Comparative Political Studies XX(X) 1 –29 © 2010 SAGE Publications DOI: 10.1177/0010414010365998 http://cps.sagepub.com
Democracy
Promotion, Civil
Society Building,
and the Primacy
of Politics
Manal A. Jamal
1Abstract
Since 1991, Western bilateral and multilateral democracy promotion assistance, especially for civil society development, has increased dramatically. Much of the literature that assesses the impact of this assistance has focused on either direct recipients in civil society or macro transformations, with minimal systematic analysis of how developments in civil society unfold. This article argues that political settlements shape the impact of Western civil society building initiatives. The inclusivity of political settlements can determine who receives funding and who does not and also influences the representativeness of political institutions. In contexts with noninclusive political settlements, where certain groups are excluded from the settlement and the settlement enjoys minimal support, democracy promotion efforts are more likely to exacerbate polarization, thereby weakening the quality of civil society. Examining the women’s sector of civil society in the Palestinian territories and El Salvador, this article illustrates the primacy of political settlements and the limitations of civil society building in contexts where certain actors are excluded from the onset.
1James Madison University, Harrisonburg, VA Corresponding Author:
Manal A. Jamal, James Madison University, Department of Political Science, MSC 7705, Harrisonburg, VA 22807
Email: [email protected]
doi:10.1177/0010414010365998
Keywords
democracy promotion, civil society development, women’s sectors, Palestinian territories, El Salvador, political settlements, war-to-peace transitions
In the post–cold war era, few topics have captivated scholars and policy makers alike as that of strengthening civil society and promoting
democrati-zation in different parts of the world.1 Since 1991, bilateral and multilateral
Western donor assistance for democracy promotion, especially for civil
soci-ety development,has increased dramatically and has become a central pillar
of U.S. foreign policy. The Middle East Partnership Initiative,2 the Broader
Middle East and North Africa Partnership Initiatives,3 and the Millennium
Challenge Account are only a few of these recent initiatives.4 A critical
ques-tion, however, warrants further investigation: Why are democracy promotion efforts and civil society building measures more successful in some cases than in others?
Despite the substantial amounts of assistance allocated to democracy
pro-motion efforts, the impact has been mixed, varying from one case to another.5
Jamal 3
reconstitution of civil society entailed the institutionalization of productive patterns of engagement with local government (see Table 1).
Most scholars and policy makers who have attempted to explain different outcomes associated with Western donor assistance and civil society develop-ment have focused on the direct impact on discrete recipients, on political and cultural constraints (Henderson, 2003; Ottaway & Carothers, 2000; Van Rooy, 1998; Sundstrom, 2006), or on preexisting ethnic and religious cleavages that may inhibit civil society development (Belloni, 2008; Orjuela, 2003). Depart-ing from these explanations, this article argues that the “inclusivity” of political settlements, broadly understood as the formal and informal political agreements that define postconflict political relations, shape the relative effec-tiveness of democracy promotion efforts and the impact of donor assistance on civil society more specifically. The “inclusivity” of the political settle-ments, measured by two empirical indicators (the extent of participation of major political groups and the degree of societal support), will influence the extent to which external actors can promote civil society development.
To test my hypothesis, I assessed developments in Palestinian and Salva-doran civil society between 1991 and 2001, focusing on the women’s sector with its constellation of women’s committees, NGOs, and gender-related projects and programs. This 10-year period comprehensively captures the scope of transformation in each case in the postsettlement period; a more focused time period would not encapsulate the breadth of organizational
change and adjustment in each context.6 In both cases, I focused on the
politi-cal centers, the Jerusalem–Ramallah access area in the Palestinian territories and San Salvador in El Salvador. This comparison is across cases as well as between the presettlement and postsettlement periods in each case. Both the Table 1. Donor Assistance to the Palestinian Territories and El Salvador
From 1992 to 2001
Commitments to Commitments to Disbursements government and strengthening Disbursements ($)a per capita ($) civil society ($)b civil society ($) Palestine 6.37 billion 1,820c 471.05 million 91.34 million El Salvador 3.4 billion 523d 463.52 million 54.10 million a. All disbursements in constant 2006 U.S. dollars (Based on OECD data, Development Assistance Committee [DAC]).
b. All commitments in constant 2005 U.S. dollars (Based on OECD data, DAC). c. Based on a population of 3.5 million.
temporal parallels and similar Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) grassroots organiza-tional trajectories justify this comparison. Both cases experienced protracted conflicts in the latter part of the 20th century—an interstate war with Israel in the Palestinian territories (for more on the history, see Quandt, Jabber, & Lesch, 1973; Sayigh, 1997) and a civil war in El Salvador (for more on the history, see Baloyra, 1982; Montgomery, 1982). During the 1970s and 1980s, the political factions and organizations of the PLO and the FMLN both adopted policies of mass mobilization and established their own grassroots structures that included labor unions, agriculture unions, health unions, stu-dent groups, women’s groups, and various other professional unions. In the pretransition period, these associations shared similarities in terms of grass-roots character, functions, and relationship to the political organizations. In both settings, such organizations played central roles in resistance, conscious-ness raising, and the provision of community services.
These temporal and organizational similarities extended to the women’s sectors. In sync with the developments of mass movement mobilization during the late 1970s, political organizations of the PLO and FMLN estab-lished mass-based women’s organizations in each case, respectively (for the Palestinian territories, see Hasso, 2005; Hiltermann, 1991; and for El Salva-dor, see Thomson, 1986). These organizations sought to support the respective struggles while empowering the committee members to improve their daily living conditions. In both contexts, the programs and projects of these orga-nizations addressed women’s practical needs such as health, sustenance, and small-scale vocational training, child care, and literacy. Their capacity to recruit women in large numbers from all walks of life and to effectively involve them in decision-making structures was the most important and
uncontested of their achievements.7 Moreover, their ability to incorporate
and forge horizontal linkages with grassroots constituencies laid the ground-work for what could become effective civil societies that could contribute to the deepening of democracy in these two contexts (see Tables 2 and 3 for a detailed description).
