In defending the White paper the Chief Minister referred to the CPC's Final Report as the Old Testament and the White Paper as the New Testament. He went on to elaborate why his Government thought it necessary to compile the New Testament:
154. Ballard, 1981:93.
155. See Mortimer, 1979:212; and Hegarty, 1979:198. 156. Government Paper, 1974.
157. Both reports were presented on 16 August, 1974.
158. Both Somare and Guise as discussed above, were two of the three Ministers who were members of the CPC.
The Government did not agree with some of the things in the Old Testament and so it drew up the New Testament. But there are a lot of recommendations in the Constitutional Planning Committee report which both sides agreed upon. It is just that on a few occasions the Government disagreed with the Constitutional Planning Committee report, so we had to suggest changes. Changes have to be made to any report tabled in this House and the members of this Parliament have the right to move amendments to any reports. It is true that the people have given us a mandate, but we must guide the people. In doing so we must ask ourselves whether all the ideas recommended by the people are right to run this country.
Fr. John Momis, the Deputy Chairman of the CPC, but in effect its
161
real chairman, replied that the Government’s White Paper was in essence a report of those with vested interests which were opposed to the true interests of the People of Papua New Guinea. The CPC brought upon itself this opposition because, 'LweJ have questioned the system,
169
the rights of vested interests ...' Momis asked further,
[ I ] f the two leaders, the Chief Minister and his deputy, really believe in democracy why then did they not join us in the committee [of which both were members] and make their changes there and then? Instead they took the easy way out. It is a coward's way out. They kept out of the committee until the day we were through with our report and then they got up and by using the party line, they are now trying to disrupt the success of the report on which we have been working with the people for so long. ^ 3
The initial argument between the CPC and the Government was one relating to how much of the total package of the CPC's recommendations should go into the Constitution. The Government took the general view that only the basic principles should be incorporated into the Constitution, leaving the details to Organic Laws1 and Acts of Parliament to regulate. In this way, the Constitution would be kept
160. See House of Assembly Debates, Third House, Vol. Ill, No. 32, 4139.
161. The Chief Minister was the Ex Officio Chairman.
162. See House of Assembly Debates. Third House, Vol. Ill, No. 32, 4145.
163. Ibid., 4147.
164. The concept of Organic Law was brought in by the Government to solve this controversy, although not completely in the view of the CPC. Nevertheless, under the proposed system of constitutional norms, the Constitution was to provide the general principles and the Organic Laws, the details.
within a reasonable size. The CPC wanted all the recommendations contained in its Final Report to be included in the proposed constitution.
The Government appeared to adopt two techniques in rejecting those of the CP C ’s recommendations that it did not like. Either it spelt out in specific terms what it preferred, arguing that the CPC's recommendations were vague; or it classified a particular recommendation as a matter of detail which should be best left to the ordinary legislation to deal with. It opposed particularly the CPC's recommendations on provincial government, an investment code, citizenship and the head of state.
The Government persuaded the Constituent Assembly to omit from the Constitution any reference to a system of provincial government as
I r r
the CPC had recomended, DD but was forced to incorporate it into the Constitution two years after Independence^^ as a result of further pressure from Bougainvillean politicians. It also succeeded in getting the Constituent Assembly to leave out an investment code that CPC wanted, arguing that the code was a matter of detail which could be best regulated by ordinary legislation.
The effect of the CPC's recommendations on citizenship was to deny influential Government Ministers who were Australian citizens (such as Barry Holloway, Bruce Jephcott and Julius Chan) an automatic right to citizenship on Independence Day, which would have deprived them of their right to continue to hold high executive offices within the Government. Not only were the recommendations considered racist but the Coalition Government was further pressured by these influential Ministers and by the Australian Government to seek substantive amendments to the CPC's proposals. The Constituent Assembly agreed, and the result was that the influential Ministers
168
continued to remain in office after Independence. DO
165. See Paul Langro's speech: House of Assembly Debates. Third House, V ol. Ill, No. 34, 4398.
166. Because it was costly. See Gris, 1978:36. 167. See Constitutional Amendment No. 1, 1976. 168. Ley, 1978.
The CPC rejected the institution of the head of state because it argued that the functions the head of state performs in the Westminster system could be also performed by other public officers, such as the Speaker of the National Parliament or the Chief Justice. But the Government was able to convince the Constituent Assembly at 169 the last minute to adopt the English Monarch as the Head of State, and this led to a large public demonstration in Port Moresby to protest against the decision.
The CPC saw the main cause of much of the conflict lay in Somare's use of white advisers, although it is only fair to point out that the CPC had its own white advisers. But Barnett argues that the main factor was a break-down in communication between the CPC and the G o v e r n m e n t ; ^ “* and Johnson suggests that this was the result of a
1 72