Klinteberg, Robert F. Equatorial Guinea Macías Country The Forgotten Refugees. Geneva International University Exchange Fund, 1978.

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CONTENTS

Page _}{unb.er

1 1. ) Foreword Maps Surmnry Introduetion Baekground t-1 v 1 3 3 4 B 10 L4 15 23 2B 32 39 43 46 50 55 55 56 6I 64 66 2.L. na 2.3. 2.4. 3.1. 3.2. J.J. 3.4. 3.5. The Country The People

IIi s tory

Chronology

). Macías t Countrv

The, State Apparatus

Economy

Forced Labour

Law and Law Enforcement

Relations with Foreign Powers Macías, "The unigue Miracle"

4,r.

+.¿.

'The _{Personality of}

Macías and Religion

Papa Macías

( _{The Refugees}

5.1.

(,

6. Solutions and Recommendat,ions

Outflux

Influx

5.2.I.

Gabon

5

,2.2.

Cameroon

5.2,3. Nigeria

5.2,4.

Spain and Other

European Countries

Legal Recognitíon

Rehabilitation

Education

Sugges tions

66 69 70 7L 74 75 80 BZ 84 85 B7 6.1.

6 .2.

6.3.

6 .4.

Sources

7"

8" S.elected Bibliography

Appendix 1

Appendix 2

Appendix 3

FORE TORD

By Lars-Gunnar Eriksson, Director, International University Exchange

Fund (IUEF)

On a number of occasions, the IUEF has commissioned studies on special refugee problems with a vier,v to devise prograrunes for assistance.

A refugee problem r¿hich has been preoccupying us for the last couple

of years is that of the Equatorial Guíneans. Their plight, as well as

that of Lheir countrymen sti1l living under the brutal oppression of

President Macíast dictatorship, is litt1e known and hence the assistance

provided Eo them is in no proportion to their needs.

I^lith the assistance of a grant from the Swedish International

Development Authority (SIDA), the IUEF decided to carry out a mission,

combining a study of the situation in Equatorial Guinea itself with that

of the refugees in neighbouring countries, as well as in Spain.

The ob.jective was twofold: firstly, to provide information about

the situation of the refugees and to make proposals for programmes of

assistance, particularly in the field of education and training;

secondly, to províde firsthand information about the situation in

Equatorial Guinea in order to facilitate assessment of the possibilities for repatriation.

I,rle were lucky to be able to benefit from the services of Dr. Robert

af Klinteberg, a Swedish anthropologist with sixteen years of experience

of refugee problems in Europe, Asia and Africa. After a very risky visit to the country itself , Dr. Kl inteberg spent four months living with r-he

refugees ín Gabon, Cameroon, Nigeria and Spain. The ensuing report and

its appendix are the result of this mission, which we hope will add to

the knowledge about the refugees, as well as the situation inside

Equatorial Guinea. Above all, we hope it r¡ill contribute to increase

the aid provided to the refugees. The views expressed

not necessarily those of

this

report are those

of

Dr. Klinteberg and IUEF.

in

the

P.

FERNANDO

PO

(MACIAS

_NGUEMA

_BIYOGO)

SANTA ISABEL

.c

i\C'

BALOERI DE

0$'

cRlsro RE)¡ Þ\\

BASAKATO DEL

SAN CARLOS

SUALA SAKATO

DEL ESTE

CEPCION (RIABA)

LOCATION ON

WEST COAST OF

THE AFRICA

Sonlo lsobel

FERNANDO PO IS./ì

(MACIAS _{NGUEMA( /}

BIYOGO)

GULF OF GU/NEA

principe _ls,

ELOBEY CHICO, ELOBEY GRANDE

Sio romé lsrsõo _Tomi

NIGERIA Port Horcourl

a CAMEROON

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SUMMARY

Equatorial Guinea consists of the island of Fernando Po situated in'

rhe culf of Guinea and the mainland enclave of Rio _Y"ii^tliih is sandwiched

betweenGabonandCameroon.Thecountryissmall,2S,000km.,andhadan

estimated population of 285,000 in L910'

A strategic position made it a valuable pa!ùn in colonial politics and

for nearly 300 y..r" it was dominated by Portugal, England and spain' I^lhen it reached independ.ence aftel 110 years of Spanish rule the prospects

looked good. An economy based on the best cocoa in the world, coffee and

timber made the per capita income the highest in Black Africa' A good

infrastructure and a high 1evel of education promised even gl:eater prosperity

for the future.

In 1968, Francisco Macfas Nguema became the first President of the

independenr Republic. The diffiãulties began shortly afterr'iards when he

began to eliminate real or imagined political opponents. 1972 saw him

become President for 1ife. His rule has since become increasingly personal and is characterised by political, religious and ethnic persecuËion'

Systematic terror and near total disintãgration of the economy have

contrib-uted to drive an estimated third of the population into exile from the most

regressive desPotism in Africa'

president Maclast reign has a \^/eak po\,7er base. It functions because

of a deliberate cultural regression not unlike that of Nazi Germany, which

has thrown the country and the people into a situation far below that of

the pre-colonial period and has even destloyed lhe strong traditions of village democracy. fni" is condoned by the foreign po!üers present'in the

country, notably the USSR, Cuba and China' as \^7e11 as by ruthless capítalist

enterprises, particularly French. The United Nations' Development Prografrune

(UNDP) and the European Economic Community (EEC) provide assistance' tacitly accepting the regimL, while Spain and the Vatican remain silent about what

is going on in oid"r to avoid, at all costs, a final rupture of very strained relations. The silence perpetuates the terror, and the cost is paid by the

people of Equatorial Guinea'

official figures for refugees are: 60,000 in Gabon, 30,000 in cameroon'

5,000 in Nigeriu:6,000 in spain, wirh smaller groups in a number of other countries in Africa and Europe. The refugees in Gabon and cameroon are in

an especially difficult posiiion. Agents provocateurs threaten their

security. unemployrnent, poverty, tact< of education and medical facilities

combine with the language problLm and micro-political tensions to make their

situation increasingly worrying.

Maclas, persecutions have been directed against the intellectuals in

particular. As a consequence, the refugees are probably among the best

educated and most competent professionally in Africa, a fact i¡hich poses

special problems for their social and economic rehabilitation.

l i l

E

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INTRODUCTION

This report deals with the situation of the refugees from Equatorial

Guinea. For varíous reasons they have remained almosttotally ignored and

neglected. ft was thanks to the initiative of the International University

Exchange Fund (IUEF), and the generous assistance of the S¡^¡edish International

Development Authority (SIDA), that I had an opportuníty to go on a f.act-fínding

missíon to Central Africa during four months in L978,

The fact-finding was planned with four major questions in mind:

l{hat is the situation of the refugees?

I,rlhat are the possibilítíes of repatriation?

lrlhat are the short-term and long-term needs of the refugees?

Itlhat solutions should be suggested?

