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Over the last few years, the media have been rife with reports probing cross-cultural differences in LGB rights. There have been frequent news reports about non-European countries persecuting people on the basis of their sexualities (see Chapter 1, ‘Homophobia varies across space and time’). The contrast between countries in their approach to gay rights prompted The Economist (www.economist.com) to run a cover story about what they called ‘The Gay Divide’ (see Figure 1). Seemingly, some of these countries had an increasing interest in identifying closeted LGB people. For example, the [Persian] Gulf Cooperation Council has reportedly looked for technological solutions (i.e., devices that could be described as ‘gay detectors’;

Szieckowski, 2013). On the contrary, some Western countries have been providing refuge to LGB people from countries with anti-gay laws. In March 2014 the BBC reported that people asking for asylum in the UK based on their sexuality ‘faced explicit questions and others were asked to hand over video evidence to prove their sexuality’ (‘Theresa May orders review…’, 2014, par. 2). In response to a series of similar news, #Mashed posted a satirical video about an alleged ‘gay detector’:

according to the video (a facetious advertisement for a machine named Intrusion by OppressiTech) the detector could be similarly useful for countries wanting to allow only gay asylum seekers (a British flag was shown) and to those intending to exclude gay people (a Qatari flag was shown; Mashed, 2013). While the UK and the Gulf countries clearly have opposite stances on sexuality, their preoccupation with the place of LGB people in their respective nations (either within or without) is remarkably parallel. The present chapter uses the tools of quantitative social psychology to disentangle the relationship between sexuality and ethno-cultural norms.

Sexuality and the nation have long been connected: sexual mores have been used historically to argue for the cultural superiority or inferiority of certain ethnic groups, countries or regions. For example, Europeans in the 19^th century referred to the perceived promiscuity of other peoples in order to justify colonialism (Pryke, 1998; see Chapter 1 for a review). As seen in the media examples above, certain voices in the West have used the relative acceptance and protection of LGB people in their countries to argue against non-Western people and cultures in the context of migration and of cultural and religious conflicts; this alignment of sexualities and nationalities has been called homonationalism (Puar, 2007). Most typically, Muslim

Figure 1.

The cover of The Economist (October 2014) contrasted Western and non-Western LGB rights policies. Note the use of contemporary Western visual clichés to represent gay rights (two disembodied, interlocked male-looking hands; the rainbow pattern in the title); also note the use of white to represent the “forward” West and black to represent the

“backward” East.

immigrants are seen as bringing in misogyny and homophobia to their (more progressive) host countries (see Caldwell, 2009, for a book-long example of this discourse). Moreover, Western tolerance towards gay people is sometimes used as a rhetorical tool to vilify Middle-Eastern countries and to justify wars against them (Puar, 2007; Butler, 2009). Conversely, many in Eastern Europe and other regions see gay rights campaigns as an unwelcome Western interference in their culture: in Chapter 5, I have shown how a gay pride parade has been construed as foreign by Romanian ultranationalists. Such a sexuality-nationality dynamic has been called heteronationalism (Gosine, 2009). As seen in the Discussion of Chapter 5 (and in the gay-detector examples above), homo- and heteronationalism are often similar in the way they enmesh sexuality and nationality. For convenience, I will jointly call the two sexualised nationalism.

For psychology, sexualised nationalism is interesting for at least two reasons.

