“Country Reports on Terrorism 2013”
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INTELIGENCIA ECONOMICA Y COMPETITIVA.
Se acaba de publicar el informe del Departamento de Estado de Estados Unidos titulado Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, que anualmente analiza la situación del terrorismo en el mundo, señalando lo más destacable en cada país1. Una labor que se viene realizando desde el año 1995, al menos de forma pública, a través del documento que se denominaba Patterns in Global Terrorism.
A pesar de los posibles sesgos e intereses norteamericanos que se puedan plasmar en los informes, en base a las relaciones que en cada momento existan con otras naciones, es una función a agradecer, que posibilita a los expertos en seguridad y analistas acceder a información seleccionada y tratada, y realizar algunas comparaciones. Se trata además de un ejemplo de la necesidad de difundir información en materia de Seguridad Nacional, un ejercicio de transparencia que podría extrapolarse a otros países menos avanzados en ese campo. Porque la transparencia es compatible con los criterios de seguridad. Y porque la información sobre seguridad, responsable, real y oportuna, es un derecho de los ciudadanos, además de ser una de las vías para desarrollar una cultura de seguridad y comprometer a los ciudadanos en su importante papel. En el siglo XXI ya no basta con informar, ni siquiera con comunicar. Las sociedades modernas exigen procesos mucho más participativos y de co-creación de políticas públicas.
En el caso norteamericano es la ley la que exige que el Secretario de Estado remita al Congreso, antes del 30 de abril, un completo informe sobre la situación global del terrorismo. El Country Reports on Terrorism sustituye a Patterns in Global Terrorism a partir del año 20042.
1 Todos los informes anuales se pueden consultar y descargar en:
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/
2 La creación del Centro Nacional Contraterrorista (National Counterterrorism Center) fue el motivo fundamental de dicho cambio.
MINISTERIO DE DEFENSA EMAD-CESEDEN
INSTITUTO ESPAÑOL DE ESTUDIOS ESTRATÉGICOS
“Country Reports on Terrorism 2013”
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La estructura del informe es la habitual. Tras una exposición de la situación global, se analizan los principales hechos y políticas desarrolladas en cada país, valorando su grado de compromiso internacional, se determinan los países que patrocinan el terrorismo, aquellos que se consideran clave, así como los principales grupos terroristas, que no tienen que ser únicamente los señalados en la lista Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO)3. También dedica atención a los posibles santuarios terroristas, una cuestión que a nuestro juicio vive actualmente un momento delicado, tal y como se ha señalado en repetidos informes de expertos y think tanks, debido al incremento de presencia territorial de muchos de los grupos señalados. El informe se acompaña de un interesante resumen estadístico.
Se trata de un extenso informe, sobre el que destacan los siguientes aspectos:
1. Principales conclusiones del informe.
Al Qaeda continúa siendo una importante amenaza para Estados Unidos, sus ciudadanos, sus intereses, y sus aliados, a pesar de la pérdida de capacidades de Al Qaeda Central.
El proceso de descentralización de Al Qaeda continúa, con unas franquicias regionales cada vez más autónomas en la toma de decisiones. La consecuencia es una agenda más regional y local que global.
La inestabilidad y fragilidad de estados en África y Oriente Medio ha hecho surgir multitud de grupos de extremismo violento.
Al Qaeda sufre una crisis de liderazgo, señalando como ejemplo el enfrentamiento en Siria entre el Frente Al Nusrah y Al Qaeda en Irak (actualmente Estado Islámico de Irak y el Levante, ISIL) , y la desobediencia a las órdenes superiores de este último grupo. Su líder, Al Zawahiri, tampoco ha sido escuchado en su petición de evitar daños y víctimas colaterales. En 2013, el líder de Al Qaeda en la Península Arábiga fue designado como número 2 de Al Qaeda.
Siria es el escenario de un enfrentamiento sectario, entre suníes y chiíes que apoyan al régimen de Assad (Irán, Hezbollah, y chiíes iraquíes).
El conflicto en Siria ha hecho saltar las alarmas sobre la creación de una nueva generación de terroristas comprometidos con la yihad global, como ya sucedió en los años 80 en Afganistán.4
http://www.nctc.gov/
3 Para información sobre la base legal de dicha lista, y su actual configuración:
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/
4 La preocupación en muchas ocasiones se centra en los residentes de países occidentales que viajan a Siria y que pueden retornar a sus países de origen más radicalizados si cabe, y con formación en combate y manejo de explosivos, pudiendo actuar además de modelo y figura idolatrada por nuevos candidatos a adoctrinar. No se atiende tanto a los posibles efectos de la creación de un ejército terrorista, con experiencia en combate en campo abierto, capacidades de mando y control. En este aspecto es muy a considerar el artículo publicado a comienzos de año por Berger, en Foreign Policy:
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/02/04/war_on_error_al_qaeda_terrorism
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En materia de financiación, los secuestros (especialmente en los casos de Al Qaeda en la Península Arábiga y Al Qaeda en el Magreb Islámico) continúan siendo efectivos, así como las donaciones de países del Golfo.
Los actores individuales (lone offenders), siguen suponiendo también una amenaza, citando como ejemplo el atentado en Boston en abril de 2013.
2. Referencias destacadas sobre la actividad de grupos terroristas en 2013.
Los atentados de Boston, el 15 de abril de 2013. Existiendo referencias a las acciones individuales, no se trata el tema del denominado terrorismo autóctono (homegrown terrorism), un fenómeno de preocupación internacional y que afecta a muchos estados, incluyendo España.
Al Qaeda en el Magreb Islámico. El informe destaca su actividad de secuestros y ataques regionales y la salida del grupo de al-Murabitoun, liderado por Mokhtar Belmokhtar, y responsable del ataque a la planta de gas en In Amenas en enero de 2013 (800 secuestrados y 39 fallecidos) y el ataque en mayo a una base militar y una mina de uranio de Areva en Níger.
El nacimiento de los grupos denominados Ansar al-Sharia, en Túnez y en Libia.
La amenaza permanente de al-Shabaab, a pesar de la presión de las fuerzas de la misión AMISOM. Su estado ha llevado al grupo a adoptar acciones de estilo insurgente y salida hacia países próximos, muestra de lo cual es el ataque en el centro comercial de Nairobi (Kenia) en septiembre de 2013, que causó la muerte a 65 civiles, de 13 nacionalidades diferentes, y 6 policías y militares.
Boko Haram continuó su actividad incesante de secuestros, asesinatos masivos de civiles, y ataques a objetivos militares. El informe destaca sus vínculos con grupos externos del Sahel, y el permanente cruce de fronteras a Camerún, Chad, Niger.
