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The hegemony of quantification within psychology actually has its roots in the Western Enlight- enment period – when faith fell out of fashion and reason took its place. During this time mathematics also underwent a transformation from a discrete, insular discipline into a universal language that could be applied to other disciplines, allowing it to become the language of quan- tification in any scientific field (Frängsmyr 1990). This history set the stage for psychology to embrace quantitative methods and thereby help prove it was a ‘real’ science.

And certainly, Western psychology did come to accept quantitative methods as the route to knowledge early in its disciplinary history. Two major sources are typically cited as influential in the transformation that swept psychology in the nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries: psychophysics and mental testing. Gustav Fechner is credited as the father of psychophysics, a field which took as its mission the measurement of psychological phenomena via discrete units of physical sensation (for a history of Fechner’s career in psychophysics, see Heidelberger 2004). Mental testing was the earliest iteration of psychological assessment in the form of intelligence testing, or the first attempts to capture mental capacity in discrete, measureable units (see e.g. Goodenough 1949 for a more thorough description of the origin of mental testing). The revo- lution lay in the belief that the leap from the internal world of the research subject to a tangible, behavioural representation was justified and scientifically sound.

Many historians have noted important contextual influences that allowed psychophysics and mental testing to come into existence and be widely embraced. Hornstein’s (1988) his- tory points out that neither movement was without its detractors or without debate, but each profoundly shaped the future of experimental psychology nonetheless. The wider cultural embrace of technology as a result of industrialization, along with the increasing need for social control, were political forces that supported the use of psychological science. Hornstein argues that the acceptance of these methods allowed psychologists of the time to focus on the meth- ods of their science rather than its theory. This focus allowed them to avoid the uncomfortable and unanswered question of whether psychological phenomena were, in fact, measurable, and if these measures had any real meaning. Embracing quantitative methods in both psychophys- ics and mental testing provided considerable benefits to the profession, including facilitating communication between researchers as a result of standardized methods of experimentation and evaluation.

The link between widespread acceptance of quantitative methodology and the positivistic paradigm in psychology also owes some debt to the professionalization of psychology at the end of the nineteenth century. This process involved, in part, distancing psychology from the discipline of philosophy, as the natural sciences had long since done, and from philosophy’s intro- spective methods of knowledge production as a means of garnering legitimacy and its related benefits (Coon 1993). This professionalization process came with an attendant set of values, ones that were key to psychology’s place at the science table: positivism, objectivism, and the belief in value-free knowledge (Hoshmand and Polkinghorne 1992; Morawski 2011).

Largely in the latter half of the twentieth century, criticism of quantitative methods them- selves as well as their dominance in psychology arose most often from advocates of qualitative methods (e.g. Ponterotto 2005a). These critiques addressed the limitations of quantitative meth- ods, arguing for the use of qualitative ones, but did so in a way that dichotomized and often pitted the methods against each other in methodological debates. For example, quantitative researchers have argued for the advantages of these methods (e.g. the increased ease of standard- ization, generalization, and dissemination of results, and their congruence with evidence-based practice). The assumption that a quantitative approach is objective and value-neutral, however, has come under fire. Specifically, the claim of value-neutrality glosses examination of the ways in which quantitative methods may reify social inequalities (Fine 2011), and produce research results that have limited clinical (Hunsley 2007; Ioannidis 2005) as well as multicultural (Burman 2007) utility.

Critical psychology’s contributions

As critical psychologists have noted, the central role of quantification within psychology is inex- orably linked to the discipline’s need to be seen as a ‘real’ science, and concomitantly, the prestige associated with scientificity (Morawski 1985; Teo 2009; Toomela 2010). Unlike other scientific disciplines, however, psychology has had to grapple with a fundamental ontological question: what is – and what should be – psychology’s proper subject matter, behaviour or conscious- ness (lived experience)? What are psychology’s epistemic commitments as it struggles to define itself and interpret its goals as a science? Thus, the contributions that critical psychologists have made in terms of critiquing quantitative methods must be seen as part of a much larger debate about the relationship between epistemology (how the world/experience/behaviour is known and represented) and ontology (what the world/experience/behaviour ‘really’ is). Here we will review critiques of quantitative methods within the context of how science is interpreted in psychology. We also discuss how phenomenological, feminist, and critical psychologists have helped to deconstruct the ‘quantitative/qualitative divide,’ and we address some of the political, ethical, and social policy implications of transcending this divide.