In the early 1990s, the Palestinian territories and El Salvador began war-to-peace transitions. In 1991, Palestinian representatives attended the Madrid peace conference, which ultimately culminated in the 1993 Declaration of
Principles (DOP).8 In 1992, the FMLN and the government of El Salvador
5 Tab le 2. Inception of W omen’
s Organizations in Palestinian
Ter ritories–J erusalem Ramallah Access Ar ea (1978–2001) Note:
All italic text = Fateh and its clientelistic netw
orks;
bold text = opposition;
no bold or all italics text = liberal moderates.
*PWWSD was f
ounded b
y a f
ew branch members of the Ramallah committee of the UPWWC
, against the will of the Palestinian P
eople’ s Par ty . *W omen’ s Affairs
Technical Committee was f
ounded b
y w
omen fr
om the UPWWC
, the pr
o-Fida cadr
e of the FPW
A
C
, and w
omen fr
om the
WCSW
. The abo
ve
mentioned UPWWC
, FPW
A
C
, Union of Palestinian
W omen’ s Committees, and WCSW ar e no
w among its member organizations.
‡WCLA
C was f
ounded b
y w
omen fr
om the UPWWC and the pr
o-Fida cadr
e of the FPW
A
C
.
PPP
Union of P
alestinian W or king W omen’
s Committees (UPWWC)
1981
Gender Desk, P
alestinian Ag
ricultur
al Relief Committees
1986
W
omen’
s Center f
or Legal Aid and Counseling (WCLA
C)
‡
1991
Gender Desk, LA
W
- P
alestinian Society f
or the Protection of Human
Rights and the En
vironment 1991 P alestinian W or king W
omen Society f
or De velopment (PWWSD)* 1991 W omen’ s Aff airs
Technical Committees (W
ATC)
*
1992
Jer
usalem Center f
or W omen 1994 DFLP W orking W omen’
s Committees (WCC) 1978
renamed Federation of P
alestinian W omen’ s Action Committees (FPW A C) 1989 (Pro-Fida Cadre) W omen’
s Center f
or Legal Aid and Counseling (WCLA
C)
‡
1991
W
omen’
s Studies Center 1991
W
omen’
s Aff
airs
Technical Committees (W
ATC)
*
1992
PFLP
Union of Palestinian W
omen’
s
Committees (UPWC) 1981
6
Fuerzas
P
opulares de Liber
ación (P opular F orces of Liber ation, FPL)
Asociación de Mujeres de El Salv
ador
(Association of W
omen of El Salv ador- AMES) 1978 Mo vimiento de Mujeres ‘Mélida Ana ya Montes’ (Melida Ana ya Monte W omen’ s Mo
vement- MAM) 1992*
P
ar
tido
Com
unista
de El Salv
ador
(Comm
unist P
ar
ty
of El Salv
ador-
PSC)
Fr
ater
nidad
de Mujeres Salv
adoreña s (F rater nity of Salv ador an W
omen) 1956 Associación de Mujeres Prog
resistas
de El Salv
ador
(Association of Prog
ressiv
e
W
omen of El
Salv
ador-1975) AMPES
Instituto de Investigación, Capacitación y Desarrollo de la Mujer
‘Nor ma Guirola de Ejercito Re volucionar io del Pueb lo (Re volutionar y Ar m
y of P
eople , ERP) Asociacion par a la A utodeter minación
y el Desarrollo de Mujeres Salv
adoreña (Association f or the Self-Deter mination and De velopment of Salv ador an W omen- AMS) 1987 1991* P ar tido Re volucionar io de los Tr abajadores Centroamer icanos (Re volutionar y P ar ty of Centr al Amer ican W or kers , PR TC) Asociacón de Mujeres Salv adoreña (Association of Salv ador an W omen- ASMUSA 1982 Asociación P or Mejor
ar de la Mujer y
el N
i~no
(Association
for the Impro
vement of W omen and Children 1984 Mo vimiento Salv adoreño de Mujeres (Salv ador an
Resistencia Nacional (National Resistsance
,
RN)
Asociación de Mujeres Lili Milag
ro
Ramírez
(Association of
W
omen-
Lili Milag
ro
Ramírez) 1984 Mujeres por la Dignidad y la
Vida
(W
omen f
or
Dignity and Lif
e-
Las
Dígnas 1990 1996*
Mo
vimiento
P
opular Social Cr
istiano
(P
opular Social
Chr
istian
Mo
vement- MPSC)
Organización de Mujeres Salv
adoreñas
(Organization of Salv
ador an W omen-ORMUSA) 1985 1990* Salv ador an
Right-Wing+ Cruzada Pro Paz y
Tr abaj o (Cr usade f or P
eace and W
or k) 1979 Frente F emenino Salv adoreño (Salv ador an W omen’ s Front) 1979 N on -A ff ili at N on -g ra ss ro ba se d C en tr o de O rie nt ac ió n R P ar a la M uj S al va do re (T ra in in g C en fo r S al va do W om en o n R C O R A M S 19 88 In st itu to d E st ud io s de M uj er “ N or V ir gi ni a G ui de H er re ra (In st itu te o W om en ’s S tu “N or m a V ir gi de H er re ra C E M U JE R 19 90 In ic ia tiv a de M uj er es Tab le 3. Inception of W omen’
s Organization in El Salvador
-San Salvador
7 Tab le 3. (contin ued) Herrer a’ (Institute of Research, Tr aining, and De velopment of W omen ‘Nor ma
Guirola de Herrer
a-
IMU) 1986 1994*
Asociación Democrática de Mujer
es
(Democr
atic
Association of W
omen- ADEMUSA) 1988 1992* Mo vement of W omen- MSM) 1986 1988* C ri st ia na s (I ni tia tiv e of C hr is tia n W om en ) (1 99 0-19 93 ) G ru po d e M uj er es U ni ve rs ita ri as (G ro up o f U ni ve rs ity W om en ) (1 99 0-19 93 ) Fl or d e P ie dr a (F lo w er o f t he S to ne ) 19 94 M uj er J ov en (Y ou ng W om en ) 1996 Instituto Salv adoreño par a el Desarrollo de la Mujer (Salv ador an Institute for W omen’ s De velopment- ISDEMU) 1996§ Note:
bold text = non-grassr
oots-based NGOs;
no bold text = mass-based organizations.