Grupos terroristas palestinos. El número de lanzamientos de cohetes contra Israel ha sido el más bajo en los últimos 10 años (74 lanzamientos en 2013, frente a 2.557 en 2012).
Grupos asentados en el Sinaí, como Ansar-Beit al Maqdis, que atacan objetivos israelíes y egipcios.
El resurgir de las Qods Force de la Guardia Revolucionaria de Irán, detrás de muchas de las operaciones de ventas de armas, concretamente a Yemen y a Bahrein, y patrocinio del terrorismo chií.
Hezbollah, a quien las autoridades han atribuido en 2013 el atentado del 5 de febrero de 2012 en Burgas (Bulgaria) contra un autobús de turistas israelíes (6 fallecidos y 32 heridos). Multitud de complots de Hezbollah, fuera del Líbano,
Y tampoco se atiende demasiado a que lo que sucede con el bloque suní también está sucediendo con el chií, con Hezbollah como el grupo mejor organizado, con mejores capacidades de combate, con experiencia en Siria en inteligencia, infantería, dirección y planificación, y unión de elementos iraníes, iraquíes y sirios. Son por tanto dos los ejércitos que se han formado, flexibles, sin forma, con alta descentralización, pero que se pueden movilizar en cualquier momento y lugar. En este sentido destaca el siguiente informe de Maria Sullivan:
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Hezbollah_Sullivan_FINAL.pdf
“Country Reports on Terrorism 2013”
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han fracasado en los últimos meses. Y la Unión Europea designó a su rama militar como organización terrorista en 2013.
Existen otras menciones destacadas al atentado en la entrada de la Embajada de Estados Unidos en Ankara, a los ataques anarquistas en Grecia, a los cientos de ataques en Colombia a pesar de las negociaciones de paz, y a la campaña de violencia de disidentes en Irlanda del Norte
3. Referencias a Europa.
Europa sigue sufriendo ataques terroristas, algunos de los cuales se presentan bajo la forma de acciones individuales.
El mayor desafío para Europa es el viaje de jóvenes ciudadanos a Siria, en apoyo a los rebeldes. Tanto la Unión Europea como muchos estados han adoptado medidas, tanto preventivas, como de monitorización, así como de reingreso en las sociedades de origen.
Algunos de los atentados destacados han sido el de Reyhanli (Turquía), que causo 52 fallecidos; los de la ciudad de Volgogrado (Rusia) en octubre y diciembre, con más de 41 víctimas.5
Finalmente destaca la polémica generada por el espionaje de Estados Unidos a sus aliados europeos, con preocupación por los efectos en la lucha contra el terrorismo.
4. Referencias a España.
Existen referencias a España en 10 páginas del informe, bien sea por iniciativas en las que participa, o por operaciones desarrolladas en otros países contra miembros de ETA, o de grupos de reclutamiento de yihadistas.
La parte principal referente a nuestro país se detalla en las páginas 115-117, destacando:
La consideración de España como aliado activo de Estados Unidos contra el terrorismo internacional.
La profundización de la cooperación de España con Argelia, Mali y Mauritania para luchar con Al Qaeda en el Magreb Islámico.
La ausencia de acciones del grupo terrorista ETA, desde el cese definitivo de la actividad armada anunciado en octubre de 2011.
La ausencia de atentados contra España y sus intereses en 2013. Únicamente hay que señalar el secuestro de tres periodistas en Siria.
Las capacidades españolas contra el terrorismo, coordinadas por el Centro Nacional de Coordinación Antiterrorista, se han mostrado efectivas. La cooperación entre Cuerpo Nacional de Policía y Guardia Civil es buena, con un fuerte intercambio de información y análisis conjunto de riesgos. Se muestra
5 El informe no cita entre lo más destacado el degollamiento de un soldado británico por un ciudadano nigeriano y el ataque días después en París, que generaron cierta alarma social.
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alta capacidad para detectar, detener y responder a los incidentes.
España participa, e incluso lidera, multitud de foros internacionales de lucha contra el terrorismo, que son señalados en el informe.
Destaca la importancia del acceso de la Guardia Civil a Europol, que hasta 2012 sólo se realizaba vía Cuerpo Nacional de Policía.
A nivel operativo refiere la operación conjunta de ambos cuerpos, desarrollada en Ceuta, contra la red de reclutamiento, adoctrinamiento, y financiación de viajes, así como las continuas detenciones de miembros de ETA.
5. Estados patrocinadores del terrorismo
Son designados oficialmente por el Departamento de Estado6. Se considera a los siguientes:
Cuba, aparece en la lista de 1982. Señala el informe el cobijo facilitado a miembros de ETA y las FARC, acogiendo las negociaciones de 2013 entre el Gobierno colombiano y representantes de este último grupo.
Irán, en la lista desde 1984. El informe destaca su apoyo a la yihad palestina y a Hezbollah, su expansión en África, y su venta de armas a separatistas de Yemen y a opositores chiíes de Bahrein. Y supone un riesgo por su desarrollo del programa nuclear.
Sudán, en la lista desde 1993. El gobierno ha continuado siendo en 2013 un aliado en la lucha contra el terrorismo. Miembros y afines a Al Qaeda continúan en dicho país. Y muchos sudaneses integran grupos terroristas. Quizás la acusación más directa sea que Sudán continúa permitiendo a miembros de Hamas viajar, financiarse y residir en el país.
Siria, en la lista desde 1979. No es preciso profundizar demasiado en sus vinculaciones con Irán y con Hezbollah, y en su posesión de armas químicas.
6. Santuarios terroristas.
Se definirían como aquellas áreas físicas sin gobierno o alta fragilidad estatal, en las que las organizaciones terroristas pueden organizar, planificar, financiar, comunicarse, reclutar, entrenar, circular, y operar en general de forma segura debido a la ausencia de capacidades del gobierno para su control, o ausencia de deseo político, o de ambos.
Los lugares apuntados son Somalia, el Trans-Sahara, Mali, el litoral del Mar Sulawesi y el archipiélago Sulu, el sur de Filipinas, Irak, Líbano, Libia, Yemen, Afganistán, Pakistán, Colombia, y Venezuela.7
6 http://www.state.gov/j/ct/c14151.htm
7 Sí es preciso señalar que la evolución de estos santuarios es constante, y que al margen de los países o zonas señaladas existen otra multitud de zonas que se convierten en bastiones de grupos terroristas, en Argelia, en el Sinaí, en Mauritania, en Nigeria y en multitud de puntos del planeta.
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7. Nuevas organizaciones terroristas en la lista de Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs).
Durante 2013 se han añadido a la lista:
Ansar al-Dine
Boko Haram8
Jama´atu Ansarul Muslimina
Al-Mulathamun Combatant Battalion Los tres criterios para la designación son:
Debe ser una organización extranjera.
