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6. Seguimiento al desempeño de las IOCP UR. Elabora programa de visitas

6.2. Recuperación de bienes

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THE ORANGE REVOLUTION

LOSES ITS ZEST

MICHAEL FOLEY

ONE YEAR ON, UKRAINIANS HAVE LOST FAITH IN THEIR NEW GOVERNMENT AND THE MEDIA IS ALL AT SEA IN THE RUN UP TO MARCH ELECTIONS

One Kyiv newspaper’s analysis of Ukraine’s first year under the Orange Revolution led with the headline: ‘One year later what’s the difference’. The

paper did, however, go on to list the many changes that had taken place in the year since thousands of people camped out on Kyiv’s busiest street,

Khreschatyk, and in Independence Square calling for fair elections and eventually ensuring the victory of their hero, Viktor Yushchenko. One year on and President Yushchenko’s image is somewhat tarnished.

Thousands came to see him and celebrate his first anniversary, but spirits were muted. It was not the cold, rain, snow and slush underfoot: the citizens of the capital are used to such things. It was more that this exercise in revolutionary democracy, which delivered a banker to the highest office in Ukraine, was meant to deliver more.

However, on the night itself – 22 November 2005 – thousands jostled their way into Independence Square, along with an impressive number of riot police. But even as they arrived to swell the crowd, many were already leaving, long before Yushchenko spoke. The Ukrainians know how to put on an impressive show: they came with hundreds of orange flags on telescopic flag poles while all along the street, people were selling the orange tee-shirts, scarves and mugs that were such a hit last year. Meanwhile, on the platform with its giant

screens, a political soap opera was playing out.

Some months earlier, Yushchenko had sacked his prime minister Yulia

Tymoshenko, the second half of the heroic ‘revolutionary’ double act, but this did not keep her away from the celebrations. Yushchenko welcomed her with a kiss on the cheek, but if the crowd was hoping for a reconciliation they were disappointed. When she was criticised by Yushchenko, Tymoshenko folded her arms and appeared to cry; when the crowd chanted her name, Yushchenko stood patiently then chided the crowd for its rudeness in preventing his speech. Tymoshenko is a cross between Eva Peron and Marianne, the French symbol of revolution. She is striking looking (her picture adorns t-shorts, flags and

badges) and her image was as much an icon of the revolution as was

Yushchenko’s pock-marked faced, caused, as we now know, by an attempt to poison him. She understands the power of her image perfectly. Her blonde hair is always in a braid across the top of her hair, which for Ukrainians is highly symbolic. For them, she is both modern and a reminder of the peasant folk traditions so beloved by Ukrainian nationalists. She was brought to the stage on the shoulders of her supporters dressed in a white coat and an orange scarf with a Ukrainian flag clutched in her hand. She looked like the embodiment of the nation: a nineteenth century nationalist figure in modern day Ukraine, with an eye on next March’s parliamentary elections. You do not need a detailed understanding of semiotics to see her image as pure theatre, pure media. The media has been central to Ukraine’s development since 1991 and its fortunes a useful indicator of the health of civil society. For a number of years, it was one of the most dangerous places to be a journalist. During last year’s

round, it was a decision of journalists at one of the country’s television services to declare they would operate with an unusual degree of impartiality that

helped ensure Yushchenko’s victory. The declaration also highlighted the normal highly partisan behaviour of a media that was either state-owned and unfailing in its support of government, or so called independent, which usually supported some sort of power interest. It was also a system in which editors were served with temniki, or unofficial edicts from the administration, which dictated what should and should not be covered. What was lacking was anything that might be called impartial: a media that covered events in the interests of the electorate rather than of its owners and benefactors. Now, some journalists working for opposition TV networks took to sporting orange items of clothing and badges supporting Yushchenko on air.

Today, most observers agree that one of the pluses since the Orange Revolution has been press freedom and a degree of transparency. There has been a huge decline in press harassment from the central authorities and a corresponding decline in the number of reports of pressure on journalists from local

authorities. During his speech in Independence Square, Yushchenko talked of his support for independent journalism. Yet many in the profession are

disappointed that there has been so little movement in the investigation into the killing of journalist Georgy Gongadze, a murder that has become a touchstone of how far Ukraine has travelled on the media front.