The first question required information about where the refugees are

and in whar circumstances they find themselves, about health and nutrition,

security, emplo¡rment, relations with nationals and other micro-political

considerations - all seen in the context of the general situation in the

country of asylum

The second was crucial in the sense that voluntary repatriation

always remains the most desirable solution to a refugee problem, so much so

that it is questionable if other forms of assistance should even be attempted

if a return is a genuine possibility. An assessment of the situation required

information about Ëhe economíc situation inside Equatorial Guinea: employment,

salaries and prices, economic plans and prospects, infrastructure, etc.; the health and nutrition status; macro- and micro-polirics, educatíon and

security. Information about these matters would _{also hopefully help in sorting}

out some of the rather disturbing contradictions which occurred as soon as one

tried to understand the situaËion

There r^rere, for instance, the discrepancies betv¡een the sombre

picture of Equatorial Guinea painted by the exiles and the rather more s)anpathetic

descriptions given in certain Spanish and French media; the apparent ambivalence

of the United Nations and the European Economic Community, both giving assistance

while providing minimal information about their progrannes, an unusLlal policy for

donor agencies. There \^iere also the conflieting appraisals of the reliability

of rhe information abouË the country. l,Iore specifically, if President Macías

had his counLry under strong domination, must he not also have an equally strong

po\,,rer base indicating that vast numbers of his subjects were in favour of the

regime? If it \^/ere true that exiles returned voluntarily, must it not be

assumed that Macfast rule r^ras much more benevolent than had been a1 leged?

hlhy had the important Fang tribe, described as fierce \¡rarriors, not created an effective opposition to the President if they had really felt oppressed?

Evidently these and oËher questions had to be given satisfactory ansr¡/ers. t

! f I

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Once it became clear if large-scale repatriation was a realistic

solution to the refugee problem, a preliminary need assessment would have

to be presented, either'for a return to a counlry said to have lost much

of its htunan resources and its infrastructure, or for continued lífe in

exile.

The question of repatriation reoccurred in the context of the

needs of the refugees, especially in the field of education and training.

If they vrere to go back to a country said to have lost much of its trained

*"rrporlr and infrastructure, how could assistance best be used to alleviate

the needs of Equatorial Guinea? If the refugees could not go back, how

could they best be assisted to become useful residents in the countries

of asylum?

Final1y, preliminary solutions would have to be suggested on the

basis of these needs, to facilitate further discussions between the countries

2

2.L.

BACKGROUND

TIIE COUNTRY

Equatorial Guinea

is

among the least known countries

in

the ¡¿or1d

today. It is

often confused with Guinea-Conakry and Guinea-Bissau, even with

New Guinea

in

the Pacífic

(1) or

incorrecÈly referred

to

by

íts old

colonial

name, Spanish Guinea.

Geographically and administratively

it

consists

of

t¡¡o

parts,

the

mainland province

of

Rio Muni plus the three coastal

islets

Corisco, Elobey

Grande andElobey

Chieo;

and the offshore islands Fernando Po and Annobón.

These have now been renamed, respectively, Macías Nguema Biyogo and Pigalú,

but

will

be mentioned by

their

more

familiar

names

in this

report.

The official capital is Malabo, formerly Santa Isabel, on Fernando

Po. The island is subdivided into the districrs of Malabo; Luba, ex-San

Carlos; and Riaba, ex-Concepcion. Also included in Maclas Province is

Annobón r^rhich constitutes a fourth district. On the mainland the Rio Muni

Province has twelve districts: Bata \,/ith the province capital, Ebebeyin,

Evinayong, I'ficomeseng, Bimbiles, Mongomo, Nyefang; Mbini, formerly Rio

Benito; Kogo, Acurenen, Nsok and Rio Campo.

Fernando Po is in the Gulf of Guinea, 33 km from the nearest part of the Cameroon coast. It is roughly 70 by 30 km, with a coastline of some

250 krn and an area of 2rOI7 km2, and consists of Ëhree extinct volcanoes.

The highest, Pico de Santa Isabel, is 3,007 meters and important for Ëhe

possibilities it offers for electronic surveillance of sea and air traf.f.íc along a strategically important part of the African coast. The Moka

mountain, with its crater lake at 11800 meters, used to be economically

important because of its livestock. A1l over, the volcanic soils contribute

to exLremely fertile lands, and in Malabo a broken dor,¡n crater rim provides

a good deepwater harbour some 700 meters in diameLer.

Annobón is the last of the chain of volcanoes which begins with

¡{t. Cameroon and continues through Fernando Po, Príncipe and Sao Tomé.

South of the Equator and 600 km south-south-west of Malabo, it is 750 meters

high, covers 17 km2 and, at the time of independence, had a population of

1,500. This has since been reduced by an uncontrolled cholera epidemic.

NaËural reseurces abound in Equatorial Guinea. The agricultural

potential is very high, particularly on volcanic soils and the differing altitudes allow the cultivation of practically anything. The sea and the

rivers are rich in fish and other seafoods.

On the other hand, there seem to be no mineral resources of any

consequence. ùn the mainland, minute quantities of gold have been found

near Evinayong, and there have been rumours about títaniumriron-ore and

coal. Prospecting for oil in the coastal sediments, inspired by the presence

I

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1

ii! ill iii ji ,r1 iì1 !il :il lii .ii lj ll ',iI iii ''l ,il ril rll tìi :l :,i I .ii Ì :il ,i iii ì:i ;i ri I I' ;. i :l .j ril

of oil in similar

investment of US$

be excluded that

geological strata in Gabon, began in 1960' In spite of 15 million it has so far 1ed to nothing, but it cannot

future test-dri11ing might produce results'

Duringthecolonialtime,theeconomywasbasedprimarilyon

cocoa, famous for its excellent quality; on second grade Robusta coffee;

on timber, like Oukoumé, walnut aná different kinds of mahogany; and on

palm-oil.

Rio Muni is a rectangular enclave on the continent, bordering

on Cameroon in the north and Gabon in the east and south, roughly 7?0 _^O^I . ,

140 km, with approximately 150 km of coastllne and wiÈh an area of 2b'0UU Km'

Most of the boundaries have been drawn with a ruler on the colonial map'

Behind a narror¡r coastal plain, the landscape begins to roll gently

upwards, eventually reaching hills of 1,000 tó 11200 meters in rhe eastern

pära. Geological1y, it consists of ancient metamorphic rocks, like granite'

gn.iss, diorites and gabbroes. This produces soils of mediocre quality,

but with an annual rainfall of 21300 mn or more, average temperature of

¡øõC rni

"lr"ttge hurnidity rangíng around 862, the fertility is very

good and

rhe rain forest stands lush and ábundant - strikingly beautiful in its great variety, manifested in 140 different species of wood'

Animal life in the forest \^7as sparse but rich in variety, with

gorillas, chimpanzees, elephants' hippopotami, buffaloes' antelopes'

crocodiles, pythons and Gaboon vipers _{' It} would seem that it has now

practicalty àisappeared, as pïoLein shortages have forced people to hunt

rh"t",r"t they have been able to calch with traps and dogs'

In the Rio Tamboni estuary are the manglove-studded islets of

Corisco, Elobey Grande and Elobey Chico' respectlvety 1-5,2'34 and O'26 kmZ'

Being closer to the coast of Gabon than to that of Rio lfuni, the islands were

the subject of conflicts betr¿een the two countries in 1912 and 1974'

2.2, THE PEOPLE

Ethnically,EquatorialGuineahasbeendominatedbytwogloups' the ancíent Bubi on Fernando po, and the increasingly powerful Fang on the

mainland. some of the history of the country is influenced by the animosity

between them, which has been deliberaCely exploited in a divide-and-rule

policy, both by the colonialists and by the present regime'

TheslaveryperiodmusthavehurttheBubibadly,butquiteto

v/hat exte"a ir unknown. Statements that they suffered from a ne\^/ decline

around 1900 probably reflect exaggerated population estimates in the pasr

rather than an actual reduction brrt, since then, their number has increased very slowly. Apparently they were affected by sleeping sickness and other

diseases and, _"".otairrg to Bubi informants' also by a tendency rowards

alcoholism which r¿as reinforced by Spanish plantation ovmers who paid part

J

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A census

in

1912 gave the Bubi as 547"

of

the population

of

Fernando

Po.Inlg60,theymayhaverepresentedaboutathirdoftheinhabitants.