The line designates incorporation of organizational mem
-bership into a ne
w organization.
*Organization leaders officiall
y r
egister
ed and licensed the r
espectiv
e NGO during the indicated y
ear
.
+Of these organizations,
the Crusade was a br
oad-based organization that united all w
omen to the right of the Christian Democrats,
wher
eas the
Fr
ont was unofficiall
y affiliated with the right-wing
ARENA par
ty
. Neither of these organizations,
nor the successor
ARENA w
omen’
s organization,
amassed a substantial grassr
oots f
ollo
wing.
§ISDEMU is not an organization but a g
ov
ernment institution established in 1996 to ensur
e that the ministries ar
e ad dr essing w omen’ s inter ests in the f orm
ulation and implementation of national policies.
ISDEMU w
orks with other w
omen’
s pr
of
essionalized NGOs as an equal par
tner
. The various
dir
ectors of the w
omen’
s organization par
ticipate as members of the ISDEMU boar
d; ther ef or e, the w omen’
s organizations coor
dinate and implement
the policies and pr
ograms of ISDEMU and ar
e not simpl
y the r
ecipients of its ser
noninclusive nature of the political settlement, Western donors were very selective about who their recipients would be. Western donor assistance to civil society, therefore, served to exacerbate the polarization between those who did not oppose the settlement and were eligible to receive Western donor assistance and those who did and were less eligible to receive Western funding. In El Salvador, on the other hand, because of the lack of opposition to the peace accords, Western donors were not as selective, and therefore donor assistance did not serve to exacerbate existing polarization. In turn, the poli-cies adopted by the grassroots leaders were shaped by their ability to access Western donor funding.
This article assesses changes in civil society by examining the breadth and horizontal organization of the women’s sector in each of these cases. Of particular concern is whether committees incorporated their grassroots con-stituencies in the structures of the new professionalized organizations and the extent to which donor programs required regular engagement and interac-tions with the grassroots. This article draws from more than 130 interviews with directors and program officers in donor agencies, directors of NGOs, grassroots activists, and political leaders in both contexts and follow-up interviews I conducted in the Palestinian territories in 2006.
This article first conceptualizes the terms civil society and political
settle-ments and revisits a number of alternative explanations that may account for
the different civil society outcomes in the two cases. The article then addresses civil society transformations in the Palestinian and Salvadoran women’s sec-tors in the postsettlement period, focusing on the pivotal role that the political settlements and Western donor assistance played in these processes.
Clarifying the Conceptual Terrain
Political Settlements
Jamal 9
transitions” (Karl & Schmitter, 1991), or what O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) define as
an explicit, but not always publicly explicated or justified, agreement among a select set of actors which seeks to define (or better, to rede-fine) rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the “vital interests” of those entering into it. (p. 37)
Notwithstanding the historical and temporal similarities, key features distinguished the Palestinian and Salvadoran political settlements; these dif-ferences included the nature of external actor involvement, the stages embodied, and most significantly the levels of inclusivity and extent of societal support they enjoyed. In the Palestinian case, the initial DOP culminated in implementation agreements involving renegotiation and the spelling out of how agreements should be implemented. Fateh, the leadership party, negoti-ated these agreements on behalf of the PLO. Most of the Palestinian political organizations, such as the Palestinians People’s Party (the former Communist Party), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the Pal-estinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and Islamist groups, as well as prominent, secular Palestinian intellectuals, did not support or endorse the peace accords. The renegotiation agreements did not expand beyond the bilateral, narrow participation that characterized the DOP interim agreements (Bell, 2008, p. 378). Although these accords were meant to serve as only interim agreements and were nonbinding, they did not meet minimal Pales-tinian nationalist aspirations. Critics pointed out that the PalesPales-tinians had not received any guarantees for a future independent, sovereign, viable state nor any guarantees to halt Israeli settlement expansion in the Occupied Territo-ries. Ultimately, the Oslo peace process and related initiatives would enjoy
little support among Palestinians in the territories.9
Civil Society
In the broadest sense of the word, civil society addresses the conditions of citi-zenship in a given polity, both the virtues and dispositions of individual citizens, as well as a descriptive category for an arena of political participation (Hodgkinson & Foley, 2003, p. vii). Civil society serves as a mechanism to interact with the state and demand citizenship rights. In general, civil society can contribute to democracy in four central ways: (a) it counters state power, (b) it facilitates political participation by helping in the aggregation and repre-sentation of interests, (c) it serves as a political arena that could play an important role in the development of some of the necessary attributes for dem-ocratic development, and (d) more broadly, it plays an important role in furthering struggles for citizenship rights (for more on the conceptualization of civil society and its contribution to democracy, see Cohen & Arato, 1992; Diamond, 1996; Keane, 1988). Furthermore, in war-to-peace transitions, civil society can play a critical role in promoting peace agreements and compli-menting the work of domestic institutions. Civil society can contribute to the delivery of humanitarian relief, support the reintegration of former combat-ants, facilitate refugee return, improve the performance of political and economic institutions, and cultivate greater trust between different parties through civic engagement (Bell & O’Rourke, 2007; Belloni, 2008).
