Resultados descriptivos

Furthermore, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) - now African Union (AU) – also supported the territorial unity of the DRC. The OAU was founded on May 25, 1963. At that time the attempts at secession of Katanga and South Kasai were already put down. Thus, the OAU dealt with the creation of the People’s Republic of the Congo established in 1964 within the territory of the DRC.

With regard to the territorial integrity of the African states, the OAU had already decided to honour colonial boundaries irrespective of how arbitrarily they might have been. This is referring to the principle of uti possidetis explained in sub-section 1.6.2.2. The key principle enshrined in the OAU Charter regarding this question is principle 3 of the Article III that is expressed as follows:

The Member States, in pursuit of the purposes stated in Article III solemnly affirm and declare their adherence to the following principles: ... 3. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence (OAU Charter 1963).

When the Central Government of the DRC experienced secessionism, the most influential member states of the OAU such as Ghana, Guinea-Conakry, Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania, were led by the Pan-Africanists. Most African leaders were friendly towards the followers of Lumumba who established the People's Republic of the Congo. The latter was, thus, receiving logistical assistance and diplomatic support from those African states. This implies that the resolution of the OAU did not outright support the Central Government of the DRC led by the pro-Western and former secessionist Moise Tshombe. But the OAU did prefer reconciliation and thus implied unity of the DRC.

The Resolution of the Third Extra Ordinary session of the council of ministers held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 5 to 10 September 1964, regarding the threat of the territorial integrity of the DRC when People's Republic of the Congo was established is as follows:

The Council of Minister of the Organization of African Unity meeting in its Third Extra-Ordinary Session in Addis Ababa, from 5 to 10 September 1964, to examine the Congolese problem, its repercussions on the neighboring States and on the African scene at large,

Having studied the message addressed to it by several African Heads of State and Government, especially that of President Kasavubu expressing his conviction that the solution to the Congolese problem should be found within the Organization of African Unity,

Having noted the invitations of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) and the Kingdom of Burundi to the OAU to send a fact-finding and goodwill mission to their countries to seek means of restoring normal relations between the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of Congo and the Kingdom of Burundi,

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Taking note of the statement by the Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Congo indicating his efforts and desire to bring about a national reconciliation in his country,

Deeply concerned by the deteriorating situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo resulting from foreign intervention as well as use of mercenaries principally recruitment from the racist countries of South African and Southern Rhodesia,

Reaffirming the resolutions of the Organization of African Unity inviting all African States to abstain from any relationship whatsoever with the Government of South Africa because of its policy of apartheid, Considering that foreign intervention and the use of mercenaries has unfortunate effects on the neighbouring independent States as well as on the struggle for national liberation in Angola, Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique and the other territories in the region which are still under colonial domination, and constitutes a serious threat to peace in the African continent,

Convinced that the solution to the Congolese problem although essentially political, depends on the pursuit of national reconciliation and the restoration or order, so as to permit stability, economic development of the Congo, as well as the safeguarding of its territorial integrity,

Deeply conscious of the responsibilities and of the competence of the Organization of African Unity to find a peaceful solution to all the problems and differences which affect peace and security in the African continent,

1. APPEALS to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to stop immediately the recruitment of mercenaries and to expel as soon as possible all mercenaries of whatever origin who are already in the Congo so as to facilitate an African solution; 2. NOTES the solemn undertaking of the Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to guarantee the security of combatants who lay down their arms; 3. REQUESTS especially all those new fighting to cease hostilities so as to seek with the help of the Organization of African Unity, a solution that would make possible national reconciliation and the restoration of order in the Congo; 4. APPEALS to all the political of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to seek, by all appropriate means, to restore and consolidate national reconciliation; 5. DECIDES to set up and to send immediately to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) and the Kingdom of Burundi an AdHoc Commission consisting of Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Somalia, Tunisia, U.A.R., Upper Volta and placed under the effective Chairmanship of H.E. Jomo Kenyatta, Prime Minister of Kenya, which will have the following mandate:

(a) to help and encourage the efforts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the restoration of national reconciliation in conformity with paragraphs 2 and 3 above; (b) to seek by all possible means to bring about normal relations between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its neighbours, especially the Kingdom of Burundi and the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville); 6. INVITES this Commission to submit its report to the Administrative Secretary General, for immediate distribution to all Member States; 7. APPEALS strongly to all powers at present intervening in the internal affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to cease their interference. The Member States are further invited to give instructions to their diplomatic missions accredited to these powers with the view of impressing upon then this appeal; 8. REQUESTS all Member States to refrain from any action that might aggravate the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or worsen the relationship between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its neighbours; 9. and REQUESTS the Administrative Secretary-General to provide the commission with all the necessary assistance to accomplish its mission [OAU ECM/Res.5 (III)].

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This resolution was far away from solving the Congo Crises. Keesing's Record of World Events (1964) points out that the above resolution contained no decision on Tshombe's request for African troops because a motion to sanction the dispatch of such troops had been narrowly defeated, with Ethiopia abstaining and Madagascar absent–a fact which was believed to have led to Tshombe's abstention from voting on the resolution. On the other hand the resolution contained no call for an ‘immediate cease-fire’ and said nothing about the proposed Commission's powers, President Kasa-Vubu having sent a message that it should on no account have jurisdiction to help to mediate between Congolese parties (Keesing 1964:204). The OAU has neither declared illegal nor condemned the creation of People’s Republic of the Congo. It recommended rather the reconciliation of all Congolese politicians involved in the crisis. As mentioned earlier in sub-section 4.4.2.3, this breakaway state was ended militarily by the UN operation Red Dragon.

4.6 CONCLUSION

The focus in this chapter was on the nature of the centre-periphery relations at the time of the independence of the DRC and during the first series of attempts at secession. This investigation reveals that there was little that kept Leopoldville and the provinces together and that it was understandable that some provinces would regard the DRC as unmanageable and that secession would constitute attempts at making the administration more manageable and economically viable. The size and communication problems of the territory were important contributors in this regard.

Several factors, stemming from the centre-periphery relations, were at the origin of sentiments of secessionism in the DRC in the 1960s, namely:

First, there were important differences in the ethnic composition of the centre and the peripheries and also among the various provinces. Ethnicity therefore became an important factor in the relations between the centre and the periphery as well as in and among the various regions. By the time of independence, the rural population was more orientated towards the regional capitals than Leopoldville, because of their proximity to the regional capitals. Moving beyond the community warmth inspired a feeling of fear among the indigenous population of the peripheries distant from Leopoldville, which was mainly populated by the ethnic group Bakongo.

Second, administratively, the Central Government of the DRC was unable to be represented throughout the huge territory by reliable public servants who would oppose all threats to the territorial integrity of the state. Needless to say that administratively, the central authorities

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could hardly contact officials in remote areas due to the weakness of transport and telecommunication infrastructure aggravated by natural obstacles. This has contributed to a widening gap between the centre and the peripheries. At this stage it is important to understand that at this point there is an interesting intersection between theories of internal exploitation and the theory of right-sizing the state. The centre was able to extract resources and income from the peripheries but was not in a position to penetrate the peripheries effectively from an administrative point of view. This led to resentment – give more get less – but oddly it appears the fear of dominance by the centre was a reality and particularly in the case of Katanga which was somewhat more equal than the other peripheries. It was also the fear for the personality of Lumumba.

Third, from an economic perspective, a prominent characteristic of the peripheries is that the most important natural resources of the DRC are located there. Consequently, the largest mining companies of the DRC at independence were located in the restive peripheries, namely Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK) in Katanga, Société Internationale Forestière et Minière du Congo (FORMINIÈRE) in South Kasai, Office de Mines d’or de Kilo-Moto (OKIMO) in Oriental Province and Société Minière du Kivu (SOMINKI). The peripheries were in the position of a fear of dominance and exploitation by the centre. Whereas, as centre of political dominance, Leopoldville was in the position to use violence in order to exploit the peripheries.