In

addifíon, therL were a few thousand Fernandinos

_'

They are a group of

mixed heritage descended from Europeans as r¿ell as from former slaves

îi;;";;;

by"the

Brit.ish,

and from emancipated Africans from sierra Leone'

Liberia and the West Indies, oft.en with English names and a knowledge of

Coastal

Englísh.

Other minorities r/ere lhe Crioulos

of

mixed African and

portuguese blood, and irmigrants from Ëhe ís1and

of

Annobón, populated by

liberated slaves from Angola. There I¡/ere a1 so

limited

nurnbers

of

Fang and

ri"y.ro"

from Rio Muni and 4,222

whites.

However, the largest group !üere

irmigrants fron

Nigeria; Ibo, Ibibio

and

Efik

contracË \^rorkers on the

"o"oã plantatiorr"

tto lived in

compaet

colonies'

Theybrought the toËal

population up

to

some 63r000 shortiy before independence, making a population

density

of

31 per

kmz.

An important characleristic $/as the large surplus

of men, caused by the importation

of

workers '

The mainland

tribes

are divided

into

Ë¡¡o seeËions. The oldest

inhabitants are the small

tribes of

the Bujeba and the Ndowe

tribe with its

subdivisions Benga and Combê. They are the "People

of

the Beach", Los

Playeros. Inland are the Fang, comparatively

late arrivals'

A census made 31 December 1950 showed Rio l'Íuni

to

have 156,175

inhabitants;

L,4g7

of

them whites, and L2,263 mainly of.Gabonese and

Cameroonese

origin.

Ten years

later

the population had increased

to

LB3'377;

Z,gøq

of

rhem

rtit".

The population density was 7 per krn2,

fairly

evenly

distributed throughout. the

districts.

Subsequent figures have to be

extra-polated

r¡ith

the help

of

an estimated growth rate

of

1.7% per annum' This

brings rhe populetion

to

285,000

in

1970 and would have brought

it to

326'000

in

1978

if it

had not been

for

factors outside normal demography' The slow

growth raÈe should be

noted.

Although Èhe infant mortaliËy rate I'fas one

of

the lo¡¿est on the African continent (53.2/Lr000), Lhe

fertility

rate \'ras

Ëhe second lowest (G55/Lr000)

after

Gabon' This

sub-fertílity

has a strong

bearing on the values and atùitudes

of

the ethnic groups, especially the

Fang.

l,lany events

of

the more recent

history of

the people

of

Equatori-al

Guinea are fair1y

well

known,

in particular

from

writers like

Ndongo Bidyogo'

Domínguez, Fernandez, Pelissier and

cronjé.

l{hat has been made less clear

is

the general

cultural

and social background

for

these events and the attitudes

which hãve interacËed

with

them. To

clarify

the issue

it is

necessary to make

a thr:mbnaíl sketch

of

the

people.

The emphasis

will

be on the Fang

tribe,

because

of its

numerical and

political

domifiance, and because

its

extension

into

three countries must be taken

into

account

for

an understanding

of

the

situation

of

the exiles.

Fang stories

tell that

they cane from a bush country

far to

the

north-easË, outside the region

of

the

tropical rain forest'

They seem to

have been driven south and south_r,¡est by the Fulbé

tribe

Some one hundred and

fifty

years ago and

to

have s1ow1y made

fheir

\day

into

rn¡haE

is

nor'r Ëhe

Centre-Sud Province

of

Cameroon, Rio Muni and the norttrern and north-\^Testern parts

lll iii ii; irj irl ;ìi :ir iii iii ìli iii rij iil iii iii

movemenË petered _{out around 1890. l4ígration inside Fang territory is still}

going on, which has made _{frustrated colonial administt.iorc describe the}

Fang _{as "nomadic". The Ëerm is misleading, with few, if any, of the normally}

accepted _{criteria of nomadism applicable to the slow extension and}

consolid-ation of an area taken over from smaller tribes.

Fang settlements _{have taken dífferenË forms. In Cameroon and Rio}

l4uni _{there are relatively well demarcated. areas populated by one parËicular}

subdivision of the tribe while in Gabon fragmented groups are interspersed.

Relations between the groups are strengthened by

"*ogr*y, a system aimed at

preventing _{incest in the widest sense of the term, which allows a}

man to

marry _{only outside his} own clan. The Fang actually appear to practise double

exogamy, which means that a man is prohibited from _{ràrrying nàt only a girl}

from his fatherts c1an, buË also one from _{his motherts. this cornplicated}

system means _{that the kinship ties become further extended geographically.}

rt is also indicative of the profound values-Fang tradition attaches to

morality, which they regard as one of the fundamental _{prerequisites for the}

granting of fertí1iry.

It is not certaín what the economic basis of Fang life was before

the migration began, but once _{they entered their present tãrritory, trad.e}

seems to have become a dominant aspect. Slave trade and colonialism had

encouraged an extensive netv/ork of Ërad.e routes between the inland and the

littoral, and the Fang were in an excellent geographical and cor¡rnercial

position to make use of it.

During the seventy years after 1850, commerce changed from almost

exclusively ivory and natural produce to manufactured _trade goods, and

from _{bartering to exclusively cash basis. rn the process, most of the}

traditional skil1s at handicrafts disappeared. and the capitalisation of

trade goods upset _{the circulation of} marriage payments _{which, in turn,}

weakened _{the social organisation. This is relevant to the present hardships}

in Equatorial Guinea in three \,rays: non-existence of the cottage ind.ustries

which might have provided basic necessities, adherence to cash economy in

spite of runavray inflation, and serious social disorganisation.

compared with many other Bantu _{tribes, the Fang appear to have}

paid little _{attention to farming. subsistence agricultui"}

"ãr, on rhe whole, for the I¡/omen' while the men d.evoted themselves to trading, at times raising

the necessary capital through wage _{labour in the timber industry and to the}

sporting events of hunting _{and "obánn" raiding. The introd.uction of cocoa}

and other cash _{crops, in the nineteen-twenties, changed this. Many of the} men became _{farmers attached to a particular plot of 1and. As a consequence,}

the population became more settled and the growing importance of trading centres for the crops led to previously unknown concentrations of the

population. In the centres the bark huts gave \,/ay to r^¡ell-built houses

of dried clay on woodframes and, _{in spite of a certain resistance to}

innovations, furniture of all kinds began to appear. propelled _{by the}

economic boom which had begun in the tr,¿enties with the

"*ploit"tion of

oukoumé wood and the profits made from cocoa and _{coffee, lh"} area \,,/as on its

\''lay _{ro a relative prosperity. At the same time, crises were building up inside}

a social system which was _{vulnerable to the sLrains imposed by rapid}

socio-economic change.

