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Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. - A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.

The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations. (6a)

Q: How do you execute a judgment?

A: You file a motion for execution before the same court which rendered the judgment.

Q: How is the execution enforced?

A: There are two 2 modes under Section 6:

1.) Execution by motion – within five (5) years from the date of its entry;

and

2.) Execution by independent action if the five year period to execute by motion has elapsed with no motion having been filed and before it is barred by the statute of limitations..

Execution BY MOTION means that the prevailing party shall ask the court to issue a writ of execution by simply filing a motion in the same case.

EXAMPLE: I am the plaintiff and I have a judgment here against the defendant. I do not know of any assets of the defendant because the defendant for the meantime is as poor as a rat. But after a certain period of time he becomes a wealthy man. All I have to do is to file a motion and the court will order the execution, provided the motion is filed within 5 years from the date of the entry of judgment. The date of the entry of judgment and the date of finality are the same (Rule 36, Section 2).

Lifetime of a writ of execution

The writ shall continue in effect during the period within which the judgment may be enforced by motion (Sec. 14). Hence, the writ is enforceable within the five-year period from entry of judgment as provided for in Sec. 6 because within that period, the writ may be enforced by motion. This is an amendment to the old rule (Sec. 11 R 39) which provided that the lifetime of the writ was 60 days from the receipt of the writ by the officer required to enforce it.

Q: Suppose the defendant becomes rich after 5 years, can I still file a motion to execute?

A: No more, because execution by motion must be filed within 5 years only from the date of its entry. If the judgment was not executed within the 5-year period, the judgment has become dormant.

A writ of execution issued by motion of the prevailing party after five (5) years from the date of entry of the judgment is null and void. There is then a need for the prevailing party to file an independent action for the revival of the judgment before the action is barred by the statute of limitations (Tag Fibers, Inc.

vs. NLRC 344 SCRA 29; Terry vs. People 314 SCRA 669).

It was held that if the writ of execution was issued and the levy made within five years from the entry of the judgment, the auction sale may be made even after the five-year period. The sale of the property and the application of the proceeds are merely the means to carry out the writ of execution and a levy already validly made. Accordingly, the levy is the essential act by which the property is set apart for the satisfaction of the judgment (Gov’t. vs Echaus 71 Phil. 318; Quiambao vs. Manila Motor Co., 3 SCRA 444). The sale must however, be made within ten years during which the judgment can be enforced (Ansaldo vs. Fidelity & Surety Company, 84 Phil. 547; Jalandoni vs. PNB 108 SCRA 102).

Q: What is a dormant judgment?

A: A DORMANT judgment is one that was not executed within 5 years.

Revival of Judgment

Q: So, how can that (dormant) judgment be awaken?

A: The procedure is to file another civil action. A civil action for revival of judgment. That is what you call EXECUTION BY INDEPENDENT ACTION which must be filed before it is barred by the statute of limitations. The second sentence states, “after the lapse of such time (which is 5 years) and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.”

Q: When will it be barred by the statute of limitations ?

A: According to Article 1144 of the New Civil Code, the judgment may be enforced only within ten (10) years.

The ten-year period commences to run from the finality of the judgment which is the period within which the judgment can be enforced (Art. 1152 in relation to Art. 1144[3], Civil Code). Because under the Rules, the date of the finality of the judgment or final order shall be deemed to be the date of entry (Sec. 2 R 36) the period shall run also from the date of entry of the judgment.

An action for revival of judgment presupposes that the same can no longer be enforced by mere motion. This means that from the date of the finality of the judgment no motion was filed for the execution of said judgment, thus, the need for its enforcement by action.

The action for revival of judgment is no more than a procedural means of securing the execution of a previous judgment which has become dormant after the passage of five years without it being executed upon motion of the prevailing party (Saligumba vs. Palanog GR 143365 December 4, 2008).

The action to revive a judgment must be filed within ten years from the date the judgment becomes final because an action to enforce a judgment prescribes in ten years from the finality of the judgment (Art. 1144[3] in relation to Art. 1152, Civil Code of the Philippines). Since the date of the finality of the judgment or final order shall be deemed to be the date of the entry (Sec. 2 R 36), the prescriptive period shall run from the date of entry of the judgment.

When a judgment is revived under Section 6, such revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within 5 years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action also before it is barred by the statute of limitations (Sec. 6).

Revived judgment a new judgment

A revived judgment is deemed a new judgment separate and distinct from the original judgment. It is not a continuation of the original judgment. The action to revive the judgment is a new action and results in a new judgment constituting a new cause of action with a new period of limitation. Hence, the ten (10) year period to revive the revived judgment shall commence to run from the date of the finality of the revived judgment and not from the date of finality of the old, original judgment (PNB vs. Bondoc 14 SCRA 770).

