Procedimiento de Diseño API RP 11L

Literature argues that leadership and culture are important influences on performance and effectiveness, but that this is hard to show empirically.328

The following section highlights some characteristics, and published information (admittedly very limited) that may be significant for leadership and culture in MfE and DoC.

First, New Zealand public service Chief Executive appointments are not made by politicians or ministers but by a statutorily independent State Services Commissioner (although Cabinet has a right of veto). And the Chief Executive is then the employer of all staff in their departments. Consequently,

322 _{P. Ali Memon and Harvey C. Perkins, "Environmental Planning and Management: The Broad Context," in}

Environmental Planning and Management in New Zealand, ed. P. Ali Memon and Harvey C. Perkins (palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 2000).P.18. Ericksen, ed. Planning for Sustainability: New Zealand under the RMA. P.235. Bührs, "New Zealand's Capacity for Green Planning: A Political-Institutional Assessment and Analysis." P.38. Young, Our Islands, Our Selves: A History of Conservation in New Zealand. P.211.

323 _{P. Hartley, Conservation Strategies for New Zealand (Wellington: NZ Business Round Table, 1997). P.398.}

Scott, Public Management in New Zealand: Lessons and Challenges. Pp.39-42 & 140. Scott says the reason for this is one of efficiency, whereas others see it also one of control. Heywood, Politics. P.385. Peters, The Politics of Bureaucracy. P.13.

324 _{This line of argument is advanced for “contractual” government and public choice theory. M. Olsen, The}

Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Interest Groups (Cambridge, Massc.: Harvard University Press, 1968), Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government.

325 _{These included native forest die-back probably from introduced possum browsing, and the collapse of a}

viewing platform in Punakaiki National Park killing fourteen people. Young, Our Islands, Our Selves: A History of Conservation in New Zealand. P. 215-216

326 _{See MfE, "Annual Report 1998-1999." P.2. and ———, "Annual Report 2005-2006." P.2.}

327 _{DoC, "Annual Report 1999-2000." MfE, "Annual Report 1999-2000." DoC, "Annual Report 2008-2009." MfE,}

"Annual Report 2008-2009."

328 _{Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. McMahon, The Environmental}

Protection Agency: Structuring Motivation in a Green Bureaucracy: The Conflict between Regulatory Style and Cultural Identity. Peters, The Politics of Bureaucracy. P.79.

3: NZ Context

unlike some other jurisdictions such as the USA, there is a higher degree of formal separation of departmental staff from the immediacy of political imperatives. Second, in twenty-five years of existence MfE and DoC have had five Chief Executives each, suggesting some lengthy periods of management stability. A degree of separation from immediate political concerns and management stability might create conditions to pursue longer term environmental objectives, or the time to create the frameworks that support positive environmental outcomes. Alternatively, this might create barriers to new thinking about different ways of addressing environmental problems. Third, DoC and,to a lesser degree, MFE are large departments and consequently leadership and decisions are exercised at many levels, not simply by the Chief Executive.329 _{A fourth point is leadership within} MfE seems to focus on the fostering of excellence in ideas and the powers of persuasion and bargaining, whereas in DoC it tends to focus on operational excellence and management of affected interests.330 _{This is something of a generalisation and similar qualities may well be found in both} organisations. Nevertheless it is also a reflection of the nature of each department’s work, and what is culturally valued.

Leadership can create or harness culture, but culture itself is not necessarily a product of leadership. Culture can arise and persist independent of leadership.331 _{Culture in MfE and DoC has been}

commented on anecdotally332 _{but the closest that approaches to an academic analysis is Johnston’s} characterisation of alternative management discourses and the ways these discourses are embedded differentially in New Zealand’s environmental legislation, referred to in Chapter 2. Johnston’s

argument is that the MfE has tended to be imbued with a communitarian, pluralist culture drawn, he argues, from the Resource Management Act and local government legislation (although it might be argued there is also a market-oriented rationality given the RMA’s role in regulating property rights), whereas DoC’s culture is influenced by its operational role and the preservationist ethos of the Conservation, National Park, and Wildlife Acts. Johnston would argue that this gives rise to an administrative efficiency rationality based in a technical expert’s view of system dynamics, with elements of a pluralist and communitarian discourse where this complements the internal technical

329 _{Based on my own experience and discussion with present and past DoC and MFE Chief Executives, CEO}

leadership can be an important variable factor in the nature of each department’s policy approach but it is uncommon for the CEO to always impose their own views. In my opinion, some external observers attribute more influence to direct roles played by department CEOs than is in fact the case.

330 _{This observationis based on comparison of DoC and MfE internal management guidance documents. See}

MfE, "Professionalising Policy: A Guide for the Craft of Policy Analysis," (Wellington: Ministry for the

Environment, 2011), ———, "Professionalising Policy: Cost Opportunity Risk Benefit Analysis; the Cobra Policy Guide," (Wellington: Ministry for the Envrionment, 2011), DoC, "General Managers Handbook," ed.

Department of Conservation (Wellington: Department of Conservation, 2001), ———, "Managers Handbook," ed. Department of Conservation (Wellington: Department of Conservation, 2009).

331 _{Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. P.101.}

332 _{For example, R. Kerr, "Market Mechanisms and Conservation," in Environmental justice and market}

mechanisms (Auckland: New Zealand Business Roundtable, 1998). P.2. “DoC loo culture of extravagance,” 14/1/2006, Infonews, http://www.infonews.co.nz/news.cfm?id=12586 (accessed 14/10/2012).