Jamal 11
they reinforce existing hierarchy and polarization and decrease the likelihood of cooperation (Putnam, 1993).
In the context of war-to-peace transitions, however, a number of con-straints exist that do not exist in “ordinary” transitions. First, ethnic and religious divisions might be more solidly entrenched in civil society (Belloni, 2008), and a number of “bad” civil society groups might endeavor to under-mine the transition process (Paris, 2004, pp. 160-161). Moreover, in postconflict contexts, resources are often limited, and therefore Western donors can play more significant roles in shaping outcomes than they would otherwise. The overall weak political institutional framework also constrains civil society’s interactions with the state, thus limiting its potential to address the concerns of citizens.
Alternative Explanations
A number of alternative explanations could account for the less than optimal impact of Western donor assistance on civil society in the Palestinian territo-ries in contrast to El Salvador. These explanations center on varying donor interests and geo-strategic considerations, the differential impact of institu-tionalization and professionalization on civil society in different contexts, preexisting societal cleavages, and the variation among the actual cases.
Geopolitics, Donor Objectives, and the Natural
Outcome of Professionalization
developmental goals, questionable sustainability, and greater accountability to donors rather than to the constituencies they are supposed to serve.
Ultimately, however, the outcomes of donor strategic interests are inti-mately related to the terms of a political settlement. Although in the post–cold war era state-sponsored donors were more geo-strategically invested in the Middle East than in Central America, the fragility of the Oslo Accords led to more concerted efforts by Western donors to bolster the settlement. The higher amounts of aid associated with this resulted in the implementation of more stringent professionalization criteria. The political nature of this aid often led to a strategic delinking of the grassroots because of the more important objective of supporting the peace accords and leaders who were amenable to the settlement and to the West.
Preexisting Societal Cleavages
Western donor assistance to civil society can exacerbate preexisting societal cleavages, be they ethnic or religious (Belloni, 2008; Orjuela, 2003). Accord-ing to Belloni (2008), peace agreements may institutionalize sectarian divisions and preserve the power of groups such as paramilitaries and mafia syndicates with extensive connections to the political level. He adds, “In this context, the attempt of international organizations and donors to promote and support civil society is often disappointing” (p. 208). However, a well-functioning state can protect against the abuses associated with entrenched sectarianism or ethnic division.
Such explanations, however, do not fully capture the extent to which polit-ical settlements shape state institutions and their ability to effectively harness existing ethnic, political, and social divisions. Moreover, in the Palestinian and Salvadoran cases, ethnic and sectarian divisions were not at play; the divisions were political. Most notably in the Palestinian case, the political settlement institutionalized existing political polarization.
Case Variation
Jamal 13
addressing human rights, land redistribution, and ex-combatant reintegra-tion, and a UN peace operation was actively involved. Conceivably, a civil war resolution is more likely to involve a larger number of domestic actors, necessitating higher levels of domestic support as opposed to interstate wars.
However, regardless of the type of conflict, the negotiation frameworks, or the number of significant international political actors at a negotiation table, polarization will result when a political settlement fails to garner the support of major domestic political actors or important societal constituen-cies. In El Salvador, negotiations to resolve the civil war took place between the GOES and the FMLN, and although important political groups such as the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats did not partake in negotia-tions, they did not oppose the accords and were not marginalized from development processes thereafter as in the Palestinian case. Had these parties opposed the accords and been excluded as a result, similar polarization dynamics as in the Palestinian case would have transpired despite the varia-tion in conflict type or UN involvement.
More restrictive security environments and limited governmental support may also account for different civil society outcomes. Most notably, the out-break of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000 and the continuation of Israel’s encroachments against the Palestinian territories may have further chal-lenged civil society institutions, resulting in different trajectories. These factors alone, however, do not explain variation within a case, or the underly-ing rationale for governments or other dominant groups to favor one group over another. Moreover, such factors do not explain why cases also experi-encing societal insecurity related to crime and poverty may undergo more constructive civil society developments, as in El Salvador.
The Centrality of Political Settlements
I argue that the political agreements reached by the different parties—specifically, their level of inclusivity and degree of societal receptivity and support— shaped subsequent civil society developments. This argument builds on the democratic transitions literature (Hagopian, 1990; Karl, 1992; Karl & Schmitter, 1991), and a narrow body of peace-building literature that addresses the feeble prospects for peace and democratization in light of unsatisfactory political pacts (see, e.g., Gurr, 2000; Walter, 1999). Neither body of scholarship, how-ever, specifically addresses Western donor civil society building and democracy promotion efforts. This article argues that in divided political contexts in which important political groups are excluded from existing set-tlements and the majority of citizens reject their very basis, Western donor assistance will minimize cooperation, exacerbate political polarization, and weaken civil society by promoting favored groups over others. This is espe-cially true if the interests of dominant political parties and Western foreign donors coalesce to marginalize important political sectors. (See Figure 1.)
