publisher University of Rosario
type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
type info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
title A Strategic-Equilibrium Based
title A Strategic-Equilibrium Based
subject Strategic equilibrium, syndicates, derived partition function form game, von Neumann and Morgenstern solutions,
stronger player paradox, Equal opportunity, attractor.
subject Strategic equilibrium, syndicates, derived partition function form game, von Neumann and Morgenstern solutions,
stronger player paradox, Equal opportunity, attractor.
source 2145-4558
source 0124-4639
source Revista Universidad & Empresa; Vol. 12, núm. 19 (2010); 54-86
source "Universidad & Empresa" Journal; Vol. 12, núm. 19 (2010); 54-86
rights http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
rights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
relation http://revistas.urosario.edu.co/index.php/empresa/article/view/1307/1351
language spa
format application/pdf
description The strategic equilibrium of an N-person cooperative game with transferable utility is a system composed of a cover
collection of subsets of N and a set of extended imputations attainable through such equilibrium cover. The system
describes a state of coalitional bargaining stability where every player has a bargaining alternative against any other
player to support his corresponding equilibrium claim. Any coalition in the sable system may form and divide the
characteristic value function of the coalition as prescribed by the equilibrium payoffs. If syndicates are allowed to form,
a formed coalition may become a syndicate using the equilibrium payoffs as disagreement values in bargaining for a
part of the complementary coalition incremental value to the grand coalition when formed. The emergent well
binding agreements. The strategic-equilibrium corresponding to the derived game gives an equal value claim to all
players. This surprising result is alternatively explained in terms of strategic-equilibrium based possible outcomes by a
sequence of bargaining stages that when the binding agreements are in the right sequential order, von Neumann and
Morgenstern (vN-M) non-discriminatory solutions emerge. In these solutions a preferred branch by a sufficient number
of players is identified: the weaker players syndicate against the stronger player. This condition is referred to as the
stronger player paradox. A strategic alternative available to the stronger players to overcome the anticipated not
desirable results is to voluntarily lower his bargaining equilibrium claim. In doing the original strategic equilibrium is
modified and vN-M discriminatory solutions may occur, but also a different stronger player may emerge that has
eventually will have to lower his equilibrium claim. A sequence of such measures converges to the equal opportunity
for all vN-M solution anticipated by the strategic equilibrium of partition function derived game.
description The strategic equilibrium of an N-person cooperative game with transferable utility is a system composed of a cover
collection of subsets of N and a set of extended imputations attainable through such equilibrium cover. The system
describes a state of coalitional bargaining stability where every player has a bargaining alternative against any other
player to support his corresponding equilibrium claim. Any coalition in the sable system may form and divide the
characteristic value function of the coalition as prescribed by the equilibrium payoffs. If syndicates are allowed to form,
a formed coalition may become a syndicate using the equilibrium payoffs as disagreement values in bargaining for a
part of the complementary coalition incremental value to the grand coalition when formed. The emergent well
known-constant sum derived game in partition function is described in terms of parameters that result from incumbent
binding agreements. The strategic-equilibrium corresponding to the derived game gives an equal value claim to all
players. This surprising result is alternatively explained in terms of strategic-equilibrium based possible outcomes by a
sequence of bargaining stages that when the binding agreements are in the right sequential order, von Neumann and
Morgenstern (vN-M) non-discriminatory solutions emerge. In these solutions a preferred branch by a sufficient number
of players is identified: the weaker players syndicate against the stronger player. This condition is referred to as the
stronger player paradox. A strategic alternative available to the stronger players to overcome the anticipated not
desirable results is to voluntarily lower his bargaining equilibrium claim. In doing the original strategic equilibrium is
eventually will have to lower his equilibrium claim. A sequence of such measures converges to the equal opportunity
for all vN-M solution anticipated by the strategic equilibrium of partition function derived game. [298-words]
identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10336/7899
identifier http://revistas.urosario.edu.co/index.php/empresa/article/view/1307
date.available 2014-07-09T17:41:04Z
date.accessioned 2014-07-09T17:41:04Z
date 2011-03-10