IT

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!

I

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A classical study by Balandier analyses what happened in Gabon;

what \^7ent \^rrong r¿ith the colonial system and how the Fang responded' (1)

The situation i-n Equatorial Guinea shor¡s st-rong analogies which help in

explaining how a rapidly developíng country with excellent economic

pofential has backtracked a century of evolution in a few years and become

the most backr¡ard region in Africa.

Early explorers like du Chaillu and Fourneau were impressed by

the intelligence _"tt¿ tn" vitality of the Fang, but were not a\'rare of the

vulnerability which was inherent in the social system. They saw the

strength and dynamism but not that it was lacking in direction' Migrations

to do wage labour added to the dispersion and fragmentation of the social

grorrpirrgs. Rapid economic progress had unfortunâte social side-effects ãnd contributed to a !üeakening of tradítional values which, in turn,

interacted with what can best be described as a eultural inferiority

complex vis-ã-vis the colonialists and their technical superioríty. "The

whiteman r¡ras described as the favourite son of God, the possessor of the

knowledge that is the source of power. He was said to be able to perform

miracles (akungé) ." (2)

At the same time, the growing imbalance was further affected by

Ëhe gap betvreen the traditional village elders and the rapidly growing

number of well trained and educated youngsters who were becoming a ne\¡I

social type for which there \^/as no place available within the system'

Apparently, the Fang felt a kind of identity crisis and a need

for reorientation. ]n the late forties' a series of steps v/ere taken to

cope with the situaËion: bringing the groups togelher inside the "alar

ayãng" movement for clan consolidation and setting up the "Pahouin Congress"

for policy-making and external relations. ("Pahouin" has often been used

as a name for the Fang. In reality, it is probably a corruption of a

M'pongwe phrase *eaning "I do not know" used in response to incomprehensible

quesËions about their neighbours the Fang')

Another response to the vaguely understood but strongly felt

crisis was in the field of religion. Missionaries, money and the miracles

of technique had reduced the ínfluence of the Biéri cult of ancestor worship'

A new, more por4Terful _{, religion} had to be introduced. The outcome r¿as the

syncretistic Bwiti cu1t, courbining traditional and Christian traits and

sirongly reminiscent of the Voodoo of the inlest Indies and the Candomblé

of Brazi|. Like these, Bwiti had strong elements of magic and secrecy and

is, in many respects, an underground movement made to Serve as refuge and

defence frorn the superimposed threats of colonialism"

The reaction is in no way unique. 0n the contrary, it is quite

common as a reaction of defence againsË oppression in the form of innumerable

more or less messianic movements throughout history. On occasion the reactior¡

has been pushed further to become a militant \^/ay of political expression and

Balandier

_,

L970.

Balandier, Ibid.

_{r P.}

279

i'

(1)

action. Bur while such a turn of events as, for instance, in Çhe case of Mau-Mau in Kenya has oftqn been the work of évo1ués with a sopûisticated

policy towards eventual improvement of their own peoþle, Equatorial Guinea

is a different case altogether.

The Bwiti cult appears to have been growing strong during the

fifties. It vras protected partly by its ov¡n clandestinity and partly by

the perpetual lack of corununicaËion across the cultural and linguistic

gap between colonisers and colonised. In retrospect, it is clear that

much of Macfasr election campaign in 1968 r¡as dírected towards the adherents

of the Bwiti cult and, more specifically, towards Lhe influential village elders whos.e fears of the Spaniards could be played upon easily. Once the

foreigners and their superior magic were gone, the good o1d days of Fang

po\¡/er would return, with many wives and children; the old virtues restored,

notably that of greater respect for the elders. All the property of the

colonialistis would be distributed to those'who were for Macías, bringing

endless prosperity.

a') _IlISTORY

The history of Fernando Po began in a distant past when it was

populated by Bantu-speaking peoples coming across the narro\.{ straits from

what is now Víctoria on the coast of Cameroon. Their descendents were the

Bubi who created a centralised kingdom, ruled from the Moka highlands.

Portuguese seafarers came to the island tn 1472, noted its great economic

and strategic value and named it Formosa, "The Beautiful".

Twenty-one years later, in an unparal1e1led display of colonialistic

at,titudes, a Papal Bu11 put the "undiscovered" r¡or1d up for grabs, dividing

it into two spheres of interest for Portugal and Spain. The Papal Seal closed

Africa to Spain and. gave Portugal South America east of longitude 460\,1. The

arrangement survived until L777 when Spain obtained Fernando Po in exchange

for its part of BraziI . i^Ihat Spain lost in terms of size of territory it

gained by getting a base for the slave-trading which was necessary for the

exploítation of its American colonies. But Spanish presence on the island

was insignificant and the most influential there r¡rere the British who were

soon Ëo use it as a base for their anti-slavery warships. English attempts

at buying the island were opposed by the Cortes but Spanish interests in

keeping it were dívided and it v/as not until 1858 that Spanish colonial interests, rapidly declining in the rest of the r¿orld, reluctantly began to

focus on equatorial Africa. In the turmoil of frantic land-grabbing in the

late nineteenth century, Spain demanded large areas on the mainland where

it r¿as now beginning to stake out possessions, but. it was'up against stronger

colonial po\¡¡ers and received only a fraction of its claims.

Originally, the desire to possess the mainland terrítory of Rio

Muni was based on a realisation that there \¡/as a great need for manpower

on the plantations of Fernando Po. This did not work out. The mainland

tribes were different from the docile Bubi and Crioulos. Spanish settlers could geL theiï way with the Playeros. They found it rather more difficult

The Fang were fierce warriors, independent and primitive' not quite' to be

trusted and no good as farm labour. The inability to understand what was

goíng on ¿lmong the Fang qras _to become one of the most fatal short-comings

of the colonialists.

There were other faí1ures. Rio Muni remained largely unexplored

until the 1920s. Itlhen the Europeans finally moved in they did much to

develop Èhe area, building model villages compleËe with churches and schools

along the new roads, introduced coffee farming and timber industries, built

"r, rã"q,r"te road netowrk and worked hard on getting the health situation

under cont.rol. But there \^7as an ever-presenË paternalistic attitude which

prevented clear ideas of the damages which were being done and created

what was to become a heavy psychological legacy. Post-primary educagion

was sadly neglected and attitudes tol'rards political conscíousness hlere set

by the Franco regime.

In 1945, a newly awakened and slightly bewildered attention to

its exotic colony found an expression in the creation of an Institute for African Studies in Madrid. IL was getting too late. "The winds of change"

were moving up on the Beaufort scale. The Bubi and the Playeros kept quiet,

but Fang nationalism \^las beginning to express itself in Gabon and Cameroon'

gradualiy spilling over into the more prosperous and advanced Rio Muni'

lp"in r.â"tå¿ with increasing oppression, culminaling wirh the alleged murder

of the nationalist Enrique Nvo.

