Is Collective Titling Enough to Protect Forests?
Evidence from Afro-descendant Communities in
the Colombian Pacific Region
Maria Alejandra Vélez Juan Robalino
Juan Camilo Cárdenas Andrea Paz
Eduardo Pacay Álvarez Ojeda
Documentos
CEDE
ISSN 1657-7191 Edición electrónica.
No
.
3
Serie Documentos Cede, 2019-03 ISSN 1657-7191 Edición electrónica.
Enero de 2019
© 2019, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE. Calle 19A No. 1 – 37 Este, Bloque W.
Bogotá, D. C., Colombia Teléfonos: 3394949- 3394999, extensiones 2400, 2049, 2467
[email protected] http://economia.uniandes.edu.co
Impreso en Colombia – Printed in Colombia
La serie de Documentos de Trabajo CEDE se circula con propósitos de discusión y divulgación. Los artículos no han sido evaluados por pares ni sujetos a ningún tipo de evaluación formal por parte del equipo de trabajo del CEDE. El contenido de la presente publicación se encuentra protegido por las normas internacionales y nacionales vigentes sobre propiedad intelectual, por tanto su utilización, reproducción, comunicación pública, transformación, distribución, alquiler, préstamo público e importación, total o parcial, en todo o en parte, en formato impreso, digital o en cualquier formato conocido o por conocer, se encuentran prohibidos, y sólo serán lícitos en la medida en que se cuente con la autorización previa y expresa por escrito del autor o titular. Las limitaciones y excepciones al Derecho de Autor, sólo serán aplicables en la medida en que se den dentro de los denominados Usos Honrados (Fair use), estén previa y expresamente establecidas, no causen un grave e injustificado perjuicio a los intereses legítimos del autor o titular, y no atenten contra la normal explotación de la obra.
Universidad de los Andes | Vigilada Mineducación
1
Is Collective Titling Enough to Protect Forests?1
Evidence from Afro-descendant Communities in the Colombian Pacific Region
Maria Alejandra Vélez
Juan Robalino
Juan Camilo Cardenas
Andrea Paz
Eduardo Pacay
Abstract
During the mid-1990s, one of the most ambitious land reforms in recent decades took place in Colombia. The reform recognized collective land rights of 5 million hectares by Afro-Colombian groups, with the dual goals of improving livelihoods and preserving valuable ecosystems. We estimate the impact of this collective land titling program on forest cover using panel data and a difference-in-difference empirical strategy. We find that overall, collective titling significantly reduces deforestation rates, but the effect varies substantially by sub-region. We observe that the larger effects are in Nariño and Valle del Cauca especially in places with higher deforestation threat, closer to the forest frontier, to roads, and to navigable rivers, as well as in places without illegal crops. Our qualitative analysis suggest that this might be the result of communities being able to expel private companies from their lands which is more challenging with actors promoting illegal crops. We conclude that under the adequate conditions, titling can lead to forest conservation.
Key Words: Afro-descendants; Collective property; Colombia; Land titling; Forest Cover; Impact Evaluation
JEL: Q15; Q23
1 This work was possible thanks to the financial support from EfD. We acknowledge the excellent research
2
¿La titulación colectiva es suficiente para proteger los bosques? Evidencia de las comunidades afrodescendientes del pacífico colombiano
Maria Alejandra Vélez§
Juan Robalino⁎
Juan Camilo Cardenas♦
Andrea Paz♣
Eduardo Pacay∞
Resumen
A mediados de la década de los noventas, una de las reformas agrarias más ambiciosas de las últimas décadas tuvo lugar en Colombia. La reforma reconoció el derecho colectivo de 5 millones de hectáreas a comunidades afrocolombianas, con el doble objetivo de mejorar su calidad de vida y preservar ecosistemas estratégicos. Nosotros estimamos el impacto de este programa de titulación colectiva en la cobertura forestal, utilizando datos de panel y una estrategia empírica de diferencias en diferencias. Encontramos que en general, la titulación colectiva reduce significativamente las tasas de deforestación, pero el efecto varía sustancialmente según la subregión. Observamos que los efectos más grandes se producen en Nariño y Valle del Cauca, especialmente en lugares con mayor amenaza de deforestación, es decir, más cerca de la frontera forestal, las carreteras y los ríos navegables, así como en lugares sin cultivos ilegales. Nuestro análisis cualitativo sugiere que esto podría ser el resultado de la organización comunitaria y la capacidad de sacar a las empresas privadas legales de sus territorios, lo cual es un desafío en el caso de las economías ilegales. Concluimos que bajo las condiciones adecuadas, la titulación colectiva puede llevar a la conservación de los bosques.
Palabras Claves: Afrodescendientes; Propiedad Colectiva; Colombia; titulación de tierras; Cobertura Bosque; Evaluación de Impacto
JEL: Q15; Q23
§ María Alejandra Vélez, School of Management, Universidad de Los Andes, [email protected]
⁎ Juan Robalino, Escuela de Economía, Universidad de Costa Rica & CATIE, [email protected] ♦ Juan Camilo Cárdenas, Economics Department, Universidad de Los Andes, [email protected] ♣ Andrea Paz Biology Program, City University of New York and Graduate Center City University of
New York, [email protected]
3 1. Introduction
Conservation of forests for the provision of ecosystem service continues to be one of the most important and difficult challenges in current times. From the local provision of food to the regulation of climate, sustaining the biophysical properties of forests remains one of the most important goals for policymakers. Yet, economic forces, including illegal markets, continue to incentivize the replacement of forests with agricultural and pasture land, especially as the population grows and the most productive lands become scarcer. Markets for timber and cleared land that allow the expansion of crops and livestock activities send signals contrary to maintaining the generation of economic benefits from forests. Mining and other extractive activities also compete with forest conservation. In this context, multiple strategies for conserving forests have emerged over several decades. These include the declaration of protected areas through national or regional parks, privatization of land for conservation by individuals and NGOs, and the assignment of collective property rights to ethnic communities.
Regarding transferring, recognizing or restoring collective land rights to communities, there is no consensus on how effective these strategies are to stopping deforestation and evidence is scarce (Ostrom and Nagendra 2006; Robinson et al. 2014, Blackman et al. 2017; Blackman and Veit, 2018). Our goal in this article is to answer this question by exploring, through satellite imagery and panel data, how the assignment of collective property rights to groups of ancestral afro-descendant people in the Pacific region of Colombia has affected the rate of deforestation in areas of high biodiversity and high levels of poverty.
4
exploit timber products with external companies if, for example, the community organizations were to participate in value chains active in the region. These factors will lead to increases in deforestation rates. Alternatively, such devolution of power could mean the strengthening of a territorial occupation model that could align, with the right local institutions, the goals of forest conservation with cultural and economic systems based on more sustainable use of forests. Collective property rights over the territories inhabited by these communities can become crucial institutional determinants of the decisions made at the level of the community organizations in charge of defining yearly action plans. Secure property rights could deter the arrival of external forces, such as legal but also illegal sawmills and illegal mining, that drive deforestation. Communities could access financial mechanisms such as the Program on Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD+) by generating
carbon credits from conservation.
