Pruebas

This section examines the elements of first order management of conflicts relating to the MTS (i.e. the images, instruments and actions). The study identified different conflict issues within the arrangement, which were grouped into three main categories. These are conflicts related to institutional and operational arrangements, conflicts resulting

Non-state

actors Local community

International community

Forestry Commission

Stool landowners

Non-governmental organisations (e.g. Rural

Development Youth Association-RUDEYA) State actors

Forest Services Division (FSD) Headquarters Resource Management Support Centre (RMSC) Regional FSD District FSD

World Bank, FAO-NFF, IUCN-Netherlands, AfDB-CFMP

Local chief ‘Odikro’& community- based organi- sations MTS farmers (involves both indigenes and migrants, both males and females) Taungya com- mittee with a leader termed taungya head

Key: AfDB-CFMP = African Development Bank-Community Forestry Management Project; FAO-NFF= National Forestry Facility of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO); FSD = Forest Services Division; IUCN-Netherlands = International Union for Conservation of Nature; MTS = Modified taungya system.

Figure 8.3 The partnership arrangement within the modified taungya system (MTS) in Ghana

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from competing claims, and anticipated conflicts resulting from uncertainty about the future. Respondents indicated that each category represents a number of issues as well as different actors involved in the conflicts (Figure 8.4). The next subsections present the nature of each conflict category and highlight the images (type of conflict, issues, actors, causes and dynamics) as well as the instrument or strategies these conflict actors and their external actors employ to address these challenges. Subsequently, the actions proposed by the study respondents are discussed based on the three conflict categories.

Table 8.3 Respondents’ perceptions of conflict issues related to institutional/operational arrangements (N=192)

Conflict type Conflict issues Chirayaso

Kunsu- Nyamebekyere No. 3 Total % Frequency % Frequency %

Intra-group  Boundary-related issues 35 18 79 41 59

 Disproportionate alloca-

tion of forestland 52 27 10 5 32

 High fee payment for land

preparation 4 2 2 1 3

Inter-group  Farmers failing to plant

timber trees 3 2 7 4 6

Source: Field survey, 2010.

Conflicts related to institutional and operational arrangements

The study identified three intra-group and one inter-group institutional and operational conflict issues (Table 8.3). These were mentioned by the majority of the respondents (N=192) representing 91% of the total respondents. The intra–group conflict types are boundary-related issues, the disproportionate allocation of forestland and high fees for land preparation incurred by farmers and between farmers and their leaders. The inter- group conflict type is crop destruction by the FSD due to the unwillingness of farmers to plant trees on their plots. Generally speaking, conflicts in Chirayaso with regard to the disproportionate allocation of forestland were referred to relatively more often (27% of the respondents), whereas in Kunsu-Nyamebekyere No. 3 the majority of the respon- dents (41%) reported boundary-related conflicts. Both antecedent and manifest causes of conflicts were identified in this conflict category. Three key drivers trigger the boundary-related conflicts. First, such conflicts occur when a person trespasses onto another person’s plot, as often occurs in the case of farmers who share a common boundary, partly because the initial boundary lines7 marking the demarcation of indi- vidual plots are distorted by weeding and burning. Secondly, the nature of the forest terrain contributes to unclear boundary lines between the plots. The third driver of such conflicts is greed and selfishness, which result in intentional trespassing by a neighbour and contribute to an atmosphere of mistrust and misunderstanding among the farmers.

7 _{During the allocation of the degraded portion of forest lands, the range supervisor and forest guards,} together with the taungya committee leaders, demarcate the allocated coupe for a year. Large trees are often removed by hired labourers with contributions from the group before the plots are divided among the members. Depending on the area assigned, each member receives at least a one acre plot. Boundaries between plots are often, but not always, marked by a stump, pegs or trench. Since bound- ary markers are not permanent, they easily burn and are covered up by the soil, which potentially leads to boundary disputes in the future.

