Disproportionate radiation risk
90% o f Taiwan’s nuclear waste come from the three nuclear power plants, while very small amounts o f nuclear waste are from industry, medical and research activities. Nuclear power plants share about 30% o f electricity supplies, which is seen to help to maintain a stable energy supply and continuous economic growth after the first energy crisis, and bring Taiwan’s political stability and national security. However, the nuclear power plant operation has led to the domestic dilemma o f nuclear waste management, which involves issues o f equal distribution. As previously mentioned, spent fuel is temporarily stored in the pools o f each nuclear power plant, while most low-level nuclear waste has been stored on Orchid Island since 1982. The remote areas with low population density tend to be chosen as nuclear waste storage sites because it is seen as easier to get higher public acceptance and could minimize risks. Local residents around the three nuclear power plants usually pay more attention to the safety o f nuclear power plant rather than nuclear waste storage. Issues o f the risk o f nuclear power plant operation and the argument for its closure are not the question this thesis addressed. Figure 1.4 shows that nuclear waste facilities are located in peripheral areas.
Mainland China Taiwan Strait Wuchiu Taiwan Orchid g Island o.4
Figure 1.4 The distribution of nuclear waste facilities in Taiwan Note:
a. Spent fuel is stored in the three nuclear power plants: No.l (1978- ), No.2 (1981-) and No.3 (1984- ). No.4 is under construction.
b. Low-level nuclear waste is stored on Orchid Island (1982-). c. Wuchiu was chosen as one of the priority for permanent
storage in 1998. It is close to Mainland China (about 10-20 nautical miles).
Kasperson (1983: x-xi) argues that nuclear waste storage at particular sites is to diffuse benefits to society at large but concentrated risks, which tends to ‘put risks disproportionately on rural, economically depressed, and politically powerless peoples.’ Hoffman (2001) also argues that the gap between the distribution o f nuclear costs and benefits is significant in the American context. He claims that the majority o f nuclear-generated electricity flows to customers east o f the Mississippi. But the adverse impacts are largely experienced by residents o f the Indian community, and the compensation offered by the U.S. government is simply incommensurate with the damages (p. 463).
The nuclear waste repository on Orchid Island (see Appendix III for photos o f Orchid Island) has caused disproportionately adverse impacts on the Yami tribe (see Chapter 4), although no evident o f obvious negative impact on the Yami health and the environment o f Orchid Island related to the nuclear waste repository has been found (Taiwan Power Company, 1997, 2002). The decision to set up an interim nuclear waste repository on Orchid Island was made in the late 1970s. The site selection process was dominated by the Atomic Energy Council, which was hidden and privileged access for technocrats without consulting the public. Such authoritarian governance and closed policy-making processes during the martial law period could make decisions efficiently, but it has led to Yami distrust and follow-up conflicts (see Chapter 4, 5 and 6). The rumours about a ‘military harbour’ or ‘cannery’ spread out when the special dock for shipment started to be constructed in 1976, because the Yami had no access to the information. To clarify the rumours and misunderstandings, government officials simply explained the selection criteria by document and emphasized that Orchid Island is the best choice for the repository from the perspective o f experts (Hung, 1998: 13-14). On the other hand, there is research claiming that the Yami were told that the government was building a fish-canning factory for Orchid Islanders (e.g. Li et al., 1992; Wei, 1994).
The Yami’s anti-nuclear waste movement, supported by Christian church and environmental groups and broader social groups, has forced Taipower to halt further shipments in 1996, and any plans o f expansion o f the Orchid Island dumping site were suspended. However, it caused the Yami to suspect that Taipower was trying to continue to ship nuclear waste to their homeland when the workers o f Taipower were carrying out routine checks o f the repository on Orchid Island in November 2000.15
The Yami also got Taipower’s promise to remove the repository from their homeland by the end o f 2002. In order to solve the siting dilemma o f nuclear waste, Taipower has developed an incentive and compensation scheme, and a technical screening program.