Two years later Spain was finally admitted into Èhe United Nations.

Respectabitity became a must. l'loreover, there was the issue of Gibraltar

and how to put pressure on the British to hand it back to Spain. UN pressure

tovrards decolonialisation left litt1e option. The Madrid Government had to

do something. It made the colony a province and began an assimilation policy" Economically, iE created great benefits for the population, in particular for

the r¿hites. Predictably, the increased freedom stimulated the demands for

further independence. In 1958, hundred of nationalists went into exile' one of the most important leaders was kil1ed and pressuTe mounted. The

nationalists protested in the UN against the strengthening of the Spanish

influence through an increasing integration r¿hich sar¿ the first African

delegates in the Cortes in Madrid and growing numbers of African students

in universities in Spain. The opposition against these apparent benefits must

be seen against the inferiority complexes which the colonial domination created'

From 1960, Spanish repression became milder. Prisoners and detainees

were released and ín 1962 most of the exiles had returned. In that year

Spanish Foreign Minister Carrero Blanco visited Spanish Guinea for the first

tiure. Things were beginning to stir. In 1963 a referendum \^7as held on the

question of increased autonomy. The people of Fernando Po, feeling they

had more to lose than to gain from stronger Fang participation in internal

affairs, voted against. The larger population of Rio Muni voted for' In July Lg63, the Liberation Conrnittee of the OAU increased

diplomatic pressure and, one month later, Madrid announced its intention of

giving the two provinces of Spanish Guinea greater autonomy and an opportunity.

ii li ii il i1 :ìr ,ii ri: l¡ ir il ii: :t: lir l l Ìll iil I 'rì .l :ll ii .! ,;I H H rq tf il t:t 1å tl Id H il lt il it_iÍ +t i¡ :l ¡t å il ït {l rl il rl i¡ 11 f1 Ìl t1 r1 ¿t i1'_t 1 il -.êd ¡i it ¿1 Ël fi fl * H d # d # g åi fl ,21 åt AI ïl fl {t Il # ,'.¡l ä ö ü # fl ã å Yd {1 s F-l :Èl ,'l .;l irl :j l

Atanasio Ndongo founded the independence party MONALIGE and an

autonomous goverrìment r^ras set up, headed by Bonifacio Ondo Edu who later

became the leader of the MUNGE party. An unkno\^m colonial civil servant

from a remote inland district named Francisco Macfas was,íappointed as

Vice PresidenL.

It is obvious that Ëhe last years of Spanish rule represented

a seríous attempt to make up for past neglect. "Economically speaking the

period of autonomy \^ras characterised by outstanding achievements, especially

as regards Ëhe development of an economic and social infrastructure and

the development of agricultural exports." (1) Fernando Po had a per capita

GNP of US$ 466.-- in 1965, way above any other country in Black Africa. In 1968, the average per capita GNP for the whole country reached US$ 300.--,

second only to Gabon. Literacy \,/as assessed at 897., there \474s one doctor

per 71230 inhabitants and 5.7 hospital beds per 1,000; Fernando Po had

12.3 telephones per 1,000 and by far the highest number of vehicles. The

countryts energy consumption per capita was the fourth in Black Africa, etc. Q)

Opinions among the exiles about the role of Spain as a coloniser

vary from acceptance by most of the refugees in Africa, to harsh condennation

from several of the politícal1y conscious resistance groups in Europe. But

even those who give much credit to the malerial benefits of the later period

of Spanish presence agree that"Ëhe greatest crime Spain committed in Equatorial

Guinea was its neglect to introduce political education and to form political

cadres". There is an easy explanation for this, the oppression of politics during the Franco regime - but the fact remains. The colonial por^/er withdrew

from a country woefully unprepared for the political aspects of independence. The circtrnstances leading up to and following independence'

described in some detail by the specíalists, will be outlined here under

section 3, ttMaclas I Countrytr. 2.4. CI1RONOLOGY r'l rl ,i' ii iil 'i ti ¡l r470 1500 L4:3 L494

T77 7

L789

Portuguese seafarers discover uninhabited Annobón, and

r\^ro years later Fernando Po, populated by the Bubi people.

First factories and slave-trading on Annobón

Papal Bu1l splits the world into tv/o sphere of dominance

between Portugal and Spain along longitude 46oW, shutting

out Spain from Africa and giving a part of present-day

Brazil to Portugal.

Portugal and Spain swap Fernando Po and Annobón for BrazíLían

possessions.

Spain begins slave-hunting and slave-trading.

(1)

(2)

ANRD document, undated.

"España y Guinea Ecuatorial", Servicio Informativo

1968,

10

L827

England sets up a base

for

naval ships

to

suppress the

slave trade

at

Port Clarencer no\¡tr Malabo'

Beginnings

of

Fang migration

into

Rio Muni'

1843

A spanish Royal commíssioner sent t.o take possession of

the islands appoints an Englishman the

first

governor

of

Fernando Po

1B5B

The

first

spanish-born governor, and beginnings

of

spanish

colonialism orì Fernando Po'

1866

The

first

Catholic mlssions on Fernando Po

1885

Germany and France draw a coÍlmon border between their

respective colonies Karnerun and Gabon'

lBBg

Spain, having

lost its

American and Asian colonies,

expropriates land from the indigenous population and

steps up the colonialisation.

Fang migrations ebbing ouË.

1900

A

treaty in

Paris reduces Spanish land claims on Ëhe continent from 300,000 km2

to

26,000

k'n2:

the Rio Muni enclave

which

is

conceded from French Gabon. An adminisËraËion

is

organised

ín

1904, but most

of it

remains unexplored

unril

rhe 1920s.

1936 Civil

war

in Spain.

Fernando Po

is Falangist.

Republican

Rio }funi becomes

"pacified", i.e.,

Falangist'

Lg42

Treaty with

Britain

on Nigerian labour

in

Equatorial Guinea.

Lgl+7 Fang nationalism emerges

in

Gabon and Cameroon. Spain Ëries

-

_to

_{repress budding tendencies towards} independence'

1953

Nationalist leader Enrique Nvo

is killed

1955

Spain

joins

the United Nations.

Lg56

Under UN pressure Spain gives

its

colony equal status

r¿ith the provinces

of

the peninsula.

spain introduces an assimilation policy along Portuguese 1ines.

1958

Nationalist leade-r Acacio Mané

is ki1led.

Hundreds

in

exíle

in

Gabon ¡.nd Cameroon.

f959

The indigenous population

is

granted Spanish citizenship.

.

Nationalists protest increasing Spanish domination

in

the UN.

1960 General Spanish

elections. First

African delegates

in

the Cortes.

iii

1ìi

llj

iri

iii

.,i

jii

ii

iti ììl iij lij ili

iÌi

ili iti iii

!11

ti;l

lrll

I'il

L963 Referendum. Rio Muni votes for increased autonomy'

Fernando Po against for fear of becoming dominated by

the Fang. Macías becomes Vice President'

Franco no¡ninates Bonifacio Ondu Edu to head the autonomous

government.

