This document may not be published, quoted or copied without the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence. Although providing airborne firepower in support of land force operations is one of the three key doctrinal roles for tactical aviation, it has historically been marginalized within the Canadian Forces (CF) tactical aviation community. However, this project was effectively discontinued when control of the CF tactical aviation community passed from the Army to the Air Force in 1975.
The findings of the panel, in what became known as "The Manley Report," recommended obtaining new medium lift. The nature of modern conflict has evolved significantly since the end of the Cold War. Therefore, prudence dictates that UAVs are one of the solutions being explored as a possible way to satisfy the fire support role for the tactical aviation community.
Critical to this initiative was a review and reissue of the Army's Capability Development Record (CDR) for tactical aviation support. The final chapter will then provide a brief overview of the full range of options that exist for providing a fire support capability, from the.
ARMED AVIATION HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
Adding to the problems for the military was the fact that the air force was tasked with purchasing all aircraft, including military helicopters.28. In reality, the problems stemmed from a systemic difference in combat philosophies between the Air Force and the Army. The success of the concept depended on the ability to achieve close interaction between the air and the ground.
Black, "Ansbach, the Apache and the Decline of the Canadian Army Air Force", Airforce Magazine 31 no. The result was the introduction of the CH146 Griffon in 1994 under the Utility Tactical Transport Helicopter (UTTH) project. Recognizing the importance of this training to the Army, 1 Wing HQ identified the need to secure a more suitable weapon system for the CH146.64.
The cessation of the combat mission provided the Army with an opportunity to formally document the future requirements of the tactical aviation community through an update of the tactical aviation CDR. Unification set in motion events that would lead to the establishment of Air Command and the subsequent transfer of control of the tactical aviation fleet to this organization.
THE CONTINUING NEED FOR PRECISION AVIATION FIRES
This chapter will begin with an examination of the nature of the most likely defense challenges that will be faced in the foreseeable future. Understanding the nature of the future security environment requires an understanding of the prevalence of irregular warfare, which has most often manifested itself in the form of an insurgency. 90 sensor-to-shooter connections is an alternative term for the Canadian doctrinal term "sense-to-act". B.C.
However, the overall intent of the document is to ensure that the CF is set for future combat operations, and in this context it is clear that the CDR finds its initial measure of justification. Therefore, it is clear that Canada's strategic aviation doctrine firmly supports a much more robust fire support capability for the tactical aviation community in support of the military. NATO's tactical air force doctrine recognizes armed action as one of the most important helicopter roles.101 The CF's operational level aviation doctrine states that the role of tactical aviation is to support ground force operations by providing aerial firepower, reconnaissance and mobility.
Following the announcement of the purchase of the Chinook helicopters, the CH146 Statement of Operating Intent (SOI) directed that the CH146 become more focused towards. First is aerial escort (AE) of other aviation assets; this included approx. 70% of the total missions carried out in. Next is the Armed Oversight (AOW) of ground operations, which also includes response to troop-in-contact (TIC) situations; this accounted for approximately 25% of the unit's missions.
The CH146 quickly became one of the helicopters most feared by the insurgents in southern Afghanistan. Despite the lethality of the through guns, it should be noted that the success of the Canadian tactical aviation mission in Afghanistan was made possible by the availability of coalition support. Canada does not have a balanced force structure in its tactical aviation force; the rapid purchase and field service of six used Chinook helicopters from the US to sustain the CF's participation in the Afghanistan mission was a clear recognition of the conceptual failure of having a single.
Therefore, it is worth examining other countries' approaches to dealing with the realities of contemporary operations. One of the logical solutions to this problem is the use of aviation-borne precision guided munitions (PGM), given their smaller kinetic yield. The only way to ensure the tactical aviation community is able to meet the challenges of the future battlespace in support of the Army is to undertake the necessary capital investments in a PGM capability.