The process of collective land titling of Afro-descendant communities in the Pacific Region began after the 1991 Colombian Constitution was issued. During the last two decades, this process has led to the collective titling of over five million hectares, gradually implemented over these years. Created as a redistributive social policy while conserving valuable ecosystems, collective land titling was based on the premise that Afro-descendant communities occupying territories with high ecological value could consolidate sustainable management of their natural resources (Plant and Hvalkof, 2001; Offen, 2003; Ng’weno, 2001; World Bank, 2005; Sanchez & Roldan, 2002; Sanchez & Garcia, 2006).
5
We find that the overall net effect of titling in the Pacific Region decrease deforestation. These results remain robust with the inclusion of control variables that capture market dynamics, such as distance to navigable rivers, distance to roads, distance to forest frontiers and the presence of illicit crops. When we separate the analysis by department, our results show that collective titling did not increase deforestation in any of the regions we studied. In fact, the effects in Nariño and Valle del Cauca are negative, large and statistically significant. For these departments, we also show that the negative effects of titling on deforestation increase in areas with high deforestation threat (close to the forest frontier, to roads, and to navigable rivers) as well as in places without illegal crops. This implies that titling, given the adequate conditions, can lead to forest conservation. To interpret and understand our results, we also conducted 54 interviews with community leaders in each of the sub-regions included in our study to understand the titling process, the drivers of deforestation and the channels through which collective property might protect forests. Our interviews provide evidence that the reduction of deforestation in titled communities is explained by two forces: i) a local community-based organization that defines the rules for community use of natural resources mainly in Valle2; and ii) the
expulsion of private companies dedicated to timber exploitation in Valle, and mainly oil palm in Nariño. In the absence of collective titling and community organization triggered by this collective titling process, the same trend of resource extraction, and agricultural expansion from previous decades would have continued.
The strategic importance of the question of the impact of collective titling on forest cover is immense. First, the Pacific region is considered one of the most diverse regions on the planet, due to its high levels of endemic species and species variety (WWF 2002). The natural wealth of the territories entitled to black communities, apart from their biodiversity, includes mineral resources that have historically been part of the economic culture of the region, as well as part of its conflict. In addition, it has valuable ecosystems due to the water cycle and consequently for the provision of environmental services in the region and beyond. Indeed, one of the main objectives of collective titling is to build and promote self-government in the use of natural resources in collective territories. Second, the amount of land that has been titled is quite substantial and some argue that this effort to recognize the historical presence of black communities in the region may be one of the most important land reforms in Latin America (Offen, 2003). Similar collective
6
titling processes are taking place in territories occupied by Afro-descendants in Ecuador, Panama, and Brazil. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the effects of collective titling in order to promote effective programs in the region. Third, our study is relevant for a variety of branches in academic literature discussing the role of property rights on conservation. In economic literature, the lack of property rights has been considered an obstacle to economic development and the efficient use of resources. Collective titling is expected to create an incentive for community members to stay vigilant and impede the invasion of intruders, as well as to invest in resources for their future benefit (Schlager and Ostrom 1992; Baland and Platteau, 2003). In theory, collective titling constitutes the first step towards a sustainable use of resources (Ostrom 1990) but it needs to pass the empirical test. Fourth, at the country level, Law 70, supporting the collective titling process, is currently under public discussion and further development in the context of implementation of REDD+ projects. Scientific data will provide information for this discussion to design and implement conservation projects in the region.
Our results complement previous studies that find that the titling process had positive impacts on certain socio-economic outcomes. Peña, Vélez et al. (2017) estimated the impact of collective land titling on the well-being of Afro-descendent communities in Colombia. Their findings suggest that collective land titling creates more secure property rights and a longer time horizon for households in collective territories, which leads to investment in their private physical and human capital. Our results suggests that household and communities might also be investing in natural capital.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we discuss the literature related to property rights and forest conservation. Then, we describe the specific context of the Pacific region and the scope of Law 70, including a discussion of deforestation drivers by sub-regions.
In the third section, we explain the data used and our empirical strategy. The fourth section presents and discusses our results. Finally, our conclusions are included in the final section.
2. Relevant literature and the specific context of the Pacific region 2.1. Relevant Literature
7
research focuses on the effects of restricting land use by using command and control policies such as protected areas on deforestation outcomes (see Andam et al. 2008, Joppa and Pfaff 2010, Sims 2010, Ferraro et al. 2011, Pfaff et al. 2009, Pfaff et al. 2013, Pfaff et al. 2015, Robalino et al. 2015). Other research has focused on the effects of incentive policies such as payments for ecosystem services that lead the way out of deforestation (Arriagada et al. 2012, Robalino and Pfaff 2012, Alix-Garcia et al. 2012). Generally, these studies find that conservation policies have reduced deforestation. However, they could also increase the impact on forests cover by targeting land with higher threats of deforestation.
8
titles. It is important to note that choices of control observations change the counterfactual and, therefore, the research questions. In particular, we address how titling affects afro Colombian communities. This implies that our research question is related to how individuals in these communities change behavior by estimating what they would have done in the absence of titling. Using other forest areas outside afro Colombian communities includes within the counterfactual how other regimes would have behave and the question is related to other regimes. Second, we explored regional differences within the Pacific to capture the heterogeneous organizational dynamics and deforestation drivers in each department.
As Blackman et al. (2017) reviewed, the rest of the literature exploring the relation between titling (mainly collective) or decentralized management and forest cover, involves more than 100 published papers without aiming at establishing causality, but giving important insights to advance understanding of land titling as a conservation tool. For example, Ostrom and Nagendra (2006) collected information from various data sources and methods to explore what could explain the success on the conservation of forested lands, by comparing private, state and community-based arrangements, only to find that the type of property rights alone could not explain successful conservation. If anything, they claim, the participation of communities in making and monitoring rules, regardless of their ownership, seemed to be a positive factor in determining conservation. Larson (2011) reports a review from 152 forests in nine countries showing that “forest degradation is inversely related to strong collective action and rule enforcement at the local level” (p.542). Cronkleton & Larson (2015), report a study across 21 indigenous and mestizo communities in Napo, Ecuador, and Huánuco and Ucayali, Peru, concluding that even though formal recognition of rights is an ideal situation, it is not always a sufficient factor to provide security.
9
in different regions of the world." (Robinson et al., 2014, p. 288). Referring to communal land, the authors reports positive conservation outcomes for Central America but less so for Africa, given regional conflicts and/or weak governance. However, besides conservation, they argue that common property could be important for overcoming poverty by providing farming land (Robinson et al., 2014, p. 288). Rasolofoson et al. (2015) find no clear effect of community-based forest management systems in Madagascar when compared to non-community forest management, except for the case in which the former includes prohibiting commercial uses. Shahabuddin et al. (2010) explore the evidence for India in terms of deforestation and conservation of biodiversity by comparing protected areas to community-managed forests. Their results suggest that, compared to open access, community-based forest management can show promising results in terms of forest conservation, although the results in terms of species diversity are not as promising if compared to protected areas.