With regard to the disproportionate allocation of forestland, 32% of the respondents accused the MTS leaders of greed, selfishness and favouritism during land distribution which had resulted in some people being denied land and allowing others to take more plots and occupy the most fertile portions of forestland. Such incidences were reported more frequently in Chirayaso (by 27% of the respondents), where most of the young- sters in the village were denied access to taungya plots (see Box 8.2). Another intra- group conflict type is related to the alleged high fees collected by the taungya leaders from the MTS members for land preparation. Moreover, in the process of collecting money, conflicts arise due to: (i) taungya leaders not paying and yet allocating extra plots to themselves and (ii) the denial of farmer access to a plot because of a failure pay the required contribution. In relation to the latter, some farmers believe the fees are ex- orbitant and deprive poor farmers of access to plots, whereas farmers who are finan- cially better off are capable of accessing extra plots for farming.

 Disproportionate allocation of forest- land

 Unclear boundaries  Farmers failure to

plant timber trees  High fees for land

preparation

Figure 8.4 Conflict categories displaying the issues and actors

Modified taungya system (MTS)

conflicts

* Others include food crop thieves, chainsaw operators and hunters

Actors Issues

Conflict categories

Anticipated con- flicts resulting from uncertainty about the future Competing claims and inadequate pro- tection from these claims

Institutional and opera- tional conflicts

 Food crop theft  Fire setting to trap

game by hunters  Crop and tree

destruction by chainsaw operators  Uncertain of future

timber benefit dis- tribution among in- dividual partici- pants

 Slow pace as re- gards registering and signing MTS agreement  Insecurity about

future timber bene- fits due to risk of fire and theft before maturity  Fear of discontinui- ty of the MTS scheme Among farmers Between farmers and taun- gya leaders Farmers vs. FSD Farmers vs. others*

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A farmer’s failure to plant trees despite several warnings by either taungya leaders or the FSD results in crop destruction by the FSD. The respondents were of the opinion that both the farmers and the FSD should share the blame because some farmers delib- erately refuse to plant trees based on their belief that trees impede the development of the food crops if they are planted first. On the other hand, delays in the supply of seed- lings by the FSD also affect the survival and growth success of the seedlings.

Boundary-related conflicts were mentioned more frequently in Kunsu-Nyamebe- kyere No. 3 (41%) than in Chirayaso (18%). They triggered multiple effects in the vil- lages, including arguments, fighting, misunderstanding, quarrels, hatred, summons from the authorities (chiefs, elders and taungya leaders), illegal farming, a loss of interest in engaging in the plantation scheme, the destruction of crops, disagreements and threats.

Boundary-related conflicts occur during land preparation when the vegetation is burnt and boundary lines become blurred, and also occur during plot distribution in the planting season, when people encroach on each other’s plots. The study revealed that most respondents (53%) classify boundary-related conflicts as non-violent, with only 8% reporting them as being violent (Table 8.4).

Table 8.4 Respondents opinions about conflicts severity

Conflict issues Frequency (n) and percentage (%) in the two communities(N*=185) Chirayaso Kunsu-Nyamebekyere No. 3 Total Non- violent Violent Non- violent Violent Non- violent Violent Boundary-related is- sues 30 (16%) 5 (3%) 68 (37%) 10 (5%) 98 (53%) 15 (8%) Disproportionate allo- cation of forestland 41 (22%) 9 (5%) 7 (4%) - 48 (26%) 9 (5%) Destruction of food crops by FSD officials 3 (1%) - 6 (3%) - 9 (4%) -

Payment of fees for land preparation

4 (2%) - 2 (1%) - 6 (3%) -

* Seven respondents who reported conflicts of this category did not respond to this question.

Conflicts arising because of the disproportionate allocation of forestland cause griev- ances and protest, which almost resulted in violent clashes, especially in Chirayaso vil- lage. However, prompt intervention by the FSD official in charge of the area and the chief and elders of the village helped to ensure a peaceful end to the demonstration.

Other effects mentioned were quarrels among disputants, which often involved the invoking of ‘gods’ (curses8

), and fighting that occasionally resulted in injuries. This type of conflict is seasonal and occurs during plot allocation and is perceived as non- violent.

Similarly, according to the respondents, the destruction of crops by the FSD results in feelings of hatred, fighting, misunderstandings and land confiscation by FC officials.

