guiding concept from recent psychology, the script, can provide a useful bridge, and will also play other valuable roles in this thesis. The script framework stems from the broader concept of a cognitive schema, largely developed by the psychologist Frederic Bartlett (1932) in his work on memory. Bartlett argued that people recognise, categorise and so understand figures, pictures and stories by organising elements in schematic patterns. A script, sometimes also called an ‘event schema’, is a particular kind of schema for social interactions.27 _{Developmental psychologists}

were some of the first to apply the script framework in the 1970s. One pioneer of this approach, whose work I draw on in this chapter and the next, is Katherine Nelson.

predictability in the course of an individual's interaction with his or her environment’

(2005:106.). It may well make sense that ‘the shareable characters of experience and action are the earliest constituents of our life’ (ibid:107). But such a functional presentation cannot tell us about the ‘mechanisms’ that work the process.

27 The term was first used in this way by the Artificial Intelligence (AI) theorists Roger Schank and Robert Abelson (1977), before being picked up in developmental and child psychology by Katherine Nelson and others – see Nelson and Gruendel (eds.) (1986), Nelson (2007) – and by social cognition theorists such as Susan Fiske and Shelley Taylor (1991:119).

Although it involves a considerable simplification, it can be helpful to use the following basic cognitive psychology picture of how scripts work. An

individual has a memory store or ‘repertoire’ of scripts. As an individual navigates social worlds she perceives cues which lead her to (however consciously or

unconsciously) categorise the situations she finds herself in as exemplars of known types. Once the context is categorised, an appropriate script from her repertoire is then ‘cued’. For example, we can think of children as learning, rehearsing and varying scripts for familiar events such as ‘bedtime’, ‘dinnertime’, etc. Most basically, a script is a sequence or pattern of activity: first you wash your hands, then you sit down, then you eat, etc. Roles may be identified, and activities in the sequence assigned to different roles: parent, child, etc. But we can also see a script as more than merely behavioural: it also contains cognitive elements, such as beliefs and expectations about what different actors occupying different roles will do, etc. Furthermore, we can also think of scripted motivations and affects. Learning and following a script then means adopting not just role- defined activity patterns, but also attitudes and dispositions. This is where we can make a bridge with Nietzschean drive psycho-physiology, as we can see scripts as embedding drive patterns of valuing and desiring as well as acting.

One reason why the script framework has proved particularly popular with developmentalists has to do with the nature of infant memory. Until the 1980s, psychologists commonly believed that infants had no long term memory stretching over months. Research using methods such as the delayed imitation paradigm (discussed above) overturns this view, and also brings out some particular features of early long term memory. First, it seems that infant memory

is focused not on objects but on ‘action programs’ and ‘the dynamics of events’ (Nelson 2007:90): before children develop a long-term memory for particular objects, they are able to recall and reproduce event sequences (see Nelson 2007:90).28 _{Second, researchers think of infant memory as implicit, that is, ‘not}

accessible to voluntary recall out of context’ (ibid).29 _{An implicit memory is one}

that ‘comes back’ to us unbidden and in context, perhaps triggered by

environmental features that repeat from a previous experience. Such implicit memories need not involve any conscious representation of the remembered event: they might, for example, involve unconscious keyings of movements or dispositions.30

A third feature is the role of repetition in infant memory. Nelson points out that infant event memory decays if it is not re-called or put to use over ‘relatively short periods of time’ (ibid:89). If an event is to continue being ‘stored’ in

memory, it must be repeated; singular events, according to Nelson, are not generally remembered. Delayed imitation experiments show stronger recall over time when the initial sequence is repeated.31 _{This last point is particularly relevant}

because it could provide some support for a form of Nietzsche's nutrition principle. Script patterns that are ‘nourished’ by repetition are implicitly

remembered – that is, more likely to be activated and enacted in future. Patterns that are not repeated are, eventually, forgotten. Early memory is largely

28 Nelson relates this point to her further claim that infants not only remember, but also perceive

the world as a dynamic flow of events and activity patterns – it is only later in cognitive development that they begin to ‘dismember’, as Nietzsche might say, event sequences into discrete objects and actors

29 Though it is hard to think how this claim could be falsified.

30 Indeed, although this is to touch on big debates, Nelson (2007:91) further argues that they need not be thought of as involving representation in any form.

