Pronóstico: Reservado y a largo plazo.

Comparative institutional analysis has contributed to the debate on flexicurity by demonstrating that both the extent and the way in which items of flexibility and security enter into the bargaining agenda across countries does indeed depend on institutional arrangements (Ibsen and Mailand, 2011). As summarised in Figure 2.1 (p. 56), Marginson and Galetto (2015) argue that employers and unions are more likely to develop shared understandings of what flexibility and security mean, and what forms of flexibility and security are appropriate to explore, where their relationship is more firmly institutionalised under the presence of sector level bargaining. Moreover, when coordinating mechanisms between the sector and the company level exist, first, issues of flexibility and security are more likely to be negotiated at the company level as social partners feel secure entering into them. Second, company level agreements tend to be characterised by a lower degree of heterogeneity as actors can only negotiate within the constraints provided by the sector. Specifically, their study shows that in countries with single-employer bargaining systems outcomes of negotiations are more oriented towards flexibility and less towards security than in countries with multi-employer bargaining systems. The main reason is that under single- employer bargaining unions cannot rely on the protection of the sector level agreement and the outcomes of negotiations are likely to reflect local power (im)balances; generally, to the advantage of the employers. Secondly, Marginson and Galetto argue: ‘measures addressing security, such as training related to employability and social entitlements such as parental leave, typically pose a collective action problem for individual employers because of risks such as poaching of workers with general skills or incurring relative labour costs disadvantage’ (Marginson and Galetto, 2015:17). Thus, under single-employer bargaining the extent to which social partners benefit from letting security items into their bargaining agendas is revealed to be more limited than in multi-employer bargaining.

In addition, differences can be anticipated amongst the company level arrangements found in different countries. These arise from the procedural rules governing the relationship between the sector and the company level (Arrowsmith and Marginson, 2008). In this regard,

Marginson and Galetto’s (2015) study shows that the scope and breadth of bargaining topics over issues of flexibility and security is more extensive in the presence of articulation mechanisms that organise decentralisation through demarcation. In contrast to delegation, according to which the scope for negotiation at the company level is restricted or controlled primarily through the use of opening-clauses, demarcation occurs when sector and company level social partners act within different, yet coordinated, spheres of competences (Marginson and Galetto, 2015). Competency demarcation is typically set out by national and/or sector level social partners who are responsible for identifying both modes and scope of company level negotiations. With their findings, Marginson and Galetto (2015) confirm that effective articulation mechanisms, such as those provided through delegation or demarcation, exert pressures on sector level social partners to both address flexibility and security and enable – and constrain – company level negotiations. In particular, it is shown that under ‘centralised decentralisation’ (Due et al., 1994; Due and Madsen, 2008) sector level unions have agreed to devolve part of their bargaining competences – and established the procedures to do so – as a result of the two-way relationship that links the sector to the employee representatives at the company level. This relationship has evolved in a two-tier system according to which some areas are dealt with at the sectoral level while others become the object of local level negotiations.

Further, while Marginson and Galetto (2015) have enriched the debate on the role of collective bargaining over flexibility and security by proving that sector level institutions – and the way in which they are articulated – matter, Ilsøe’s study (2012) suggests that other factors may be also relevant. Significantly, by analysing the concept of ‘centralised decentralisation’ in the Danish industrial sector, Ilsøe finds out that depth and scope of company level bargaining also depend on the extent to which the balance of power between local actors reflects sectoral dynamics, primarily,union density and trust between bargaining parties. In the main, she argues that the presence of shop stewards at the company level forms ‘a local power base’ (2012:778) for union representatives to actually engage with the competences they have been delegated by the sector. By securing autonomy and empowering shop stewards, high union density at the local level has a twofold effect on the outcomes of negotiations. On the one hand it gives unions the confidence they need to both provide and accept delegation mechanisms. On the other hand, it avoids representation problems so that employers can expect their counterparts to take the lead in implementing the agreement. In this light, she concludes that ‘centralised decentralisation’, in Denmark, features a particular

combination of institutional resources and trust-based relationships that allow social partners to exploit integrative potential and conclude agreements that are likely to benefit both sides of the industry. Relevant to the focus of the present research, Ilsøe (2012) shows that amongst the items negotiated at the local level many are related to flexibility and security measures; for example, variable pay, flexitime, fringe benefits and training. This suggests that company level bargaining may also represent a significant policy arena for flexibility and security trade-offs to occur. Nevertheless, in addition to the literature on sector level bargaining, a comparative focus on company level institutional arrangements is likely to reveal variations and/or similarities of outcomes both across and within countries.

Crucially, the first set of questions this thesis addresses is (Figure 2.1):

o Q1a. To what extent and how do sector level collective bargaining and social dialogue in different countries address issues of flexibility and security?

o Q1b. To what extent and how do sector level bargaining arrangements in different countries influence the way in which flexibility and security enter company level bargaining agendas? What are the implications for the actors involved?

To conclude, scholars have demonstrated that sectoral institutions – and the way in which these are articulated across-levels – do indeed matter: they exert pressures on social partners to address flexibility and security through collective agreements and establish parameters on their scope (Ibsen and Mailand, 2011; Marginson and Galetto, 2015). However, there is still a great deal of uncertainty about the impact that such agreements have at lower institutional levels when social partners bargain on similar issues. The next step is, therefore, to explore the outcomes of negotiations over issues of flexibility and security across companies.