ZANU-PF liberation narratives were born out of the developments that took place after the rejected referendum in 2000. The sovereignty of Zimbabwe, expressed in terms of black land ownership, was rekindled against the background of growing opposition to ZANU-PF rule. The perspective of the opposition is that the defeat of ZANU-PF in the referendum represented an opposition narrative that had a telling effect on the elite in power as that awakened them to the realisation that their power base had diminished. As Ndlovu-Gatsheni524 puts it, ZANU-PF inscribed a national monolithic history to re-invent itself amidst deteriorating control over the popular will. Ranger525
concurs by intimating that the national history served to proclaim the continuity of the Zimbabwean revolutionary tradition which was averse to all other historical perspectives on the Zimbabwean story except the one sanctioned by ZANU-PF.
522 S. Moyo & P. Yeros, (2007). The radicalised state, p. 105. 523 Ibid.
524 S. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, (2012). Rethinking Chimurenga and Gukurahundi in Zimbabwe, p.1.
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As had happened in Tanzania when Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) lost its grip on people and systematically intimidated other parties out of existence in 1963 and legislated itself as the sole party, 526 the ruling ZANU-PF party started to monopolise the transmission of the political culture of the state through state-owned media and propaganda. Propagandists who were intellectuals themselves, were charged with the task of orienting the history of Zimbabwe to fit-in with ZANU-PF thinking, making proclamations that the land is the economy and the economy is the land.527 In December 2000, Mugabe told ZANU-PF that it must continue to strike fear into the
heart of whites who were their real enemy.528 When Ian Smith came to power in 1964, his Rhodesia
Front party appointed propagandists from apartheid South Africa to articulate what it perceived as a serious communist menace, and to caricature Mugabe as a communist.529 This political practice was bequeathed to the black government and was literally applied in its original form against groups and organisations that ZANU-PF classified under the ‘enemy concept’. A version of this propaganda in the present era may be what is now called ‘fake news’.
The land question enabled the ruling party to reconfigure itself ahead of the presidential elections set for 2002. Mugabe threatened to resume the bush war should the electorate reject the party as it had done in the referendum two years earlier. Gramsci’s theory of hegemony aptly underscores the link between hegemony pand dictatorship both of which are mutually inclusive and complementary.530It must be noted that by threatening to resuscitate the armed struggle, Mugabe, in a collegial relationship with the war veterans, had a firm belief that the state belonged to them and to ZANU-PF because they liberated it. Compagnon531 sharply contradicts this ZANU-PF claim, arguing that it is a characteristic distortion of history to say that the country belongs to them. Mugabe rhetorically kept reminding people that Zimbabwean sovereignty was not negotiable and that he would rather eat grass than compromise the country’s sovereignty.532 From the perspective
of ZANU-PF, targeted sanctions imposed on Mugabe and his war cabinet were intended to persecute them for their bravery in challenging the west’s international hegemonic control of the
526 K. I. Tambila, (1995). The transition to multiparty democracy in Tanzania, p. 487.
527 D. Moore, (2001). Is the land the economy and the economy the land? Primitive accumulation in Zimbabwe. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 19(2), p. 253.
528 M. Dube, & R. Midgley, (2008). Land reform in Zimbabwe, p. 16.
529 D. Lowry, (2007). The impact of anti-communism on white Rhodesian Political culture, p. 188.
530 T. R. Bates, 1975. Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony, Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 36, No. 2, p. 352. 531 D. Compagnon, (2000). Briefing Zimbabwe, p.450.
