RECOMENDACIONES PLAN DE

assess a high provider concentration as well as an increase over time for 1994, 1997 and 1998.

The concentration ratios tend to be higher than in comparable studies for the German audit market.

31 Stefani (2006) proves a dominance of PwC (52.1%) towards Ernst

& Young (24.5%) and KPMG (21.1%) for 2002.

32 Breitkreuz/M ueßig (2010)

the Swiss audit market is divided as well on the Big Three. Deloitte has a minor market share, while Ernst & Young, KPMG and PwC have over time a relative consistent market share of approximately 95%. The concentration ratios are over time relative stable.

33

Gary and Andrea (2015)

United States

We find that firms employing a CSO and exhibiting poor environmental performance, relative to other firms in their industry, prefer to report sustainability results without assurance. While we do find that larger firms in the U.S. are significantly less likely to employ assurance, this result decreases over time.

Further, we provide initial evidence that the value-relevance of sustainability assurance is increasing with time.

34

Beck and Mauldin (2014)

United States

Our findings suggest a more complex relationship between the CFO and the audit committee than current regulations recognize and cast doubt on the ability of regulation to force one structure on the negotiation process.

35

Bruynseels and Cardinaels (2014)

United States

In particular, we find that firms whose audit committees have ―friendship‖ ties to the CEO purchase fewer audit services and engage more in earnings management. Auditors are also less likely to issue going-concern opinions or to report internal control weaknesses when friendship ties are present.

On the other hand, social ties formed through

―advice networks‖ do not seem to hamper the quality of audit committee oversight.

36

Chen, Srinidhi, Tsang, and Yu (2016)

United states We find that audit fees are positively associated with the likelihood of standalone CSR report issuance, and this positive association becomes stronger when managers perceive a greater need for credibility, i.e., when CSR reports are longer or issued with external assurance, when firms have strong CSR concerns, and when reports are issued sporadically.

Corroborating our results, we find that CSR reports

issued by firms committing to high audit fees

accelerate the incorporation of future earnings

information into current stock price. Taken together,

our findings suggest that a commitment to higher

financial reporting quality has the potential to bring

positive externality to firms' nonfinancial disclosures

and ultimately affects the issuance of CSR reports.

37

Fonda,Wongb and Lic (1999)

China Our findings suggest that government regulation alone is insufficient to create financial markets that foster auditor independence

38

Gula, Kimb andQiuc (2010)

China We show that synchronicity is a concave function of ownership by the largest shareholder with its maximum at an approximate 50% level. Further, we find that synchronicity is higher when the largest shareholder is government related. We also find that foreign ownership and auditor quality are inversely associated with synchronicity. Finally, we show that the amount of earnings information reflected in stock returns is lower for firms with high synchronicity.

39 Sanja and

Mateja (2015) Croatia

The characteristics of the audit market in Croatia are investigated, with a focus on market concentration measured by standard measures such as the

Concentration rate, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and the Gini coefficient. According to market shares based on total clients‘ assets and revenues, the audit market for listed companies is moderately to highly concentrated, with a decrease in the five-year period (2013 compared to 2008).

In contrast to the German and UK studies, they used of the

G-coefficients, CR and HHI with moderately high concentration.

40 Guo (2014) China

regional market concentration for domestic-listed firms is positively related to audit fees and negatively related to audit quality; in less

concentrated regional markets, abnormal audit fees have a positive association with audit quality;

however, this association is weaker in highly concentrated regional markets. As market concentration increases, monopoly auditors can extract abnormally high profits without additional effort; thus, abnormal audit fees in concentrated markets are more likely to capture the auditor-client economic bonding that may impair audit quality.

41

Allen, Jere and Taylora (1995)

Australia The development of both brand name reputation and industry specialization by Big 8 auditors is argued to be costly and therefore to increase audit fees. For a sample of 1484 Australian publicly listed companies we estimate audit fee premia for Big 8 auditors. On average, industry specialist Big 8 auditors earn a 34% premium over no specialist Big 8 auditors, and the Big 8 brand name premium over non-Big 8 auditors averages around 30%. These results support that industry expertise is a dimension of the demand for higher quality Big 8 audits and a basis for within Big 8 product differentiation.

