Canada's Whole-of-Government concept, developed in the early 2000s, was first applied in Afghanistan and has since become entrenched in many of the Canadian government's engagements abroad and at home. In response, this article provides a detailed examination of Canada's application of the whole-of-government approach in Afghanistan and the Arctic. This study concludes that, while not necessarily prohibitively expensive, the successful application of the Whole-of-Government concept across all departments is difficult to achieve.
2 Wilemijn Keizer, Review of Existing Studies and Evaluations of Whole of Government Integration and Operations (Kingston: Canadian Defense Academy, March 2009). While Canada's application of WoG efforts in Afghanistan was undoubtedly one of the first and most significant expressions of this approach, the WGA did not stop with the withdrawal of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) from that country. For this reason, Operation ADENDA will not be considered as part of the study of Canada's WoG efforts in Afghanistan.
6 Department of Global Affairs Canada, Evaluation of the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) and the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) (Ottawa: GAC, September 2016). This will involve a detailed review of the policy framework governing Canada's WGA in Afghanistan and the Arctic.
DEFINING CANADIAN WOG
Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World provides a comprehensive overview of Canada's foreign policy. 14 DFAIT, Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World (Overview) (Ottawa: DFAIT, 2005); Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan, Report of the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan (Ottawa: The Panel, 2008). 15 DFAIT, Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World (Review) (Ottawa: DFAIT, 2005), Foreword.
20 Ibid, 14; Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World (Diplomacy) (Ottawa: DFAIT. 21 Department of National Defense, Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World (Defense) ) (Ottawa: DND, 2005), 26. Although the policy review did not address the Arctic in much detail, it did recognize that Canadian security and.
26 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World (Overview) (Ottawa: DFAIT, 2005), 8. 28 DND, Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence influence in the world (Defense) (Ottawa: DND, 2005), 17.
CANADA’S WGA IN AFGHANISTAN
Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ambassador Chris Alexander”, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Brussels, Belgium, 2 November 2006. Of course, NATO's lack of a clear national and multi-year strategy was partly responsible for assessing the effectiveness of the WGA difficult.47 However, as the Manley Report pointed out, measurable and verifiable criteria to assess the effectiveness of Canada's WoG strategy were not identified as part of the initiation of Canada's mission in Kandahar.48. Based on the findings and recommendations of the Manley Report, the GC revised the objectives and measures of effectiveness of its strategy for Kandahar.
These priorities were complemented by a set of 44 specific targets that the GC aimed to have completed by the end of the mission in 2011.50 These targets and priorities were part of a larger package of reforms introduced by the Manley Report. was proposed, which helped Canada's efforts in Kandahar. Although it was recognized that not all departments involved in the WGA approach needed to have balanced resources or equal roles, the resource and personnel offset gave the CAF a disproportionate level of influence over the direction of the mission. Unfortunately, despite an increase in civilian personnel, military and civilian efforts were never fully integrated or weighted commensurate with the scope of the mission.
While Canada's WoG concept was flawed at the start of the mission in Afghanistan, it should be noted that in response to the Manley Report, the GC did undertake reforms. Members of the military failed to understand the role of civilians working in the organization and on some occasions tried to take over command. Certainly, at the beginning of the mission, when the WGA was initially implemented, the prospects for interdepartmental cooperation were generally well received.
It therefore favored the implementation of quick-impact projects aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the population. CIDA contributes only "a small contingent [of] young officers mainly to the PRT", thus limiting the effectiveness of the WGA.98 Beyond this, however, the implementation of the strategy was flawed, as its objectives were not informed by consensus by the contributing departments.
This led to the composition of the WoG team being insufficient to fulfill the objectives of the mission, a. 101 This can be achieved by involving the WoG partners in the preparation of the mission's goals and parameters. Finally, the management influenced by the individual departments and the authorities delegated to them should be balanced according to the needs of the mission; this is particularly relevant when dealing with highly hierarchical organizations such as CAF.103.
Although it may be difficult to achieve, influencing a change in the strategic culture of the Canadian government would facilitate future efforts to enact a WGA. While these lessons are drawn from Canada's experience in Kandahar, the likelihood that any of the related recommendations will be implemented would be increased if they also benefit from Canada's domestic application of the WGA.