Debe estar comprometida en actividad terrorista
Debe suponer una amenaza a la seguridad de nacionales estadounidenses o a la seguridad nacional (defensa nacional, relaciones internacionales, o intereses económicos) de los Estados Unidos.
8. Anexo estadístico9
Dicho anexo es elaborado por el National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). Destacaremos únicamente algunos datos que permitan dimensionar el problema del terrorismo:
En 2013 se produjeron 9.707 ataques, que causaron 17.891 fallecidos y 32.577 heridos.
En 2013 tuvieron lugar 2990 secuestros o tomas de rehenes.
Irak, Pakistán y Afganistán lideran la lista de países donde se localizan los ataques, con 2.495, 1.920 y 1.144 respectivamente, con un 57% de los totales.
Suman en los tres estados más de 11.500 víctimas (el 66%).
Los ataques terroristas se han producido en 93 países diferentes.
Los principales causantes de los ataques y víctimas han sido los Talibanes (641 ataques y 2.340 víctimas), Al Qaeda en Irak (401 ataques y 1.725 víctimas), Boko Haram10 (213 ataques y 1.589 víctimas).
Sobre las armas utilizadas, en el 57% de los ataques se emplearon bombas y
8 Boko Haram se incorpora a la lista el 14 de noviembre. Los últimos hechos, especialmente el secuestro de más de 200 niñas el 14 de abril de 2014, ha vuelto a iniciar el debate sobre la tardanza de Estados Unidos en la adopción de esta medida, tras las continuas masacres de este grupo desde el año 2010.
Configurada como una amenaza local (únicamente se puede atribuir un atentado de carácter global, contra las dependencias de la ONU en Abuya, en agosto de 2011, que causó 23 fallecidos; también un secuestro en Camerún, de una familia francesa que visitaba el parque de Waza, el 19 de febrero de 2013, y que fue liberada dos meses después), presenta claros rasgos de amenaza regional (vínculos con grupos del Sahel, entrenamiento conjunto, y evidencias obtenidas en la operación internacional en Mali). El salto cualitativo, que no cuantitativo, en la forma de actuar, con las bombas en los autobuses en Abuya del 13 de abril de 2014, que causaron más de 70 fallecidos, y el secuestro de las niñas, ha hecho elevar todas las alarmas en 2014, sobre algo que ya era previsible.
9 http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/225043.pdf
10 De nuevo se percibe, con este indicador, la letalidad de este grupo, caracterizado por llevar a cabo continuas masacres que hasta la actualidad no habían despertado demasiado interés internacional.
Cada ataque de Boko Haram causa una media de 7,46 fallecidos, muy por encima de los siguientes grupos: Tehrik-i-Taliban con 4,40, y AQI, con 4,30.
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explosivos, en un 23% asaltos armados, en un 8% asesinatos, y en un 6%
ataques a infraestructuras y también toma de rehenes.
Los objetivos de los ataques fueron a civiles y propiedades privadas (3.035 ataques), policías (2.388) y gobiernos (1.376) mayoritariamente. Pero a ellos no escapan periodistas (167), instituciones educativas (354), ONGs (51) o turistas (16).
José María Blanco Navarro Director Centro de Análisis y Prospectiva Guardia Civil
Country Reports on Terrorism 2013
April 2014
________________________________
United States Department of State Publication Bureau of Counterterrorism
Released April 2014
Country Reports on Terrorism 2013 is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f (the “Act”), which requires the Department of State to provide to Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of the Act.
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COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2013 Table of Contents
Chapter 1. Strategic Assessment Chapter 2. Country Reports
Africa Overview
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
The Partnership for East African Regional Counterterrorism Burkina Faso
Burundi Cameroon Chad
Democratic Republic of the Congo Djibouti
Eritrea Ethiopia Kenya Mali Mauritania Niger Nigeria Rwanda Senegal Somalia South Africa South Sudan Tanzania Uganda
East Asia and Pacific Overview
China, Hong Kong, and Macau Indonesia
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Republic of Korea
Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Europe Overview Albania Austria
3 Azerbaijan
Belgium
Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria
Cyprus Denmark France Georgia Germany Greece Ireland Italy Kosovo
The Netherlands Norway
Russia Serbia Spain Sweden Turkey
United Kingdom and Northern Ireland Middle East and North Africa Overview
Algeria Bahrain Egypt Iraq
Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, and Jerusalem Jordan
Kuwait Lebanon Libya Morocco Oman Qatar
Saudi Arabia Tunisia
United Arab Emirates Yemen
South and Central Asia Overview
Afghanistan Bangladesh India Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Maldives
4 Nepal
Pakistan Sri Lanka Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan
Western Hemisphere Overview
Argentina Brazil Canada Colombia Mexico Panama Paraguay Peru Venezuela
Chapter 3. State Sponsors of Terrorism Cuba
Iran Sudan Syria
Chapter 4. The Global Challenge of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism
Chapter 5. Terrorist Safe Havens (Update to 7120 Report) Terrorist Safe Havens
Countering Terrorism on the Economic Front
Multilateral Efforts to Counter Terrorism; International Conventions and Protocols Long-Term Programs and Initiatives Designed to Counter Terrorist Safe Havens - Countering Violent Extremism
- Capacity Building
- Regional Strategic Initiative Support for Pakistan
Collaboration with Saudi Arabia
Broadcasting Board of Governors Initiatives: Outreach through Foreign Broadcast Media Chapter 6. Terrorist Organizations
Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB) Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB) Ansar al-Dine (AAD)
Ansar al-Islam (AAI) Army of Islam (AOI) Asbat al-Ansar (AAA)
5 Aum Shinrikyo (AUM)
Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) Boko Haram (BH)
Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA) Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)
Gama’a al-Islamiyya (IG) Hamas
Haqqani Network (HQN)
Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI)
Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B) Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM)
Hizballah
Indian Mujahedeen (IM) Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis-Sudan (Ansaru) Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM)
Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) Jemaah Islamiya (JI)
Jundallah Kahane Chai
Kata’ib Hizballah (KH)
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) Lashkar e-Tayyiba
Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ)
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) Al-Mulathamun Battalion (AMB) National Liberation Army (ELN)
Palestine Islamic Jihad – Shaqaqi Faction (PIJ)
Palestine Liberation Front – Abu Abbas Faction (PLF) Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) Al-Qa’ida (AQ)
Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI)
Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) Real IRA (RIRA)
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N)
Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) Revolutionary Struggle (RS)
Al-Shabaab (AS) Shining Path (SL)
Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) Chapter 7. Legislative Requirements and Key Terms
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Chapter 1
Strategic Assessment
Al-Qa’ida (AQ) and its affiliates and adherents worldwide continue to present a serious threat to the United States, our allies, and our interests. While the international community has severely degraded AQ’s core leadership, the terrorist threat has evolved. Leadership losses in Pakistan, coupled with weak governance and instability in the Middle East and Northwest Africa, have accelerated the decentralization of the movement and led to the affiliates in the AQ network becoming more
operationally autonomous from core AQ and increasingly focused on local and regional objectives.