Psychology as a human science

The meaning of science within psychology has been contested since the discipline’s break with philosophy. Yet this contestation has not received adequate attention within mainstream psychology. As a result, critiques of the hegemony of quantification – frequently referred to as the quantitative/qualitative divide – have focused on issues of methodology. However, as described below, the ‘quantitative imperative’ (Michell 1990, 2003) developed out of a particular view of sci- ence and thus is as much an epistemic and ontological achievement as it is a methodological one. Edmond Husserl, often referred to as the founder of phenomenology, described what he saw as an epistemological ‘crisis’ in psychology and the social sciences more generally in the early 1900s:

Quantitative methods

without a proper philosophical grounding the focus was shifting from description to causality. This shift led psychology to commit the dangerous error of ‘naturalizing’ consciousness – upholding the subject/object dichotomy and treating lived experience as if it were a thing that could be measured (Husserl 1970; Jennings 1986; see also Cosgrove and McHugh 2008). Hus- serl, and later other phenomenological psychologists (e.g. Giorgi 1985), argued not for a simple return to psychology qua philosophy, but rather argued for a philosophically grounded empirical psychology. The problem was not that psychology turned toward science per se. Rather, the problem was that it turned toward a particular version of science – a positivist empiricist model that objectified its subject matter, believed that the methods of the natural sciences were the only valid route to knowledge, and failed to appreciate the sociopolitical grounding of expe- rience. Husserl laid the groundwork for later phenomenological psychologists to argue that psychology should be (re)conceptualized as a (philosophically grounded) human science – one which understood the limits of purely psychological explanations of lived experience.

Thus, since the beginning of the discipline’s break with philosophy, there were attempts to address the larger epistemological and political issues at stake. Indeed, if these issues and concerns had not been marginalized within mainstream psychology, perhaps the field could have avoided the reductionism inherent in the quantitative/qualitative debate, for conceptualizing psychology as a philosophically-grounded human science does not mean that one must eschew quantita- tive methods. Quantitative methods may be a helpful resource provided that researchers using these methods adopt what Westerman and Yanchar (2011) refer to as an interpretive (rather than objectivist) view of inquiry. An interpretive view of inquiry is one that is consistent with a reflexive, contextual approach and does not succumb to a classical view of measurement (i.e. quantification is the only valid and reliable route to knowledge). Westerman and Yanchar (2011: 144, emphasis added) sum this point up well: ‘[N]umerical data will be useful if they are endemic and thus relevant to the lived experiences under investigation, that is, if they are based on everyday, practical numeracy’. From this perspective, statistical significance is not the Holy Grail, but is simply another way for psychologists to use scientific inquiry in the service of social justice. Laboratory research and quantitative methods can be employed in a way that is consistent with the narrative emphasis and philosophical anthropology of a human science approach. Insofar as researchers understand that statistics tell stories and serve rhetorical purposes (Billing 1994), and in so doing produce certain realities/meanings and marginalize others, there is nothing inherently incompatible with using quantitative methods to investigate what Husserl termed the Lebenswelt or lifeworld.

Guild interests, positivism, and quantification

The over-emphasis on quantitative methodology must also be understood in terms of the field’s guild interests. For example, the recent push for prescription privileges for psychologists can be seen as promoting guild interests in a way that sustains the hegemony of quantification; many critical psychologists see this push as being dictated by the pressure of managed care, and by loyalty to the tradition of positivism and quantification (Ball et al. 2009; Cushman 2000; Hayes et al. 1995). In the applied psychologies, (e.g. clinical psychology), the positivist view of science was reified in the Boulder scientist-practitioner model, which makes clear a division between the ‘science’ of positivistic, quantitative research and the methods of psychology in practice and emphasizes a one-way flow of knowledge from researcher to practitioner (Chwalisz 2003; Hoshmand and Polkinghorne 1992). The Boulder model was promoted as unique to the train- ing of psychologists and thus served the profession’s guild interests; it afforded a level of prestige and helped differentiate psychology from related mental health fields.