The inclusivity of the political settlement, my key independent variable shapes the impact of donor assistance on civil society in three fundamental ways. First, it influences the types of projects and programs donors are more likely to promote. In politically noninclusive contexts where agreements are fragile, donors are often more concerned with promoting political settle-ments rather than building a stronger civil society. Second, political settlements affect who receives funding and who does not and thus the strate-gies adopted by different actors. As a result, these settlements shape the degree of horizontal and vertical polarization among individuals, groups, and organizations that receive funding and can professionalize and those that cannot. In particular, the settlements affect the degree of vertical hierarchy between those organizations that receive Western donor funding and profes-sionalize their operations, and may become service providers, and those that cannot and may become service recipients.
Third the inclusivity of the political settlement also shapes the representa-tiveness of political institutions. Through electoral laws and the frequency of elections, dominant groups influence the ability of opposition groups to par-ticipate in elections and prevail at certain levels of government. In turn, electoral outcomes influence how much and what type of access opposition groups (and affiliated NGOs) will have to council or assembly representa-tives in local and legislative levels of government.
Jamal 15
political liberalization (Paris, 2004) and civil society development (Belloni, 2008) during war-to-peace transitions may inherently exacerbate conflict, this article takes the argument a step back and examines how political settle-ments shape the institutional engineering process as well as distinct outcomes in these contexts.
War-to-Democracy Transitions and
Transformation of the Women’s Sectors
Following the start of the war-to-peace transitions in both cases, Western state-sponsored donor agencies played critical roles in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of these countries, in the provision of relief and economic assistance, and in the ensuing efforts to promote democracy and strengthen civil society. Despite the many temporal and organizational similarities between the cases, civil society development trajectories diverged in the postsettlement period. As I demonstrate through an analysis of the women’s sector, Western donor interests became much more political in the Palestinian case and implicitly (or explicitly) sought to promote the peace accords and Western liberal cultural norms. Many of the programs sought to transform the women’s movement’s collective struggles into individual cases that could be tackled with proper training, often discounting Israel’s continued infringe-ments against the territories. Donors were often interested in promoting individuals and/or organizations that could promote certain ideas and norms
Political Settlement Non-Inclusive
Western Donor Assistance
Western Donor Assistance
Polarized, weak Civil Society
More cooperative, stronger Civil Society Inclusive
associated with the peace process rather than incorporating and interacting with broader constituencies. In El Salvador, because of the more inclusive political settlement, Western donor programs were less political and often focused on economic development and the institutionalization of regular pat-terns of interaction with local government. The successful implementation of these goals required that the women’s organizations be able to reach and incorporate grassroots constituencies.
The Re/Constitution of the Women’s Sector
in the Palestinian Territories
Western donor support for the institutionalization and professionalization of the women’s sector took place in a discriminatory manner, and a fragmented
sector of civil society developed.10 Hence, as in other sectors of Palestinian
civil society, three broad tendencies emerged, which included pertinent political organizations as well as loosely affiliated individuals and groups (see Table 2 for details). On one hand, a liberal moderate, Western-funded, Western-modeled, and professionalized circuit of women’s organizations
emerged.11 An opposition tendency of grassroots women’s committees and
women’s organizations that did not support the Oslo Accords and therefore could not access Western donor funding also came to light; this tendency attempted to maintain and carve spaces for itself, bound to the professional-ized organizations for resources and restricted in its access to the Palestinian Authority (PA). Meanwhile, the Fateh-affiliated grassroots women’s com-mittees consolidated their clientelistic relationship with the PA.
Throughout this process of reconstitution, Western donor assistance and the programs promoted by foreign donors played a pivotal role in mediating relations between these different constituent parts of the women’s sector and in institutionalizing patterns of interactions with the PA. Western donor agen-das most often did not require organizations to incorporate their grassroots into the structures of the new professionalized NGOs and in fact encouraged a strategic delinking in some cases. Of the eight women’s organizations in the Jerusalem-Ramallah access area that were able to access Western funding and professionalized, only two worked with grassroots constituencies—the
Palestinian Working Women Society for Development (PWWSD)12 and
Pal-estinian Agricultural Relief Committees—Rural Women’s Development
project.13 In general, interactions between the grassroots and the
profession-alized NGO sector became limited to lectures, training sessions, and workshops; these interactions were often mediated through liberal moderate
organizations such as the Women’s Affairs Technical Committees (WATC)14
Jamal 17
Palestinian Women (GUPW). In this new hierarchy of relations, the liberal moderate professionalized organizations provided lectures and training ses-sions about women’s rights and gender empowerment and the opposition tendency grassroots organizations were often the recipients of these ser-vices. Moreover, in some cases, the WATC would provide seed funding to the grassroots committees. The Fateh and its clientelistic tendency had the most consistent access to the PA. Because this new hierarchy coincided along political lines, it further exacerbated existing tension and decreased the likeli-hood of generating cross-cutting cleavages and cooperation, thus weakening the overall fabric of civil society.
The Liberal Moderates
Of the three tendencies, the liberal moderates had the most consistent access to Western donor funding and as a result spearheaded the process of estab-lishing professionalized NGOs (see Table 2 for details). This tendency became best associated with the fraction within the Federation of Palestinian Women’s Action Committees (FPWAC), which supported the peace accords and was loosely affiliated with Palestinian Democratic Union (FIDA—a splinter party of DFLP), and women within the Union of Palestinian Working Women Committees (UPWWC), which were affiliated with the Palestinian People’s Party (PPP). FIDA and the PPP did not oppose the Madrid and Oslo Accords and were more liberal and Western in their cultural orientation and therefore in an advantaged position to access Western foreign donor assis-tance. Both these political organizations adopted NGO professionalization of their former grassroots committees to facilitate their political transition in the post-Madrid era; the new professionalized NGOs (sans grassroots) would provide these factions and their leaders employment prospects and oppor-tunities to remain involved in the political life of Palestine without being wedded to the Oslo Accords. To appeal to Western donor priorities, many professionalized NGOs adopted programs that addressed democratization, human rights, the “empowerment” of women, and civic education. As Hamami (1995) explains, “democratization” of Palestinian society became the rallying call of the former leftists after the Oslo Accords.