The past several years have seen the emergence of a more aggressive set of AQ affiliates and like-minded groups, most notably in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Northwest Africa, and Somalia.
AQ leadership experienced difficulty in maintaining cohesion within the AQ network and in
communicating guidance to its affiliated groups. AQ leader Ayman al-Zawahiri was rebuffed in his attempts to mediate a dispute among AQ affiliates operating in Syria – al-Nusrah Front and al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), now calling itself the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) – which resulted in the expulsion of ISIL from the AQ network in February 2014. In addition, guidance issued by Zawahiri in 2013 for AQ affiliates to avoid collateral damage was routinely disobeyed, notably in attacks by AQ affiliates against civilian religious pilgrims in Iraq, hospital staff and convalescing patients in Yemen, and families at a shopping mall in Kenya.
Terrorist violence in 2013 was fueled by sectarian motivations, marking a worrisome trend, in particular in Syria, Lebanon, and Pakistan, where victims of violence were primarily among the civilian populations. Thousands of extremist fighters entered Syria during the year, among those a large percentage reportedly motivated by a sectarian view of the conflict and a desire to protect the Sunni Muslim community from the Alawite-dominant Asad regime. On the other side of the conflict, Iran, Hizballah, and other Shia militia continued to provide critical support to the Asad regime, dramatically bolstering its capabilities and exacerbating the situation. Many of these fighters are also motivated by a sectarian view of the conflict and a desire to protect the Shia Muslim community from Sunni extremists.
The relationship between the AQ core and its affiliates plays out in the financial arena as well. As was the case for the last few years, the affiliates have increased their financial independence through kidnapping for ransom operations and other criminal activities such as extortion and credit card fraud.
Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are particularly effective with kidnapping for ransom and are using ransom money to fund the range of their activities. Kidnapping targets are usually Western citizens from governments or third parties that have established a pattern of paying ransom for the release of individuals in custody.
Private donations from the Gulf also remained a major source of funding for Sunni terrorist groups, particularly for those operating in Syria.
In 2013, violent extremists increased their use of new media platforms and social media, with mixed results. Social media platforms allowed violent extremist groups to circulate messages more quickly, but confusion and contradictions among the various voices within the movement are growing more common. Increasingly, current and former violent extremists are engaging online with a variety of views on tactics and strategy, including admitting wrongdoing or recanting former beliefs and actions.
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Key Terrorism Trends in 2013
--The terrorist threat continued to evolve rapidly in 2013, with an increasing number of groups around the world – including both AQ affiliates and other terrorist organizations – posing a threat to the United States, our allies, and our interests.
--As a result of both ongoing worldwide efforts against the organization and senior leadership losses, AQ core’s leadership has been degraded, limiting its ability to conduct attacks and direct its followers.
Subsequently, 2013 saw the rise of increasingly aggressive and autonomous AQ affiliates and like- minded groups in the Middle East and Africa who took advantage of the weak governance and instability in the region to broaden and deepen their operations.
--AQ leader Ayman al-Zawahiri experienced difficulty in maintaining influence throughout the AQ organization and was rebuffed in his attempts to mediate a dispute among AQ affiliates operating in Syria, with ISIL publicly dissociating its group from AQ. Guidance issued by Zawahiri in 2013 for AQ affiliates to avoid collateral damage was routinely disobeyed, notably in increasingly violent attacks by these affiliates against civilian populations.
--Syria continued to be a major battleground for terrorism on both sides of the conflict and remains a key area of longer-term concern. Thousands of foreign fighters traveled to Syria to join the fight against the Asad regime – with some joining violent extremist groups – while Iran, Hizballah, and other Shia militias provided a broad range of critical support to the regime. The Syrian conflict also empowered ISIL to expand its cross-border operations in Syria, and dramatically increase attacks against Iraqi civilians and government targets in 2013.
--Terrorist violence in 2013 was increasingly fueled by sectarian motives, marking a worrisome trend, particularly in Syria, but also in Lebanon and Pakistan.
--Terrorist groups engaged in a range of criminal activity to raise needed funds, with kidnapping for ransom remaining the most frequent and profitable source of illicit financing. Private donations from the Gulf also remained a major source of funding for Sunni terrorist groups, particularly for those operating in Syria.
--“Lone offender” violent extremists also continued to pose a serious threat, as illustrated by the April 15, 2013, attacks near the Boston Marathon finish line, which killed three and injured approximately 264 others.
--Many other terrorist groups not tied to AQ were responsible for attacks in 2013, including the People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C), which carried out a number of high-profile attacks last year, including a February 1 suicide plot targeting the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, Turkey.
* * *
While AQ core leadership in Pakistan is much diminished, Ayman al-Zawahiri remains the recognized ideological leader of a jihadist movement that includes AQ-affiliated and allied groups worldwide.
Along with AQ, the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani Network, Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and
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other like-minded groups continue to conduct operations against U.S., Coalition, Afghan, and Pakistani interests from safe havens on both sides of the Afghanistan/Pakistan border, and in Pakistan, terrorist groups and AQ allies, such as TTP, have executed armed assaults not only on police stations, judicial centers, border posts, and military convoys, but also on polio vaccination teams and aid workers.
Other South Asian terrorist organizations, including Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LeT), cite U.S. interests as legitimate targets for attacks. LeT, the group responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks, continues to pose a threat to regional stability.
AQAP carried out approximately one hundred attacks throughout Yemen in 2013, including suicide bombings, car bombings, ambushes, kidnappings, and targeted assassinations, regaining the initiative it had lost through 2012 as a result of sustained Yemeni government counterterrorism efforts. Of the AQ affiliates, AQAP continues to pose the most significant threat to the United States and U.S. citizens and interests in Yemen. AQAP has demonstrated a persistent intent to strike the United States, beginning in December 2009 when it attempted to destroy an airliner bound for Detroit, and again the following year with a plot to destroy several U.S.-bound airplanes using bombs timed to detonate in the cargo holds. In 2013, AQAP’s leader, Nasir Wahishi, was designated by AQ leader Zawahiri as his deputy, and the group continued to maintain a focus on Western targets.