Guild interests are also manifest in mainstream psychology’s uncritical endorsement of the evidence-based practice (EBP) movement. Critical psychologists have noted the conflation of EBP with quantification and measurement, and the lack of theorizing about the ethical and conceptual framework that grounds it. Yet mainstream psychology has embraced EBP; it is strongly encouraged by leading agencies in the profession (APA 2006; Hunsley 2007), reflected in the content of training curricula (Pontoretto 2005b), and required in order to be compet- itive by funding agencies. The National Institutes of Health (NIH), in its research guidelines, defines research integrity in terms of a value-neutral definition of objectivity and emphasizes the importance of statistical procedures and replication of ‘experiments’ in publications (NIH 2007, 2012). Also, when funding agencies encourage the use of mixed-methods designs, they require researchers to provide evidence of validity of their qualitative data by using the con- ceptual framework of a quantitative approach – such as using software programs to structure sampling and demographic information and to categorize narrative data quantitatively. Despite the emphasis on mixed methods, many authors acknowledge the difficulties of integrating the two methodologies because of unexamined differences in their philosophy (Sale et al. 2002). It is necessary to critically examine implicit differences in their underlying conceptual, norma- tive, and ethical frameworks. Otherwise, invitations to combine approaches through the use of ‘mixed methods’ simply reproduce the positivist tradition (Giddings and Grant 2007).

Feminist contributions and quandaries

It is important to emphasize that confidence intervals, p-values, and MANOVAS are not the enemy. Quantitative methods – such as comparisons of group means – can be used in the ser- vice of social justice. For example, advocates of quantitative research such as feminist empiricists could use the practice of comparisons of group means to try and better understand ‘within cell differences’ (e.g. differences among women) and ‘between cell similarities’ (e.g. similarities between men and women or girls and boys) (Stewart and McDermott 2004). Quantitative methods could therefore be used to disrupt inaccurate beliefs in gender differences and be used to inform public policy. For example, Hyde (2005) reviewed meta-analyses that compared males and females on a variety of constructs in support of the ‘gender similarities hypothesis’. In con- trast to the popular gender differences model, Hyde found support that men and women are largely similar; 78 per cent of the results from meta-analyses on gender differences yielded effect sizes of 0.35 or smaller. Hyde also reviewed research supporting the influence of context on the appearance of differences between men and women and discussed the results of her review in terms of the social and political costs of the gender differences model. Although Hyde does not identify as a critical psychologist, her research is grounded in a similar framework; she interro- gates the social and political costs of the epistemic commitments she makes as a researcher.

However, some feminists have been harshly critical of the ways in which the ‘institutionaliza- tion of a quantitative perspective in psychology’ (Hornstein 1988: 3) has led to oppressive stere- otypes, social practices, and institutions. For example, standpoint theorists maintain that gender differences exist and researchers should challenge stereotypes by using qualitative methods to identify, describe, and celebrate gender differences. Feminist standpoint theorists appreciate the fact that quantitative methods:

were introduced at a time when psychology was struggling to transform itself into a science and American society was engaged in developing new means of controlling an increasing heterogeneous population. . . . [P]sychology has of necessity had to form alliances with such agents of social control as government, education and the military. . . . [I]t is not surprising

Quantitative methods

therefore that American psychology has increasingly advanced a view which has empha- sized control, prediction, and classification.

(Hornstein 1988: 24) Thus, historically there has been a clash between feminist empiricists like Hyde (2005) who believe that researchers should ‘fight with science’s own tools’ (Hubbard 1988) and standpoint theorists who maintain that narrative approaches are more consistent with a social justice focus. This clash is an example of how polarizing the quantitative/qualitative divide can be when the predominant focus is on methods rather than on the normative frameworks and epistemic com- mitments that should ground our methodological choices.

Initial attempts to bridge this divide within feminist psychology, as well as in psychology more broadly, led to calls for ‘methodological pluralism’. (Indeed, the very phrase ‘mixed meth- ods’ is still de rigueur in academe.) Advocates suggested a rather simplistic solution: the call for pluralism was essentially an additive approach. Both statistical techniques as well as narrative methods could be used to understand psychological phenomena. However, implicit in the call for pluralism was the belief that quantitative methods were needed (and privileged) in the search for objective data and causes of behaviour. Qualitative approaches were helpful insofar as they could give the researcher access to participants’ ‘subjective’ experiences. The call for plu- ralism still left the terms (and power dynamics) of the debate intact – the subjective/objective dichotomy remained unchallenged and ‘real,’ ‘hard’ data could only be obtained through quan- titative measures. Moreover, the recommendation of methodological pluralism as a counter to the ‘institutionalization of quantification’ is grounded in naïve realism (Michell 2003). A naïve realist view assumes that experience is something one ‘has’, and that one can know the world/ experience and represent it accurately, whether by words or numbers.