10
agricultural and labor markets. Vergara-Asenjo et al. (2014) also show that in Panamá, indigenous lands along with protected areas are promising strategies for forest preservation. Porter-Bolland et al. (2012) present a meta-analysis of 40 protected areas and 33 community-managed forests and evaluate deforestation rates. They find that on average, community managed forests present lower and less variable rates of deforestation. As for the case of Ecuador, Holland et al. (2014), find no differences between strictly protected areas and areas with mixed tenure systems where indigenous lands overlap with national parks, arguing that indigenous institutions could be part of a conservation strategy.
2.2. Pacific Region Context
Political struggles around the world during the second half of the twentieth century, have developed strong social movements aiming at defending the rights of indigenous and ancestral groups to their lands. A landmark milestone in these struggles was the so-called C-169 (“Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169)) by the ILO. Since 1991, 22 countries have already ratified it. These struggles pushed for international legislation and national policies to defend the rights of these groups. Further, the environmental agenda, with one of its highest points at the Rio 1992 UN convention, along with these political struggles for preserving biological and cultural diversity, created pressures for governments to engage in various strategies for conservation of forests through national parks systems, on the one hand, and the recognition and transferring of property rights to indigenous and ancestral groups on the other. Nowadays, 27% of forest in the developing world is communal property or used by communities in communal arrangements (Agrawal 2007 citing White and Martin 2002; ITTO 2005). In Colombia, indigenous groups have gained recognition of their collective occupation and governance of the territory since 1890 (Law 89) under the legal form of “resguardos” (reserves), although these were not fully recognized but until 19913. Afro-Colombian
communities, although occupying large areas of the country, mostly in the Pacific coast, did not receive this formal and legal recognition up until the constitutional assembly issued the new Constitution in 1991.
In fact, until 1991, Afro-Colombian communities inhabited the Pacific region, on lands that lacked formal arrangements, regarding individual or communal property rights. For
3 See an evolution of indigenous rights at
11
the Colombian Government this entire region which includes mainly four Departments (Choco, Valle del Cauca, Cauca and Nariño4) was considered a massive forest reserve of
“unoccupied lands” with no recognition of the ancestral presence by black and indigenous groups (Plant and Hvaalkof 2001).
The Pacific region, ranging from Ecuador to Panamá and adjacent to the western Andes to the East, has been occupied by afro-descendants escaping slavery. The region has historically been occupied by indigenous groups, and a few mestizo populations that attempted to colonize these lands also for agricultural and mining purposes.
Since the seventeenth century, various subsistence and commercial activities such as agriculture, fishing, hunting, gold mining and timber exploitation have remained the main economic activities in the region (Grueso et al. 1998). The Pacific area remains among the poorest in Colombia, and more recently one of the most affected by the violence created by the political conflict and drug trafficking activities.
Private companies, both national and foreign, have always been interested in accessing the rich natural resources of the region, including forest and mining resources. The tension between these external forces for extracting resources and the internal ones associated with the subsistence economies of these black and indigenous communities set the stage for this land reform. It was initiated in 1991 and it was later followed by Law 70 of 1993, which triggered the titling of more than five million hectares as collective lands to afro Colombian communities.
Black communities occupied the territory under rather low densities in forested lands with informal arrangements and ‘de facto’ private holdings with no legal titles to support them, but social norms and conventions that evolved over time (Velez, 2011). Contrary to indigenous organizations, these afro-descendent communities did not have hierarchical structures for governing their internal affairs, although leaders played important roles in organizing various community projects.
The new Colombian Constitution included a transitory article (55), which acknowledged the ancestral occupation of these territories by black communities and mandated that within two years the state was obligated to recognize and formalize their right to these lands as ethnic groups. In 1993 a new law (Ley 70/1993) was issued, establishing the path for the titling of these lands to community organizations that became the authority over
4 The Community Councils of Afro-Colombian communities are distributed as follows: 58% in Choco,
12
communal land. Communities gained the right to exploit their resources and the right to exclude outsiders (Velez, 2011). Using the typology by Schlager y Ostrom (1992) to classify the heterogeneous bundle of territorial rights, these black communities gained access, extraction, management and exclusion rights and only lacked “alienation rights.” Thus, these communities are not allowed to fracture, divide or sell their lands, nor can they use it as collateral for credit purposes.
The process that led to this collective titling reform included a decade of social organization supported by Catholic missionaries (e.g. Claretianos) and indigenous organizations that inspired a black rural movement (e.g. Movimiento Cimarrón and the PCN -Proceso de Comunidades Negras) aiming at the empowerment of the communities in the region (see Escobar et al. 1996; Grueso et al. 1998). Such social movements emerging throughout the Choco region (northern sub-region of the Pacific coast) and the Valle del Cauca (mainly in the city of Buenaventura), were also responding to an increase in pressures from industrial logging and mining projects, in many cases authorized by environmental and governmental authorities. Since these were ‘de facto’ open access lands, and there were no formal property rights over private holdings this land was at the mercy of several actors, creating pressures against the wellbeing of these communities and their dependence on the natural capital. In this context, lessons from the indigenous movement that had raised similar concerns and had achieved success in getting their collective rights recognized and defended in their “resguardos”, led these new black movements to petition for the recognition of their self-governing structures and their historical occupation of these lands.
A landmark case in this process emerged in the Choco region through the Peasant Association of the Middle Atrato -ACIA (Asociación Campesina Integral del Atrato) in 1987. This organization sent a petition to the land authority (INCORA at the time), to stop issuing timber extraction concessions to private companies along the Atrato river in forest reserves that had historically been occupied by black communities. ACIA then requested a collective title of 800,000 hectares to protect their territory. Although the land title was not issued at that time, the request set the pace for the upcoming constitutional mandate in 1991 and the subsequent law in 1993 (Pardo, 1997; Restrepo, 2011).
13
gained an unprecedented number of elected representatives. These leaders brought the demands of the black communities to the table, which translated into transitory Article 55 and led to Law 70 in 1993 for the collective titling of these lands.
With the mandate from Law 70 in 1993, the national government and its recently created Ministry of the Environment addressed the World Bank in 1994 asking for financial support for the execution of this law. The World Bank supported this process as a conservation strategy and funded the titling of the first 2.3 million hectares (Sanchez & Roldan, 2002). Within these first collective titles, in 1996, the peasant organization ACIA, newly organized as a “Community Council” under the name COCOMACIA, received one of these titles with over half a million hectares.
The process of issuing these collective land titles, along with the local rules and structures required from these community organizations, created an entirely new form of local political governance that increased the visibility and bargaining power of the region (Velez, 2011). Influenced by the ILO 169, a later Decree (1320 in 1998) extended the autonomy and recognition of these communities by requiring prior consultation to conduct any project that could potentially affect their territories.