WEAPONS ANALYSIS
Although the design has yet to be finalized, it appears that the size and weight of the HEMi rocket will be comparable to Hydra and CRV7 rockets. However, it should be noted that missiles have the greatest kinetic yield of the options presented, and as such pose the greatest risk of causing collateral damage. 157 The Hellfire missile was selected to fire the opening shots of the First Gulf War.
COIN campaigns, with the associated need to minimize collateral damage to ensure the support of the local population, must become the priority focus of the CF. Both commanders and aircrews must be prepared to accept a level of personal risk to maintain control of their weapons in order to fulfill the larger purpose of the COIN campaign. The concept of stored kills is critical as it is directly related to impermanence, one of air's vulnerabilities.
All of the proposed weapon options have the ability to be used as a modular mission kit, and are relatively similar in terms of the integration required to successfully locate, designate and engage the target. Missiles represent the most expensive option, with costs increasing in proportion to the complexity of the guidance system and warhead. It should be noted that the previously mentioned cost envelopes are by no means a complete list of all the financial implications associated with these weapons.
The internal aspects of normality relate mainly to procedures related to the use of weapons. This is particularly important in light of the previous analysis which indicated that more than one weapon system may be required. It is therefore obvious that the potential hazards associated with the similarity of the Hellfire and DAGR guidance systems would be within an acceptable level of operational risk.
Furthermore, capabilities such as fire and forget, while understandably borne out of the survivability requirements of the conventional battlefield, are not necessary for CF to acquire given the low intensity of COIN operations. Ultimately, as has been shown, there is no single system solution that perfectly fits the needs of the tactical aviation community. Ultimately, it is clear that the optimal solution for CF will involve a mix of both missiles and PG rockets; this will ensure that the consideration of collateral damage is fully respected, while at the same time the ability to exploit the fleeting opportunities of the COIN environment is ensured to the greatest extent possible.
DELIVERING A PGM CAPABILITY
Armed UTTH are well suited to meet the operational needs of the tactical aviation community. In this view, an armed UTTH is definitely the first of the available options. Ultimately, the risk posed to the aircrew is inversely related to the survivability characteristics of the aircraft.
221 A discussion of the circumstances that led to the success of the Iraqi ambush is beyond the scope of this article. Battlefield endurance is a crucial consideration, as it contributes to transience, one of the doctrinal limitations of air power. In light of the factors used to distinguish the tradeoffs in the combat effectiveness of the aircraft that can meet the entire operational mandate for the CF's tactical aviation community, including a PGM fire support capability, it is possible to very clearly pin down some set.
This leads to the final conclusion regarding the armed UTTH: based on their operational capability and flexibility, they should continue to form the backbone of the CF's tactical aviation community. While a full analysis of the implications of manned-unmanned teaming for the CF tactical aviation community remains an area for future research, the increasing battlefield synergies resulting from MUM-T lend significant weight to the acquisition of UAV platforms. In the short term, the most viable solution seems to be the armament of the CH146, while an attack helicopter is likely to remain a politically unacceptable solution for the CF.
As such, a detailed examination of the proposals in the Canadian Army's Capability Development Record (CDR) for Tactical Aviation was warranted to confirm their validity. Not only did it provide the impetus for the development of the attack helicopter, but just as importantly, it spawned the Air-Land Battle Doctrine. There are a number of families of precision weapons to consider to determine which best suit the CF's operational needs.
Unfortunately, there is no single solution that perfectly meets all the needs of the tactical aviation community. The culmination of this study was a consideration of the combat effectiveness of various manned and unmanned aviation platforms to determine which aircraft would best meet the needs of the CF for the future deployed operations. In the short term, the most viable solution would be to increase the armament of the CH146.
Due to the unclassified nature of this document, a detailed examination of the classified performance data for the most likely weapon options for the tactical aviation community, namely the Hellfire, DAGR, and APKWS, must be conducted. CH146 Griffon ELE Expansion/Replacement Issues and Options: Vector Brief to the Chief of the Air Force.
