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PROCEDIMIENTO SANCIONADOR Artículo 70. Garantía de procedimiento

In document Tomás Lorenzana González 03/01/10 (página 36-42)

The near miss incidents discussed in the three roundtable sessions are summarized below.

5.2.2.1 Roundtable No. 1 – November 29, 2017

Two participants told of instances in which they felt that they were close to capsizing. In both cases, operators’ practices were the primary cause of the “near miss.” In the first instance, the participant said he was in shallow water. He had ended up in rougher weather than he had anticipated because he had not checked the forecast. As he attempted to turn the vessel, a large angle of heel ensued before it returned upright. The participant stated that he should not have been in the area in that particular vessel and he should have followed the forecast to avoid the rough seas.

The second incident occurred when a different participant was steaming with tubs full of fish on deck. With an increased center of gravity, the vessel experienced a large angle of heel before it returned upright and the crew were able to make it to port. The participant acknowledged that the tubs should have been stored in the hold of the vessel and ensured that he did so for future trips.

Both incidents have been included in Table 13. These incidents are additional examples of operator’s practice being the primary cause of a near capsizing event. Both participants said the events were isolated incidents. The group said that near miss events are becoming less frequent because of the quota system in place. With a quota system, operators do not need to take as great of a risk to increase their overall catch. The importance of experience was brought up once more as a participant said that experienced operators take measures

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to reduce the likelihood of a near miss incident occurring. Finally, participants discussed the cod fishery. It was agreed that as cod returns to relevance in the Newfoundland and Labrador fishery, the current fleet of vessels will have trouble accommodating it. As a result, the number of near misses and capsizing events may increase.

5.2.2.2 Roundtable No. 2 – January 16, 2018

Multiple near misses involving participants were discussed. Participant 2 spoke of two separate incidents. In both incidents, improper dewatering of the catch led to the free surface effect. During the first “near miss,” the vessel was half loaded with capelin. Because the equipment was not performing as it should, there was a large amount of water in the hold. The load acted as a free surface and reduced the vessel’s stability. As a result, the vessel rolled to a large angle when it encountered a significant swell but the crew made it to port without capsizing. Participant 2’s second near miss came when he was pumping capelin on a new vessel. There was a gap in the pen boards and the bottom of the hold and the load shifted during pumping operations. A large list occurred and the crew ceased operations and made it to port with a “heavy list.” For both incidents, operator’s practice was the primary cause according to participant 2 during this session.

Participant 4 also brought up a near miss in which he was involved in. A vessel that was being used for sealing was modified with a five-foot extension on the stern. The owner was confident it would be fine but did not get any stability work done and no inspections were performed. However, during operations the crew noticed the vessel was exhibiting abnormal behaviour that was originally attributed a malfunctioning autopilot. The vessel met a large swell that rolled the vessel to an angle that “threw” the crew from their bunks. A second swell caught the newly installed appendage and the vessel was put on its side for

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two minutes (as approximated by the participant). The vessel made it back to port. In this case, the impact of the appendage on the vessel’s performance in rough weather was not considered. As such, it was an unsafe modification that was the primary cause of the near miss capsizing event. The three near misses are documented in Table 13.

5.2.2.3 Roundtable No. 3 – March 28, 2018

Participant 4 disclosed that he had been on a vessel that had come close to capsizing. The vessel was out in rough weather and rolled to an angle of approximately 45° when it was hit with a gust of wind close to 65 knots. After the large roll, the transmission failed and they had to be rescued. The participant said he had confidence in the vessel and that he never felt in any real danger. The cause of this near miss is operator practice as the vessel was operating in weather conditions it should not have been. The incident has been documented in Table 13.

5.3 Interviews

In order to gain a better understanding of operators’ level of stability knowledge, one- on-one interviews were conducted. The interviews focused on vessel stability and the risk of capsizing. The outcomes of interviews were divided into critical categories pertaining to vessel stability, as described below.

1. Determining if a Vessel is Stable or Unstable

One of the basic indicators of stability is how a stable vessel “feels” compared to an unstable vessel. A vessel with a high metacentric height (a high initial stability) will feel “stiff” and respond quickly to disturbances. Accelerations are high and a vessel that has an excessive metacentric height will be uncomfortable. On the other hand, a vessel with low

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initial stability will feel “tender.” It will respond slowly to disturbances exhibiting low acceleration and feels comfortable.

While a vessel’s metacentric height does not describe the entire range of its stability, it is an important indicator of the risk of a vessel capsizing. It is important that operators are aware of the relationship between how a vessel responds to the sea and its stability. Without this basic understanding, it can be difficult for operators to make appropriate decisions regarding stability and capsizing.

2. Stability books

Operators were asked whether they had a stability book and, if they did, did they know how to use it and find it useful.

3. Maintaining a Stable Vessel

This question aimed to identify what operators perceived as best practices in regards to stability during operations. Operators’ actions while fishing are an important indicator of their understanding of stability. Understanding these actions can provide insight into whether or not operators are putting themselves in high-risk situations. This portion of the discussion can also indicate if there are any important best practices that operators are not aware of or if there are any dangerous practices that are common amongst participants.

4. Risk of Capsizing

Interview participants were asked what they felt posed the largest risk to capsizing a vessel during operations. Operators indicating what they perceive as the most significant risk can help to clarify their understanding of stability and what factors can make their

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vessel more susceptible to capsizing. Operators were also asked if they identified capsizing as a major risk. It is important to evaluate the awareness of operators to the risk of capsizing. Without sufficient recognition of the risk that capsizing poses, an operator may under-value decisions or actions that make their vessel more susceptible to capsizing.

5. Best ways to Reduce Capsizing

Finally, operators were asked what they felt was the best way to reduce capsizing risk. Specifically, participants were asked if the felt stricter regulations or increased education would be effective ways to reduce capsizing. Participants were asked if they would be open to additional stability training.

The interviews are summarized in the sections below. Participants that have received formal stability training are discussed in 5.3.1 and those without any formal stability training are discussed in 5.3.2. Interview participants are listed in Table 14. Operators with formal stability training are highlighted in red, while those without are in blue. Those fishing furthest away from St. John’s are highlighted in red, as are those with the least amount of experience. Distance from St. John’s was tracked as a potential proxy variable to measure the proximity to, or ease of availability of, stability training.

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Table 14: Interview Participants

In document Tomás Lorenzana González 03/01/10 (página 36-42)

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