Thus, with regard to the appeal of secessionism, the natural resources were a major determinant of secessionism in the DRC. The leaders of the restive provinces were unquestionably motivated to secede from the Central Government given the fabulous natural resources their regions enjoyed in comparison to other provinces of the DRC. The geographic concentration of mineral deposits in particular and their unequal distribution made the DRC for the most part prone to secessionism in the first half of 1960s. For that reason, the attempted secessions of the rich provinces would deprive the Central Government of substantial income from natural resources. The Katanga is definitely a striking case of the quest for self-determination based on the desire to take exclusive advantage of the rich concentration of natural resources in the province, such as strategic important deposits of cobalt and uranium. It was also industrially advanced compared to the rest of the DRC.

Fourth, from a political perspective, taking advantage of local leaders’ frustrations as a result of the implementation of a centralized unitary form of state by Lumumba, which excluded local specificities, secessionism in Katanga and South Kasai was externally encouraged by Belgium and other Western powers in order to create or maintain Western economic and geostrategic interests in the DRC. Subsequently, the creation of a breakaway state in Oriental Province, including Kivu Province, was motivated by ideological choice in favour of communism and supported by the major communist states of the world from the days of the Cold War.

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There were economic implications of the centre in the creation of the People’s Republic of the Congo insofar as there is a greater link between the ideology implemented by the centre and the type of economy in effect. Moyra Grant (2003) argues that communism is often perceived – especially from a liberal standpoint – as a philosophy of anti-individualism which denies the fundamental rights of private ownership and economic freedom. However, since these abstract

‘natural rights’ have only ever, in reality, applied to a minority of individuals even in the most affluent societies, the ethical virtues of communism continue to appeal to some people.

Communism embodies an ideal of freedom, from exploitation and want, as the natural consequence of economic equality. Communists would argue that capitalist ‘freedom’ is a friction, that economic exploitation and oppression are wholly inimical to any genuine freedom and that any belief in freedom under capitalism is simply the product of false consciousness (Grant 2003:26). Overall, the sentiment of exploitation of the peripheries by the Central Government sustained the creation of the secessionist movements in the three wealthiest restive provinces, particularly in Katanga and South Kasai, which were historically the biggest contributors to the national budget. Thus, the wealthiest provinces should imperatively remain part of the DRC for the survival of the centre. The principle that the provinces should give according to their means and receive according to their needs was applied, but found wanting among the restive peripheries.

The three attempted secessions would have been impossible without external support. What would have prompted secessionism would be the balance of power that was in favour of the breakaway states in view of the support they received from other countries. Thus, Sandra W.

Meditz and Tim Merrill (1993) argue that throughout the first five years of independence, the armed forces fragmented into several competing power centres, working for various ethnic political leaders as well as their own interests. A combination of ineffective national leadership and a chaotic political and social environment limited the ANC's ability to operate in a professional manner. As a result, the ANC was a national armed force in name only. It was not only incapable of protecting the country, but at times even threatened its existence. Only the performance of the UN forces in ending the 1960-63 secession of Katanga Province kept the DRC intact’ (Meditz and Merrill 1993:278).

The illegality of the three attempted secessions was ultimately established in terms of the DRC constitution. OAU of which the DRC was a member was also opposed to secession. The OAU in particular ‘guaranteed’ the territorial integrity. Moreover, the UN charter is hesitant on the issue of secession, including the works of the scholars of the right of secession. In addition, from an international law perspective, the right to secession also came into play.

It is true that the attempts at secessionism were in fact put down by external forces. They were all ended militarily, firstly by the operation military of the Congolese National Army against

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Autonomous Mining Republic of South Kasai, secondly by the UN intervention against State of Katanga and thirdly by a combined action of the forces of the UN and Congolese National Army against People’s Republic of the Congo. The fact is that at independence the centre was too weak to prevent breakaways and it could only quell the situation with the assistance of the international community. However, the breakaway states did not in the long run have sufficient power to be successful.

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CHAPTER 5