Two UN resolutions urge Spain to give full independence

and to prepare a constitutíonal conference'

A UN commission visits Bquatorial Guinea'

Record. year for cocoa. In October Èhe constitutional

conference begins in Spain, buL stalls'

t964

L965

]-966

t967

1963SpainI^fantstoincreaseinternationalpressureonBritain

to

concede Gibraltar and pushes the conference

to

show

its

eagerness

for

decolonisation'

Macíasr relations with Trevijano

begins'

Maclas

visits

UN

in

New York'

11 August, the new constitution

is

accepted

in

a referendum

observed bY the UN'

In

September general elections are won by Macías '

12 October: proclamatíon

of

Independence'

11 Novernber: Equatorial Guinea

joins

the UN'

Lg6g

t{acías bans Red Cross

relief flights

from Fernando Po to

Bíafua;

asks UN

for

peace-keeping

force; ki1ls

Ondo Edu'

5March:thefirst''coupd'étatatËempt'tleadstoviolent

seriesofassassinations.6,00Ospaniardsareevacuated by

air

and sea, B0 remain

in

Equatorial Guinea'

TgTo''YouthonEhelnlarchwithMacías''roamthecountry.

7

July:

creation

of

"Partido Unico Nacional'

Exchangeofambassadorsbetr¿eenSantalsabelandPeking.

Equatorial Guínea voËes

for

China

in

the UN'

LSlt

Macías assumes

total

por¡/er'

SpaindeclaresallinformationaboutEquatorialGuineatobe

against the

official

secrets act'

LgTzReligiouspersecutions'NzéAbuy'BishopofBata'inexile'

14

July:

l'Iacías makes himself President

for Life'

AgreemenEsabouteconomic'cultural'rechnicalandmilitary assistancefromUssR'Cubaandothersocialistcountries.

Somalís and Ethiopians engaged

ín

the security system'

Strained relations with Gabon'

r97 3 Maclas imposes ne\,ü coûstitution and renames most places in

a desire

for authenticity.

Third PUNT congress. Attempts

at

a national census. Economy

disintegrating.

Ca. L27. of

the populatíon

in exi1e.

US$ 400,000'-- loan from IDA'

August: formation

of

ANRD Liberation movement'

"Coup attemptil followed by large-scale

killings

'

L97 4

L975: March: formation of Liberation movements: ANALIGE, URGE and MOLIFUGE in SPain.

1976

Deterioration

of

relations

with spain.

Macías signs

friend-ship treaty r,/ith PresidentBokassa

of

CenËral African Republic.

Labour treaty with Nigeria abrogated and 20,000 Nígerians

repatriated.

All

Roman Catnâlic

priests

and nuns arrested'

Diplomatic relations with US broken.

Franco dies.

11 Nigerians shot

in

Malabo. 25,000 repatriated' US Embassy closed.

Equatorial Guinean students

in

Spain occupy the Equaforial

Guinean embassy

in

Madríd. Their

relatives at

home ki1led

in

reprisals.

Meeting

of

the Liberation movements.

20 October: the ner¿ Spanish Government

lifts

the

official

secrets act from information about Equatorial Guinea.

lularch:

last

Spanish diplomat leaves embassy

in

Malabo.

November: The President

of

Gabon, Omar Bongo' goes

to

Spain

where he requests diplomatic support

for his

countryts claim

on the islands

of

Equatorial Guinea

in

exchange

for

Gabonrs

support

for

spain

in its

problems

with

the canaty Islands.

Macías

visits

Peking, Pyongyang and Hanoi'

March:

last

Spanish teachers leave.

April:

A mercenary committs suicide

in

London. Docr:ments

found

in

his apartment prove

that

he had been employed in

I972

to

overthrow Macías and put General Ojukwu, leader of

the Bíafran

rebellion, in his

place.

May: Macfas declares an

atheistic

state.

June:

The Spanish Minister

of

Foreign

Affairs

says

in

Peking

that

his

country would strengthen

its

diplomatic relations

with Equatorial Guinea'.

July:

Six Spanish

priests

are expelled from Equatorial Guinea.

Equatorial Guinean ambassador

in

Gabon abducËed and presuruably

ki11ed.

L97 7

L97 B

J. MACIAS' COUNTRY

The change r¡hich has Laken place in Equatorial Guinea after Macías

took poweris ofamagnitude which makes it unique in Africa. stil1 more

astounding is that it remains so unknor^m. It is a contributing part' of

the tragedy that even the meagre information ¡n'hich has trickled out of the country has to a great extent been ignored, or repressed. Spain and the

vaLican have kept their silence. So have the socialist countries and the

inter-governrnental organisations. Some lJestern publications like "Marchés

Tropicãux" have produãed information vihich is misleading to the point of

becárning fa1se. Other üIestern reíterations of reports from the refugees

have been regarded by Third !,lorld countries as representing partisan

interests. t'Such reports remain a matter of speculation in the absence

of first-hand reports, much more so while Spain, United States and West

Germany are sti11 Equatorial Guineafs rnajor.trading partners'" (1) fne

list of trading païtners is incorrect but the caution is justified' Most

of what has been published so far is at best second-hand, and much of it

consists of rehashed digests based on sources so far away in time and space

that checking' and controlling become irnpossible'

The task of providing a report on Ëhe exiles, their reasons for

leaving the country and the possibilities of repatriation, made an assessment

of Ëhe current situation inside the country essential. However, a study

of the existing documentation was anything but conclusive.

until 1968 the country had been abundantly, if not wel1, described

inSpanishpublications.AnauthoritylikeLinigerlistsl,T00titlesinhis

iiuriogr"ptti. Q) Macías changed that. rn December 1968 he told leading

civil servanEs "Franco commands in Spain and I command here" ' (3) Among

his commands were the closing doi,rn oi tr"tt a dozen nevrspapers and

period-icals, rigid censorship and banning of all foreign journalists' News from and about Ëhe country became scarce, contrádictory and hard to evaluate'

In 1971 he was helped by the Franco regime which made all information

relating to EquaÈo.i"f grrirrea "materia reservada", prohibiting its public-ation in Spain under the official secretst act'

tr{hat was eventually published was obviously biased. statements

from Ì,Ialabo, reinforced by Macíast eminence grise, Trevijano, stressed the

progressive nature of a regime threatened by colonialism and imperialism'

Those who had fled from the country held rather different opinions '

Impartial sources like member organisations of the uN expressed

themselves in bland offici.alese and ín statistical estimates. Handbooks

abouË Africa provided some inÈeresting information but in vier¿ of what I

was laËer Eo experience personally, much of it is so out-of-date that it

is totally misleading. l"la1abo is no longer a town where "You may sip

coffee in the main plaza in front of the Cathedral, walk to the port and

No

.

79

,

l"larch \97 8.

,

"Guinea EcuatorialiBibliogtafía general,UNESCO 1L91 4

(1)

(2)

(3)

Africa Magazine,

Liniger-Gournaz rM.

L4

the beach, and enjoy 12 hours a day of televísion on free public sets (Spain's

last pre-independence gift) and where inexpensive local taxís Ëake you to a

cqcoa esËaterr. (1) All this was already untrue in 1973 and the statements

in "Africa Yearbook" of L976 ate nothing short of macabre. Its "VisiËorrs

Guide" provides opening hours for banks and shops, lists hotels and restaurants'

and describes t"tala¡o _"ã "r busy town, throbbing with life and music". (2)

Evidently it was necessary to visit Equatorial Guinea personally,^.