Some of the thousands of fighters from around the world who are traveling to Syria to do battle against the Asad regime – particularly from the Middle East and North Africa, Central Asia, and Eastern and Western Europe – are joining violent extremist groups, including al-Nusrah Front and ISIL. A number of key partner governments are becoming increasingly concerned that individuals with violent
extremist ties and battlefield experience will return to their home countries or elsewhere to commit terrorist acts. The scale of this problem has raised a concern about the creation of a new generation of globally-committed terrorists, similar to what resulted from the influx of violent extremists to
Afghanistan in the 1980s.
The violence and disorder in Syria extended to the various violent extremist groups operating amongst the Syrian opposition. In late 2013 and early 2014, violent infighting occurred between al-Nusrah Front and ISIL, resulting in the February death of Ayman al-Zawahiri’s envoy to Syria Abu Khalid al-Soury, who was a member of Ahrar al Sham. Despite this infighting, ISIL is the strongest it has been since its peak in 2006; it has exploited political grievance among Iraq’s Sunni population, a weak security environment in Iraq, and the conflict in Syria to significantly increase the pace and complexity of its attacks. ISIL continues to routinely and indiscriminately target defenseless innocents, including religious pilgrims, and engages in violent repression of local inhabitants.
In 2013, AQIM remained focused on local and regional attack planning, and concentrates its efforts largely on kidnapping-for-ransom operations. While a successful French and African intervention countered efforts to overrun northern Mali by AQIM and several associate groups, these factions continued to pursue attacks against regional security forces, local government targets, and westerners in northern Mali, Niger, and the broader Sahel region in 2013.
Originally part of AQIM, the al-Mulathamun Battalion (AMB), also known as al-Murabitoun, became a separate organization in late 2012 after its leader, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, announced a split from AQIM. AMB claimed responsibility for the January 2013 attack against the Tiguentourine gas facility near In Amenas, in southeastern Algeria. Over 800 people were taken hostage during the four-day siege, which led to the deaths of 39 civilians, including three U.S. citizens. AMB was also involved in terrorist attacks committed in Niger in May 2013, targeting a Nigerien military base and a French uranium mine.
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Groups calling themselves Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia and the Libyan cities of Benghazi and Darnah also operated in the North Africa space. The three share some aspects of AQ ideology, but are not formal affiliates and generally maintain a local focus. In Libya, the terrorist threat to Western and Libyan government interests remains strong, especially in the eastern part of the country. Libya’s porous borders, the weakness of Libya’s nascent security institutions, and large amounts of loose small arms create opportunities for violent extremists. In Tunisia, Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia attempted suicide attacks against two tourist sites in late October 2013 and killed a political oppositionist in July that same year, suggesting the group remains intent on attacking Western and Tunisian interests.
In East Africa, al-Shabaab continued to pose a significant regional threat despite coming under continued pressure by African forces operating under the African Union’s AMISOM command and steady progress in the establishment of Somali government capability. Perhaps because of these positive steps, al-Shabaab targeted its attacks on those participating in the effort to bring stability to Somalia. In September 2013, al-Shabaab struck outside of Somalia (its first external attack was in July 2010 in Kampala, Uganda), attacking the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya. The assault resulted in the death of at least 65 civilians, including foreign nationals from 13 countries outside of Kenya and six soldiers and police officers; hundreds more were injured. Al-Shabaab’s attacks within Somalia continued in 2013, and resulted in the deaths of hundreds of people, including innocent women and children.
Boko Haram (BH) maintained a high operational tempo in 2013 and carried out kidnappings, killings, bombings, and attacks on civilian and military targets in northern Nigeria, resulting in numerous deaths, injuries, and destruction of property in 2013. The number and sophistication of BH’s attacks are concerning, and while the group focuses principally on local Nigerian issues and actors, there continue to be reports that it has financial and training links with other violent extremists in the Sahel region. Boko Haram, along with a splinter group commonly known as Ansaru, has also increasingly crossed Nigerian borders to neighboring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger to evade pressure and conduct operations.
Palestinian terrorist organizations in the Hamas-controlled Gaza continued rocket and mortar attacks into Israeli territory. The number of rocket and mortar launchings on Israel from Gaza and the Sinai was the lowest in 2013 in more than a decade, with 74 launchings compared to 2,557 in 2012.
According to Israeli authorities, 36 rocket hits were identified in Israeli territory in 2013, compared to 1,632 in 2012. Of the 74 launchings on southern Israel, 69 were launched from the Gaza and five from the Sinai Peninsula.
Sinai-based groups, such as Ansar-Beit al Maqdis, also continued to pose a serious threat, conducting attacks against both Israeli and Egyptian targets in 2013.
Since 2012, the United States has also seen a resurgence of activity by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Qods Force (IRGC-QF), the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), and Tehran’s ally Hizballah. On January 23, 2013, the Yemeni Coast Guard interdicted an Iranian dhow carrying weapons and explosives likely destined for Houthi rebels. On February 5, 2013, the
Bulgarian government publicly implicated Hizballah in the July 2012 Burgas bombing that killed five Israelis and one Bulgarian citizen, and injured 32 others. On March 21, 2013, a Cyprus court found a Hizballah operative guilty of charges stemming from his surveillance activities of Israeli tourist targets in 2012. On September 18, 2013, Thailand convicted Atris Hussein, a Hizballah operative detained by Thai authorities in January 2012. On December 30, 2013, the Bahraini Coast Guard interdicted a
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speedboat attempting to smuggle arms and Iranian explosives likely destined for armed Shia
opposition groups in Bahrain. During an interrogation, the suspects admitted to receiving paramilitary training in Iran.
On June 22, 2013, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) declared it would treat Hizballah as a terrorist organization. On July 22, 2013, the EU designated the “military wing” of Hizballah as a terrorist organization, sending a strong message to Hizballah that it cannot operate with impunity. Both Hizballah and Iran issued public statements to denounce the EU, demonstrating the impact of the designation. The EU designation will constrain Hizballah’s ability to operate freely in Europe by enabling European law enforcement agencies to crack down on Hizballah’s fundraising, logistical activity, and terrorist plotting on European soil.
Iran remained one of the chief external supporters of the Asad regime in Syria and continued to help ensure the regime’s survival. The IRGC-QF, Hizballah, and Iraqi Shia terrorist groups have all increased the number of their personnel in Syria since the start of the conflict. Iran also continued to send arms to Syria, often through Iraqi airspace, in violation of the UN Security Council prohibition against Iran selling or transferring arms and related materials.
While terrorism by non-state actors related to AQ and state-sponsored terrorism originating in Iran remained the predominant concern of the United States, other forms of terrorism undermined peace and security around the world. In Turkey, the DHKP/C was responsible for a number of high-profile attacks in 2013, including exploding a suicide vest inside the employee entrance to the U.S. Embassy in Ankara on February 1. Anarchists in Greece launched periodic attacks, targeting private businesses, foreign missions, and symbols of the state. In Colombia, there were still hundreds of terrorist incidents around the country. In Northern Ireland, dissident Republican groups continued their campaigns of violence. “Lone offender” violent extremists also remain a concern, as we saw on April 15, 2013, in the United States, when two violent extremists exploded two pressure cooker bombs near the Boston Marathon's finish line, killing three people and injuring an estimated 264 others.