3. Methodology 3.1. Quantitative Data
Our area of analysis involves Afro-Colombian communities located in four departments in the Pacific region (Cauca, Choco, Nariño and Valle del Cauca). We have a total of 141 communities that received titles between 1996 and 2010 (See Figure 1). We obtained information of official forest cover data from 1990, 2000, 2005 and 2010, developed and provided by IDEAM (Instituto de Hidrología, Meteorología y Estudios Ambientales) and official community limits from 2012 from IGAC (Instituto Geografico Agustin Codazzi). With this information, we analyzed deforestation in the following three periods 1990-2000, 2000-2005 and 2005-2010. Within those periods, we know that 50, 64 and 27 communities were titled during the 1990-2000, 2000-2005 and 2005-2010 periods respectively (See Table 1).
14
57,840 points that were covered by forest in 1990. This means that we have one sampled point every 0.5 square kilometers of forest area.
For each forest point, we obtained information on deforestation for the end of the period. We have 30,571, 33,380 and 18,829 points titled in 1990-2000, 2000-2005 and 2005-2010, respectively (see Table 1).
In Table 1, we also describe the dependent variable and the treatment status. The treatment status indicates how each point was included in the analysis according to the communities titling period and the deforestation period. A point was considered treated if it was titled before the analyzed deforestation period, and a point was considered untreated if it was titled after the analyzed deforestation period. If a point was titled in the same analyzed deforestation period, it was taken out of the analysis because it is unclear if it should be classified as treated or untreated. We can observe that deforestation rates (e.g. percentage of deforested points) are different between those communities that received titles in different periods, even among communities with the same treatment status. For instance, during the period 1990-2000, deforestation rates are highly different for those communities that received titles during the period 2000-2005 and for those that received titles during the period 2005-2010 (column D).
For each point we calculated distance to protected areas, rivers, and roads as well as land slope and precipitation using the information provided by IGAC5. We also have
information about the presence of coca plantations in 2002 per point, using information provided by UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime). We further compute distances to non-forest areas, which reflects proximity to forest frontiers. We can observe that the different characteristics between titled communities in different periods are significant (see columns D, E, and F). This is important as these variables are highly relevant in explaining the forces behind deforestation; and the differences imply that we cannot only compare deforestation outcomes.
In addition, in Table 1, we can see that the fraction of titled communities in each period varies significantly among departments. For instance, during the period 1990-2000, most titled communities were located in Choco, while during the period 2005-2010 most of the titled communities were located in Nariño and Valle del Cauca. In Figure 2, we can see that the deforestation rates are very different among departments, even if we compare
15
those in the same treatment status within the same period. These differences provide evidence that the deforestation process is different in nature between departments.
3.2. Qualitative Data
We conducted 54 interviews with community leaders in each of the departments included in our study to understand the titling process, the drivers of deforestation and the channels through which collective property might protect forests.
For each interview we use the deforestation maps developed for each sub-region for the periods of 1990, 2000, 2005 and 2010 and asked the interviewed to explain according to their perceptions and local views the drivers of deforestation in each period. Each interview lasted between 45 to 75 minutes depending on the expertise of the leaders. We conducted 13 interviews in Choco, 13 in Valle del Cauca, 10 in Cauca, 14 in Nariño and 4 with national experts.
3.3. Econometric specification
The main objective is to estimate the impact of titling on deforestation by comparing deforestation rates in communities that have received their title with a credible estimate of what would have happened in the opposite scenario. In order to adequately estimate this alternative scenario, we will use a difference in difference (DID) strategy. This means that we will compare changes in deforestation before and after a community receives a title, to changes in deforestation in communities where no title has been granted. Because the titling process has taken place over the last two decades, we take advantage of this expansion of the process over time when conducting our analysis (see Figure 1 and Table 1). The empirical equation estimated is:
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜏𝜏𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽0+ 𝛽𝛽1𝑡𝑡3+ 𝛽𝛽2𝑡𝑡2+ � 𝛽𝛽3𝑗𝑗𝐺𝐺𝑗𝑗 𝑗𝑗
+ 𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝜇𝜇
where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 takes the value of 1 if a forest point i at the beginning of the period t was
deforested by the end of the period t and a value of 0 if it was not deforested by the end of the period t; 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if pixel i is located in a
16
community fixed effects for community council j where pixel i is located6; 𝑡𝑡
2 and 𝑡𝑡3
represent period fixed effects on deforestation for period two (2000-2005) and three respectively (2005-2010); and finally 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of characteristics that affects
deforestation rates. This vector of characteristics includes variables such as community area, slope, rainfall, distance to small rivers, distance to navigable rivers, distance to main roads and ‘distance to non-forest (See Table 1, pixel covariates), where all the variables do not vary over time except distance to non-forest. For the variables that are fixed over time, we seek not to affect them by the treatment, so we used variables before 19907 only.
Parameters 𝛽𝛽 and 𝜏𝜏 are estimated and reflect the effects that control variables and titling have on deforestation rates, respectively.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable sample Total Titling Year (C)-(B) Diff. (D)
Diff. (B)-(A)
(E)
Diff. (C)-(A)
(F)
1990-2000 (A)
2000- 2005
(B)
2005-2010 (C)
Communities
Number of communities 141 51 64 26
Points
Number of points 57840 18576 31668 7596
Dependent Variable
Deforestation rate 1990-2000 4.10 4.35 3.58 5.17 1.59*** -0.77*** 0.82*** Treatment status Out Untreated Untreated
Deforestation rate 2000-2005 3.71 3.99 3.29 4.80 1.51*** -0.70*** 0.81*** Treatment status Treated Out Untreated
Deforestation rate 2005-2010 3.05 2.55 3.27 3.34 0.07 0.72*** 0.79*** Treatment status Treated Treated Out
Community Covariates
Area 29681 30571 33380 18830 14550 2809 11741*
Pixel Covariates
Dist. to National Parks 2012 (km) 45.99 40.87 48.77 49.36 0.59* 7.9*** 8.49*** Dist. to small rivers (km) 0.41 0.53 0.34 0.37 0.034*** -0.19*** -0.16*** Dist. to navigable rivers (km) 3.13 3.46 2.86 3.25 0.394*** -0.6*** -0.21*** Dist. to main roads (km) 73.86 92.90 60.97 69.49 8.52*** -31.93*** -23.41*** Coca zone 2002 (dichotomous) 0.27 0.20 0.21 0.65 0.44*** 0.01 0.45*** Distance to non-forest 2000 (km) 0.76 0.73 0.69 1.03 0.33*** -0.04*** 0.3*** Slope (%) 1.43 1.27 1.54 1.44 -0.1*** 0.27*** 0.17*** Rainfall (mm) 5341 4754 5915 4928 -987*** 1161*** 174***
6We use community fixed effects because treatment effects take place at the community level. Another option would
have been using fixed effects at the pixel level. However, given that deforestation analysis takes place in areas with forest, deforested pixels in one period disappear in the next period, which practically eliminates this possibility as we could only use those that are deforested in the last period in a balanced panel.