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weaker states such as Zimbabwe (ibid.). It was for this same reason that western countries wanted regime change in Zimbabwe to secure their economic interests and the ESAP was considered part of the regime change strategy.533 The land narrative temporarily lost significance as evidenced by the rejection of the draft constitution of 2000 that prioritised land redistribution based on proactive legislation that was fast-tracked through a predominantly ZANU-PF parliament. For the land project to succeed, ZANU-PF manipulated the discourse of nation-building and made itself privy to sustainable development in Zimbabwe, making sure that it remained legitimate as a party both at home and internationally even after systematically eliminating the opposition.534
Gramsci also refers to the inseparable nature of cultural and intellectual factors in historical development, highlighting the role of intellectuals in designing society’s destiny, enforcing consensus through dictatorship as means to create and achieve party hegemony.535 In Zimbabwe, intellectuals such as Tafataona Mahoso from the Harare Polytechnic, Vimbai Chivaura from the English Department of the UZ, Claudius Mararike (UZ) and Mupepereki from the UZ Agriculture Faculty took turns to present a programme entitled National Ethos on the only available television station that operated in the country. The programme was designed to create a patriotic citizenry, the assumption being that the renowned professionals would hoodwink the audiences by their repeated patriotic arguments. These intellectuals sought to extend the worldview of the rulers to the ruled and to secure the consent of the masses to the law and order of the land. However, it is when these intellectuals fail in their assignment to create party domination that the ruling class engages the coercive apparatus to discipline those who do not see things through their lenses. The ruling ZANU-PF party after 2000 had the advantage of almost two decades of incumbency before the formation of a formidable opposition MDC party in 1999. However, ZANU-PF got a rude awakening in the 2000 parliamentary elections when its parliamentary hegemony was broken for the first time since independence. Despite ZANU-PF’s concerted efforts to de-campaign the MDC as a party with no liberation war credentials536 or as a party that was not rooted in the armed
struggle, the opposition garnered 57 seats against ZANU-PF’s 62 seats under conditions of state-
533 G. Cawthra, (2010). The role of SADC in managing political crisis and conflict, p. 27. 534 C. Ncube, (2010). Contesting hegemony, p. 76.
535 T. R. Bates, (1975). Gramsci and the theory of hegemony, p. 353.
536 W. Willems, (2013). ‘Zimbabwe will never be a colony again’: changing celebratory styles and meanings of independence. Anthropology Southern Africa, 36, p.24.
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sponsored violence 537that saw the murder of the leader of the MDC, Morgan Tsvangirai’s campaign manager, Tichaona Chiminya, near Murambinda Growth Point. The struggle for control of the state before the 2002 presidential elections demanded a meticulous re-definition of key concepts such as independence, heroism and belonging to the exclusion of all organisations and individuals that dared to challenge ZANU-PF. These were labeled as traitors who would be dealt with by the ruling ZANU-PF party. The CCJPZ and the WCC covered the 2002 presidential race that pitied Tsvangirai for MDC and Mugabe for ZANU-PF. It argues that ZANU-PF “stole” the election in view of the high incidences of intimidation and violence that were sufficiently serious to question the legitimacy of the election results.538
The role of the media in disseminating ZANU-PF party propaganda was a key aspect in state denial to proffer political space for opposition politics immediately after the government defeat in the 2000 referendum. The opposition MDC and individuals who were critical of ZANU-PF were targeted for media attack. Their interests were reframed and repackaged by the Ministry of Information and Publicity led by another intellectual, Professor Jonathan Moyo so that the so- called unpatriotic behaviour of black Zimbabweans who were vehicles of the white-driven regime change interests would be laid bare. When Tsvangirai visited one of the remotest villages in Zimbabwe it is said that people asked to know why he was black because ZANU-PF had always been telling them that he was white. This also was the extent to which mainstream media played a very destructive role. The government made illegal the operation of independent radio and television stations, a decision that saw the closure of Joy TV in 2002 so the listeners were exposed to the state ZTV that churned out information that was pro-ZANU-PF. Mugabe and ZANU-PF were openly supported whereas the opposition was viciously attacked.539 It was for this reason that Chitando substituted ‘Terror vision’ for ‘television.’540 The new land politics in Zimbabwe after
the annulment of the Lancaster Constitution revived racial conflicts that had been subdued under the dispensation of reconciliation in the first decade after independence. The whites were an irreplaceable enemy of the state for their close association with the MDC which was not clear on its party policy regarding land redistribution. One of the challenges the MDC faced was that it was
537 R. Matikiti, (2008). The church and the struggle for multi-party democracy in Zimbabwe, p. 34. 538 CCJPZ. (2002). The presidential elections; March 9, 10, 11 2002.