First, it places issues of gender and sexuality in the same plane as ethnicity, race and religion. Moreover, it recruits sexuality for national (self-)definition, in addition to the more familiar territorial, linguistic, and religious criteria. (This aspect of sexualised nationalism has been explored in detail in Chapters 1 and 5.)Therefore, such binary pairs become possible as Muslim versus gay (Butler, 2009) and Romanian versus gay (Chapter 5; see also Nachescu, 2005). A classic study by Tajfel et al. (1971) found that categorising people into ingroup and outgroup leads to ingroup favouritism, i.e., the tendency to allocate more resources to one’s own group. Ingroup favouritism is not, however, limited to maximising the resources of one’s own group, but it also involves maximising the difference between the ingroup and the outgroup: resources are allocated in such a way that the ingroup shall get more than the outgroup (Tajfel et al., 1971; Turner, 1983). Difference maximisation will go as far as sacrificing some of the ingroup’s gains to ensure that the outgroup obtains comparatively less (Sidanius et al., 2007). Puar’s (2007) work suggests that Westerners regard LGB people as ingroup members in contrasts with a Muslim outgroup. Difference maximisation has been found when groups were defined by nationality (Sidanius et al., 2007) and by sexuality (Fasoli et al., 2015), but it remains an open question whether it would also occur in the case of sexualised nationalism. It is also an open question whether the

homo- and heteronationalistic discourses in the media can influence how people allocate resources to groups. In this chapter, I will assess whether the resource allocation bias described by Tajfel et al. (1971) is present in the case of the Muslim-versus-gay binary.

Second, sexualised nationalism complicates the relationship between homophobia and ethnic prejudice. Adorno et al. (1950) asserted that all prejudices (racism, sexism, homophobia etc.) were underlain by a personality trait they named authoritarianism. Scores of studies conducted since (including Chapter 4 of this thesis) have confirmed that homophobia and ethnic prejudice are positively related, and that both are predicted by authoritarianism. Such a value configuration is compatible with heteronationalism, whereby the same individuals reject foreigners and LGB people. But in individuals with homonationalistic beliefs, we expect to see low levels of homophobia paired with high levels of ethnic prejudice. This pattern is difficult to understand if we attribute both prejudices to the same root cause (i.e., authoritarianism), and therefore homonationalism might provide an alternative (or at least an important exception) to the authoritarian personality. The present chapter examines the implications of homonationalism for the authoritarian-personality hypothesis, and more broadly to the social psychology of prejudice.

Homonationalism has been the subject of much theoretical and discursive work, but seemingly no quantitative psychological research. Qualitative research suggests that homonationalistic discourses flourish: from Israeli tourist advertisements (Puar, 2014) to Dutch political manifestos (Hekma, 2011), and from American war reports (Butler, 2009) to Romanian online forums (Woodcock, 2011), pro-gay attitudes are used to contrast a ‘civilised’ nation to ‘backward’ ethnic groups.

This evidence, however, almost invariably comes from the analysis of news reports, political speeches, and other professionally crafted texts. Discourse analysis is useful for understanding societal views and media messages, but the question remains how these messages are reflected in people's thoughts and behaviours.

Puar’s (2007) construction of homonationalism may seem at odds with the premises of quantitative psychology. Specifically, Puar approaches homonationalism

as an assemblage.²⁴ The term was introduced by Gilles Deleuze, and it refers to

‘emergent unities that nonetheless respect the heterogeneity of their components’

(‘Gilles Deleuze’, 2012, section 2, par. 7). Therefore, ‘there is no organic unity or cohesion among homonationalisms’ (Puar, 2007, p. 10). Contrary to this constructionist view emphasising variability, psychologists typically assume that their constructs are stable and measureable. A closer look into basics of psychological measurement, however, reveals a more nuanced view: according to Cronbach and Meehl’s (1955) classic paper on validity, constructs only have meaning as part of a broader theory. Since no theory is definitive, ‘our incomplete knowledge of the laws of nature produces a vagueness in our constructs’ (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955, p. 294).

