Las terminales

Given the above context and the preoccupation with social stability, the Guangdong provincial authority kept silent about SARS from November 2002 up until February 2003, with the exception of a few denials about the spread of the virus by its subordinating local governments. Zhang Dejiang, the Party secretary of Guangdong, reportedly ordered a news blackout on SARS as soon as the Guangdong authority became aware of the spread of the virus (Puska, 2005). Nevertheless, as previously noted, the preoccupation with stability was often coupled with concerns about economic growth. Guangdong was the powerhouse of the Chinese economy and it was China’s largest trading and taxpaying province. Its economic growth was highly reliant on foreign investment and tourism (especially from Hong Kong and Macau). Given its economic weight and outward orientation, it was unsurprising that the leadership of Guangdong were very concerned with any negative news such as SARS that could potentially affect inward investment and tourism. Several other economic factors also contributed to the decision to censor SARS in this period. In January 2003, the main reason for silencing reports on SARS was to maintain consumer confidence during the Chinese New Year so that people would continue to spend and travel (Washington Post, 2003). In addition, the spring was the high season of trade for Guangdong as the China Export Commodities Fair was about to open in Guangzhou in April 2003. The Fair was important to China’s trade as well as to the country’s open image so the authorities considered that this Fair should not be disrupted. One might also speculate about the motives of the Guangdong leadership on this delicate issue. The Party secretary, Zhang Dejiang and the provincial governor, Huang Huahua, both recently appointed to their respective posts, were relatively young among their same-ranking

colleagues. They were certainly cautious about their political careers and feared any exposure of bad news in their jurisdictions.

While governments at varies levels sought to resolve the problem of SARS, they took a solely closed approach in the hope that they would eliminate the virus by working hard behind the scene (Zheng and Lye, 2004). However, without a concerted effort, the combat against the virus was poorly coordinated. Moreover, the problem of administrative fragmentation went beyond Guangdong province and worsened the overall situation. The Guangdong authority should have known about the seriousness of the virus by early January and reported this to the central government in Beijing by early February (Saich, 2003). An investigation team was quickly dispatched to Guangdong but civilian and military health experts were unable to agree on the nature of the virus until April 19 due to a lack of cooperation (Puska, 2005). Even within the civilian health authority, researchers affiliated with the central and provincial medical institutes disputed over the right measure of treatment, which led to avoidable exposure to the virus in hospitals that followed the wrong advice (Puska, 2005). The statistics on the number of infections also faced the same problem. It was not until late April that the number of infections announced by the civilian health authority began to include those patients admitted by military hospitals, which resulted in significant underreporting compared with the updated statistics adjusted after April 20. Without accurate information, even the leadership in Beijing had to wait for information to be synthesised before making any decisive actions. According to a credible source in Beijing, the head of the CCP’s General Office once consulted the Health Minister on the overall infectious situation so that he could then decide whether or not to take quarantine measures in Zhongnanhai (the CCP headquarters), but the Health Minister was

unable to provide accurate information because that was also what he was trying to find out44.

While the virus was spreading, the efficacy of this closed-door approach was challenged by both international and domestic stakeholders (even by reform-minded officials within the Chinese political system). The first wave of panic erupted in Guangdong, shortly after the Guangdong authorities reported the virus to Beijing. Short messages suggesting that there was a ‘deadly flu’ in Guangzhou were forwarded by mobile phone users millions of times within three days (Life Weekly, 2003a). People rushed to buy all sorts of things that were said to be able to resist SARS, such as herbal medicines for treating cold, vinegar and mosquito coils (believed to kill germs), antibiotics and face masks. Although much of this information was exaggerated or simply untrue, and the panic buying was unnecessary, without transparent information, people still opted to believe this false information (because this was the only type of information that was widely available). The credibility of the government fell dramatically.

In hindsight, the main source of pressure that forced the Chinese leadership to act decisively actually came from the international community. The WHO, which initially dealt with the Chinese government very patiently, eventually issued travel advisories for Guangdong and Hong Kong. This was followed by a flurry of cancellations and postponements of high profile international events, such as the World Economic Forum China Business Summit and the Rolling Stones concert (Puska, 2005). Foreigners living in Beijing also started to flee. China’s international image was tarnished.

For much of the period between March and April 2003, the central and Guangdong governments released more (carefully filtered) information on SARS at press conferences but they reiterated that the virus was not serious. Nonetheless, the steadily rising publicly

released infections figure implied a different conclusion contrary to the official statement that everything was under effective control. The civilian health authority certainly understood that kept saying everything was fine would be unconvincing, but it had more important and delicate factors which must be taken into account. In fact, the civilian health authority was aware of the seriousness of the situation but could not do much about it before consulting other institutionally more powerful departments. This was even more so, given that the time when the SARS crisis emerged coincided with the political high season of the PRC – the 10th NPC was underway in March in Beijing. Traditionally, during NPC sessions media outlets were told to mainly report positive news and focus on the conference itself so as to create a favourable environment for the NPC. The civilian health authority certainly did not want to be the troublemaker which disclosed negative news that could potentially disrupt the high politics.

Moreover, the 10th NPC was of something special in the PRC’s history – it marked the completion of the civilian leadership power transition from the CCP’s third generation of leadership, headed by Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji, to the fourth generation, led by Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao45. Power transitions in authoritarian regimes were often uneasy. These power transitions often triggered or were accompanied by political turmoil, as seen in China in 1976 and 1989. The transition from the third to the fourth generation by then was relatively smooth, suggesting a transformation towards a more regularised regime in terms of legal-rational legitimacy (Weatherley, 2006). However, a contingent event such as SARS could create opportunities for individual leaders, mainly Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin, to demonstrate their clout. The showing up of their relative strengths and weaknesses could potentially change the subtle balance of power between the two leaders and disrupt the

45

Jiang Zemin did not give up his chairmanship of the Central Military Commission until September 2004. Nonetheless, the handover of state and government power between the two generations was completed in

power transition. The political risk of leaking negative news at this critical juncture was thus extremely high.

On April 3, the Health Minister Zhang Wenkang held a press conference at which this highest ranking health official claimed that there were only 12 SARS cases in Beijing in total. He stressed again that SARS was under control and therefore ‘China is a safe place to work, tour and live’ (Xinhua, 2003a). However, the actual situation was already grave and hundreds more people were infected by the virus on a daily basis. Zhang’s lie was met by fury within China and beyond. A few days after the controversial press conference, Dr. Jiang Yanyong, a respected military surgeon, provided authentic information to CCTV and the Hong Kong based Phoenix TV that there were more than 140 SARS patients in three military hospitals alone (Life Weekly, 2003b). This information was then exposed by the foreign media such as the Time Magazine and the Wall Street Journal. Subsequently, the WHO issued a travel advisory for Beijing. At the same time, Southeast Asian countries took measures to restrict incoming travellers from China. International isolation put further pressure on the Chinese government to take actions.