7The exception is the coca variable, which is from the year 2002. To avoid biasing the estimates because titling could
17
Departments
Cauca 0.14 0.11 0.17 0.15 -0.02*** 0.06*** 0.04*** Choco 0.47 0.44 0.61 0.09 -0.52*** 0.17*** -0.35*** Nariño 0.23 0.30 0.14 0.38 0.24*** -0.16*** 0.08*** Valle del Cauca 0.15 0.16 0.08 0.38 0.3*** -0.08*** 0.22*** Note: Descriptive statistics for pixel covariates are calculated from forests in 1990
As we previously discussed, communities that received their title after 2005 have a higher deforestation rate between 1990 and 2000 than those that received titles between 2000 and 2005. This implies that these two groups are different regardless of the treatment status. Therefore, controlling for covariates that are related to titling and deforestation is key for an unbiased identification of the effect of titling on deforestation. First, we control for community council fixed effects, which implies that unobserved community fixed effects (such as social capital or community organization) will not bias our estimates of the impact of titling on deforestation. Second, we control for period-fixed effects. This implies that changes in the levels of deforestation between one period and another do not affect our estimates of the titling effect on deforestation either. In addition, the first period is longer than the rest for all communities. The ‘period dummies’ control linearly for the fact that the first period is longer.
One challenge we faced was that the periods of analysis are long because deforestation information is measured in long time spans due to the lack of more recurring data. Within those periods, there are points that receive the title at the beginning of the period and others at the end of the period. It is difficult to classify each of these points in a treatment status within that period. In order to eliminate this “contamination” effects over our estimates, we drop points that were titled within the same period of analysis (See Table 1 cells labeled as “Out”). We are left with the points to which we can assign treatment status unambiguously. Given that we have three periods, we can still control for time-invariant community fixed effects, as well as period fixed effects.
18
other regional characteristics as discussed in the next section. The effect of one explanatory variable might be very important in one department and not in another. This reduces the potential effects that a restrictive specification might have on the estimated effects of titling.
For the same reason expose before, we use matching analysis. As the characteristics of treated observations vary as new communities get titled, we choose to focus on those that are similar to the ones titled in the period 1990-2000. Therefore, before we conduct our difference in difference empirical strategy, we select communities that were titled in the period 2000-2005 that were similar to those titled in the period 1990-2000. We then select communities that were titled in the period 2005-2010 that were similar to those titled also in the period 1990-2000. This is an estimate of the average treatment effect on the treated in 1990-2000. Using this matching strategy, we also explored heterogeneous effects. We do this by splitting the sample and estimating the effects far from and close to non-forest areas, far from and close to roads, far from and close to navigable rivers and finally with and without illegal crops (coca).
4. Results
We first present the results from the qualitative analysis where we describe how the titling process took place and what the drivers of deforestation were based on the interviews realized with community leaders and regional experts. Then, we present overall and heterogeneous estimated effects of titling on deforestation.
4.1. Titling process and local authorities
The key governance feature from the Law and its subsequent decrees was the requirement to form a Community Council (CC) to gain access to the collective title and act as the new political and territorial management organization. A General Assembly formed by all inhabitants of the collective territory elects the board of the CC for a three-year term. There is variation in the mechanisms of participation within this structure. However, all key major decisions need to be deliberated in consultation with the General Assembly and the representatives from villages within the CC (Velez, 2011).
19
Community Councils were also mainly defined along rivers and watersheds, but some rivers were divided especially where communities were historically separated due to different economic activities. In the Valle del Cauca sub-region, mostly around the rural area of Buenaventura, two types of CCs were formed: CC by watershed and CC based on pre-existing settlements or villages. The PCN (Proceso de Comunidades Negras) supported the creation of watershed-based councils. Organizing by watersheds maintained social, cultural and productive ties along the rivers while organizing by existing villages, used the existing community and local political divisions and associations known as "Juntas de Acción Comunal” (See Velez 2011 for more details). In Nariño, based in our interviews, Community Councils were created under the umbrella of three groups (e.g. ASOCOESTNAR, RECONPAS, and COPDICON) that supported different political and organizational views in the region. Within each group, each community was autonomous in their organization to form the Council. As in the rest of the regions, many were defined along rivers or watersheds, but others were defined by historical productive or ideological differences. Others determined their organization based on the attachment to or family ties to one specific territory. There is only one big council (Consejo Mayor) which consists of 13 small councils around the Tapaje River. The role of local boards within each community council and the presence of and enforcement by regional governmental environmental authorities’ in the Pacific also varies among regions. The CVC (Corporación Autónoma Regional del Valle del Cauca), in Valle is recognized as the strongest authority in the region with some level of articulation with community councils. For example, in Buenaventura, the CVC funded the design of communities’ territorial management plans and there are some examples of co-management with community councils. It is not the same in Choco, where CodeChoco (Corporación Autónoma Regional del Choco), has been immersed in several corruption scandals regarding the issuance of illegal forest exploitation permits and the presence of systematic illegal mining exploitation without any enforcement. In Nariño, the regional environmental authority, Corponariño (Corporación Autónoma Regional de Nariño), is locally known for issuing deforestation permits without the support of the Community Councils. In Cauca, the presence of the regional environmental authority, the CRC (Corporación Autónoma Regional del Cauca) is rather weak and locals’ do not really have information about its activities.
20
have supported economic and conservation initiatives over the last decades, their incidence has been less important in Cauca and Nariño.
Based on this information, for the empirical analysis, we conclude that it is necessary to control for variables that are related to the formation of councils such as the presence of rivers and political divisions. Additionally, as the titling process and the presence of environmental authorities and organization between one department and the other differ significantly, it is highly relevant that we test if titling affects differently across departments.
4.2.Deforestation Drivers
Although in each sub-region or department, details and timing regarding deforestation drivers and rates vary (see Historic Graphic by the department in Appendix 2), according to the interviews with local leaders, some drivers are common in the whole region which is also consistent with the report of other studies (See for example, Gonzáles et.al. 2018, Leal & Restrepo 2003, Molano 2017, Suárez et al. 2018 UNODC 2017, IIAP 2008). Deforestation in the Pacific region has always been driven by timber exploitation (from mangrove and tropical forest) and gold mining by locals and outsiders. These activities have been transformed since the 17th century with the acquisition of new technology and the entrance of mechanized exploitation. Subsistence agriculture has also been developed mainly at the margin of the rivers. In addition, some commercial agriculture such as coconut, plantain, cocoa, rice, sugar cane and important oil palm plantations (in Choco, Nariño, and Valle) have also been a deforestation driver in the region. Cattle ranching in the north of Choco and shrimp farming in Nariño have also been identified as important causes. Since the 1990s, but especially after 2000, illegal coca crops expanded in the region, mainly in Nariño, Cauca and Choco. Over the years, changes in production peaks in timber, gold, and coca have responded to market demand and global prices. Different actors have entered in the region promoting these productive activities. However, since the approval of Law 70, legal enterprises that did not belong to black communities had more restrictions on entering the region, and massive forest permits were no longer issued to private companies (e.g. Cartón de Colombia, Maderas del Daríen, Triplex Pizano). The same did not happen with illegal enterprises since often, these imply illegal armed actors who support encroachment and threaten local government structures.
