Validación de las Hipótesis de Investigación

The previous empirical material and analyses relied on selected narrative interview accounts of people whom we considered lower class because they a) did not have any assets (such as land or houses or a shop) 71_{, b) no or little formal education or c) were}

working as casual labourers. Some people shared all of these three characteristics, others one or two of them. Equipped with these limited assets and capa- bilities, the livelihood options of lower-class Afghans are diverse but on a low threshold level. Wherever possible, Afghans try to preserve their way of life within the extended family in one place because in their perception this is the best way to protect them from physical harm. Nevertheless, economic misery and needs but also the trajectory of violent conflict in Afghanistan have caused families to split up and expand existing or establish new translocal networks.

Seasonal migration of entire family sections has always been a feature of certain segments of lower- class Afghans (e. g. winter stays in comparably warmer Jalalabad or the peripatetic mobility of harvest workers, trinket sellers and the like), as have the strategic efforts put into building translocal networks (before the outbreak of violent conflict mainly for enhancing options of labour chain migration).

However, the wars and increasingly adverse polit- ical conditions in the neighbouring host countries

71 \ Some of the interviewees have assets ‘back home’, e.g. land that rela- tives or children use for securing their own livelihood. In one case, a respondent was able to travel to his land from Karachi twice a year and get his owner’s share of the harvest.

Thus, the involuntary submission to discrimination and extortion—also bribing has to be afforded—can also be categorized as a livelihood option. This and the social network- and trust-building with the neighbouring social context in the best case provides Afghans in Iran and Pakistan with similar chances as local citizens, e.g. to obtain access to the housing market, land, or business licenses. In settings where the ‘outsider’ status of displaced people is less felt by them (e. g. in Peshawar), Afghans are also more easily able to take loans from neighbours and immerse themselves in local society.

This said, however, it is important to be aware that even among these lower-class people, there are significant differences with regard to the category of future livelihoods. Some of them manage to send their children to school and even higher education so that the next generation may have the opportunity of middle-class livelihood options leading to a profes- sional career in Afghanistan or abroad. Education and skills acquired during the displacement phase/s are likely to have a positive effect on future livelihood- making because they add options to the range of activities family members can undertake to secure livelihoods. Then again, in the regional social context where there are neither a rule of law nor governmental pro-poor policies, education does not suffice for social upliftment. As some of the accounts of those we have identified as lower-class people indicate, links with power holders are crucial for social mobility–and the fall of a power holder is likely to have an adverse effect on his followers. 74

(proof of residence, i.e. PoR-card) and those without and culminated after the Peshawar school attack in late 2014. Since then, the threat of arrest and deportation exists equally in Pakistan for non-PoR card- holders.

74 \ The account of the Kuchi elder in Maslakh camp who had been an officer in the regime of Najibullah and, after the regime was toppled, fled with his livestock, sold it and became an inhabitant of the IDP camp is a case in point. The mullah who sided with Taliban in Ghazni and worked as a pistachio picker in Kerman province in Iran may be another example for the reliance on powerholders.

and Pakistan, money and socio-economic status have become more important for official local acceptance. This is especially true in Pakistan where, after Afghan refugees irrespective of their socio-economic

status were allowed to settle down wherever they wanted, Afghan businesses constitute an important part of the national, even if largely informal, economy. Afghan entrepreneurs have dominated several sectors

of the Pakistani economy for decades, e.g. the trans- port sector and carpet-making and trade (even though via intermediaries). The ongoing ousting of Afghans from Pakistan implicates losses for Pakistan’s

economic production and affects employment. 76 _On

the flipside, sentiments against Afghans are growing. A Pakistani businessperson and member of the Paki-

stan Carpet Manufacturers and Exporters Association in Lahore stated that the Afghans should ‘go back’. 77

A Pakistani carpet seller in Lahore’s Landa Bazaar explained, “all the Afghans who used to be around this bazaar left four to five days ago because of the attacks”, alluding to the comprehensive security operations by police and rangers following the bomb attacks that took place just a few days earlier (see the empirical sections on Pakistan). They are back “where they belong. Afghans are not only carpet weavers and traders; they are also terrorists.” 78 _{This statement}

captures the current attitude shared by many Paki- stanis towards Afghans that reportedly has evolved since 9/11. The blanket insinuation of Afghans being terrorists affects those most strongly whose features can clearly be identified to be of Afghan origin.

76 \ For example, one carpet trader mentioned that he employs 40 Pakistani workers for carpet finishing (washing and cutting) alone. Interview in Lahore, February 2017.

77 \ He explained, “50 to 70 per cent of the Afghans in Pakistan have already left to Afghanistan. The situation in Afghanistan is getting better. Of the ones I know personally, about 70 per cent are gone. Those remaining have established their businesses here; their kids go to school. However, now the businesspersons are also leaving. Their pre- ferred destinations are Norway, the US, Canada and India. It takes about two years for them on average to sort out business closure and arrange their departure. This is beneficial to our local carpet industry” (interview with Pakistani carpet trader, Lahore, February 2017). 78 \ Interview, Lahore, February 2017.

In the following, we briefly point out findings from the analysis of interviews with people from the In the following, we briefly point out findings from the analysis of interviews with people from the middle class in protracted displacement situations in Afghan- istan and its neighbourhood. We will show how these markedly contrast the livelihood-generation of lower- class displaced people, because members of the middle class can rely on assets / dispositions and access opportunities that are not available to the lower class 75_,

including relationships with influential individuals and their social networks. The argument is made in three steps: First, we provide analytical insights from our interviews on how middle-class Afghans handle the challenges of integration and established‒outsider relationships in the displacement context. Second, we look into the relocation context after the return and specifics concerning the organization of the return movement to Afghanistan. Third, we discuss the large-scale refusal of Afghans (especially of the middle class) to return. Even if return is emotionally aspired to, it is generally considered not safe and for many Afghans not at all realistic in the current circumstances because sustainable livelihoods can- not be secured. The Chapter ends with a summary of class differences in livelihood options by comparing those of the lower class vs the middle class.

Specifics of local integration in the