‘Beyond the pluralist compromise’ (Morawski 2011: 272)

Many feminist and critical psychologists have argued that because of the hegemony of quan- titative methods, real dialogue in the field about the relationship between epistemology and methodology has been undermined (see e.g. Morawski 2011; Ussher 1999). There is a clear need for a more nuanced discussion of power dynamics, representation, and how best to capture the sociopolitical grounding of experience. Unfortunately, however, the quantitative/qualitative divide tends to pit one side against the other in a debate solely or predominantly about methods. For example, qualitative researchers often position themselves as being uniquely able to obtain more valid and useful data; they can give voice to marginalized groups in a way that investiga- tors using quantitative methods cannot. However, as Brinberg and McGrath (1985: 13) astutely note, ‘validity is not a commodity that can be purchased with techniques’. Critical psychologists have shown that it is not only quantitative researchers who are committed to a naïve realist view (see e.g. Michell 2003; Morawski 2011); some narrative approaches position the researcher as an ‘omniscient narrator and summarizer’ (Flyvbjerg 2001: 86) of individuals’ experiences.

In contrast to the ‘pluralist compromise,’ critical psychologists recognize the impossibility of any method, in and of itself, as a guarantor of truth. They argue that it is theoretically weak and politically problematic to accept mainstream psychology’s individual-society dualism, to assume that the individual is a fixed entity ‘rather than the product of historically specific prac- tices of social regulation’ (Henriques et al. 1998: 13). Critical psychologists thus emphasize the relationship between knowledge and power. In fact, over twenty years ago Prilleltensky (1989) insightfully described the ways in which psychology’s failure to fully interrogate this relationship led the field to reinforce, rather than challenge, the status quo – regardless of the psychologist’s

approach. For the critical psychologist, the question of what it means to generate knowledge in an unjust world (Lather 1991) needs to be at the foreground of all psychological inquiry.

Therefore, one way out of the pluralist compromise is to challenge the naïve realism that pervades both quantitative and qualitative approaches (Michell 2003). If psychological research is to live up to its emancipatory potential, researchers must recognize that experience can be epis- temically substantive but never epistemically self-sufficient (Alcoff 1997). That is, consciousness [experience] is constituted; it is ‘something produced rather than the source of social ideas about the world’ (Henriques et al. 1998: 8). Researchers will be less likely to be tethered to a particular methodology if they avoid the ‘false ontology of experience’ and see subjectivity itself as being produced. Thus, from a critical psychological perspective, moving beyond pluralism should not be equated with giving qualitative methods equal status. Regardless of one’s method (narra- tive or statistical), certain epistemic commitments must be made: one must use an interpretive framework, challenge the individual-society dualism, and understand the subject as a product of positions and discourses.

Conclusion and future directions

As demonstrated in this chapter, throughout much of its history the discipline of psychology has been struggling to establish its own ‘scientificity’ primarily through its quantitative orien- tation. Critical psychologists have shown that disciplinary insecurity and a lack of theorization of key concepts such as validity and objectivity have contributed to the field’s obsession with quantitative research designs. The assumption within mainstream psychology is that validity and reliability can be purchased – with quantitative techniques. This assumption has been referred to as ‘methodolatry’ (Bakan 1967), and ‘methodologism’ (Teo 2009), and has led to the perception that methodology, ontology, and epistemology are separate domains and independent from one another. However, it is impossible to develop robust research designs and choose appropriate research methods without considering the interdependence among all three domains. Teo (2009: 44) sums this point up well, ‘[Methodologism] is a research practice in which the subject matter is secondary but the method has primacy’. Thus, one of the main goals in critical psychology is to resist unhelpful and reductive dichotomies (e.g., the qualitative/quantitative divide) and to bring greater attention to the importance of exploring the epistemological bases of our meth- odological and research design choices.

Resisting the pull of unnecessary dichotomies also has practical implications. Critical psy- chologists need to engage more with mainstream psychologists who use quantitative approaches. Such collaborations will continue to invigorate dialogue about methods and theory; researchers using quantitative methods will be less likely to reify the individual/society dualism and these collaborations will help critical psychologists develop new and innovative ways to incorpo- rate quantitative methods within an interpretive framework. For example, there has been a recent influx of members from Divisions 24 (Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology) and