* * *
To meet the challenges described herein, our response to terrorism cannot depend on military or law enforcement alone. We are committed to a whole of government counterterrorism effort that focuses on countering violent extremism; building the capacity of partner nation security forces to address threats within their own borders and participate in regional counterterrorism operations; and
strengthening relationships with U.S. partners around the world to make the rule of law a critical part of a broader, more comprehensive counterterrorism enterprise. See Chapter 5, Terrorist Safe Havens (7120 Report) in this report for further information on these initiatives, which also include designating foreign terrorist organizations and individuals, countering violent extremist narratives, strengthening efforts to counter the financing of terrorism, and furthering multilateral initiatives such as the Global Counterterrorism Forum.
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Chapter 2
Country Reports
AFRICA
The Africa region experienced significant levels of terrorist activity in 2013. In East Africa, the Somalia-based terrorist group al-Shabaab remained the primary terrorist threat. Somali security forces and the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) continued to make gains against al-Shabaab in 2013, but an inability to undertake consistent offensive operations against the group allowed al-Shabaab to develop and carry out asymmetric attacks, including outside of Somalia. Most notably, al-Shabaab launched an attack against the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya on September 21 that left at least 65 people dead. The attack, which targeted innocent civilians, was claimed by al-Shabaab as a response to the involvement of Kenyan armed forces units in Somalia, who in late 2012 expelled al-Shabaab from the port city of Kismayo, a major revenue source for al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab issued persistent threats to other countries contributing troops to AMISOM. Driven out of major urban areas, al-
Shabaab has returned to a strategy focused on asymmetric attacks intended to discredit and destabilize the nascent Federal Government of Somalia. In 2013, the United States continued to support
AMISOM and the establishment of a stable Somali government, and worked to enhance counterterrorism capacity in Somalia and throughout the broader region.
Various East African countries continued to detect, deter, disrupt, investigate, and prosecute terrorist incidents; enhance domestic and regional efforts to bolster border security; and create integrated and dedicated counterterrorism strategies. Counterterrorism cooperation across the region picked up following the Westgate attack and nations began to examine their procedures for responding to attacks on soft targets.
In West Africa, conflict in Nigeria continued throughout the northern part of the country, with Boko Haram and related actors committing hundreds of attacks, reportedly resulting in over a thousand casualties in 2013 alone. This violence reportedly spilled over into neighboring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.
French and allied African forces successfully disrupted and pushed back efforts by al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other violent extremist groups to control northern Mali. In August, successful elections took place in Mali and a regional African peacekeeping force was installed with Western support to restore stability and governance to the country. France and other international partners continue to contribute forces to the region to assist the Malian government to rebuild and to deter terrorist threats. Western efforts to increase counterterrorism capacity in the region were focused in 2013 on enhanced border security, regional information sharing and cooperation, and countering violent extremism.
TRANS-SAHARA COUNTERTERRORISM PARTNERSHIP
Established in 2005, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is a U.S.-funded and implemented, multi-faceted, multi-year effort designed to build the capacity and cooperation of military, law enforcement, and civilian actors across North and West Africa to counter terrorism.
Areas of support include: (1) enabling and enhancing the capacity of North and West African militaries to conduct counterterrorism operations; (2) integrating the ability of North and West African militaries and other supporting partners to operate regionally and collaboratively on counterterrorism efforts; (3)
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enhancing individual nations’ border security capacity to monitor, restrain, and interdict terrorist movements; (4) strengthening the rule of law, including access to justice, and law enforcement’s ability to detect, disrupt, respond to, investigate, and prosecute terrorist activity; (5) monitoring and countering the financing of terrorism (such as that related to kidnapping for ransom); and (6) reducing the limited sympathy and support among communities for violent extremism.
TSCTP partners include Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon (joined in 2014), Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia.
TSCTP has been successful in building capacity and cooperation despite setbacks caused by coups d’état, ethnic rebellions, and extra-constitutional actions that have interrupted work and progress with select partner countries. For example, U.S. training and equipment have assisted Mauritania in monitoring its border with Mali and sustaining professional units for operations against AQIM.
Similarly, training and equipment have supported Niger’s efforts to protect its borders and respond to terrorist incidents. While assistance to Mali under TSCTP was suspended following the March 2012 military coup that overthrew Mali’s democratically elected government, that suspension ended on September 6, 2013, following successful elections in that country.
Several TSCTP programs have worked to counter violent extremist radicalization and recruitment of youth, including educational and training courses in Algeria and Morocco, and extensive youth employment and outreach programs, community development, and media activities in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad.
THE PARTNERSHIP FOR REGIONAL EAST AFRICA COUNTERTERRORISM
Established in 2009, PREACT is a U.S.-funded and implemented multi-year, multi-faceted program designed to build the capacity and cooperation of military, law enforcement, and civilian actors across East Africa to counter terrorism. It uses law enforcement, military, and development resources to achieve its strategic objectives, including (1) reducing the operational capacity of terrorist networks, (2) developing a rule of law framework for countering terrorism in partner nations, (3) enhancing border security, (4) countering the financing of terrorism, and (5) reducing the appeal of radicalization and recruitment to violent extremism. PREACT member countries include Burundi, Comoros,
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.
In 2013, the U.S. government, through PREACT, continued to build the capacity and resilience of East African governments to contain the spread of, and counter the threat posed by, al-Qa’ida, al-Shabaab, and other violent extremist organizations. PREACT complements the U.S. government’s dedicated efforts to promote stability and governance in Somalia, including support for AMISOM. For example, training and equipment have assisted Djibouti in monitoring its land and maritime border with Somalia and supporting professional units in operations against al-Shabaab. Similarly, training and equipment for light infantry, technical intelligence, and crisis response units have supported Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda’s efforts to protect their borders and respond to terrorist incidents.
BURKINA FASO
Overview: In 2013, the Government of Burkina Faso aggressively undertook measures to combat the regional danger posed by terrorist organizations, specifically al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM). It also responded to potential threats; and continued to stress the importance of international
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cooperation in defeating terrorism. The Government of Burkina Faso has recognized the importance of regional stability as an element in the fight against terrorism, and as a result has played an important regional role in finding a political solution to the conflict in Mali.