8 _{Invoking of ‘gods’ (curses) is a local way of dealing with problems, and employed especially when a} person is falsely accused. The accused person calls on the ‘gods’ to be a mediator or judge in the con- flict situation. It has spiritual implications. If the accused person is indeed innocent, then the accusing person gets sick until some rituals are performed to help him or her to recover or to die peacefully.

Box 8.2 Conflict scenario and conflict management processes in the Chirayaso community

Conflict type: Conflicts arising from disproportionate allocation of MTS plots among MTS farmers.

Conflict issue: Some of the people in Chirayaso did not gain access to forestland under the MTS during the 2009 allocation season.

Conflict actors: This conflict involved the executives of the MTS and some citizens of Chirayaso who were denied access to an MTS plot for farming.

Causes and effects of the conflict: The disproportionate allocation of plots by the executives resulted in about 58 community members not having access to MTS land to farm. The people who did not gain access to the land demonstrated in the community with red clothes tied around their wrist and head to indicate the serious- ness of the problem. The matter was then reported to the chief and elders as well as to the FSD official in charge of the area. Some days were set for resolution proc- esses to take place.

Mode of conflict management: facilitation, mediation and field verification

The conflict management approaches employed by the mediators in 2009 were a blend of facilitation and mediation, with key mediators being the FSD field official and the chief and elders. Other actors present in the management process were the taungya executives, forest guard, beneficiary taungya members, representatives of demonstrators (aggrieved farmers), and a teacher who acted as a secretary. The FSD official facilitated the resolution process by asking the taungya head to explain the allocation process used to distribute plots to the people. The head declared that the number of plots allocated was 120 plots (15 ha) measuring 25 by 50 m for each farmer. The opportunity was given to the demonstrators to respond, but nobody disputed the head’s pronouncement. The facilitator therefore said the process of dividing the demarcated area by the leaders was wrong because it should have been twenty-eight hectares instead of fifteen. He also said that the taungya leaders did not adhere to his instructions and asked for the list showing the number of peo- ple registered for the scheme (139 people). However, it was ascertained that 123 people had been registered instead of the 139 referred to by the taungya head. During the process, a person commented that the taungya leaders had taken four plots each instead of one plot to be allocated to the farmers. Nevertheless, the women among them argued that, in view of the task of the taungya leaders, they should be entitled to the four plots to which the audience agreed. Thirty-two plots were therefore given to the eight taungya leaders, leaving a balance of eighty-eighta plots to be shared among 139 people. It was realised that fifty-one b people would then not have access to the plots and, in order to provide for these people, the FSD official, together with the chief and elders, called for field verification. The resolution process was also used to elect new taungya leaders, with the rationale being that the old leaders had been involved in the disproportionate allocation of MTS plots and allegedly had taken money from some farmers without providing them with plots. The chief asked the FSD official to investigate the monetary issue to unearth the truth of the matter.

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In Chirayaso, for example, the denial of plots despite fee payment resulted in a demon- stration that led to extra demarcation of land to the aggrieved farmers.

Within the conflict category of institutional and operational conflict, the actors in- volved use a blend of conflict management approaches to manage the conflict inci- dences (Figure 8.5), with meditation preventing boundary-related conflicts and conflicts about the disproportionate allocation of MTS plots by MTS executives (94% of the re- spondents referred to the respective conflict categories). Mediation was also used to resolve non-payment of fees for land preparation (67% of the respondents referred to this conflict category). Dialogues, the re-demarcation of plots to clarify boundary lines or plot re-allocation were often used to complement mediation. The most frequent ap- proach is for taungya leaders to resolve conflicts that involve two ordinary farmers. However, in the case of conflicts that involve aggrieved farmers and taungya leaders, mediation parties like the chief and elders and the range supervisor(s) are called in.