CANADA’S WGA IN THE ARCTIC
Furthermore, the increased traffic in the Arctic increased the likelihood of ships getting into distress and of spills. To meet these new challenges and opportunities, a WGA will have to be utilized in the Arctic. It concludes by drawing lessons from Canada's implementation of the WGA in the Arctic.
Although these goals were generally accepted by the various departments dealing with the Arctic, there was confusion over the interpretation of the concept of sovereignty. Like security, Arctic security was a shared responsibility, with the lead agency varying depending on the nature of the emergency. 132 Meredith Kravitz and Vanessa Gastaldo, “Emergency Management in the Arctic: The Context Explained,” in Whole of Government through an Arctic Lens ed.
Although many other examples of successful WoG efforts could be presented here,135 it is also important to acknowledge the limitations and failures of the WGA in the Arctic. 150 Karen Everett and Emily Yamashita, “Whole Government in the Canadian Arctic,” in All Government Through an Arctic Lens Ed. In practice, government departments have demonstrated their ability to cooperate on a variety of Arctic issues and programs.
Whitney Lackenbauer and Heather Nicol, Whole of Government through an Arctic Lens (Antigonish: Mulroney Institute of Government, 2017), viii; Lajeunesse, and Lackenbauer, "The Canadian Armed Forces in the Arctic. Given the CAF's resource advantage over civilian departments, its assertive culture and its focus on sovereignty that aligned with the government's vision, its influence shaped the nature of the training This unevenness of the burden of implementing the WGA in the Arctic can be further felt given the fiscal constraints associated with the post-financial crisis era of the Harper government.
However, cooperation between these departments and those involved in defense, security and safety in the Arctic remained nominal. The success of the GC's implementation of the WoG effort in the Arctic was mixed, but the effort provided valuable insight into how the approach could be improved. Furthermore, there was a lack of clarity regarding the mandate to lead the implementation of WoG efforts in the Arctic.
Regardless, it is important to recognize the interdepartmental collaborative successes achieved in the Arctic. To improve the effectiveness of the WGA in the Arctic and extend its application to other departments, the Prime Minister could mandate the creation of a Cabinet Committee on Arctic Affairs, as recommended in the 2010 report of the Standing Committee on National Defence.
COMPARISON AND RECOMMENDATIONS
To address these questions, this chapter will begin with a contextual comparison of the application of WGA in Afghanistan and the Arctic. The following comparisons have been divided into three broad categories: Canada's goals, the operationalization of the WoG concept, and the effects of culture and mandates on the WGA. Canada's objectives in Afghanistan were less clearly defined and evolved over the length of the mission.
This difference meant that the roles of the agencies participating in security-related operations were reversed. In studying the application of the WGA in Afghanistan and the Arctic, it becomes clear that interdepartmental integration cannot be achieved without careful design. Although some studies emphasize the importance of creating a Cabinet Committee born out of the PCO to coordinate interdepartmental efforts, lessons from the Arctic offer alternatives.
In studying the application of the WKV abroad and at home, it becomes clear that culture plays a significant role in determining the effectiveness of interdepartmental cooperation. Through this programme, members of the CAF receive strategic postgraduate level education on a range of topics including. Unfortunately, while continuing formalized training may be part of the CAF's culture, this is not the case for the rest of the civil service.
Alternatively, as the Arctic case study suggests, it may be time to redefine the WGA concept to reflect a more disaggregated approach, not by department but by competence. Indeed, despite the lack of direct involvement in the management of WoG relations in the Arctic, cooperation between the partners was voluntary and seemed to be mutually beneficial. While the department's organic structures in the Arctic were largely intact, the complex bureaucratic structures created by START and DFAIT slowed decision-making and project implementation and frustrated some of the department's partners.
Finally, this research has suggested that inherent shortcomings within the WGA may necessitate a redefinition of the concept. Overall, this article has demonstrated the relevance and applicability of lessons learned from several WGA case studies to the concept in general. However, the implementation of the concept will not happen automatically and requires careful consideration and design.
Evaluation of the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) and the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF). Canada's partial submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf relating to its Continental Shelf in the Atlantic Ocean.