Burkina Faso is a strong U.S. security and defense partner in the region and continued to receive substantial training and material support for counterterrorism efforts through its participation in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership and multinational peacekeeping efforts. U.S. assistance facilitated the establishment of a 1,000-person border security task force, and the training and
equipping of a military counterterrorist unit. Burkina Faso also contributed a peacekeeping battalion and police unit to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).
As a result of a heightened general threat of retaliation following the French-led military intervention in Mali, the Government of Burkina Faso increased its security posture at diplomatic facilities and at major public events. Unconfirmed reports indicated the possibility of violent extremist elements entering Burkina Faso’s northern region, notably its refugee camps, either for safe haven or to extend their operational reach. In response, the Burkinabè military deployed a joint counterterrorist task force of soldiers and gendarmes to assist in the management of refugees, gather intelligence, secure key infrastructure, and interdict terrorist activity.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Burkina Faso implemented the Terrorism Suppression Law of 2009, modeled after French law, which criminalizes a wide range of terrorist- related activities and imposes criminal punishment of up to life in prison. However, no one had been charged under the law by year’s end.
Burkina Faso’s police and gendarmerie were hindered by a chronic lack of training, specialized tactical equipment, and personnel. There was a lack of interagency coordination and intelligence sharing between the gendarmerie, which falls under the Ministry of Defense, and police agencies, which all operate under the authority of the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Security. The
gendarmerie has specialized units which conduct investigations, respond to crises, and protect the nation’s borders, but is too small to be effective throughout the country. The National Police, who are likely to be first responders, lag far behind the gendarmerie in training and equipment. There is a lack of information technology resources to assist criminal investigation, manage cases, and share
intelligence.
The Government of Burkina Faso took several steps to improve its capabilities, however. In January, the government ordered the creation of a new police unit charged with counterterrorism; and in March, the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Security announced a 50 percent increase in recruitment of national police in 2014 to respond to growing security issues.
The U.S. government, through the U.S. Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program, has provided assistance to the National Police since 2010. In 2013, Burkinabè officials were trained in crime scene investigations and post-blast evidence recovery. In 2013, 26 police officers, gendarmes, and criminal prosecutors participated in four International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) courses, including the six-week Law Enforcement Executive Development course. In February, the U.S.
government provided non-lethal tactical equipment to the National Police’s Multipurpose Intervention Unit.
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With the support of the United States, the Government of Burkina Faso installed the Personal
Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES) biometric traveler database at the airport in Ouagadougou.
Countering Terrorist Finance: Burkina Faso is a member of the Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. A recent FATF/GIABA West Africa terrorist finance case study featured a case from Burkina Faso involving cash couriers and arms smugglers operating in Burkina Faso and Nigeria.
Burkina Faso has an extremely small formal banking sector which makes cash and other informal value systems significant risks for abuse by terrorists. While the Ministry of Finance’s financial intelligence unit, CENTIF, collects and processes financial information on money laundering and terrorist financing, it lacks adequate human and information technology resources to identify and prosecute significant money laundering, which is likely occurring. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
(INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes:
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.
Regional and International Cooperation: Burkina Faso is active in regional organizations and international bodies, including the UN, AU, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF). In April, Burkina Faso and Denmark co-hosted a regional workshop on countering violent extremism in Ouagadougou to gain insights on concrete programming ideas from partners. In October, Burkina Faso hosted another regional workshop for the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force.
The Government of Burkina Faso played a leading role in finding a political solution to the conflict in Mali. President Blaise Compaore, as ECOWAS mediator, led negotiations between northern Malian groups and the interim government in Bamako that culminated in the Ouagadougou Accord in June, paving the way for successful presidential elections in July.
Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: Burkina Faso is a majority-Muslim country, where the predominant form of practice of Sunni Islam is not conducive to violent extremism.
The country is often mentioned as an example of religious tolerance. Religious leaders regularly denounce violence and call for peaceful coexistence of all religions, and civil society organizations play an active role in mitigating religious conflict. The Burkinabè government encourages regular and ongoing inter-faith dialogues. In 2013, the government of Burkina Faso enthusiastically welcomed several international countering violent extremism efforts, including programs led by the United States, Denmark, and the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation.
BURUNDI
Overview: Burundi has demonstrated a commitment to addressing international terrorism and
contributed six battalions to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). A counterterrorism cell, formed in 2010, consists of elements of the police, military, and the National Intelligence Service. In the aftermath of the September 2013 al-Shabaab attack in Nairobi, the Burundian National Police (BNP) conducted several counterterrorism operations throughout the country in an attempt to disrupt and dismantle potential terrorist operations. However, the BNP are hampered by a lack of training,
resources, and infrastructure. In addition, the BNP has focused counterterrorism efforts on the Muslim community and foreigners in Burundi, rather than basing actions on operational intelligence. This reflects the BNP’s belief that these groups pose the greatest terrorist threat to Burundi.
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Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Burundi has provisions in its penal code defining forms of terrorism. Sentences for acts of terrorism range from 10 to 20 years in prison to life imprisonment if the act results in the death of a person. Burundi continued its participation in the U.S.
Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program and the International Law
Enforcement Academy. Through ATA, Burundian National Police received training in 2013 to bolster its leadership and management skills and to build investigative capacity.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Burundi is not a member of a Financial Action Task Force- style regional body. This gap prevents any overall assessment of the risks the country faces in regards to terrorist financing. While the government has created counterterrorist financing laws, it has yet to commit funding, provide training, or implement policies. Very few people in the country have access to the formal banking sector. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.
Regional and International Cooperation: Burundi is a member of the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism; and as such, has received funding for military and law enforcement
counterterrorism training. Burundi has cooperated with neighboring countries to exchange information on suspected terrorists. Burundi has also contributed six battalions to AMISOM to stabilize the
situation in Somalia.
CAMEROON
Overview: The Government of Cameroon considers countering terrorism and violent extremism a top security priority, and worked with the United States in 2013 to improve the capacity of its security forces. The Nigerian terrorist group Boko Haram (BH) took advantage of weaknesses in Cameroon’s border security and conducted several terrorist acts in Cameroon’s far north region in 2013, including targeted killings and kidnappings of Cameroonians and expatriates. Cameroon responded to the attacks with an increased security presence in its northern regions.
2013 Terrorist Incidents: In 2013, BH was responsible for targeted killings of Cameroonians and Nigerians living in Cameroon in the villages of Kouseri and Kolofata. The exact number of casualties attributable to BH is unknown. BH operatives were involved in the following incidents:
In February, BH claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of a family of seven French citizens in the far north region of Cameroon. BH assailants seized the family near Waza National Park and took the hostages to Nigeria before they were eventually released two months later. There were no casualties. The media reported that a ransom was paid to secure their release.
In November, BH members kidnapped a French priest near the town of Koza, in the far north region of Cameroon. The assailants invaded the priest’s home and took him to Nigeria before releasing him six weeks later. The conditions required to secure his release are unknown.