While this ruling was abandoned in PNB vs. Deloso 23 SCRA 266 and Luzon Surety Co. Inc. vs. IAC GR 72645 June 30, 1987, which held that the ten-year period should run from the finality of the original judgment and not from the finality of the revived judgment, the ruling in Bondoc was resurrected in the

present provision of Section 6 which declares in its last sentence that “The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.”

The SC had long ago ruled that after the lapse of five (5) years, the judgment

“is reduced to a mere right of action in favor of the person whom it favors which must be enforced, as are all ordinary actions, by the institution of a complaint in the regular form” (Compana General de Tobacos vs. Martinez and Nolan 29 Phil.

515; Aldeguer vs. Gemelo 68 Phil. 421).

If the prevailing party fails to have the decision enforced by a motion after the lapse of five years from the date of entry of the judgment, the said judgment is reduced to a right of action which must be enforced by the institution of the complaint in a regular court within ten years from the time the judgment became final (Bausa vs. Heirs of Juan Dino GR 167281 August 28, 2008).

Action for Revival not to reopen any issue affecting the merits of the judgment

An action for revival of judgment is not intended to reopen any issue affecting the merits of the judgment debtor’s case nor the propriety or the correctness of the first judgment. It is a new and independent action wherein the cause of action is the decision itself and not the merits of the action upon which the judgment sought to be enforced is rendered (Juco vs. Heirs of Tomas Siy Chung Fu GR 150233 February 16, 2005; Saligumba vs. Palanog, supra). It is an “original action, not a mere incident of the primitive suit or a mere auxiliary or supplemental remedy” (Aldeguer vs. Gemelo 68 Phil. 421).

The purpose of the new action is not to reexamine and retry issues already decided and the cause of action of this new action is the judgment to be revived and no identity of causes of action can be said to exist between the first and the second actions (Caina vs. CA GR 114393 Dec. 14 1994). GThe consideration of any issue affecting matters that could have been raised in the previous case must be deemed as definitely foreclosed (Phil. Reconstruction Corp. Inc. Vs. Aparente 45 SCRA 217). It is not meant to retry the case all over again (Enriquez vs. CA 372 SCRA 372).

Riano’s comment:

If the action to revive a judgment (or an action upon a judgment is according to Aldeguer vs. Gemelo a new cause of action and not a continuation of the old, it should not, in this sense, be dependent upon the previous action for its

jurisdictional requirements and does not necessarily have to be filed in the same court which rendered the judgment.

It is submitted that the new action, i.e.., to revive the judgment would necessarily raise the fundamental issues of whether or not the plaintiff has a right to have the judgment revived and to have a new right of enforcement from its revival, issues that by nature are incapable of pecuniary estimation. Inevitably, a litigant may find himself in a situation where he files the action in the RTC to revive a judgment rendered by a MTC.

It is submitted that it is in this light that the 1957 case of Torrefranca et al., vs.

Albiso 102 Phil. 732 should be re-examined.

The facts had their origins in an action to revive a judgment filed in the same court which, more than five years ago, rendered a judgment in an action for forcible entry against the defendant. The defendant opposed the action but the justice of the court declared the judgment revived. The subsequent appeal to the CFI was dismissed and plaintiff went to the SC on a question of law – whether or not a justice of the peace has the authority to revive its own judgment.

The SC ruled that the Judiciary Act of 1948 gave justice of peace courts jurisdiction over actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer “and also empowers them … to issue all processes necessary to enforce their judgments and orders. Needless to say, the revival of a judgment is a necessary step in its enforcement…”

The rationale of Torrefranca in sustaining the power of the court to revive its own judgment is clearly predicated on the jurisdiction of the trial court over the case of forcible entry. The ruling obviously assumes that the revived judgment is a continuation of the old judgment and viewed the revival of the judgment as merely incidental to or ancillary to the execution of the original judgment.

This rationale does not fall squarely with the more recent pronouncements of the Court that an action to revive a judgment is a new cause of action and not a mere continuation of the original action.

Venue of revival of judgment action-

In Infante vs. Aran Builders Inc. GR 156596, August 24, 2007, the Court xplained thus:

“… the proper venue depends on the determination of whether the present action for revival of judgment is a real action or a personal action … if the action for revival of judgment affects title to or possession of real property, or interest

therein, then it is a real action that must be filed with the court of the place where the real property is located. If such action does not fall under the category of real actions, it is then a personal action that may be filed with the court of the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides…”

When the five-year period to execute by motion may be interrupted

In many instances, the delays in the execution of the judgment were through causes clearly attributable to the judgment debtor as when he employs legal maneuvers to block the enforcement of the judgment. Delays attributable to the defendant have the effect of suspending the running of the prescriptive period for the enforcement of the judgment (Potenciano vs. Mariano 93 SCRA 463;

Camacho vs. CA 287 SCRA 611; Republic vs. CA 260 SCRA 344).

