Field, Picture Palace: A Social History of the Cinema (London: Gentry, 1974); Bradby, James & Sharratt, ibid. Leisure in the Industrial Revolution, supra note 1 at 141 (the world of commercialized leisure provided its own controls); Leisure and Society, supra note 1 at 62 (a central feature of. On the professionalization and commercialization of sport, see Leisure and Society, supra note 1 at 67-70; W.J.
Similarly, the courts declared that a variety of popular breeds were unlawful uses of the streets. 15 (temporary wooden structure with desk at Doncaster Racecourse found to be a "permanent place" for purposes of the Act); Bows v. Popular fairs and festivals also came under increasing legal attack in the second half of the nineteenth century.
The court stated that the races substantially interfered with the use of the land for the specific purposes of the trust. The court was careful to note that the proposed work would enhance the "enjoyment of the park" (ibid. at 557). In the court's view, such exclusion was only "partial, discontinuous and temporary" (Harris v.
34;' A common right was the right to receive a share of any natural produce of another's land. Other cases in the late nineteenth century demonstrated the willingness of courts to relieve recreational claimants of the burden of various procedural and evidentiary requirements. Courts continued to affirm customary entertainment rights well into the late nineteenth century.
Public Regulation of Indoor Commercial Entertainments
34;' The most important legislative enactment of the early nineteenth century was the Alehouse Act, 1828, which gave the judges absolute discretion to grant licences. Except in the case of renewal applications for pre-licensing beer houses, judges may also consider the needs and characteristics of the neighborhood. 173 at 185 (H.L.) [hereafter Sharp], Lord Herschell declared in the House of Lords, "I think it impossible to do otherwise than hold that the discretion of the justices is not in any way bounded" See e.g.
The primary legislative innovation of the nineteenth century was the introduction of national drinking time controls. 17, of the Grants Act, 1872, it is not sufficient merely to prove that persons have gambled at the hotel, but that proof must be given that the manageress or servants who were present to the guests in the room knew about the game of chance." later case, Somerset v. The magistrate convicted Ferguson of breach of the peace, and the Court of Queen's Bench affirmed on the ground that his "swearing and cursing" could be heard early on Sunday morning in the middle of the street thirty yards away.' .
In contrast, the courts were reluctant to declare pub behavior illegal if it did not directly implicate the peace of the streets. Indeed, police powers to enter pub premises declined as the century progressed. The court was convinced that "a person using bad language in such a loud and noisy manner at three o'clock in the morning in his own house commits a breach of the peace" (ibid.).
As in the case of pubs, an important innovation of the Victorian period was the improvement and strengthening of the licensing powers of magistrates. The defendant had permitted "dancing" in the form of an elaborate stage performance, complete with waterfalls, of a ballet called "Recreations of the Sylphides." Except for two dancers, there was no dancing in the hall.
Courts have also supported judges who have imposed conditions on music hall licenses designed to increase the prestige of the halls, such as requiring a certificate. The relative respectability of music halls was also indicated by the fact that in London the police had fewer rights to enter music halls than pubs. The court first commented on the respectability of theaters as compared to other forms of entertainment---especially street entertainment--in Betterton's Case (1695), 5 Mod.
County Council of West Riding'', the Divisional Court upheld the right of the local authority to impose such a restriction; Mr VORSPAN- POPULAR URBAN LEISURE IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND 955 applies for a liquor licence.'5 The Vice-Chancellor noted that the council had exercised its discretionary power and that “the courts refuse to give a precise definition of the limits of such discretionary authority”357.
Private Law: Nuisance and Judicial Management
Second, judges granted relief in significant part based on the entertainment's position in the moral hierarchy. However, he was reluctant to grant an injunction, preferring to leave relief to the parties. Moreover, although the Oxford could be liable for the gathering of crowds, it could not control the conduct of the spectators or the performers—a factor, it should be noted, that the court in Brewster disregarded in granting an injunction .
Concluding that the balance of convenience therefore favored the defendant, the court decided to await the trial of the action. Finally, the operation of the boxing club in Bellamy affected not only neighbors but also passers-by on the public streets. After considering factors such as the nature of the location, the timing of the activity and the years the game had been played at the location, the court concluded that the bowling alley was indeed a nuisance.
Judge Kekewich noted that the organ playing in particular “disturbed the ordinary comfort of the neighbors, the people. He did not rule on the music and singing in the club premises because the plaintiff's counsel "barely relies on this part of the case" (ibid. at 163). An artist who lived nearby complained that the shouting and shouting of patrons disturbed his living comfort and performing his profession." Mr.
Judge Eve agreed that the owner of the amusement park was causing too much noise in a quiet neighborhood."'. But he concluded that the injunction was justified because the noise was affecting the plaintiff's wife's health and keeping their child up at night. Brewster is also a judge specifically noted "the number of the lowest classes who could not pay admission" and whose presence outside is absent.
The court also referred to the Inchbald case, the latter establishing "another important principle, namely, that the noise of a performance constituted a nuisance requiring the interference of the court" (ibid, p. 351). He continued that the defendant "cannot place persons on the street to regulate the crowd, and one of the first things the police would do would be to prevent other persons from disturbing the traffic of the street." Gulliver, an authoritative Court of Appeal decision in the early twentieth century, effectively increased the liability of seemingly respectable businesses such as music halls for attracting obstructive street crowds.
Conclusion
