LA PROBLEMÁTICA DE LA INFORMALIDAD DE LAS MICRO, PEQUEÑAS Y MEDIANAS EMPRESAS

Besides the formal criteria relevant to institutional analysis, like transparency and accountability, aspects of culture and mentality deserve attention in order to assess the performance of an institution – and its ability to change. Like politics, administration depends on the professional quality and attitude of the people employed. Molle et al. point out that the bureaucracy, the rule of the office, in the water sector of many agrarian societies has attained a special political role within the context of nation-building.654 _{Their hydraulic mission, especially in former colonies,}

has come to be closely linked to the very legitimacy of the state. In today’s Pakistan the status of WAPDA, the chief water management body, is expressed by the size of its staff and budget and the scope of authority. Reflecting the ties between the bureaucracy, the military and the government, its management includes numerous retired military officers. Being responsible for the initiation and operation of landmark projects like the large dams at Tarbela and Mangla, WAPDA symbolizes the nation’s progress in the energy and water sectors. WAPDA, in spite of institutional changes in recent years, most notably the establishment of a separate water sharing institution (Indus River System Authority, IRSA), has by and large maintained its position and status.

Mustafa, tracing the role of current water institutions back to the colonial era, finds that the heritage of the once prestigious Indian Civil Service – with its elitist bureaucratic culture – tends to further a development gap between the state and

the civil society.655 As a result, bureaucrats in the water sector act less as civil servants but rather masters of a colonized population. This, according to Mustafa, is particularly obvious in the case of irrigation officials who exhibit a general allegiance to science of the empire which leads them to distance oneself from the natives,

652 _{Ibidem, p. 10. Cf. Muhammad Arif Raza: An economic analysis of institutional reforms in irrigation}

sector in Punjab, Pakistan; PhD dissertation, Faculty of Agricultural Economic and Rural Sociology, University of Faisalabad, 2008, p. 165; www.prr.hec.gov.pk/Thesis/735.pdf (April 2011).

653 _{Jean-Daniel Rinaudo, P. Strosser & S. Thoyer: Distributing water or rents? Examples from a public}

irrigation system in Pakistan; Canadian Journal of Development Studies, vol. 21, no. 1, 2000, p. 4.

654 _{François Molle, P. Mollinga & P. Wester: Hydraulic bureaucracies and the hydraulic mission: flows}

of water, flows of power; Water Alternatives, vol. 2, no. 3, 2009, p. 336. The authors note that the role of the bureaucracy in water management, including the phenomenon of corruption, requires further study; p. 344.

655 _{Daanish Mustafa: Theory versus practice: The bureaucratic ethos of water resources management}

and administration in Pakistan; Contemporary South Asia, vol. 11, no. 1, 2002, p. 42. Mustafa’s study is particularly significant as it is based on a series of qualitative interviews with officials of various tiers of the water administration. To my knowledge, this represents the most in-depth study of administrative culture in the water sector of Pakistan to date.

treating them as irrational and prone to causing trouble, and something to be controlled rather than served.656 _{In addition, the engineering bias makes many of the}

bureaucrats consider social aspects of their job as vexing distractions rather than an integral part of any resource management paradigm.657

As a result, a degree of isolation occurs which not only inhibits the flow of important water-related information, but also undermines the professional management of water. In recent years, the staff of water management bodies, particularly that of WAPDA and the Irrigation Departments, has been criticized for a neglect of important tasks and the misallocation of allotted funds.658 While the water management sector, particularly the operation and maintenance of the irrigation network, is widely considered to be insufficiently funded, available funds have not been used towards improving system performance. Instead, three quarters of the total budget are allocated for salaries and other administrative expenses.659

At the provincial level (Irrigation and Power Departments) the great number of personnel – estimated by Chaudhry at over 80,000 – however does not reflect a high degree of professionalization.660 Manig and Kuhnen note that, except for the higher echelons which require engineering degrees, most employees receive poor salaries and have little competence because of the strictly centralized hierarchical structure of decision-making. Consequently feedback from farmers on the effects of water management is unlikely to reach the decision-making level.661 According to van der Velde and Tirmizi, this isolation occurs even within the bureaucracy, between civil engineers (administrative staff) and mechanical engineers (on-site work) of the same department (IPD).662