21
a more important role in deforestation. Lastly, given that the deforestation process differ from one department to the other, is relevant that we reflect that deforestation drivers can have different effects across departments.
4.3. Estimation of the overall and department titling effects
22 Table 2.
Estimates of the Titling Effects on Deforestation by different specifications
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Effect -0.0108** -0.0183*** -0.0129*** -0.0125*** -0.0109** -0.0123** -0.0141**
Standard errors [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
# obs. 108,816 108,816 108,224 108,224 108,224 108,224 108,224 # treated obs. 69,604 69,604 69,270 69,270 69,270 69,270 69,270 # untreated obs. 39,212 39,212 38,954 38,954 38,954 38,954 38,954
Controls
Period Fixed effects+ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Treatment-status by
department fixed effects++ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Forest cover % per
community+++ No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pixel characteristics+++ No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Presence of illegal crops
(coca)+++ No No No Yes No No No
Municipality Fixed effects No No No No Yes No No
Community Fixed effects No No No No No Yes Yes
Sample All All All All All All Matched
Standard errors in brackets, +linear and square terms *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 + two dummies dividing points from three different periods of deforestation: 1990-2000 (omitted), 2000-2005 and 2005-2010 and ++ communities are divided within three groups by department, those that were titled in 1990-2000, those that were titled in 2000-2005 and those that were titled in 2005-2010 +++ We allowed variables to affect differently by department by interacting with department dummies.
23
outside those departments that generate good matches in order to conclude if titling had any type of effect.
In summary, we do not find any statistically significant evidence that titling collective lands increases deforestation. We find that on average, this policy has decreased deforestation, but these results are driven mainly by the departments of Nariño and Valle del Cauca, in the southern half of the Pacific coast.
Table 3. Titling Effects by departments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Nariño Valle del Cauca Cauca Choco
Treatment status by department Fixed Effects a
-0.0129*** -0.031*** -0.015* -0.004 0.009 [0.005] [0.010] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] Communities
Fixed Effect b
-0.0123** -0.021* -0.021** -0.008 0.000 [0.005] [0.012] [0.010] [0.008] [0.009] Communities
Fixed Effect b
Matched sample
-0.0141** -0.026* -0.029** -0.010 0.001 [0.005] [0.012] [0.010] [0.008] [0.009]
# obs. 108,224 23,732 15,484 16,736 52,272
# treated obs. 69,270 14,937 7,789 10,302 36,242 # untreated obs. 38,954 8,795 7,695 6,434 16,030
Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 a: The specification is the same specification (5) of
table 2. b: The specification is the same as (6) of table 2.
4.4. Estimation of the heterogeneous effects
We now estimate the effects of titling in different subsamples. We test if titling effects are different close and far from roads and forest frontiers. We test this for Nariño and Valle del Cauca, as in these departments we do find untitled communities similar to those titled. This is not the case for Cauca and Choco.
24
statistically insignificant. The difference between these effects are substantial and even with opposite signs.
When we explore the distance to roads, we find that in areas close to roads from Nariño titling reduces deforestation in above 5 percentage points. This result is also statistically significant. We also find statistically significant reductions of about 3 percentage points in deforestation far away from roads in Nariño. However, those reductions are smaller than the effects closer to roads. Reductions in deforestation rates in areas close to roads in Valle del Cauca are of about 1.5 percentage points. These effects are certainly smaller than the ones found in Nariño but statistically significant nonetheless. We do not find enough treated municipalities far from roads in Valle del Cauca.
For the departments of Nariño and Valle del Cauca, we find similar effects when we split the sample using distance to navigable rivers. In communities close to navigable rivers, titling decrease deforestation by more than 3 percentage points and the results are statistically significant. Far from navigable rivers, however, the impacts of titling are very low and statistically insignificant.
The presence of coca, an illegal crop, also makes a difference in the impact. As we can see, the effect of titling in places with this illegal crops is very small and statistically insignificant. However, the effects of titling on reducing deforestation in places without coca cultivation is significant. This is also consistent with the fact that titling helps deter legal activities but not illegal ones as found in the interviews.
5. Discussion
25
Among the arguments in favor, however, is the possibility of aligning monitoring and control with the possibilities of self-governed institutions in the communities, which have better information about the use and misuse of ecosystems. Another argument is that collective titling can make use of economies of scale as opposed to assigning private property, which is highly costly in terms of transaction costs with a much larger number of individual owners. Furthermore, within an institutional framework that has increasingly protected the rights of indigenous and ancestral groups, which is the particular case of Colombia, and growing international attention on issues related to protecting the rights of these ethnic communities, it may become harder for economic forces favoring extractive activities to enter into these territories without being noticed.
We found that collective titling to Afro Colombian Communities has reduced deforestation in the Pacific by more than a one percentage point, which it is an important effect given the regional rates. However, when conducting the analysis by region, we found only evidence that this effect is significant for Nariño and Valle del Cauca: two regions with different deforestation dynamics and rates. Nariño had the highest deforestation rates in both titled and non-titled communities in the whole region. Valle was among the lowest. We also found that places with lower transport costs to local and external markets (closer to the forest frontier, to roads, and to navigable rivers) the negative impacts of titling on deforestation is significantly larger. This is the land with highest pressure of deforestation.
Based on the findings from the interviews performed for this study, our hypothesis is that the reduction of deforestation in titled communities is explained by two forces: i) a local community-based organization that defines the rules for community use of natural resources mainly in Valle and ii) the expulsion of private companies dedicated to timber exploitation in Valle, and mainly oil palm in Nariño. In the absence of collective titling and community organization triggered by this collective titling process, the same trend of resource extraction, and agricultural expansion from previous decades would have continued.
26
conflict associated with emerging gangs and drug trafficking. In general, these extractive activities come together by illegal armed actors infiltrating communities through violence and disrupting the local organizations capacity to enforce their rules and norms. The definition of new rules to manage natural resources and the reduction of legal companies in Valle and Nariño seem to be strong enough in titled communities that reduction of deforestation in the area is significant and probably greater than the incursion from illegal activities. The same is not occurring in Choco and Cauca. Even though in Choco, leaders identified new rules to manage the territory and deter private extractive enterprises, on average, titling did not reduce deforestation. Further research should explore the impact of collective titling on coca crops and expansion of illegal activities.