42

Sirois and Simunic ( 2011)

UK Based on this model, we predict how certain market characteristics, namely market size and investor protection regime, affect the structure of the auditing industry and differences between Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit quality and fees. In the model, audit

technology plays a central role in determining the

level of audit quality and fees as Big 4 auditors

compete on both quality and price through fixed

investments in technology, the level of which is

increasing in both market size and the level of

investor protection. The model offers a coherent

explanation for the documented ‗Big 4/non-Big 4

dichotomy‘ and dual structure of the industry.

43

Jere , Michas and Seavey ( 2011)

Columbia Thus concentration within the Big 4 group appears to be detrimental to audit quality in a country and of legitimate concern to regulators and policymakers.

However, Big 4 dominance per se does not appear to harm audit quality and is in fact associated with higher earnings quality, after controlling for other country characteristics that potentially affect earnings quality.

44

Joanna L. Ho and Fei Kang (2013)

Our results also show that family firms, on average, incur lower audit fees than non-family firms, which is driven by family firms' lower demand for external auditing services and auditors' perceived lower audit risk for family firms. Our additional analysis

indicates that the tendency of family firms to hire non-top-tier auditors and to pay lower audit fees is stronger when family owners actively monitor their

45

Eshleman, Lawson (2016)

United States

We find that audit market concentration is associated with significantly higher audit fees, consistent with the concerns of regulators and managers. We also find that increases in audit market concentration are associated with fewer initial engagement fee discounts (i.e., reduced lowballing), particularly for non-Big 4 clients. We reconcile our findings with those of prior research and find that our divergent findings are attributable to controls for MSA fixed effects. In supplemental analyses, we find that audit market concentration is associated with higher audit quality. We also find that concentration is associated with higher audit quality for first-year engagements, but only if the auditor does not lowball on the engagement. Our results are relevant to the ongoing debate regarding the consequences of increased concentration within the U.S. audit market (GAO 2003, 2008).

Audit Market Structure and Audit Pricing

46

Leuphana and Stiglbauer (2012)

UK Results show that EC reforms cannot clearly be related to increase audit quality but increasing transaction costs.

Audit Market Concentration and Its Influence on Audit Quality

47

Boone, Khurana and Raman (2012)

United States

Our findings hold after accounting for the effects of concentration on audit fees, the potential

endogeneity of concentration, and other variables identified in the prior literature to affect audit quality. A separate analysis of the earnings distributions for all companies covered by IBES during 2003-09 also suggests that higher

concentration increases clients‘ propensity to just beat (rather than just miss) the analysts‘ earnings forecast. Collectively, our findings are consistent with the misgivings expressed by policy makers, i.e., that oligopolistic dominance of the audit market by the Big 4 fosters complacency among auditors resulting in a more lenient and less skeptical approach to audits and lowers service quality.

Audit Market

Concentration and

Auditor Tolerance

for Earnings

Management

48

Azibi and Velte(2015)

Tunisia The link between joint audits and audit quality is still controversial. Then, the main results of empirical research on joint audit are focused. A clear positive link between joint audits and audit quality cannot be found, but there is strong evidence for higher audit costs which could lead to an increased price competition. Insofar, a lower audit market concentration by joint audits is not generally connected with higher audit quality, because there are many corporate governance interactions. To test this hypothesis, we use a sample of 306 Germany and French companies between 2008 and 2012.

Empirical results demonstrate unclear effect of the joint audit on audit quality in these two countries.

Are Joint Audits a Proper Instrument for Increased Audit Quality?

49

Aron T.

(2008)

UK In the absence of scale economies I show that the presence of moral hazard results in a convergence towards market concentration regardless of the intensity of competition. On the other hand, the dynamics leading to market concentration reduces moral hazard even when prices do not increase with concentration (e.g. Bertrand competition). Therefore, the main policy implication is that market

concentration can be effective against moral hazard and as such, welfare increasing. The model is suitable to explain the puzzling market

transformation of industries such as banking, health care and audit.