On 16 September 2000, 31-year-old journalist Georgy Gongadze, publisher of the Internet journal Ukrainska Pravda, disappeared (Index 1/03, 3/03, 2/04, 3/04). He was later found headless in a ditch in a suburb of Kyiv. He had been investigating corruption at the heart of President Leonid Kuchma’s administra- tion. At least two more journalists have been killed since.

At the time, it caused barely a ripple outside Ukraine, but the case against the alleged killers of Gongadze has just been sent to the country’s Supreme Court. The decapitation of the young reporter is now seen as a slow-burning flame that grew with others into the conflagration of last year’s Orange Revolution. But the glacial progress of the murder inquiry encapsulates both the ills of Ukraine’s ancien re ́gime and the disillusionment of many people who helped topple it.

Two former policemen are expected to stand trial for the murder of Gongadze, but Kuchma denies ordering the killing, and many Ukrainians believe

Yushchenko has granted him immunity from prosecution as part of the political deal. Kuchma’s former interior minister and an ex-police general have been accused of planning the murder: the minister was shot dead in March, hours before he faced questioning about the case, while the police chief has

disappeared. For Gongadze’s relatives, for the international journalism bodies that have taken an interest in the case, as for many Ukrainians generally, the Orange Revolution has many questions left to answer.

The much publicised Yushchenko-Tymoshenko divorce was only a sympton of the crumbling of the Orange team. As the economy slumped, in-fighting within the government burst into the open when the president’s chief-of-staff quit and accused his inner circle of being more corrupt than the ousted cronies of the former Moscow-backed president. Yushchenko’s sacking of Tymoshenko prompted old allies to brand him a traitor to the revolution, and the heckling grew when he struck a deal with Viktor Yanukovich, his Kuchma-backed opponent in 2004’s election. The president also agreed not to prosecute pro- Yanukovich officials who helped rig the elections that triggered the revolution. Now, with the two figureheads of the revolution likely to split the pro-reform vote in parliamentary elections in March, polls put Yanukovich in the lead. The January dismissal of the entire government by the Rada (parliament) has been challenged by the justice ministry, but it seems uncertain what steps

Yuschenko can take to remedy this. According to State Secretary Oleh Rybachuk, a key test for the leadership is to ensure ‘honest and transparent’ parliamentary elections in March and prevent undue manipulation by those currently in office.

In office, Yushchenko launched many reforms, but most have run into the ground. The media, meanwhile, happily charts the infighting at the top of the administration and its failure to sort out the economy, end corruption or even find out who poisoned the president. Although Yushchenko himself is not tainted by corruption, the media has focused on the high living and fast cars of his 19- year-old son, and his bizarre attempt to patent the slogan of the

revolution: ‘Tak’, Ukrainian for ‘Yes’.

The English-language Kyiv Post, in an analysis piece suggested that the decline in the popularity of both Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, whose standing in the polls has tumbled to well below 20 per cent, can actually be blamed on the media: ‘Of course, much of the appearance of disarray in Ukraine’s new

administration can be blamed on the emergence of a free press that is no longer afraid to criticise top officials.’

What the Orange Revolution did not do was end the tradition of the media’s political engagement, but there is now some internal confusion. With political alliances being forged and broken and new ones being forged again, it is often difficult for the media to work out if it is for or against the government,

especially with two of the original groups within the Orange Revolution forming both the government and elements of the opposition. Former pro- government media do not know how to be oppositional; former opposition newspapers, radio and television stations suffer the same situation in reverse. Few understand the real meaning of media impartiality or objectivity. Most opt for criticism of those in power with little supporting evidence for their position. The Ukrainian media has a low level of professional skills. Maintaining a professional distance from the subject of news is something new; questioning,

journalists are not trained to do. At the same time, low salaries have

encouraged chequebook journalism. One public relations practitioner suggested he actually helped maintain a free media by subsidising so many journalists’ pay in this way. He saw nothing wrong, questionable or bizarre in this.

The changes brought in by the Orange Revolution were hardly likely to change the quality of reporting news and current affairs overnight; both print and broadcast journalists mostly work according to post-Soviet standards characterised by excessive and uncritical attention to central and local

government’s official decisions and spend little time investigating behind the scenes. But with greater press freedom, some have begun to focus on how well the Ukrainian media actually does its job. No doubt there have been major changes in Ukrainian society, but by and large, the media has been left floundering.

Michael Foley is a lecturer in journalism at the Dublin Institute of Technology. He has been working on curriculum reform at journalism schools in Bulgaria and Ukraine

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