Because of the fragility of the settlement, the larger state-sponsored Western donor agencies provided generous donor packages to the professionalized
NGOs in hopes of buttressing support.15 The WATC and PWWSD, for
exam-ple, were two major recipients of funding from state-sponsored donor
agencies,16 including the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).
as political platforms for certain individuals and often did not have much contact with grassroots or the broader Palestinian society. These representa-tives, however, explained that they were interested in promoting certain discourses in Palestinian society, especially in relation to the peace accords, democratic process ideas, and consciousness raising about the status of women (USAID representative, personal communication, September 14, 2001; Friedrich Naumann Foundation representative, personal communica-tion, September 14, 2001; Netherlands Representative Office representative, personal communication, July 25, 2001).
Fateh and Its Clientelistic Networks
The Fateh and its clientelistic network tendency is best associated with Fateh, the leadership party of the PA and the broker of the Oslo Accords, and included
the Women’s Committees for Social Work (WCSW) and the GUPW—an
umbrella grassroots women’s organization in which all the women’s commit-tees are represented. Because of WCSW’s financial support from Fateh and other pro-Fateh institutions, the WCSW was less in need of Western donor assistance than other women’s committees. The WCSW adopted a new strat-egy of heightened mobilization that often involved payment to members and employment provision, thus solidifying clientelistic networks (Member 4, WCSW coordinator, personal communication, July 22, 2001; Member 2, executive committee member of the WCSW, personal communication, July 19, 2001). By 2001, the WCSW had fared much better than the other women’s committees. Based on a number of office visits, the WCSW was more active
relative to other committees.17
The Opposition
Though many of the grassroots organizations associated with the opposition tendency varied in their willingness to articulate a position for or against the Oslo Accords, most were not able to access state-sponsored Western donor funding. The opposition tendency broadly included groups and individuals affiliated, loosely or otherwise, with the radical Left of the PLO or with Islamist organizations, Hamas, or Islamic Jihad or were simply individuals who identified as Islamist. Organizations that fell in this tendency included the FPWAC and the Union of Palestinian Women’s Committees (UPWC), affiliated with the DFLP and PFLP, respectively, a segment of the UPWWC
affiliated with the PPP, and Al-Huda and Al-Khansa’,18two Islamist
Jamal 19
women’s groups, FPWAC and UPWC were more liberal and Western in their cultural orientation; however, along with the Islamist organizations, they too were shunned by Western donors because of their assumed opposition to the Oslo Accords. Although the UPWWC was regarded more favorably by donors because its affiliated PPP was not as adamant in its opposition to the Oslo Accords, some of its members were reluctant to embrace the Oslo Accords and to professionalize all the committees (N. Barghouti, founding member of UPWWC, personal communication, July 12, 2001).
These organizations experienced economic decline as well as significant decrease in their membership. They also could no longer turn to their affili-ated political factions—the DFLP, PFLP, and PPP—for financial support because the political factions themselves were also undergoing financial crisis. Though the Islamist women’s organizations claimed to have no
affilia-tion with any political group (director of Al-Khansa’,personal communication,
September 16, 2001), they too could not access Western donor funding. These Islamists women’s organizations relied on funding from membership
fees, zakat, community donations, and donations from Islamic NGOs based
abroad, including from Gulf countries (director of Al-Khansa’, personal communication, September 16, 2001). Because Israel maintained and main-tains tight control over official financial transfers into the territories, the amounts transferred from other Islamist organizations appeared to be less than amounts disbursed by Western donors. Regardless, however, the pro-grams of Islamist organizations almost exclusively catered to the needs of grassroots constituencies (for more on funding to Islamists, see Hroub, 2006, pp. 136-138).
In the emergent structure of the women’s sector, organizations affiliated with the opposition tendency became recipients of services from the profes-sionalized NGOs. The program priorities often reflected depoliticized, “post-Israeli occupation” concerns of donors and of Fateh and liberal moder-ate female activists. These activists were more likely to have benefited from post-Oslo developments at the expense of those who remained disadvantaged by the continuation of Israeli infringements on Palestinian territories.
As a whole, the women sector’s engagement with local government remained limited. As of 2001, local government structures were extremely weak, and all mayors were members or supporters of Fateh, appointed by the PA. Moreover, Western donors have displayed minimal interest in this level of government and have not encouraged regular, constructive patterns of interaction with this level of government. In 2004 and 2005, the PA held a series of phased local government elections. Because of Hamas’ strong show-ing, the PA postponed the fifth and last phase of local elections (which still
The Reconstitution of the Women’s Sector in El Salvador
In El Salvador, the more inclusive transition afforded the various associations
and NGOs more or less the same resources and opportunities.20 As a result,
all organizations were able to professionalize their operations (see Table 3 for details) and to maintain contact with and incorporate their grassroots bases in the transition process (for more on NGO professionalization, see Biekart, 1999, p. 199). The greater consensus among the political organizations vis-à-vis the peace accords reproduced itself in the affiliated organizations; this led to less polarization among these groups and more opportunities for effective cooperation. Western donors also promoted programs and projects that encouraged and often required regular interaction with grassroots constituen-cies and coordination with local government. The combination of these factors led to greater opportunities for political participation.