There are instances where the Court allowed execution by motion even after the lapse of five years upon meritorious grounds. These exceptions have one common denominator, and that is, the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage. It has been held that in computing the time limit for enforcing a final judgment, the general rule is that the time when the execution is stayed, either by agreement of the parties for a definite time, by injunction, or by the taking of an appeal or writ of error, shall not be included. Thus, the time during which execution is stayed should be excluded, and the said time will be extended by any delay occasioned by the debtor as when the writ of execution cannot be enforced within the five-year period because the debtor filed petitions in the CA and in the SC challenging the trial court’s judgment as well as the writ of execution. Such petitions suspended or interrupted the further enforcement of the writ (Yau vs.

Silverio GR 158848; Macapagal vs. Gako GR 171994, February 4, 2008).

The period may also be interrupted by the agreement of the parties to suspend the enforcement of the judgment (Torralba vs. de los Angeles 96 SCRA 69; Macias vs. Lim 431 SCRA 20).

When 5 and 10 year periods do not apply

The periods do not apply to (a) special proceedings, such as land registration and cadastral cases, wherein the right to ask for a writ of possession does not prescribe (Rodil vs. Benedicto 95 SCRA 137; (b) judgments for support which do not become dormant and which can always be executed by motion despite lapse of the five-year period because the obligation is a continuing one and the court never loses jurisdiction to enforce the same (Canonizado vs. Benitez 127 SCRA 610).

Therefore, since the judgment will be enforced by motion for five (5) years, then after the fifth year, it will be enforced by independent action. So, I will start the civil action for revival of judgment between or after the 5th year but before the 10th year. So, that is what we have to remember.

Q: Do you mean to tell me that I have to file the case all over again, practically repeating what happened 5 years ago?

A: NO, because the judgment in the independent action is a judgment reviving the first judgment.

For example, more than 5 years ago I sued you to collect on a promissory note and you alleged payment, and you lost and the court said that you are liable to me. On the seventh year when I revived that judgment, my rights are no longer based or derived on the promissory note but on such judgment. But you can still invoke other defenses such as lack of jurisdiction, fraud. But you cannot question the correctness of the original judgment because that is already res adjudicata.

You are entitled to put up any defense that you have against me provided that you cannot question the correctness of the original judgment. That is the rule.

Q: Discuss briefly the nature of the action for enforcement of a dormant judgment.

A: The action for enforcement of a dormant judgment is an ordinary civil action the object of which is two-fold, namely, (a) to revive the dormant judgment, and (b) to execute the judgment reviving it, if it grants the plaintiff any relief. Hence, the rights of the judgment-creditor depend upon the second judgment. Being an ordinary civil action, it is subject to all defenses, objections and counterclaims which the judgment-debtor may have except that no inquiry can be made as to the merits of the first judgment. Therefore, defenses that do not go to the merits of the first judgment, such as lack of jurisdiction, collusion, fraud, or prescription, may be set up by the judgment-debtor. (Cia. Gral. De Tabacos vs. Martinez, 17 Phil. 160; Salvante vs. Ubi Cruz, 88 Phil. 236) [Taken from Remedial Law Reviewer by Nuevas]

Q: Give the exception to the rule on dormant judgment.

A: The only exception is the judgment for support which does not become dormant, nor does it prescribe. You can execute it anytime even beyond the 5-year period and any unpaid installment may be executed by motion. (Florendo vs. Organo, 90 Phil. 483) So, even if the judgment is more than 5 years old, the defendant defaulted on the seventh year, you just file a motion to collect that judgment.

Q: Suppose the judgment was executed and the property of the defendant was levied on the 4th year, and the next stage is the auction sale.

A: The SC said the auction sale must also be WITHIN 10 years. So, even if the property was levied, the auction sale must be within 10 years. Not only the levy of the property must be done within 10 years but also the including the auction sale, otherwise, any auction sale done beyond 10 years in null and void.

Now, look at the last sentence in Section 6: “The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.”

For example, I have here a judgment nine (9) years ago. I want to enforce it by action to revive judgment. You mean to tell me that the revived judgment is good for another ten (10) years? Another 5 years for motion to a right of action and then I can still revive it within 10 years?

Alright, in the original case of PNB vs. BONDOC (14 SCRA 770), the SC said that the period applies all over again from the finality of the revived judgment.

So, you have another ten (10) years. However, this principle is abandoned in the later case of PNB vs. VELOSO (32 SCRA 266), the SC said that the original period is only computed from the date of the original judgment.

And of course, because of those 2 conflicting cases, the court resolved those issues in the case of LUZON SURETY CO. vs. IAC (151 SCRA 652) where the SC

And of course, because of those 2 conflicting cases, the court resolved those issues in the case of LUZON SURETY CO. vs. IAC (151 SCRA 652) where the SC