656 _{Ibidem, p. 53.}

657 _{Ibidem. Cf. Gilmartin: Scientific empire, op. cit., p. 1129.}

658 _{The failure to engage the local population on important water works is widespread. An Asian}

Development Bank funded project, the Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Project, has been threatened by a lack of consultation with affected people, namely the residents of several villages that were to be flooded in the process, on the part of Irrigation Dept. officials who did not inform the villagers before the works began; cf. Ahsan Wagha: ADB Briefing Paper 7: Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Project; prepared for the International Rivers Network (not associated with ADB); no date given; www.irn.org/programs/mekong/adbbp7.htm (Oct. 2007). A frequently voiced concern is the lack of attention of water management officials to agricultural requirements; cf. Peter Wolff: Bewässerungsprobleme am Indus. Eindrücke und Ergebnisse eines Besuchs in Pakistan (Problems of irrigation in the Indus Basin. Impressions and results from a visit to Pakistan; in German); Technical Reports in Rural Engineering and Resource Management no. 41, 1996 (Universität- Gesamthochschule Kassel), p. 9.

659 _{World Bank: Pakistan country water resources assistance strategy; report no. 34081-PAK; New}

York: WB, 2005, p. 58.

660 _{Waheed Chaudhry: WUAs, op. cit., p. 95. This figure represents the total staff employed by the}

irrigation departments of all provinces. Statistically, one employee is responsible for 88 – 215 ha of irrigated land, as compared to between 122 and 496 ha in other Asian countries.

661 _{Winfried Manig & Frithjof Kuhnen: The case of Pakistan; in: Klaus Klennert, ed.: Rural development}

and careful utilisation of resources. The case of Pakistan, Peru, and Sudan; Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1986, p. 24 – 25.

662 _{Referring to the SCARP projects: This administrative, almost caste-like separation of officers (and}

their respective support staff) typically meant that at field level in SCARP project areas, canal and tubewell operations were rarely if ever coordinated for effective conjunctive use of irrigation water; cf. Edward van der Velde & J. Tirmizi: Irrigation policy reforms in Pakistan: Who’s getting the process right? In: Peter Mollinga & A. Bolding, eds.: The politics of irrigation reform: Contested policy

This may in part explain why the public sector staff has frequently been accused of corruption.663 _{Rinaudo notes that corruption and nepotism, coupled with vested}

interests of the bureaucracy (preservation of job, status and influence), are major causes of reform failure.664 The phenomenon of corruption can be read as a symptom of institutional weakness. A lack of transparency and accountability, among other factors, and a lack a precise regulations and authorities invite misuse.665 Mustafa, in his analysis of the Canal and Drainage Act, concludes that certain institutional deficiencies such as a failure to precisely define periods and quantities of water supplies (and cuts) provide rich grounds for corruption.666 For these reasons, the role of the public sector as such has been reviewed critically. Major funding institutions, like the World Bank, have advocated the introduction of private actors, especially in the area of irrigation services at the canal command level.667

As these institutional aspects of water management in Pakistan inevitably affect water availability (due to inadequate canal maintenance and water allocation), they overshadow the relationship between water users. Specifically, they exacerbate the asymmetry between canal head and tail end users, rich and poor farmers. More generally, they serve to undermine popular trust in public institutions on all levels, particularly among the majority of farmers who lack the capacity to exert their influence on water bureaucrats. Mistrust, as will be seen in the water sharing section

663 _{Assessments of corruption in Pakistan’s public sector focus on selected branches, including major}

water institutions like WAPDA, which – according to Transparency International (TI), has received around 15,000 complaints from individual citizens in 2002; cf. Global Corruption Report 2008; Berlin: TI, 2008, p. 211 - 215; www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/gcr_2008 (Jan. 2011). The report highlights the role of the military as the biggest landowner. Efforts to introduce accountability to a system that rewards retiring military officers with high-value plots and prestigious civilian positions (e.g. managing posts in WAPDA – outside of any qualification-based selection) have so far failed. On lower administrative levels, some progress has been achieved in the form of an integrity pact signed by the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board and TI and provincial regulations for greater transparency in Sindh; ibidem. Corruption in general remains a big obstacle to development and governance, as Khan notes, citing widespread cases of bribery in the case of irrigation tax collection; see: Feisal Khan: Water, governance, and corruption in Pakistan; in: Michael Kugelman & Robert Hathaway, eds.: Running on empty. Pakistan’s water crisis; Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2009, p. 96; www.wilsoncenter.org (Feb. 2011).