Collective titling was a first important step in the protection of the territory, but for greater effectiveness, it must be complemented with other processes, including clarity in the distribution of conservation costs. Currently, mechanisms such as payment for environmental services PES or REDD+ could be part of the answers to these demands, but the development of sustainable productive enterprises in the region that improve quality of life in the communities, without putting pressure on natural resources, is still necessary. Although some regional authorities, such as the CVC in Valle, have supported new local authorities, in general, the expected synergies with other levels of environmental authorities have not occurred. Although most of the timber exploitation continues to be illegal, titling reform was not accompanied by public funding to finance the monitoring needs of local authorities and the implementation of local management plans.
Methodologically, using a combination of qualitative and quantitative methodologies allowed use to improve the estimates. Previous studies do not consider the fact that deforestation processes vary between departments and this could play a role on the estimated effects of titling. This insight was salient within the qualitative interviews.
27 References
Agrawal, A., & Ostrom, E. (2001). Collective Action, Property Rights and
Decentralization in Resource Use in India and Nepal. Politics and Society, 29(4), 485–514. doi:10.1177/0032329201029004002
Alix-Garcia, J.M. (2007). A spatial analysis of common property deforestation.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 53(2), 141–157. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2006.09.004.
Alix-Garcia, J. M., Shapiro, E. N., & Sims, K. R. (2012). Forest conservation and slippage: Evidence from Mexico’s national payments for ecosystem services program. Land Economics, 88(4), 613-638. doi:10.3368/le.88.4.613
Andam, K. S., Ferraro, P. J., Pfaff, A., Sanchez-Azofeifa, G. A., & Robalino, J. A. (2008). Measuring the effectiveness of protected area networks in reducing deforestation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 105(42), 16089– 16094. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0800437105.
Arriagada, R. A., Ferraro, P. J., Sills, E. O., Pattanayak, S. K., & Cordero-Sancho, S. (2012). Do payments for environmental services affect forest cover? A farm-level evaluation from Costa Rica. Land Economics, 88(2), 382-399.
doi:10.3368/le.88.2.382
Baland, J., & Platteau, J. (1996). Halting degradation of natural resources: Is there a role for rural communities? New York: Oxford University Press.
Barsimantov, J., & Kendall, J. (2012). Community Forestry, Common Property, and Deforestation in Eight Mexican States. Journal of Environment and Development, 21(4), 414–437. https://doi.org/10.1177/1070496512447249.
Blackman, A., Corral, L., Lima, E. S., & Asner, G. P. (2017). Titling indigenous
communities protects forests in the Peruvian Amazon. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 201603290. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1603290114 Blackman, A., & Veit, P. (2018). “Amazon Indigenous Communities Cut Forest Carbon Emissions” Ecological Economics 153: 56-67.
Bonilla, L., & Higuera, I. (2016). ¿Parques de papel? Áreas protegidas y
deforestación en Colombia. Documentos de Trabajo Sobre Economía Regional, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
Buntaine, M. T., Hamilton, S. E., & Millones, M. (2015). Titling community land to prevent deforestation: An evaluation of a best-case program in Morona-Santiago, Ecuador. Global Environmental Change, 33, 32–43.
28
Canavire-Bacarreza, G., & Hanauer, M. M. (2013). Estimating the impacts of Bolivia’s protected areas on poverty. World Development, 41, 265-285. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.06.011
Cronkleton, P., & Larson, A. (2015). Formalization and Collective Appropriation of Space on Forest Frontiers: Comparing Communal and Individual Property Systems in the Peruvian and Ecuadoran Amazon. Society and Natural Resources, 28(5), 496– 512. https://doi.org/10.1080/08941920.2015.1014609.
Ellis, E. A. & L. Porter-Bolland (2008). Is community-based forest management more effective than protected areas?: A comparison of land use/land cover change in two neighboring study areas of the Central Yucatan Peninsula, Mexico. Forest Ecology and Management 256(11): 1971-1983.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foreco.2008.07.036
Ferraro, P. J., Hanauer, M. M., & Sims, K. R. (2011). Conditions associated with protected area success in conservation and poverty reduction. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108(34), 13913-13918.
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1011529108
Gonzalez, J., Cubillos, A. Chadid, M., Cubillos, A., Arias, M., Zuñiga, E., Joubert, F., Pérez, I., & Berrío, V. (2018) Caracterización de las principales causas y agentes de la deforestación a nivel nacional período 2005-2015. Bogota: Instituto de
Hidrología, Meteorología y Estudios Ambientales -IDEAM-, Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible, Programa ONU-REDD Colombia.
Grueso, L., Rosero, C., & Escobar, A. (1998). The process of black community
organizing in the Southern Pacific Coast of Colombia. In Alvarez, S., Dagnino, E., and Escobar, A. (eds.), Cultures of Politics/Politics of Cultures. Re-visioning Latin
American Social Movements. Westview, Boulder, pp. 196–219.
Hardin, G. (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. Science, 162(3859), 1243–1248. https://doi.org/10.1080/19390450903037302
Holland, M. B., De Koning, F., Morales, M., Naughton-Treves, L., Robinson, B. E., & Suárez, L. (2014). Complex tenure and deforestation: implications for conservation incentives in the Ecuadorian Amazon. World Development, 55, 21-36.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.01.012
IIAP (2008) Evaluación interdimensional de los daños ambientales ocasionados por el cultivo de la palma aceitera y la ganadería extensiva en los municipios de
Carmen del Darién, Riosucio (Chocó) y Mutatá (Antioquia). Quibdó: Instituto de Investigaciones Ambientales del Pacífico -IIAP-
James, A., Gaston, K.J., & Balmford, A. (1999). “Balancing the earth’s accounts”.
29
James, A., Gaston, K.J., & Balmford, A. (2001). “Can we afford to conserve biodiversity?” BioScience 51: 43–52. https://doi.org/10.1641/0006-3568(2001)051[0043:CWATCB]2.0.CO;2
Joppa, L., & Pfaff, A. (2010). Reassessing the forest impacts of protection: The challenge of nonrandom location and a corrective method. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1185, 135–149.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.05162.x.
Larson, A. M. (2011). Forest tenure reform in the age of climate change: Lessons for REDD+. Global Environmental Change, 21(2), 540–549.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2010.11.008
Leal, C., & Restrepo, E. (2003). Unos bosques sembrados de aserríos: historia de la extracción maderera en el Pacífico colombiano. Medellin: Editorial Universidad de Antioquia.
Liscow, Z. D. (2013). Do property rights promote investment but cause deforestation? Quasi-experimental evidence from Nicaragua. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 65(2), 241-261.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2012.07.001
Molano Bravo, A. (2017). De río en río. Vistazo a los territorios negros. Aguilar. Ng’weno, B. (2001). On Titling Collective Property, Participation, and Natural
Resource Management: Implementing Indigenous and Afro-Colombian Demands. A Review of Bank Experience in Colombia. Washington DC: World Bank.
Offen, K. (2003). The Territorial Turn: Making Black Territories in Pacific Colombia. Journal of Latin American Geography, 2(1), 43–72. doi: 10.1353/lag.2004.0010 Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ostrom, E., & Nagendra, H. (2006). Insights on linking forests, trees, and people from the air, on the ground, and in the laboratory. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 103(51), 19224-19231.