Eo assess the contradictory infor*"rion. But "Tourism is not encouragedt' (3)

and visas were all but unobtainable for lJesterners. I eventually goE one

from a díplomaf who was planning to defect in order to avoid the fate of

numerous of his colleagues. Some had been called home "for urgent consulations"

and some had been forcibly abducted from their embassies; all had been kil1ed. The following descriptions contain ury firsthand observations of the

situation inside Equatorial Guinea and corroborative information obtained

through methods mentioned.,below in sectlor- 7., "Sources".

3.1 THE STATE APPARATUS

"The rule of the first President, Francisco Macías Nguema, is

highly personal" observes the Encyclop.edia Britannica. l'fitogo, less given

to understatement, claims that I'True independence lasted only 145 days, from

12 Ocrober 1968 to 5 March 1969. Since then Macías has suppressed the righc

of association, abolished the political parties and created PUNT, membership

of which is compulsory from birth. The President has assumed the rights

which belong exclusively to the people. To maintain his por/Íer he practises

to an excessive degree racism, tribalism and regionalism. The life presidency

claimed by Macías is contrary to the ConsËitution. tle has insfitutíonalised

a reign of rerror by imprisoning or physically elirninating persons guilty of

non-existant or supposed crimes". (4)

Actually the democraticConstitrrlion was disregarded after 75 days.

After the Christmas recess the Public Prosecutor, Juan José Martínez Zafo,

approached the Minister of the Interior on 26 December L968, drawing his

altention to "excesses and maltreatmentt' by Government officials, and "reports,

of which the Chief of Police had no official ne\,/s, that certain persons had

been detained and were being held Inrithout having appeared in court, apparently

as political prisoners. The Minister informed the Public Prosecutor that tre

could not discuss the matter r¿ith him and that it ¡¿as forbidden to interfere

with political matters". (5)

The five political parties had all come into existence during the

colonial period. Idea Popular de la Guinea Ecuatorial (IPGE) was formed by

the lawyei, Lrri" Maho, whose leadership eventually passed on to Maclas' once

(1) A11en & Segal, "The Travellerts Africa", Hopkinson & Blake, New

York, L973.

(Z) _"Africa Yearbook and tr^lhot s .hlho", Africa Journal Ltd., London, L976,

"Africa South

of

the Sahara", Europa Publications

Ltd.,

London' 1977.

l"títogo

_,

1977 .

"Yat', october L977 .

(3)

(4)

(s)

iii iit Ìii iii

Spanish attitudes tor¡ards the independence movements had become more tolerant.

The Movimiento de 1a Guinea Ecuatorial (MUNGE) _{was formed} in 1963 by Ondo

Edu who died in Blackbich prison in 1968. The Movimiento Nacional de

Liberacion de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MONALIGE) was formed ín L964 by Atanasio

Ndongo, ki11ed in March 1968. The others r¡/ere the Fernando Po Democratic

Union and the more important Union Bubi. The Bubi leader, Pastor Torao

Sikara r¡/as to die in Bata pfison, "of thirst". A founder of the Union Bubi

is said to have died from gangrene caused by his eyes having been gouged

our.

( 1)

In 1970 Macías banned the political parties and created the Partido

Unico Nacional. In July the same year it was renamed Partido Unico l.lacional

Trabajadores (PUNT), _{"The Workerst Only} National Party'r. The PIJNT membership

card became the all-important document which had to be shov¡n ever¡zwhere and

at any time. Before he became a refugee, the Minister of fhe Interior used

to say that "Once you needed a certificate. of baptism to enter Heaven. Now

al1 you need is the card fron PUNT, because there is no other God but Macías".

Failure to produce the card usually 1ed to immediate arresÈ. The Party

activists quickly assumed a povüer over and beyond the 1aw, much of it based on the fear inspired by the youth section of PUNT, Juventud en Marcha con

Macías. The Youth on the March with Macfas \^¡as recruited mainly from the

discontented teenagers at the boÈtom of the society. Given sudden po\,üer

to intimidate anybody below the top strata of the Party they formed bands

of thugs, encouraged to ferret out potential enemies of the state.

Confisc-ations, beatings and general harassment of the population became routine.

The democratic Constitution, accepted by a UN-supervised referendum

in August 1968 had become more and more dísregarded. hrhat remained of it

was effectively s\¡/ept aside when Macías assumed Èota1 supremacy over the

nation, PUNT and the arrned forces. Adding a surrealistic touch he also declared himself Grand Master of Education, Science and Culture. (2) Aft"r

a nevr referendum, twelve months later, Ëhe Third Congress of PUNT adopted a new

constitution r¡hich formalised the autocracy and set legal rights aside in the

case of subversion or acts against state security. Accusations of these

two offences would be judged _by persons appoínted by Macías himself. Their

verdict could be anticipated from the way in which the referendum had been

carried out. "Everybody agreed that the referendum day was disastrous. It \¡/as pure coercion and ímplanted an undescribable terror: anybody who intended

to vote against. or abstain \,üas threatened with public ki1ling. This was carried

out. The few r^/ho abstained in Evinayong and Santa Isabel were given a terríble

beating, and any who managed to survive v/ere executed a few days later in

Bata prison." (3)

The Independence Consitution had tried to balance the numerically

dominant Fang by providing certain safeguards for the smaller ethnic groups

on Fernando Po. These measures r,¡ere no\,ü abolished and the administratíon of

the two provinces became more íntegrated.

L7 October 1975.

de1 Estado, 14 JulY L972.

(1)

(2)

(3)

Jeune Afrique,

Boletin Oficial

Bidyogo, p. 229

officially Malabo remains the capital. In reality the centre of po\,üer is now on the mainland, as Macfas only visits the island on very

rare occasíons, preferring to spend almost all his time in the small town

of Mongomo and ,.rl_irrg rhrãugh his political network. Each province is

go.r"rrrãd by a "Gorci" (Gobernador Civil). Each district is governed by a

ã"yor who is delegated from the Government, and by two Lieutenants-ín-Chief' one from the National Guard and one from the Militia, commanding their

respective units. The Government delegate is theoretically in control over

a conrnittee consisting of the local President of the PUNT, the President

of the l,Iomenf s Section of the PUNT and the President of the Juventud en

Marcha con Mácías. On paper this set-up is under formal control of the

PUNT and the arme-d forces but responsible to the civil administratíon'

In reality it is a shell around Ehe security organisation shown in the diagram

below, r^rhich has its members in all the other bodies, primarily as spies

and informers.