3: NZ Context

worldview.333 _{Johnston’s view supports the literature cited in Section 2.4.4.1 about departments} having shared decision premises that influence how they see issues and how they respond.

3.5.5

Summary

MfE and DoC were set up as explicit environmental departments with explicit statutory environmental roles and functions as their primary purpose. They were products of their time, influenced in design by a view of the role of government and how government should be organised that was dominant in the late 1980s. They were poorly resourced in the 1990s in terms of what they were expected to do, but this changed in the 2000s. There is some evidence from the literature, admittedly limited, that suggests their institutional settings have an effect on internal culture. What will be tested in the following case studies is the extent to which these features influence their abilities to produce environmentally effective policy frameworks.

3.6

Conclusions

The examination of New Zealand’s government system and its links with society presented in this chapter suggests there are elements potentially favourable to advancing environmental values, that there are potentially constraining components, ones that are neutral, and that all three are

interlinked.

What are possible favourable factors?

1. Taking the view of Jänicke and others that openness in decision-making helps a nation’s environmental capacity, New Zealand’s relatively transparent, non-corrupt and responsive government system should support its ability to make environmental policy. This is however, a general feature that applies to all policy-making, not just environmental policy.

2. Environmental interests are represented in Cabinet decision-making, which the literature says should be advantageous environmentally. While some may argue the seniority of such representation is not as commensurate with the importance of environmental concerns as it should be, there is representation by at least two ministers nonetheless.

3. As a result of the the NPM changes of the 1980s, New Zealand has two (and possibly three if the EPA is counted) central government departments formally accountable for advancing environmental interests, without other conflicting responsibilities.This is probably an institutional advantage environmentally.

3: NZ Context

4. New Zealand’s environmental legislation was integrated and not fragmented during the period of this study. Many (e.g. Bartlett, Bührs, Memon and others) argue this is a potentially positive environmental feature.

5. New Zealanders, according to public attitude surveys, support environmental values, but not unreservedly. Support for environmental values also appears in most political party

manifestos (although to different levels and with diferent emphases). Mixed member proportional representation has increased representation of those who promote

environmental values. These features should influence government ideological orientations. However, there are also conflicting social values which may override environmental ones, hence the degree of attachment to environmental values may be ambiguous in terms of their effect on government action.

What are possible constraining factors?

1. The New Zealand government policy system is small and hence may lack capacity to deal with complex environmental issues.

2. The New Zealand economy is dependent on the use of natural resources, and hence gives rise to powerful interests that may constrain policies to address environmental effects of that use.

3. New Zealand has a three year electoral cycle which, although possibly positive from a democratic responsiveness point of view, constrains long term policy development either because of processes involved in reassessment, or lack of cross-party support. This is, however, also a possible neutral factor in that it is a recurrent structural feature that applies to all policy development. It cannot of itself explain variability in performance between governments or departments.

4. Environmental government departments are not as powerful as the three central agencies or the economic departments. This is an institutional constraint.

5. A policy approach developed in the era of NPM continues to influence how government departments approach government action generally, and action on the environment specifically. It is argued that this policy approach tends to be cautious about government interventions and predisposed to voluntary action or market mechanisms as policy prescriptions. It is more likely a constraining factor in that it made developing some policy options more difficult. In circumstances where voluntary or market based prescriptions could be environmentally effective, then they had an easier ride through the policy development

3: NZ Context

process. Where other prescriptions were needed, and ran counter to the prevailing policy approach, then there were higher institutional and ideational hurdles to jump.

What are possible neutral factors?

1. The concentration of power in central government in New Zealand compared with other similar developed countries is significant but probably a neutral factor in the sense it can work positively or negatively in terms environmentally effective policies. Whether this factor works positively, negatively or neutrally depends, however, on government priorities, and on government will and skill (particularly timing in relation to the electoral cycle).

What do the sum of these features say about the New Zealand context? This chapter suggests it is ambiguous in terms of how environmental policy comes to be developed. On the one hand, there is a moderately favourable public climate of support for environmental measures, possibly a strong one when it comes to nature conservation. The intra-government administrative capacity to develop environmental policy is sizeable relative to the overall machinery of government in that there are two environmentally oriented ministers at the Cabinet table and two departments dedicated to advising on and promoting environmental policy. Added to these features, the locus of policy decision-making rests primarily with the Prime Minister, Cabinet, ministers and the public service (compared with other jursidictions where other branches of government or extra-government interests have a stronger formal role). With requisite priority, will, and skill, the result presumably could be rapid and effective policy. Together these features suggest there is potential for

environmental policy effectiveness.

On the other hand, constraining and neutral factors mentioned above also have to be considered. Within government, economic and resource-use interests (particularly those of primary industries), are generally in a powerful position. A structural feature, the three year electoral cycle, is a potential constraining factor in long term environmental policy development (although serving other purposes in the absence of a written constitution). The small size of the New Zealand policy system means individual people can in theory have a greater effect than in larger systems, depending on their skills. The nature of that effect depends on the orientation of their ideas. At the same time, small size may also mean less resources, and hence less diversity of ideas.

These are preliminary explanations for why there might be variability in New Zealand’s environmental policy. There is, however, nowhere near the depth of research on the subject compared, for example, with studies in Europe cited in Chapter 2.This is something this study will seek to remedy. How the study will do this is explained in the next chapter.

4: Analytical framework, methods, and case study rationale