Measurement needs to be logically sound and theoretically (and practically) useful:

construct validity is not about ultimate proof, but about an argumentative process that makes an integral part of theory development (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955;

Messick, 1995). Conversely, Puar (2007) concedes that, despite the volatility of homonationalism, understanding this concept needs ‘attempts to still and quell the perpetual motion of assemblages’ (p. 213). Indeed, psychologists have often endeavoured to ‘still and quell’ complex phenomena (see, e.g., Allport, 1940):

Danziger (1997) asserts that such projects actually gave birth to the discipline

In this chapter, I aim to explore homonationalism with the tools of quantitative social psychology. Therefore, I investigates (1) whether homonationalism can be measured and (2) whether the predictions of the prejudice literature summarised above apply to homonationalism. The following section lays out the predictions that can be derived from the literature, while the following section details the process of quantifying homophobia. In order to allow for cross-cultural comparisons, I collected data from undergraduate students from Romania and the UK. As explained in Chapter 1, Romania and the UK are the countries of interest for this thesis due to their contrasting histories of sexuality.

24 A useful example of an assemblage is an archaeological site: the objects found together are likely to be connected and they form some sort of unity. But one must always remember that the objects were not intentionally arranged for the archaeologists’ gaze and their co-occurrence is largely contingent (see Wise, 2011).

Hypotheses

In this section, I lay out the results expected for the present study based on the extant literature and on the conclusions of the previous chapters of this thesis. One central aim of this chapter is to explore whether homonationalism is quantifiable.

Therefore, I propose that:

Hypothesis 1. Homonationalism is a measurable construct.

Research on authoritarianism (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1981) has suggested that all prejudices are positively correlated because they are all underlain by the same personality trait. The results in Chapter 4 have supported the previous conclusion that both authoritarianism and ethnic prejudice are important correlates of homophobia. As explained above, Puar’s (2007) theoretical work complicates this relationship by suggesting that homophobia and ethnic prejudice can be negatively related in those who espouse homonationalism. I therefore expect that:

Hypothesis 2. More homonationalistic individuals hold more ethnic prejudice, but are less homophobic.

Hypothesis 3. The association between homophobia and ethnic prejudice is moderated by sexualised nationalism. The correlation is expected to be strongly positive for heteronationalistic participants and weaker or even negative for homonationalistic participants.

As shown by previous research, Western European countries are predominantly accepting of LGB people, unlike their Eastern European counterparts (see, e.g., Chapter 4). Consequently, homonationalistic discourse tends to characterise Western European countries, while heteronationalistic discourse seems to be more prevalent in Eastern Europe (Kulpa, 2011, see also Chapter 5). Differences between countries in the level of prejudice has been explained by differences in postmaterialism (Inglehart, 1997), authoritarianism (Stenner, 2005), and religiosity (Štulhofer &

Rimac, 2009) (see Chapter 4 for a review and analysis of World Values Survey data).

Sexualised nationalism is also obviously linked to prejudice towards ethnic minorities.

I therefore conjecture that these variables will explain the difference in sexualised nationalism between Romania and the UK. Specifically, I predict that:

Hypothesis 4. UK participants are more homonationalistic than their Romanian peers.

Hypothesis 5. The difference in homonationalism between Romania and the UK is explained by the difference in homophobia and ethnic prejudice, which is in turn explained by differences in authoritarianism, religiosity, and postmaterialism.

Homonationalism construes LGB people as ingroup and Muslims as outgroup for Western nations. The proponents of the concept have argued that the mass-media systematically reinforce this binary, thus exacerbating intergroup tensions (Butler, 2009; Puar, 2007). Indeed, an increased perception that two groups are in conflict can enhance ingroup favouritism and difference maximisation when allocating resources (Sidanius et al., 2007). This is especially the case when participants already hold prejudiced views of the outgroup. Therefore, I predict that:

Hypothesis 6. A homonationalistic media message can increase difference maximisation in allocating resources to gay and Muslim people.

Hypothesis 7. The effect of media messages on resource allocation is moderated by participants’ scores on a sexualised nationalism measure. The effect of experimental manipulation is stronger in participants with more homonationalistic scores.

Apart from testing these hypotheses, this study also has an exploratory purpose.

Given that this is the first quantitative measurement of sexualised nationalism, I ask how this variable is related to the known correlates of homophobia (see Chapters 1 and 4): authoritarianism, religiosity, political orientation, postmaterialism, and contact with LGB people.