664 _{For a game-theoretical approach to the defensive lobbying of irrigation officials by landlords in}

order to obtain water originally allotted to poorer farmers see Jean-Paul Azam & Jean-Daniel Rinaudo: Encroached entitlements: Corruption and appropriation of irrigation water in southern Punjab; Development Studies Working Papers no. 144, University of Oxford, 2000, p. 27; www2.qeh.ox.ac.uk (May 2006). In essence, the actual water distribution in this case, as a result of corruption, is subject to the financial reach of the farmer or its social network (the homogeneity of his ethnic group). For an in- depth analysis of corruption in the water sector see Jean-Daniel Rinaudo: Rentes, corruption et lobbying politique (Rents, corruption and political lobbies; in French); PhD thesis presented at University of Clermont-Ferrand, 2000, p. 32 – 33; http://cemadoc.cemagref.fr/exl- php/util/documents/accede_document.php (April 2011). I am grateful to Dr. Undala Alam for pointing out this study to me and to Dr. Rinaudo for his permission to use it as a reference.

665 _{See the case of corruption in the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board, giving rise to a water tanker}

mafia that steals water from public sources in order to sells it; cf. Peter Gizewski & Thomas Homer- Dixon: Environmental scarcity and violent conflict: the case of Pakistan; Occasional Paper; Washington, D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science/University of Toronto, 1996; www.library.utoronto.ca/pcs/eps/pakistan/pak1.htm (Sept. 2000; no page numbering).

666 _{Daanish Mustafa: Colonial law, contemporary water issues in Pakistan; Political Geography, vol.}

20, 2001, p. 829. Cf. also A. Haroon Akram-Lodhi: Like an act of God: Land, water and social power in northern Pakistan; Contemporary South Asia, vol. 10, no. 3, 2001, p. 331. Cohen states that WAPDA had been an early and marked example of official corruption; cf. Stephen Cohen: The idea of Pakistan; Washington: Brookings, 2004, p. 90.

of this study, is a factor in inter-provincial relations, too. It very likely affects behaviour and decision-making, including the willingness to share water.

Faruqee observes that, in sum, the benefits that farmers on average drew from public water management have been very limited due to a number of institutional deficits, in particular

- inadequate records on land holding and use,

- insufficient funding of important research in agriculture, and

- inadequate engagement of farmers, communication of relevant crop information and training.668

The government, having extended its authority and presence to the farm level, has failed to provide important incentives for improving water utilization. Faruqee, stressing the need to strengthen market mechanisms, recommends that water user associations (WUA) take over responsibilities from the provincial irrigation authorities (IPD/PIDA), rather than simply participating in deliberations with officials as practised to date, and that the government withdraws to sector-wide tasks like infrastructure and environmental protection.669 Such a move would, of course, directly target the bureaucratic stature and political status of the water administration, not to mention its economic links with big landholders.

Bandaragoda, analyzing the institutional consequences of modernization in the irrigation sector, finds that technical improvements in canal operation and cropping patterns etc. have received positive reactions by the farming community. At the institutional level, however, they have created challenges to the staff, in particular a decline in control over the water distribution in the system. Unclear regulations and a general lack of management capacity to cope with the operation of the remodelled system have exposed an insufficient resilience to adjust to new organizational conditions.670 Behind this lack of flexibility is both a failure of coordination between water managers and water consumers and a widespread scepticism towards new techniques due to the fact that the existing warabandi distribution system is so deeply embedded in the social norms associated with irrigation.671 In other words, the bureaucrats in this respect are not much different from water users in their reluctance to consider change as a potential road towards progress. In the case of the farmers, however, their readiness is determined by knowledge and participation; in the case of the bureaucrats, it is determined by potential effects on their institutional position.