(cont’d) The second resolution session took place in the field to verify the names of the farmers against each documented plot. The FSD official and the old and new lead- ers of taungya visited the designated plots in the forest in the company of some community members. The verification began when the FSD official started calling the names of people to stand beside their plots. Plot 12 was declared as being owned by the taungya head. However, plot 12 was not among the plots allocated to the taungya heads. Similarly, the owners of plots 15 and 16 were not identified, and there was controversy about who owned plots 26 and 27. Upon seeing that the claims made by the agitated farmers against the leaders were true, the FSD official did not continue the verification process because the discrepancies were obvious. Instead he provided the 58 demonstrators with additional portions of the degraded area to restore peace within the community. However, he reprimanded the old lead- ers for their action and warned the new leaders not to engage in such act.

After the field visit, the FSD official and the taungya leaders visited the chiefs’ pal- ace, where he debriefed him on the incidences that happened during the inspection and informed the chief and elders of the actions taken.

Actions taken

 The facilitator provided the demonstrators with portions of degraded land to re- store peace to the community.

 It was agreed among community members that executives should have 4 plots of land, compared to one each for ordinary members.

 The FSD official promised the chief and elders to investigate the monetary is- sues.

 New executives were elected.

a

Consequently, 88 plots still need to be shared instead of 91 as reported in the minutes.

b

The number of people who did not get access to the plots is 51 instead of 54 as indicated in the minutes due to a wrong calculation.

Negotiation was reported to be used in boundary-related issues where farmers agree to mutually resolve their differences amicably (referred to by 6% of the respondents reporting on this conflict category). Coercion was mentioned exclusively in relation to conflicts arising from farmers refusing to plant trees and as the sole strategy to ‘solve’ these conflicts, and referred to the force applied by the FSD when it destroys crops of the disobedient farmers.

Conflicts resulting from competing claims

Twenty respondents (9% of the total of 212 respondents) mentioned three conflict issues in this category. The issues are food crop theft, the destruction of crops and trees through the use of fire for hunting9 and crop and tree damage by chainsaw operators. All these issues are inter-group conflicts that occur between farmers and actors outside the group. Within this category, the majority of the respondents (70%) mentioned food crop theft, while 25% of the respondents reported logging damage by chainsaw millers. Only one person reported the conflict between farmers and hunters. Crop damage by chain- saw millers occurs during the illegal felling of trees, especially when the farmer is ab- sent from the field for some time. Respondents perceived the motives behind the actions

9 _{Hunters light firewood and leave it at the entrance of holes where games like rats hide. The smoke} from the firewood prevents the animals from escaping.

Figure 8.5 Conflict management strategies employed in the institutional and operational conflict category (N =192)

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of the chainsaw millers to be greed, but with a manifest cause of refusal to pay compen- sation. In most instances, the offenders are not found but, when identified, the parties employ negotiation with compensation paid to the farmer to resolve the conflict.

Conflicts emanating from food crop theft prevail among farmers or between farmers and other community members. Poverty or greed is perceived as the underlying causes of such conflicts, which are characterised by agitation and suspicion, especially when the offenders are not caught. The respondents revealed that such incidences are often reported to the chief and his elders or to the Unit Committee members. In the case of the offender not being identified, the chief issues a warning to the citizenry to desist from the act through a public announcement (the beating of the local gong-gong). If the of- fender is arrested, the chief and elders in the company of the Unit Committee try to re- solve the problem through mediation (Figure 8.6).

In this conflict category, avoidance was reported to occur in all the three issues, with the result being that some conflicts were never resolved because disputants pretended not to recognise their existence or offenders were not seen. These kinds of conflicts were all characterised as non-violent.

Anticipated conflicts resulting from uncertainty about the future and means of overcoming them

Even though the above conflict categories are mostly managed amicably, the local peo- ple anticipated potential conflicts in the near future. The first issue is how to share the 40% of the timber revenue among individual farmers when the trees mature. The basis of this concern is that the 40% share benefit is assigned to the group as a whole despite

Figure 8.6 Conflict management strategies employed in the competing claims category (n=20)

the farmers establishing their tree plots with different degrees of success which means that it will be extremely difficult to identify individual farmers’ planted trees and meas- ure their exact contribution to the scheme at the end of the rotation period. In other words, the farmers are going to be entitled to an equal share, which they consider to be