The Great Industry Gamble: Market Structure Dynamics with Moral Hazard

50

Joha and Günther (2014)

Germany We observe a fee premium for BIG-4 auditors in both market segments when applying an aggregated BIG-4 variable as well as looking at these audit firms separately. This suggests product differentiation as the root for higher prices and competitive audit pricing refuting regulators' concerns of monopolistic pricing behavior due to a high market concentration.

This is supported by a Fee Cutting effect.

Furthermore, our results demonstrate that similar to listed firms audit pricing for private firms is

influenced by client's size, complexity and risk factors.

The Big-4 Premium in the German Audit Market for Listed and Private Firms

51

Dirk and Zein (2014)

Germany The result could be of special interest for standard setters, e.g. the European Commission, which is currently revising EU audit regulation. Further, the analysis may serve as an instrument to analyze economic consequences of future changes of regulation.

Audit Market Segmentation –The Impact of Mid-Tier Firms on

Competition

52

Marianne O.

(2009)

United States

In arriving at the conclusion that the benefits

associated with the external investor model outweigh the possible risks it generates, the paper not only considers theories on managerial behaviour and ownership structure, but also gives attention to the safeguards for audit independence as listed under the 2002 Statutory Auditors‘ Independence in the EU: A Set of Fundamental Principles, and the 2006

Statutory Audit Directive. It will also consider why, in view of the limitations and restrictions placed on audit firms, with particular reference to the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, actions aimed at encouraging

Regulating the International Audit Market and the Removal of Barriers to Entry:

The Provision of

Non Audit Services

by Audit Firms and

the 2006 Statutory

Audit Directive

new market players at EU level, whilst ensuring that auditors‘ independence and audit quality are not compromised, would also require a consideration of an international dimension of issues involved in lowering barriers to entry.

53

Bleibtreu and Stefani (2015)

Germany Our results indicate that prohibiting general non-audit services that actually do not impair independence can indeed further in-crease

concentration. Moreover, a ban on these services can even decrease the quality of the audited financial statements because the average probability that managers will misreport in-creases. Our model predicts the opposite effects resulting from a prohibition on audit-related non-audit services. We find that the effects of prohibiting the supply of non-audit services depend crucially on the time at which the non-audit fees are negotiated.

The

Interdependence between the Structure of the Audit Market and the Quality of Audited Financial Statements: The Case of Non-Audit Services

54

Ettredge, Sherwood and Sun (2016)

United States

We find that higher levels of OCR are associated with smaller audit fee levels paid by NAFs in the shock year of 2004, and smaller fee increases from 2003 to 2004. HERF does not perform as a (reverse) proxy for competition in either year. We then investigate the associations of OCR and HERF with fee levels in three more recent years, 2010-2012. We again find that OCR outperforms HERF. In

additional analyses we investigate the associations of OCR and HERF with three measures of AQ in the 2010-2012 period: absolute discretionary accruals, misstatements of audited data, and auditors‘

propensity to issue first-time going concern modified opinions to potentially distressed clients. We find some evidence that competition, measured as OCR but not as HERF, is associated with improved AQ (i.e. reduced likelihood of misstatements and higher likelihood of going concern opinions). In summary, OCR appears to be an effective proxy for

competition in the audit fees context. It also is significantly associated with AQ metrics although to a lesser extent. We find no evidence that HERF serves as a (reverse) proxy for competition.

Metro Audit Market

Competition, Audit Fees and Audit Quality

55 Romero et al.

(1995) Spain

The first and only country-specific study determine a clear increase in the concentration for 250 companies in the period 1991-93. Since the implementation of the audit requirements, the dominance of the Big Six can be assessed. Their market share grows between the years 1991-93 from 83% to 95%.

Is there any

country-specific

study in Nigeria?

In document Diagnóstico de las necesidades de formación de los docentes de Bachillerato del Colegio Tècnico “Guillermo Mensi” de la ciudad Cuenca provincia del Azuay, durante el año lectivo 2012-1013 (página 188-192)