Cooperation requires trust in the sense that dependent parties need some degree of assurance that non-dependent parties will not defect.
Williams, 1990, page 8. The previous sections of this part of the chapter have introduced aspects of trust which are generally agreed upon by those working in the area. In addition, they have referred at several points to ‘intelligent agents.’ One of the claims of the present work is that trust can help artificial intelligent, or pseudo-intelligent, agents to reason about others and their environment, thus becoming more robust in situations of uncertainty, for example. Another is that having a knowledge of trust will help such agents in their considerations of cooperative situations, in conditions of imperfect information, or where the situation depends on speedy, accurate decisions, as quite often will be the case (consider the hypothetical example of agents in a flight control system for a jet airliner, for instance, where speed of decision is matched by the need for accuracy and robustness).
This section considers the effect that trust can have on decisions regarding coopera- tion with other independent agents, in cooperative and non-cooperative environments, and shows how one of the claims of the present work is justified with respect to intel- ligent agents; namely, as presented above, that trust can help independent agents in their decision making process with regard to cooperation. In order to do this, it argues that a climate of trust can encourage cooperation, and that trust allows cooperation when it would be unlikely were the trust not present or considered.
Cooperation is undoubtedly a good thing for society as a whole (Argyle, 1991). Indeed, it is questionable that society would exist without some cooperation, between governors and governed, police and public, car drivers, and so forth. As Argyle argues, cooperation is central to the whole existence of humans and humanity. Cooperation is not limited to humans either. In the animal world, cooperation exists between chim- panzees (Trivers, 1985), bats (Harcourt, 1991) and whales (Trivers, 1985). It appears that cooperation is, in evolutionary terms, a successful strategy, one which ensures the survival of the ‘genes for cooperation.’ Cooperation appears to be necessary for the very survival of the animals involved (Argyle, 1991). In humans, this is less obvious, but society depends on its presence.
Argyle (1991) gives three main ways in which people can be cooperative: 1. Cooperation towards mutual rewards.
2. Communal relationships. For example, marriage and love. Situations where altruistic concern is of importance. Also friendship, which, as well as providing its own benefits, sustains social support also.
3. Coordination. Coordination is necessary for all social situations, even if just to avoid bumping into others, for example when driving, or to hold a coherent conversation, or to work towards a group project. Clearly, cooperation is needed here.
All of these are important, and all are of some relevance to the present work. In fact, splitting the concept of cooperation in such a fashion does little to clarify it, particularly with regard to multi-agent systems within which artificial agents play a part. In addition, the problems of emotional attachment and potentially altruistic feelings on the part of an agent are beyond the scope of this thesis, although they are interesting avenues in themselves. Nevertheless, they illustrate the scope and importance of cooperation in society.
There have been in the past experiments with cooperation among small groups (face to face). Once again, Deutsch is a leader in the field. His view was essentially based on the work of George Herbert Mead. Deutsch states that “cooperation breeds new motives, attitudes, values, and capabilities.” (Deutsch, 1962, page 275). As early as 1949, Deutsch developed a theory of cooperation and competition (Deutsch, 1949a; Deutsch, 1949b), and associated experiments to attempt to justify his hypotheses. Indeed, this work bears a resemblance to the work Deutsch did later with trust and cooperation. In common with other researchers, many of Deutsch’s hypotheses con- cerned groups and their feelings towards others (McNeelet al., 1974). Thus, members of cooperative groups perceive themselves to be interdependent with that group, par- ticularly if it is in competition with another (Argyle, 1991). Whilst acknowledging the importance and undoubted benefits of competition (Galliers, 1989), it is safe to assert that cooperation is often a beneficial strategy, particularly for those cooperating. 16
Taking such benefits into account, the question remains as to where trust plays a part in the initiation and maintenance of cooperation. At the most intimate level, for example of marriage, trust plays a large part in the relationship (Boon & Holmes, 1991). In such a relationship, partners continually place themselves in the others’ hands, with the knowledge that the other is free not to cooperate. Boon and Holmes (1991) give an example of a wife, tired after a long day’s work, in the dilemma of whether or not to ask her husband to cook the evening meal. Her actually asking places her in his hands, with his different responses either justifying her decision to trust or not. As Deutsch states, “the initiation of cooperation requires trust whenever the individual, by his choice to cooperate, places his fate partly in the hands of others.” (Deutsch, 1962, page 302). For the wife, the decision to cooperate is made when she asks her husband to cook. It follows that in order to initiate cooperation, risks must be taken (Rempel et al., 1985; Rempel & Holmes, 1986; Boon & Holmes, 1991; Shapiro
et al., 1992). But the benefits are often worth the risk — the wife may well find that her husband is only too happy to cook the tea, with the associated benefits of not only a rest in the evening, but also a bolstering of her trust in him, and thus an increase in the likelihood she will ask another time. Trust often spirals upwards in this fashion
16As Argyle (1991) and Gambetta (1990) argue, some cooperation is definitely not a good thing, for
example between aggressors in a situation of war (Hinde & Groebel, 1991b) or between the members of an oligopoly, which indeed must be controlled by government. There are, then, situations where we would wish to discourage cooperation. As another example, consider how beneficial cooperation between criminals may be (Gambetta, 1990a).
(Boon & Holmes, 1991). 17
In less intimate relationships also, trust plays a part in the initiation and main- tenance of cooperation (Golembiewski & McConkie, 1975; Deutsch, 1962; Deutsch, 1973). Also in business relationships, trust allows increased performance since it pro- vides the benefits of “reduced need for monitoring behaviour and greater speed in making decisions” (Shapiroet al., 1992, page 365).
In terms of the present work, there is much of interest in what has already been dis- cussed. The formalism presented in the following chapters has ambitious ideals. One is that trust, or an understanding of it, can be instilled in artificial agents to provide robustness in the face of uncertainty and an acknowledged means of coping with the complexity of the environment, amongst other things. (This has been discussed in the previous sections.) Another goal is to develop a greater understanding of the actual
workings of trust, so that the concept can be discussed in a precise and meaningful manner. An initial aim was related to the first, in that instilling a knowledge of trust in artificial agents allows the agents to reason sensibly in cooperative (or competitive) situations involving others (trust is predominantly a social phenomenon, despite its undoubted utility in adaptation). Clearly, trust plays a major role in initiating and maintaining cooperative relationships, even if emotions are ignored (as in the example of the wife and the evening meal). 18 This argument is addressed experimentally in
chapter 7.