539 E. Chitando, (2005). ‘In the beginning was the land’, p.221. 540 Ibid., p. 235.
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a movement that represented diverse political and economic interests whose common denominator was removing Mugabe from power. Its composition was such that unanimity in strategy and policy implementation was difficult to achieve as evidenced by the 2005 split of the party into MDC-T and MDC-M over the government decision to create the Senate as the Upper Chamber of the Parliament of Zimbabwe.
The use of the race card by Mugabe to regain his fading popularity at home after losing the referendum gave him adequate guarantees of support from the war veterans who in 1997 had been given gratuities of $50 000 each.541 Consequently, war veterans were easily systematically
mobilised and deployed as ambassadors in resolving the land problem that colonialism had created.542 Chung admits the political acumen and the intellectual sophistication in Mugabe. His political skills in the 2002 presidential elections were demonstrated by his consistent attempts to portray the presidential race internally as black versus white, and internationally as the west (USA and Britain) versus Africa.543The CCJPZ report further discusses advertisements for Mugabe on television and state-controlled newspapers that consistently referred to the MDC as a British-led opposition and its leader, Tsvangirai as Judas Iscariot.544This was a biblical analogue that equated Judas Iscariot who, because of the love of money, sold out his master to the Jews for crucifixion in the same manner Tsvangirai was, according to ZANU-PF, selling the country, notably the land, to the former colonisers for the love of money. It was not surprising that in the 2002 presidential and subsequent elections, African leaders endorsed the election results that Mugabe had won despite glaring evidence of electoral fraud and manipulation on a grand scale.
The liberation narratives of the ruling ZANU-PF party were re-invigorated towards the 2002 presidential elections. New strategies were deployed to blackmail the nascent opposition MDC party. ZANU-PF mobilised war veterans to make pilgrimages to ZANLA bases in Mozambique that had been subjected to aerial bombardment by the Smith regime during the war and towards the finalization of the 1979 Lancaster Constitutional Conference. Such pilgrimages brought reminiscences of the experiences that the war veterans had gone through and of how they survived
541 N. Kriger, (2000). Zimbabwe today: hope against grim realities. Review of African Political Economy, 27(85), p. 444.
542 M. Adelmann, (2004). Quiet diplomacy, p. 250.
543 CCJPZ. (2002). The presidential elections; March 9, 10, 11 2002. 544 Ibid.
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the military onslaughts of the white regime. To be part of the teams that visited Chimoio, Nyadzonia and other ZANLA bases in Mozambique was to undergo an emotional experience. Mass graves at Chimoio and Nyadzonya were stark reminders to the war veterans that back home, the opposition parties should not be allowed to compromise the independence that the country now enjoyed. That hardened their resolve to deal with the MDC in the same manner they would deal with the whites who were alleged to have supported the ‘no’ vote in the 2000 referendum that was so clear in what the government’s position was about land repossession and redistribution. Medium spirits of reputation accompanied the war veterans as a way of showing that the exercise had blessings from custodians of African culture and tradition, and to give legitimacy to the land redistribution that was already underway.
ZANU-PF became synonymous with Zimbabwe in the sense that there was no separation of power between ZANU-PF and the state. In terms of the socialist vanguard approach which specifically hailed the supremacy of the party all the way,545 national institutions are subordinated to party interests, and not the other way around. From another perspective, a state party or a party state are juxtaposed concepts in political circles and in Zimbabwe, they point to the capture of the state by ZANU-PF, a development which has made it difficult for the opposition to win elections and take power, even when the electorate overwhelmingly voted for it.