Taipower’s incentive and compensation scheme
Taipower has set up guidelines on the great financial benefits for local communities who are willing to host low-level nuclear waste storage facilities. Some remote and poor communities have voiced their interest at the early stage o f the site selecting process, but no community has reached consensus to accept the storage facilities. Taipower’s scheme is also known as a program searching for volunteer communities to accept nuclear waste, because volunteers have the opportunity to withdraw before their making the final decision. Similar measures have been adopted in other countries to solve their nuclear waste problems, such as Sweden, Canada, and Spain (Blowers, 2000).
Such a ‘volunteer’ program is problematic because it involves great financial incentives and people’s anticipation o f a reward, which is different from the action to donate blood or help the poor in the world. Instead, it seems to be a bargain, a monetary or material deal. Canada’s experience is a good example. It happens that what a ‘volunteer’ community asks may be too high a price to pay, since the government has not been prepared to respond to community’s requirement for employment (Blowers, 2000).
It reflects the complexity o f the social dimension o f the nuclear waste problem. There are some local government officials or legislators expressing their interest in Taipower’s scheme, while local residents are strongly against the proposal. The
payment offered by Taipower will be used for local development or be distributed to local permanent residents. It happens that those who work and live in the big city and seldom go back to their remote hometown, their registered permanent residence, welcome the repository, because they will not suffer negative impact directly although they will get the compensation. However, the communities that express their willingness to host the repository are usually viewed as money-lovers, sacrificing the environment for the incentives. Those communities showing the interest in the program tended to experience pressure from local people, environmental groups and neighbouring villages after disclosure by the media, and then they gave up signing an agreement with Taipower (Atomic Energy Council, 2003).
The risk o f nuclear waste cannot be smelt, touched or observed with the naked eye. The information asymmetry might cause poor communities to be driven by financial needs without knowing the potential risk or to accept nuclear waste under the poverty-stricken condition or the pressure o f political power. Blowers et al. (1991: 21) argue that compensation is based on political expediency rather than ethical principles, and non-monetary incentives are required, such as independent monitoring, transparent information, public control over facility closure. The incentive scheme and issues o f compensation would be regarded differently for local residents in particular contexts (see chapter 4).
Taipower’s technical screening program
Taipower’s technical screening program has been launched as no local communities have agreed to accept the intensive program o f hosting a nuclear waste repository. Wuchiu, an isle o ff Mainland China’s southeast province o f Fujian, was selected as the priority candidate site for investigation in 1998 (see Figure 1.4). There
are other candidate sites on the list, including one small isle belong to Orchid Island, and towns o f Taitung County in the rural areas o f east coast (Taiwan Power Company, 2001: 8). It caused the Yami’s resentment at Taipower’s choosing their isle as one o f the option; local residents in Taitung also protested against the project.16 After the completion o f the early environmental impact assessment in August 2001, Taipower and the government proposed to compensate households in Wuchiu and to ask them to move. Local residents in Wuchiu organised a petition against the project, held a demonstration and lobbied in order to try to influence public opinions and change Taipower’s plan.17
People might argue that relocation could provide a solution to the dilemmas o f siting the nuclear waste repository. However, Seley and Wolpert (1983: 80) argue that it would result in an inequitable impact on those who are forced to move because o f the new nuclear waste facility. It may cause immeasurable psychological hardship even if the financial compensation is provided to a new home or business, especially for long-time residents and old people. Seley and Wolpert’s argument provide resonance with the Yami case discussed in Chapter 4, 5 and 6.
Taipower would need to take China’s position on this plan into consideration because Wuchiu is much closer to Mainland China than Taiwan. Although Taipower and the Taiwanese government can emphasize that the decision is legal and safe, no one could ensure that the government in Beijing would not use any means possible to stop the shipment. It might cause Chinese fishermen’s opposition or the disputes over sovereignty as well. Such difficulty in seeking a domestic nuclear waste storage site leads to Taipower’s eyeing the possible overseas alternatives. But the domestic dilemma could cause international disputes and generate another new dilemma.
16 Taipei Times, 01/05/03. Taitung protests nuclear dumping. Available at