Operationalising Sexualised Nationalism

In order to test the hypotheses in the previous section, I concomitantly employed two strategies to quantify sexualised nationalism. First, I designed a questionnaire to assess sexualised nationalism. The questionnaire consisted of 6 items describing Puar’s (2007) three facets of homonationalism and contrasting heteronationalistic statements. Puar analysed American discourses on the US’s recent defence policies, and she identified three thematic strands in homonationalistic talk: (1) acceptance of

Table 1

Relationship of Questionnaire Items to Puar’s (2007) Themes Puar’s label Theme Directly coded

(homonationalistic)

gay people makes the US better than other countries; (2) (pro-gay) secularism is construed as normal, while Muslims are rejected; and (3) US superiority (gained via gay rights) legitimises war against other countries. Polar opposites of these assertions can be found in heteronationalistic discourse: homophobia is normalised, and the quest for gay rights is construed as (Western) aggression (see Chapter 5). Drawing on Puar’s three themes and their heteronationalistic complements, I built a six-item questionnaire to assess sexualised nationalism (see Table 1).

Second, I performed an experiment to test whether priming participants on tensions between sexual and ethnic minorities influenced their behaviour.

Specifically, participants were asked to allocate resources to one Muslim and one gay charity based on an allocation scheme akin to Tajfel matrices (Tajfel et al., 1971). The scheme used here was developed by Sidanius et al. (2007): participants could opt either to maximise the gains of both groups, and give more to the Muslim than the gay cause; or to give more to the gay cause, but offer both charities a smaller amount of money. As with the other measures (see the Method section below), I aimed to construct a task that was decontextualized enough to suit both countries. Christian locals in an unnamed Belgian²⁵ town were the intended ingroup, while Muslim immigrants in the same town were the outgroup. Participants were presented with a situation where they had to allocate money to charities in European nation that was not their current country of residence (i.e., Belgium). The town of the charities was presented through a set of news flashes. The message was identical to all participants, except for one news flash that presented either Muslim immigrants or local Christians as disrupting a gay pride event. Participants then had to allocate resources to a gay and a Muslim charity by choosing between seven allocation schemes. Thus, participants had a choice between offering more to Muslims or

25 Belgium was chosen as a country with comparatively few associations in both the UK and Romania.

Note that the experiment was conducted a year before Brussels was the scene of extensive anti-terror investigations in November 2015.

penalising both groups. Sidanius et al. have named the latter alternative ‘Vladimir’s choice.’²⁶ (See Appendix E for the task.)

Method

Participants

Participants were 125 students aged 18-30 from the UK (University of Surrey, n

= 66) and Romania (Babes-Bolyai University, n = 59). As a reward, UK students were entered into a prize draw, while Romanian students received research credit. Initially, 141 students participated. The 10 participants over the age of 30 were excluded in an attempt to achieve a relatively homogeneous young sample. A further 6 participants were excluded because, being Muslim, their attitudes towards Muslim immigrants to Europe could not be clustered with those of the (Christian and irreligious) majority. The majority of participants in both countries were women; only 29% of UK participants and 22% of Romania participants were men. The gender ratio did not differ between the two countries, χ² (1) = 0.746, p = .388, OR = 0.699, 95% CI [0.310, 1.578]. One-hundred and thirteen participants described their sexuality as straight or heterosexual; five women and one man as bisexual; two women as lesbian; one woman as queer; and three men as gay, pansexual, and ‘other’, respectively.

Measures

Personal values. Religiosity was assessed by two items, one about self-labelling (e.g., Catholic, atheist etc.), and one on the importance of religion in the participant’s life (7-point Likert scale). Political stance was measured with a single item consisting of a 7-point Osgood scale ranging from ‘Left, liberal’ to ‘Right, conservative’.