The next presidential elections were held in March 2008 and they were harmonised with the parliamentary and council elections for the first time in the history of electoral politics in the country. The land issue was ZANU-PF’s rallying point. By then much of the white-owned land had been confiscated for redistribution under Models A1 and A2. In the first round of presidential elections, Tsvangirai won by 47 percent against Mugabe’s 4 percent, but failed to win an absolute majority for him to be able to form a government. This was even though it took ZEC about five weeks to announce the winner, raising suspicions that the results could have been doctored to give ZANU-PF a second chance. As Chisi laments: “You cannot explain a victory of an opposition and holding of results for thirty days. No explanation for that [is given] and finally the winner had to humble himself to become a subordinate of a loser to form a GNU.”546 This was a direct reference
to the 2008 first round of presidential elections that did not count for the opposition because it
545 K. I. Tambila, (1995). The transition to multiparty democracy in Tanzania, p. 473. 546 Interview with Sydney Chisi.
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failed to get an absolute majority. However, so worrying to the voters was the announcement of presidential results which delayed by more than a month. To complicate matters, the principle of ‘absolute majority’ got different interpretations: whether it meant 51 percent or 50 percent plus 1 remained unclear. This seems to resonate with the view that in Zimbabwe, opposition parties can win votes and seats while being denied victory.547
Masunungure states that there is evidence to suggest that the regime concluded that its party had failed in the March 2008 presidential elections and so the military should lead the march to the 27 June elections which was the date set for the election run-off.548 Masunungure remarks that
Mugabe had to institute a military style leadership to campaign for him in the re-run and this was not without violence to coerce voters and reduce the contest to a battle between the bullet and the ballot.549 The military, the bulk of whom were former fighters of the ZANLA outfit, accepted their deployment in villages and communities that they served during the armed struggle and there, they used their familiarity with the peasants to relive the Chimurenga networks which were instrumental in regaining electoral support for ZANU-PF. The Operation Makavhotera Papi (Operation Who did you vote for) code-named CIBD (Coercion, intimidation, beating, displacement) sought to identify and punish those who did not vote for Mugabe in the March 2008 elections.550 Throughout the period from 2000, ZANU-PF reverted to the use of chiefs, soldiers and the police using fear management, mobilisation and electoral processes. In Komichi’s views, the President, under circumstances of fierce political competition surrounded himself with several layers of protection: he became unreachable, became king, became ‘God’ to be worshipped as the Almighty, and people were subdued to the whole setup of that nature.551
The state monopoly over control of media was damaging to the opposition political parties. Chisi laments the style of reportage in the Herald newspaper in Harare and the Chronicle newspaper in Bulawayo during the Gukurahundi era. There was much negative reporting on dissidents while the newspapers were silent on the mass graves and the mass killings of the Ndebele people who were alleged to be supporting their destabilisation campaigns against the government of ZANU-
547 P. Chigora, et al, (2015). The Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front, p. 3. 548 E. Masunungure, (2009). A militarised election. Defying the Winds of Change, p. 80. 549 Ibid.
550 L. Sachikonye, (2011). When a state turns on its citizens, p.49. 551 Interview with Morgen Komichi.
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PF.552 The Chronicle, located in Matabeleland, could not report on the mass killings and disturbances in Matabeleland because it belonged to the public media controlled by ZANU-PF. Chisi asserts that “the Chronicle is given ‘copy and paste’ articles [for publication]. The headline in The Herald becomes the headline in The Chronicle as if there is no news in Matabeleland.”553 Mashakada posits that ZANU-PF staffed newspapers and media houses with their own functionaries.554 He relates the bombing of the Daily News offices by state functionaries, yet it was the voice of the people at that time. He also relates to the TV programme called “Face of the Nation” in which he, on behalf of the MDC, debated against David Chapfika of ZANU-PF whom he outperformed, and another between Learnmore Jongwe and Jonathan Moyo which produced similar results.555 That led to the banning of the MDC from state television, and the banning of Tsvangirai’s face from television. It shows that media’s role became pervasive to the disadvantaged of the opposition.
The promulgation of the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and POSA prior to the 2002 elections constrained the opposition in several ways. Commenting on the AIPPA Bill, Edson Zvobgo declared the unconstitutionality of twenty of its provisions thus:
The original Bill was manifestly unconstitutional. As chairman of your committee, I can say without equivocation that this Bill, in its original form, was the most calculated and determined assault on the liberties guaranteed by the constitution in the twenty years I served as Cabinet Minister.556