31 Nelson surmises (2007:89; also (1993)) that ‘such decay is no doubt functional for a rapidly changing organism in a world that is also changing in its physical conditions as well as its social offerings […] single or non-repeated experiences should be overridden by updated constructions of what is of significance to the organism.’

constructed by building up, and unconsciously reproducing activity patterns learnt through repetition – i.e., scripts.32 _{For Nelson and colleagues one of the places to}

best study the continuing formation and development of scripts is in the play, and later storytelling, of young children.33 _{One important aspect of such play is the}

rehearsal, and exploration, of social scripts: in play children alternate roles; they observe (often, insistently) rules and sequence orderings; and they explore variations. In Nietzschean terms: as they playfully re-enact scripts, children ‘nourish’ and so strengthen patterns of valuing, desiring, and acting.

We can also use the script idea to reformulate some Nietzschean thoughts on incorporation. Note that, on the one hand, a script is a feature of individual psychology: scripts are learned, ‘stored’ and reproduced by individuals. But a script is also necessarily social: it is shared by a number of actors – it is this that allows interpretation and recognition, and the regularity of patterned interaction. To put it another way: scripts are stored both in an individual's memory repertoire, but also in a shared ‘social repertoire’. To a large extent, individuals adopt their values, desires, and activity patterns – that is, their drives – by learning social scripts. We can then think of the adoption or transmission of drive patterns in terms of a transfer from social to individual repertoires. However, the process is not just passive or one-directional. Individuals refine and vary the scripts they use, and so constantly develop and transform social as well as individual repertoires.

32 With the proviso that here, contrary to many cognitive science accounts of script memory, we may not want to think of scripts as representational structures. See Nelson (2007:90-92) for a discussion of this point.

33 See Nelson and Gruendel, eds. (1986), for more on script-based approaches to children's play and learning.

(iii) Developmental layers

The research I've looked at so far in this section does not fill in all the gaps in Nietzsche's accounts of mimetic and performative incorporation. But it at least

suggests that processes of these kinds are at work in early childhood. Infants do appear to be mimetically adopting drive patterns, and performatively

incorporating them through play as well as ‘real life’ interaction. This research supports Nietzsche's claim in D34 that children adopt (moral) values ‘as born apes’. But Nietzsche also thinks that unconscious mimesis and performative repetition continue to shape our values throughout adult life. At least some developmental psychologists, including Katherine Nelson, would agree: as we develop what Vygotsky calls ‘higher psychological processes’, for example involving linguistic consciousness, early unconscious processes are transformed, but they don't stop working in us.

We can here set up a comparison between two godfathers of

developmental psychology, Piaget and Vygotsky.34 _{Piaget understands cognitive}

development as the unfolding ‘construction’ of new processes and capabilities as the child interacts with the world. But while this construction requires

environmental materials, a fixed inner architecture directs it, and development unfolds following a set hierarchical sequence of stages. For example, in terms of the development of moral values, Piaget identified two key stages which are claimed to follow a universal pattern across cultures and environment. The

34 Piaget's theory on moral development is found in his (1932). For a philosophical introduction to Piaget's thought see Boden (1979). Vygotsky emphasises the complexity of internalisation processes: they involve ‘long series of developmental events’ (57), in which different internalisations interact and overlay each other.

influential Piagetian moral development theorist Lawrence Kohlberg (1981), expands his approach with a six stage model: but again, the stages and their sequence are universal.

In Vygotsky's approach, too, almost all humans experience a number of common major shifts, including the internalisation of language. But in contrast to Piagetian thinking, the contingent specificities of local social environments, and of culturally shaped physical environments, undermines any attempt to identify universal developmental sequences. I want to highlight a further point on this, one that is emphasised by Nelson. Like Piagetian colleagues, Nelson identifies an age- linked list of six typical levels – or layers – of socially embedded cognitive development. But in a Vygotskian vein, she insists that ‘there is no implication that one moves on from one level to another’ (2007:26); in fact ‘rather than forming a clear sequence, they [appear] to be developing more or less

simultaneously’ (ibid:50). ‘Lower’ level processes do not stop being active as new layers are added.

To make things more concrete, I will zoom in on one step in Nelson's account. Although babies imitate from the start, imitative activity really takes off slightly later (usually in the second half of year one) once infants have the

perceptual and motor faculties necessary to recognise other humans around them, to ‘share attention’ with others, to observe and copy physical movement patterns, and to use communicative gestures and cries. Nelson uses the term ‘mimetic cognition’ to describe the characteristic intermodal and intersubjective processes of this level – her ‘Level 2’.35 _{Speech, and its internalisation to form linguistic}

35 Nelson's use of ‘mimesis’ derives from Merlin Donald (1991. Donald presents an influential hypothesis about the phylogenetic development of the human brain. He claims that early hominids, before the development of language, had a ‘mimetic culture’ based on gesture and

consciousness, then initiates a new layer (‘Level 3’) of cognitive processes characterised by symbolic representation.36 _{The child still uses and stores many of}