Although USAID initially attempted to exclude the FMLN-affiliated opposition NGOs from the national reconstruction plan, other donors, espe-cially Canadian donors and European private aid agencies, supported the opposition, FMLN-affiliated NGOs. Moreover, ARENA initially tried to undermine FMLN-affiliated NGOs by enacting a strict NGO law, but inter-national donors opposed the law and forced the government to draft a more liberal NGO law that was more supportive of FMLN-affiliated NGOs.
Most, if not all, of the women’s organizations also pushed for the founding of the government body Instituto Salvadoreño para el Desarrollo de la Mujer (Salvadoran Institute for Women’s Development; ISDEMU) in 1996. The organization’s mandate was to represent women’s interests in the implemen-tation of the peace accords and in the formulation and implemenimplemen-tation of national policies toward women. Unlike the WATC, however, ISDEMU did not serve as an intermediary body but worked with other professionalized NGOs as an equal partner. As a result, a broad-based coalition of women’s groups that were also strongly tied to various grassroots constituencies trans-pired (see, e.g., St. Germain, 1997).
Jamal 21
more details). Because these organizations did not have grassroots constitu-encies, Western donors were less willing to fund them.
The Mass-Based Organizations in the Post-1989 Period
After 1989, all the existing FMLN women’s mass organizations became offi-cially registered and further institutionalized and professionalized their
organizations to facilitate access to Western donor funding.21 As Carmen
Medina candidly explained, “When the war was winding down, all groups wanted to access foreign donor funding; the women’s groups were no excep-tion” (personal communication, February 16, 2002). Others emphasized that the domestic changes facilitated for better institutionalized NGOs. As Azu-cena Quintera explained, “After the peace accords, women returned to the cities and there was a new space for organizing. . . . There was a systematic reorganization of society, and we needed to organize according to the new needs” (personal communication, May 13, 2002). The professionalization of these organizations was also intrinsically tied to various women’s groups’ desire to secure a position in the newly reconstituted civil society. Western donor funding was also more readily available for such institutions, provided that they had grassroots constituencies and were in a position and willing to implement economic development programs.
In general, foreign donor assistance to the Salvadoran women’s organiza-tions was predominantly from solidarity groups. As the peace accords became more imminent, funding from foundations and state-sponsored donors became more available, though to a lesser extent than in the Palestinian case. Foreign donor agencies that funded Movimiento Salvadoreño de Mujeres during the first 12 years of its operations were representative of the types of donors that funded other women’s organizations in El Salvador. Among these groups were a number of solidarity groups and to a lesser extent a number of
state-sponsored donors.22
The New Non-Grassroots-Based Organizations
In parallel to the professionalization of Organización de Mujeres
Salvador-eñas and FMLN-affiliated women’s mass-based organizations, other women
innovative work of some of these organizations, all complained that they had difficulty accessing Western donor funding. In El Salvador, foreign donor agencies were more keen to fund the FMLN-affiliated organizations because of their relationship with grassroots constituencies. In contrast, Western donors operating in the Palestinian territories were more inclined to fund the newly professionalized NGOs whose directors they often wanted to promote regardless of their relationship with grassroots constituencies.
As happened in the Palestinian territories, the professionalization of the Salvadoran women’s sector contributed to the emergence of hierarchies between those who were paid professional employees of the movement and those who were the actual stakeholders (Markowitz & Tice, 2002). The more equitable organizational access to resources, however, led to less tension and polarization and more cooperation and thus a stronger basis for civil society development.
Western donor funded programs also played a pivotal role in encouraging grassroots-based women’s organizations to interact with local government. Not only did the number of female mayors and council members increase considerably in the postwar period, but various women’s organizations sys-tematically pushed municipalities to incorporate gender-sensitive components in their local development plans (Stephen, Cosgrave, & Ready, 2000, p. 9). Although foreign-funded programs tended to differ, they usually included some level of coordination with local municipalities, regular meetings with municipal authorities, the provision of meeting space, and thus the establish-ment of regular patterns of interaction with this level of governestablish-ment. These regular patterns of interaction ensured that coordination between the wom-en’s organizations and the municipalities was more likely to continue once donor funding was terminated.
Conclusion
Jamal 23
In the Salvadoran context, on the other hand, because of the more inclusive settlement and the overwhelming support it enjoyed, Western donor funding played a more positive role in the development of civil society. The more equitable access to Western donor funding allowed for more cooperative relations. Because of the more representative political institutional setting, Western donors helped institutionalize more regular and constructive pat-terns of interaction between civil society and state institutions. In both cases, Western donor assistance served to reinforce the degree of inclusivity of the political settlement. In turn, civil society came to mirror this “inclusivity” as well as the agendas of donors as expressed by the political settlement.
An emerging consensus in the peace-building literature posits that politi-cal and economic liberalization agendas are possible only where there are strong state institutions (see, e.g., Jarstad & Sisk, 2008; Paris, 2004). Find-ings in the article take this argument a step back and assert the unequivocal importance of inclusive political settlements not only in safeguarding peace-ful outcomes but also in shaping representative political institutions that facilitate civil society development.