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0607962103
Pardo, M. (1997). Movimientos Sociales y Actores no Gubernamentales. In Uribe V., and Restrepo E. (eds.), Antropología en la Modernidad: Identidades, Etnicidades y Movimientos Sociales en Colombia (pp. 207-252). Bogotá: Instituto Colombiano de Antropología.
30
Peña, X., Vélez, M.A., Cardenas, J.C., Perdomo, N., & Matajira, C. (2017). “Collective Property Leads to Household Investments: Lessons From Land Titling in
Afro-Colombian Communities”, World Development (97), 27-48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.03.025.
Pfaff, A. S. P. (1995). The economics of deforestation: evidence from the Brazilian Amazon and New England (Doctoral dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology).
Pfaff, A., & Robalino, J. (2017). Spillovers from Conservation Programs: Input Slippage, Market Leakage, Learning, and Motivations. Annual Review of Resource Economics, 9 (1). https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-resource-100516-053543 Pfaff, A., Robalino, J., Herrera, D., & Sandoval, C., (2015). Protected Areas’ impacts on Brazilian Amazon Deforestation: Examining Conservation-Development
interactions to Inform Planning. PLOS One 10(7). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0129460
Pfaff, A., Robalino, J., Lima, E., Sandoval, C., & Herrera, L.D. (2013). Governance, Location and Avoided Deforestation from Protected Areas: Greater Restrictions can have a lower impact due to differences in location. World Development. 55 7-20. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.01.011
Pfaff, A., Robalino, J., Sanchez-Azofeifa, G.A., Andam, K. & Ferraro, P. (2009). Park Location Affects Forest Protection: Land Characteristics Cause Differences in Park Impacts Across Costa Rica. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis Policy 9 (2) (Contributions): Article 5. DOI: 10.2202/1935-1682.1990
Plant, R., & Hvalkof, S. (2001). Land Titling and Indigenous Peoples. Washington DC:
InterAmerican Development Bank.
Porter-Bolland, L., Ellis, E. A., Guariguata, M. R., Ruiz-Mallén, I.,
Negrete-Yankelevich, S., & Reyes-García, V. (2012). Community managed forests and forest protected areas: An assessment of their conservation effectiveness across the tropics. Forest ecology and management, 268, 6-17.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foreco.2011.05.034
Rasolofoson, R. A., Ferraro, P. J., Jenkins, C. N., & Jones, J. P. (2015). Effectiveness of community forest management at reducing deforestation in
Madagascar. Biological Conservation, 184, 271-277. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biocon.2015.01.027
31
Robalino, J. A., & Pfaff, A. (2012). Contagious development: Neighbor interactions in deforestation. Journal of Development Economics, 97(2), 427-436.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2011.06.003
Robalino, J., & Villalobos, L. (2015). Protected areas and economic welfare: an impact evaluation of national parks on local workers’ wages in Costa Rica.
Environment and Development Economics, 20 (3) 283-310. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X14000461
Robalino, J., Sandoval, C., Barton, D., Chacon, A., & Pfaff, A. (2015). Evaluating interactions of forest conservation policies on avoided deforestation. PLoS ONE
10(4). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0124910
Robalino, J., Pfaff, A., & Villalobos, L., (2017). Heterogeneous Local Spillovers from Protected Areas in Costa Rica. Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists 4 (3) 795-820. https://doi.org/10.1086/692089
Robinson, B. E., Holland, M. B., & Naughton-Treves, L. (2014). Does secure land tenure save forests? A meta-analysis of the relationship between land tenure and tropical deforestation. Global Environmental Change, 29, 281-293.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2013.05.012.
Rodriguez Solorzano, C. & F. Fleischman (2018). Institutional legacies explain the comparative efficacy of protected areas: Evidence from the Calakmul and Maya Biosphere Reserves of Mexico and Guatemala. Global Environmental Change 50: 278-288. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2018.04.011
Romero, M., & Saavedra, S. (2018). Communal Property Rights and Deforestation: Evidence From Colombia. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3179052
Sánchez, E. & García, P. (2006). Los Afrocolombianos. In Stubbs, J., and Reyes, H. (eds.), Más allá de los Promedios: Afrodescendentes en America Latina.
Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank.
Sanchez, E., & Roldan, R. (2002). Titulación de los Territorios Comunales
Afrocolombianos e Indigenas en la Costa Pacifica de Colombia. Banco Mundial, No. 21711.
Schlager, E., & Ostrom, E. (1992). Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis. Land Economics, 68(3), 249–262.
32
Sims, K. (2010). Conservation and development: Evidence from Thai protected areas. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 60(2): 94–114. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2010.05.003
Suarez, J.A, González, J.J, Cubillos, A., Chadid, M.A., Cubillos, A., Arias, M., Zúñiga, E., Joubert, F., Pérez, I., Berrío, V., Yepes, A., Ome, E., Garcia, P. & Leguía, D. (2018). Causas y agentes de la deforestación en Territorios de comunidades negras del pacífico colombiano. En García et al. (Eds). Perspectiva del pueblo negro frente a la deforestación y degradación del territorio: un insumo para la construcción e implementación de Bosques Territorios de Vida- Estrategia Integral de Control a la Deforestación y Gestión de los Bosques. Colombia Bogotá, Programa ONO-REDD. pp. 82-113.
Tucker, C. M. (1999). Private Versus Common Property Forests: Forest Conditions and Tenure in a Honduran Community. Human Ecology, 27(2), 201–230.
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1018721826964.
UNODC (2017) Colombia, monitoreo de territorios afectados por cultivos ilícitos 2016. Bogotá: UNODC
Velez, M. A. (2011). Collective Titling and the Process of Institution Building: The New Common Property Regime in the Colombian Pacific. Human Ecology, 39(2), 117–129. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10745-011-9375-1.
Vergara-Asenjo, G. and C. Potvin (2014). Forest protection and tenure status: The key role of indigenous peoples and protected areas in Panama. Global
Environmental Change 28: 205-215.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.07.002
World Bank (2005). The Gap Matters; Poverty and Well-being of Afro-Colombian and Indigenous Peoples (Report No. 33014-CO). Santiago, Chile. Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Unit of Latin America and the Caribbean Region.
World Wide Fund Colombia. (2002). Memorias: Cartografía social para la
33
Figure 1.
Communities per titling period and titling years
34
Figure 2.
Deforestation rates by department and by treatment status.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Def. 1990-2000 Titling 2000-2005
UnTreated
Def. 1990-2000 Titling 2005-2010
UnTreated
Def. 2000-2005 Titling 1990-2000
Treated
Def. 2000-2005 Titling 2005-2010
UnTreated
Def. 2005-2010 Titling 1990-2000
Treated
Def. 2005-2010 Titling 2000-2005
Treated
De
fo
re
sta
tio
n
ra
te
(%
)
35 Appendix 1
37 Cauca Department