,7

\

The real administrative structure gives a different picture. Tire

diagram below shor¿s the key posts. Gone are the ideas of delegation of

po\^rer between etitnic groups, of balance and collaboration. All of them

are held by Ì'{acíast clånsmen, Ëhe Esengui from Mongomo'

tenant-in-Chief

_€--

(Government Delegate)

_-+

President of rhe PUNTT' President of

[Jomenr s Section Youth Section

Detachment Heads

Civil

Governor

..t

Mayor

National Lieu-

Ì,fi1itia

Lieu-tenant-in-Chief

)

1

SECURITY

J

Army

Detachment lleads

I

I

\.L

Militia

L7

Life President

H- E. Macías

of the Republic Nguema Biyogo

Miníster of

Armed Forces

the People I s

(Macías )

lutínister

for

National

Securiry (l'tacías)

Minister for

(Macías) Trade

Head of H.E. I s

Cívi1 Household

SecretarY General

Minístry of Defence

(Com. Teodoro Nguema

Mba N'zogo) (1)

Head of H.E. rs

Military Household

(Com. Teodoro Nguema

Mba N'zogo) (1)

Captain Aide-de-CanP

(t,taye)

lfinis

ter

f or

Bonifacio

Vice Bonifacio

President

Nguema Esono (2)

Foreign Nguema

Affairs

Esono (2)

Di s tric

t

Corunanders-in-Chief

Captain

Znd. ComPanY

(IIba Onana) ( I)

Secretary of State for

Economy and Finance

Director-General of

Information and Tourism

(Daniel Oyono AYingono)

Civil Governor

) )

) )

(3)

Notes:

(1) Cousins of Macías

(2) From Macías t village

and f amilY.

(3) Nephew of Macías

Permanent SecretarY of

the PUNT (Feliciano Oyono)

-v

(l)

Commande'r-in-Chief

of

the People's

Militia

(Braulio N'zue)

v

Dis

trict-

Lieutenants-in-Chief \y

Di s trict Second-Lieutenant s

v

Detachment Offieers

{,

Militia

Minister

of

the

Interior

Secretary-General of

the PresidencY

Director*General of

Security

As with Ëhe administration, the Government is one thing on paper

and another in reality. This began on L4 JuLy L972 when Macías, elected for

a five-year period, proclaimed himself President for Life and took upon

him-self forty-five other official titles. The first Vice-President, a Bubi

from Fernando Po, died in connection with the destruction of a photo of

Macías. According to the Constitution the post should be held by a Bubi, but the present Vice-President is a Fang from Ì'facías' clan in Mongomo.

He _will appear again in this account, in the office of Blackbich Prison.

The CabineË should also include the heads of twelve ministries.

Of those who made up the Independence Cabinet, ten have been killed'

"Africa South of the Sahara" lists the 1974 Cabinet, soberly commenting that

"some of these Ministers may be dead". Three have indeed been ki11ed' but

the low number most 1ikely depends not so much on lack of zeal as lack of

money. trrlhen the economy came close to bankruptcy in L972, several ministries

\47ere more or less closed. At present three seem to have dísappeared altogether'

The l,Iinistries of Popular Educatíon, Popular Construction, Agriculture,

Popular Health, and Electricity and Natural Resources have ministers

appointed by Macías personally. However, they have no budget and when I went

tå tne buitdings the doors had been loeked for a long time. The only

ministries which seem to function to any degree are the l4inistry for

External Relations and Friendship with the Peoples,headed by the

Vice-president; the Ministries of the Peoplets Armed Forces, National Security

and Èhe Peoplets Ministry of Trade, with Macías carrying all the portfolios'

The mechanisms which really govern life in the country are elementary,

brutal and effective. The constitutional structure at the top has been

s\^/ept array and the same has happened to the structures at grassroots 1evel,

i.u., the tradítional village democracy which functioned on a basis of

spiritual authority, kinship loyalties and prestige based on Ëhe respect

a person could earn from his community. The o1d chiefs and their councillors

have been substituted by militants appointed by Macías. "Now every chief

\^/ants to be a little Macías in his or,rn village." If he has ambitions to

go further in life he has to prove himself politically, inform on those who are discontented, report suspected "subversivos" and act in support

of Þtacías. The days of ruling by consensus are long gone.

Every village or tor^7n in controlled by a Comité de Base:, The

compositíon is the same as that of the Committee at the district 1evel,

with the local President of PUNT, the President of the I'rlomenrs Section and the president of the Youth Section. The Base CommitËee deals primarily

with national security and surveillance of al1 travel and movement within

the country. Nobody is allowed to leave his or her place of residence

wifhout splcial permission. The perrnit, ca11ed "credencia", is issued by

the Delegã'ao C.tUãtnativo. It ís given for such things as reporting for

\^/ork; on occasions for seeking such medical treatment as is available,

but very rarely for such purposes as visitinEi onets wife and children.

lfhen a traveller arrives at his stafed destination he must

prompt.ly report to the local Base Commíttee, giving an account of v¡here he

h",

"oro" from, the purpose of his visit and the persons with

whom he is

going tostay (there are no\¡/ only two hotels in the eountry, in BaLa and

Malabo) ancl for how 1ong. His host must report on the s¿tme matlers'

Failure Ëo comply inevitably leads to arresË by the political police

-the Mílitia.

Further control of movements inside the country is maintained by

an extensive network of checkpoints' established every 25 kiloneters along

Ehe roads and manned day and night. The system is based on a double watch

kept borh by the Militia and the ar:Ïny, the Guardia Nacional' At every

chãckpoint there are tr^7o separate camps \^7ith 5-10 people in each, checking

orr each other as well as on travellers'

There has been no lack of official justification for the internal

security system. Macías has declared that he has been threatened by, and

by devine grace saved from, no less than fourteen attacks against his

life. This is not a case of allegations open to doubt; it is downright

ridiculous. Already the evenLs of 5 March'Lg6g are questionable, and as far

as the other reputeã coups d'état are concerned it seems faír1y clear that

most of them have been nothing but stories made up by Macías to demonstrate

his invulnerability and divine protection. Among the refugees, opinions

are dívided as to l"lacías' other motives for claiming that he has been

threatened by "subversivos". Some say that he uses an invented attempt

against tris iife as ân excuse to kil1, others that he kills whether he has

an excuse or nor. Judging from the existing list of his victims and from

the knov¡n cases where entire villages have been exterminated, it appears

unlikely that he feels restrained by the need for offical excuses '

"Mitogott, an Equatorial Guinean using a pseudonym for the sake

of protecting rálatives inside the country' also mentiones "excessive degrees of racísm, tribalism and regionalism". This deserves comments' The racism

directed tor¿ards Spaniards may be seen as a natural post-Independence

reaction and has not been systematic. The tribalism directed tor¡ards

the non-Fang ethnic groups has been much in evidence and has been severe

periodically, but I have heard refugees of Bubi and Fernandino origin say ttrat "tie Fâng now suffer more than us". Against the background of

what has been donã to their groups lhis seemed a surprising opinion, but

their rationale \^¡as that "the Fang have lost more than us because there are

more of them and nor^i Macías oppresses everybody"'

Theregionalismcanperhapsberegardedasanexaggerated

at.tempt at counteracting the preferential treatment the colonialists

gave to Fernando Po. But other things are difficult to understand, such

as the attitude to\n/ards the already vastly diminished population of

Annobón. A medically trained refugee relates:

"In March and April there \^ras a cholera epidemic in Equatorial

Guínea. The hrorld Health organisation, in collaboration tiith

the Ministry of Health, began a campaign of vaccination with a team

for each province. The tearn for Ëhe island of Macías Nguema

Biyogo began its work in the capital, starting r¡ith the Government

grtr_rl r" i" usual and then going on to vaccinate those in

""f,oãt". A third of this latter group was vaccinated. Subsequently,