Procedimiento administrativo sancionador

So far I have shown two things. The first part of my argument (Figure 2.2, part 1) shows how the struggle for Independence resulted in the separation of the “material” (public/state) and “spiritual” (private/non-state) (Chatterjee 1993, 1995). Caste and untouchability were assigned to the private domain thus restricting the right of the state to intervene. In the second part of my argument (Figure 2.2, part 2), I show how this fragmented worldview found its expression in the contradictory mandates of the Constitution regarding untouchability. The law on one hand makes caste legal as it protects the freedom of religion but on the other hand makes certain aspects of caste in certain spaces, namely, untouchability illegal. While this separation of untouchability of caste may work in theory, the next two sections will demonstrate the ambiguity of this separation. I will show that in some cases this ambiguity has been exploited to preserve untouchability and but in others, it has been used for transformation.

In this Section I discuss the relationship of village-level caste elites with the state (Figure 2.2, part 3). So far, I have focused on the ambiguity around caste and untouchability at the level of the law. The law undermines certain aspects of caste, namely untouchability in public spaces but protects it in private domains. However assuming compliance in public spaces is a naive assumption. Additionally the data (Chapter 3 and 4) shows the variation in compliance in public spaces. The problem with a sole focus on the state assumes that the implementation of laws are a top-down process and as such is unable to account for variation in untouchability. This is because a state-centric explanation has a more fundamental problem. This view denies agency to the people for whom the laws are intended. It assumes blind compliance and obedience to laws of the government by the people.

There is disaggregated research from the state-building literature which warns us from adopting such a top-down perspective. Jim’s Scott’s research (1990, 1998, 2009) bears testimony that those in positions of power and authority often do not have hegemonic control over the lives of their subjects. What may look like compliance may not indeed

be so and this is demonstrated through the scripts (public and hidden) adopted by the oppressed such as slaves in the United States and untouchables in India (Scott 2009) and strategies of continually moving to evade state control (Scott 2009). More recently disaggregated research on state-building have shown a variation in the forms of rule which is the result of how local leaders negotiate with the state.

Drawing on her deep ethnographic work in post-conflict Afghanistan, where President Hamid Karzai was given mandate of rebuilding the country, Mukhopadhyay finds that even though observers in the United States and Western Europe may frown upon the reliance on local leaders for state-building, these apparently “undemocratic” leaders are indispensable. She demonstrates variation in the relationship between the center and periphery - i.e., while some leaders are “strongman governors” who promote the mandate of the central government, others retain the role of “warlords” and cannot be ruled (Mukhopadhyay 2014). Returning to Asia, scholars have documented evidence of varying relationships between the state and local elites (Naseemullah and Staniland 2016). Cases have been documented where the state shares authority with the local elite or as Naseemullah refers to it as “hybrid regimes” (Naseemullah 2014) or where the state is complicit in the durability of the conflict (Baruah 2005), or the state outsources law and order to militias (Staniland 2012), or as the state simply does not care (Slater and Kim 2015).

The continued authority of the local leaders or “traditional chiefs” has also been argued to actually increase responsiveness of the government (Baldwin 2016). In her work in Zambia, Baldwin argues and finds evidence that citizens tend to trust their traditional unelected chiefs more than the elected politicians. This is because of the incentives each faces. A traditional leader has a longer time horizon as compared to the politician whose time horizon is as long as an election cycle. This variation causes citizens to trust traditional leaders more for mobilizing the state for development projects. Thus the traditional leaders are seen as a bridge between the people and the democratic electoral system (Baldwin 2016).

Evidence of the link between mobilization and government services has also been documented by scholars of social movements and public goods provision. Andrews (2001) finds that US counties which had strong movement infrastructures were more likely to receive funding as compared to those who did not. Weitz-Shapiro (2006) finds that protest has a positive effect on redistribution in Argentina although the effect changes with time.

The common denominator in the studies mentioned above is the varying mobilization capacity of the local elites to bargain with the state for resources and/or sharing power. In the case of some African states, it has been found that higher level of mobilization pre-independence resulted in higher levels of government services post-independence. Bates (2008: 37) refers to this as the “fruits of independence”. These are the rewards that local elites and their supporters expected for their participation in the independence movement. And these rewards came in the form of “jobs, loans or cash” (Bates 2008: 38).

Returning to the case of our village-level caste elites, I expect patterns of public goods provision to be reflective of the bargaining and mobilization efforts that occurs between the state and village-level caste elites. If the group is deemed to be a credible threat to the political order by the state, then there is a high chance of accommodation and political inclusion. If this is not done, then there is a high chance of civil conflict (Wucherpfennig et al. 2016).

Village level elites who are successfully included by the political system find it “easier” to reconcile with laws which undermine their authority in public spaces. This is because they have become part of a political system which gives them the opportunity to extend their influence beyond the village. Thus, they become transformative agents for both caste and untouchability. On the other hand, village level caste elites who find themselves excluded by the political system, hold on to their power and do not comply with the laws of the state. In this process both caste and untouchability are preserved in the public domains.