This research has undertaken to investigate the intriguing case study of Somalia. The analysis of the Somalia crisis, having confounded many scholars and analysts repeatedly for nearly three decades, required a unique approach that looks into the case from multiple angles. The main
research question under consideration was: What are main factors that explain the
fragmentation of the Somali state and emergence of multiple, divergent polities following the collapse of the state? The journey towards finding answers to this question began with asking
and answering a number of subsidiary questions: What were the origins of the conflict that led
to the fragmentation in the first place? Why did the conflict endure so long? Why did
peacebuilding and state-building efforts to end the conflict fail? Why did Somaliland and
Puntland adopt a divergent approach and succeed where the South and central of the country had failed?
The journey then proceeded to locate the case study in the wider study of conflicts, peacebuilding and state-building by reviewing relevant literature (e.g. causes and characteristics of conflicts, external interventions, greed and grievances theory) and introduced a number of theories that will form the basis for analysis (e.g. PSCs theory, path dependency and critical junctures theories). Then, the study offered historical context of the crisis beginning from pre-colonial era to colonial rule to post-colonial independence statehood until the collapse of the state. Finally, the journey meandered around the vast terrains of the post-state collapse landscape passing through Somaliland and Puntland before stopping to reflect and report the
results by employing process tracing methodology and path dependency and critical junctures
theories.
The study found out that the underlying sources of the Somali conflicts are myriad and complex. It demonstrated that a complex interplay of internal and external factors whose origins can be located in the distant past (colonialism) are responsible for the eruption as well as the enduring nature of the crisis. In this regard, the study had identified a number of underlying sources of the conflict. They include: colonialism and its legacies; the rushed unification of Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland; greed (competition for power and resources); grievances emanating from state oppression or military dictatorship, corruption, nepotism and bad governance; and the Ogaden conflict. Furthermore, the perpetuating factors were found to be: the legacy of cold war geopolitics, politicized clan identity and the development of profitable war economy.
In a similar vein, the reasons for the failure of international efforts to find solutions to the crisis are found to be equally as numerous and complex. They include: external regional interferences and proxy wars; ill-advised international policies; the development of a war economy; the war on terror; lack of strong, visionary leadership; clan politics; poverty, corruption; radicalism and so on. While some of the underlying causes of the crisis are still present, new ones have been added to it. This is because, as the crisis became more protracted and as the geopolitical environment transformed (e.g. in the aftermath of 9/11) the dynamics and the actors evolved and finding viable solutions became ever more elusive. In this regard, it would be wrong and oversimplification to attribute the failure of peaceful solution to the conflict to one or a few external or internal factors.
Finally, the study found that the success of Somaliland and Puntland in their peacebuilding and state-building endeavour vis-à-vis the other regions is due to many factors. Initial conditions in the post-1991 state collapse differed between the South and the North. The two regions differed in their pre-state collapse historical and political developments; traditional authorities remained relatively more influential; and the communities are more homogenous. In the aftermath of the state collapse, one dominant military group emerged in both polities i.e. SNM in Somaliland and SSDF in Puntland; no war economy developed; there was no external intervention; the political leadership was stronger and more visionary; peacebuilding process was locally driven, more inclusive and consensus i.e. the communities in these regions adopted
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Appendix
1. Map showing the territories inhibited by Somali speaking nation which was
partitioned by European colonial powers
Source: http://www.somaliaonline.com/community/topic/should-somaliland-get-recognition-
2. A map showing Somaliland, Puntland and South-central Somalia
3. A map showing the division of the former republic of Somalia into six (6) regional states including Somaliland which claimed independence
Source: Chatham House https://somalianewsroom.com/2015/10/23/update-somalia-discusses- next-steps-for-2016-elections/