Postmaterialism was assessed with Inglehart’s (1997) method. Specifically, participants were asked to prioritise goals for their country, choosing between

26 The name originates in a Russian folk tale in which the protagonist (Vladimir) sacrificed his own gains in order to be able to punish his foe.

materialistic (e.g., economic growth) and postmaterialistic (e.g., clean environment) goals. (Higher scores indicate more postmaterialistic values.)

Authoritarianism. Authoritarianism was measured with a short version of Altemeyer’s Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale (Zakrisson, 2005). Apart from brevity, this version has the advantage of avoiding direct questions on homosexuality, thus minimising the overlap with other measures. The scale had good internal consistency in the current sample, Cronbach’s α = .775.

Contact with LGB people. Previous encounters with LGB people were assessed with a modified version of the questions proposed by Islam and Hewstone (1993).

With this approach, both the amount and the quality of contact are evaluated. The instrument has good reliability and content and convergent validity (Islam &

Hewstone, 1993). The scores for the quantity (Cronbach’s α = .861) and quality (α = .890) were transformed and aggregated to obtain a multiplicative index (see Dhont

& Van Hiel, 2011; Voci & Hewstone, 2003).

Homophobia. I assessed participants’ attitude to LGB issues with Morrison and Morrison’s (2002) Modern Homonegativity Scale (MHS). The instrument was highly reliable (current α = .884), and it was strongly correlated with other measures of homophobia (all rs > .72, Rye & Meaney, 2010).

Ethnic prejudice. Most measures of national, racial and ethnic prejudice are developed in specific contexts and with reference to specific groups (see e.g., Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995, for prejudice against immigrants in the UK). Following Mummendey et al. (2001), I selected those items from a well-known scale (Pettigrew

& Meertens, 1995) that are applicable to both Romania and the UK. I asked participants to answer the questionnaire with reference to the ethnic group in their country from which they feel the most distant. Participants were not asked to name the ethnic group they were referring to; on the one hand, I wished to reduce the effect of social desirability on participants’ answers; on the other hand, the groups themselves were not relevant, since different ethnic minorities live in the two countries of interest. The measure showed very good internal consistency, α = .807.

Sexualised nationalism. I constructed a 6-item Sexualised Nationalism Scale (SNS) to measure sexualised nationalism based on Puar’s (2006) work (see above).

Higher scores indicate greater homonationalism. The psychometric qualities of this measure are to be assessed in the present study.

Experimental Task

A resource-allocation task was used to further explore sexualised nationalism.

The options were based on the ‘Vladimir’s choice’ matrix (Sidanius et al., 2007). The first three options allocate more money to the Muslim charity, the fourth option allocates equal amounts, while the last three option allocate more to the gay charity.

Higher scores on the task indicate this latter preference. Thus, allocating £19,000 to the gay charity and £25,000 to the Muslim charity is scored ‘1’; allocating £13,000 to each charity is scored ‘4’; and allocating £7,000 to the gay charity and £1,000 to the Muslim charity is scored ‘7’. Note that the equal option and the options that favour the gay cause allocate less to both charities; participants can only disfavour the Muslim charity by also cutting funds from the gay one, i.e., by making ‘Vladimir’s choice’.

Procedure

Participants completed all measures, as well as the experimental task, as a Qualtrics (Qualtrics, 2009) survey. Questions were presented to participants in their country’s national language. Romanian translations were performed by myself; back-translations were obtained via Google Translate (http://translate.google.co.uk) and with the assistance of a Romanian native speaker who holds an English-language writing job in the UK. Favourable ethical opinion was obtained from the University of Surrey Ethics Committee. The full instrument and proof of the favourable ethical opinion are provided in Appendix E.

More general measures (e.g., prostmaterialism), were presented first, followed by the more specific ones (e.g., homonationalism). The experimental task was

More general measures (e.g., prostmaterialism), were presented first, followed by the more specific ones (e.g., homonationalism). The experimental task was