Although this article focused on developments in Palestinian and Salva-doran civil society between 1991 and 2001, it also directly speaks to broader political developments in both contexts since 2001. In El Salvador, the more inclusive organization of political life allowed for regular contested elec-tions. In recent years, the FMLN won legislative elections in 2003 and 2009 and the presidential election of 2009. The degree of political competition and the smooth turnover of power from ARENA to the FMLN indeed reflect the vigor of political life in the country as well as the possibilities for democratic development in inclusive contexts. In the Palestinian territories, Hamas’s 2006 legislative electoral victory led to an international outcry and the cessa-tion of Western funding to the Hamas-led government. Since then, Western state-sponsored donors have increased their funding to pro-Oslo groups and civil society organizations, further polarizing Palestinian society and weak-ening the overall fabric of civil society. The issue at hand is not simply Hamas’s political positions vis-à-vis the state of Israel. Rather, these devel-opments reflect the intrinsic intimate relationship between the inclusivity of political settlements and the possibility for democratic development in post-settlement contexts.
Acknowledgments
drafts of this article were presented at the 2007 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, the 2007 annual meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, the 2008 Politics of the Middle East Working Group Workshop at Princ-eton University, and the Department of Political Science Research Roundtable at James Madison University.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interests with respect to the authorship and/or publication of this article.
Financial Disclosure/Funding
The author gratefully acknowledges funding from the Palestinian American Research Center, McGill University’s Center for Developing Area Studies, the Faculty of Grad-uate Studies Social Science and Humanities Research Council Subcommittee (SSHRC), and the Research Group in International Security (REGIS), UC Berkeley’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies, and the Dubai School of Government, which made the research and writing of this article possible.
Notes
1. As Diamond (1996, p. 229) explains, “Civil society organizations seek from the state concessions, benefits, policy changes, relief, redress, and accountability.” 2. Then Secretary of State, Colin Powell, announced the Middle East Partnership
Initiative in December 2002.
3. In June 2004, the G8 unveiled the “Partnership for Progress and a Common Future” with the Broader Middle East and North Africa.
4. Through the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), the White House linked sig-nificant amounts of foreign assistance to performance on democratic governance (for more on MCA, see Windsor, 2006).
5. It is important to note that unlike economic development programs, democracy promotion efforts do not vary extensively depending on the donor (Carothers, 1999, p. 12).
6. The Palestinian Authority (PA) was established in 1994, and in subsequent years its institutions were established and formalized. Because by then Palestinian NGOs had to adjust their programs to deal with the new emergency circum-stances of Al-Aqsa Intifada, 2001 is an important cutoff date.
7. Despite the fact that exact membership of these committees is difficult to verify, leaders of these committees claimed to have membership bases in the thousands, covering most geographic locations.
Jamal 25
9. For example, according to a Center for Policy Research Poll, 38% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip opposed the Oslo Accords and 20.4% were not sure of how they would evaluate the agreement. For more on this, refer to Public Opinion Poll 4, Palestinian Elections and the Declaration of Principles, December 12, 1993.
10. According to the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation’s (MOPIC’s) 2001 First and Second Quarterly Monitoring Report, foreign donors committed US$19.94 million to the women’s sector between 1994 and 2000. Although this figure does not include all funding committed to the sector, especially to the pro-fessionalized NGOs, it is relatively higher than other sectoral commitments, such as US$15.457 million to the children’s and youth sector and US$3.768 million to the telecommunications sector for the same period.
11. Professionalized NGOs in this tendency received a high percentage of funding committed to the women’s sector. According to the MOPIC’s 2001 First and Second Quarterly Monitoring Report, between 1994 and 1998 foreign donors commit-ted US$697,000 to one professionalized NGO, the Women’s Affairs Technical Committees (WATC), compared to US$10.234 million committed to the whole women’s sector during that same period.
12. In 2001, the Palestinian Working Women Society for Development (PWWSD) had approximately 300 registered members, and it provided employment for about 57 of them.
13. By 2003, Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees had 12,702 members and fewer women in the gender unit.
14. In 1992, a number of female cadres from Fateh and the liberal moderate ten-dency founded the WATC to assist Palestine Liberation Organization negotia-tors. The organization continues to function as one of the principal coordinating and advocacy mechanisms of the Palestinian women’s sector, in which grassroots women’s committees participate as organizational members.
15. In contrast, smaller donor agencies were often more willing to fund grassroots-based community projects and organizations. They also tended to enforce less stringent criteria pertaining to the political backgrounds and credentials of their recipients.
16. In 2001, among the donors to the WATC were the European Union (EU), the Nor-wegian Representative Office, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Canada Fund, the Freidrich Ebert Foundation, and Díakonia (M. Khayat, coordinator of WATC, personal communication, July 9, 2001). Funding to the PWWSD fit a similar profile; among the donors to PWWSD in 2001 were the EU, the Netherlands Representative Office, and USAID.
19. These elections were to be held in 60 cities and villages, including Hebron and Gaza City.
20. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 1997), between 1992 and 1996 Western bilateral and multilateral donors committed US$4.49 million for the advancement of women. This amount was relatively less than state-sponsored and multilateral commitments to other sectors, such as US$105.43 million to the integration of social groups subsector and US$68.18 million to telecommunications.
21. The Resistencia Nacional/National Resistance (RN) supported the founding of
the women’s organizations because they expected to receive a percentage of the funding that Las Dignas would access. Eventually, the women refused to give a percentage of this funding to the RN, unleashing a bitter dispute between the women’s organization and the political party (C. Argueta, Las Dígnas coordina-tor, personal communication, May 26, 2002).
22. These foreign donors predominately included solidarity groups and municipal assemblies, such as Comité de Padova—Italia, Desarrollo y Paz—Canadá, and Pelupessi de Holanda, and foundations and state-sponsored donors such as the Council for International Development, United Kingdom, HIVOS-Netherlands, and so on.
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Bio
Manal A. Jamal is an assistant professor of political science at James Madison