In December, BH gunmen attacked civilians in several areas of the far north region.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Cameroon relies on various provisions in its penal code to respond to possible terrorist acts. These include sanctions for efforts to undermine state authority, threats to public and individual safety, the destruction of property, threats to the safety of
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civil aviation and maritime navigation, hostage taking, and the regulation of firearms and explosive substances.
Significant political will to combat terrorism exists in Cameroon, but efforts were hampered by limited capabilities, corruption, and a lack of coordination among Cameroonian law enforcement and security forces. Cameroon’s law enforcement entities involved in counterterrorism activities include the general Army, the Battalion d'Intervention Rapide (BIR), and the Gendarme. Although recent terrorist threats have targeted the far north region of Cameroon, there is no dedicated border police unit; rather, the border police are rotated into duty from the general police force. Gendarmes and police are often the initial responders to terrorist situations, but the BIR maintains superior counterterrorism
capabilities and is often called upon to provide support to potential terrorist incidents. Once the situation is secure, control of security incidents is returned to local police units for appropriate action.
Cooperation among law enforcement entities is in need of improvement.
In 2013, Cameroon received U.S. training to improve its counterterrorism and law enforcement efforts.
The U.S. government has provided training to Cameroon in counterterrorism tactics, first aid, land navigation, and advanced marksmanship. Training is conducted with Cameroonian security forces, and has contributed to numerous arrests of suspected BH terrorists. The training also emphasizes professionalism of security forces and humanitarian assistance, which leads to trust within the local population.
In August 2013, Cameroon launched production of a regional biometric passport to facilitate the free movement of people and provide enhanced security for residents of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (CEMAC) zone. In response to terrorist incidents in 2013, Cameroon also reinforced its border security by establishing control posts and deploying additional military units and gendarmes to the far north region of the country.
Cameroonian military and police units proactively confronted and disrupted suspected members of BH in the far north region. Some suspects that fled on motorbike to neighboring Nigeria were arrested or killed by Cameroonian civilians or law enforcement. However, there were no terrorism-related prosecutions by the end of 2013.
Countering Terrorist Finance: Cameroon is a member of the Central African Action Group against Money Laundering (GABAC), which enjoys Financial Action Task Force observer status. Through its membership in CEMAC, Cameroon has adopted a legislative architecture to address the issues of anti- money laundering and financial supervision. It has a financial intelligence unit, the National Financial Investigation Agency (ANIF), which processes suspicious transaction reports and initiates
investigations. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.
Regional and International Cooperation: Cameroon actively participates in AU peacekeeping operations, and its military schools train soldiers and gendarmes from neighboring countries.
Cameroonian naval and special operations forces work with their counterparts from Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea and improve maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. While cooperation with Nigeria had been mainly at the working level between unit
commanders, there are increasing signs of willingness to cooperate with Nigeria on counterterrorism, as evidenced by participation in U.S.-sponsored regional exercises.
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Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: Cameroonian authorities have taken a series of measures to address radicalization to violence and to counter violent extremism, including participating in meetings with local administrative and religious officials, and forming partnerships with local, traditional, and religious leaders to monitor preaching in mosques.
CHAD
Overview: The Government of Chad was a strong counterterrorism partner in 2013 and is a member of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). Countering international terrorist threats to Chad were priorities at the highest levels of Chad’s government, with a particular focus on
countering potential terrorist threats from across the Sahel region. Chad has a counterterrorism strategy, which focuses on promoting regional stability and securing its borders. The Chadian government strengthened border patrols along the border with Sudan and in the Lake Chad region.
The Chadian Army’s Special Antiterrorism Group (SATG), which has received U.S. training, has a national security mandate. The SATG is effective in counterterrorism operations with a specific focus on border security and interdiction of illicit goods trafficking, but faces a number of logistical
challenges. In 2013, the SATG increased surveillance of the northern border with Libya and the unit was deployed to Mali and the Central African Republic.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Chadian criminal law does not explicitly criminalize terrorism. However, certain general provisions of the Penal Code (1967) have been used to prosecute acts of terrorism. Chadian law enforcement has demonstrated a limited but effective
capacity to detect, deter, and respond to potential terrorist incidents. Some Chadian units have limited investigations, crisis response, and border security capacity. Law enforcement units display basic command and control capacity. Specialized law enforcement units possess some necessary equipment but have many unfulfilled needs.
Border security is a common interest for the U.S. government and Chad. In 2013, Chad participated in the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) Sahel Cross-Border Workshop in Niamey.
In the law enforcement sector, the United States has provided Chad with training and technical assistance through the State Department’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program in the areas of building law enforcement border security, investigations, and crisis response capabilities. Chad also worked with the United States to reduce the threat from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems
(MANPADS) and other conventional weapons sought by terrorists.
Chad worked in collaboration with the U.S. government to implement biometric screening as part of the Terrorist Interdiction Program/Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES). In 2013, the United States, working with Chadian authorities, deployed the first state-of- the-art PISCES border security system at the N’Djamena airport, and expanded PISCES systems to additional Ports of Entry in late 2013.
In 2013, Chadian security forces executed several cordon and search operations in the Lake Chad region, extending south to the capital, in an effort to prevent spillover from ongoing security operations on the opposite side of Lake Chad undertaken by the Nigerian government directed against Boko Haram.
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The Government of Chad also established the Antiterrorism Brigade in 2013, which has two
permanent officers and borrows officers from the organized crime brigade as needed. The Chadian government is currently working with the governments of Sudan, Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon, and Libya to form border commissions and joint task forces to better control their borders. In particular, Chad works in cooperation with Sudan on a mixed-force border patrol, which has enabled the two countries to better monitor and control their joint border.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Chad is a member of the Action Group Against Money Laundering in Central Africa (GABAC), an observer to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) with the same mandate and status as a FATF-style regional body. GABAC works directly with Chad’s financial intelligence unit, the National Financial Investigative Agency (ANIF). ANIF is hindered by serious resource constraints, and law enforcement and customs officials need training in financial crimes enforcement.
Chad’s financial sector is underdeveloped and lacks sufficient capacity to enforce banking regulations.
Financial intelligence reporting and analysis is limited. Additionally, law enforcement and customs officials require training in financial crimes enforcement. Several banks voluntarily report suspicious transactions, but the practice is not universal as there is no regulation requiring banks to report them.
The national entity charged with monitoring money laundering is understaffed and lacks sophisticated equipment to perform its activities effectively. Although it maintains working relationships with commercial banks, it does not monitor wire transfers, SMS mobile money transfers, or other money transfer channels such as hawala brokers.
For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes:
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.
Regional and International Cooperation: Chad participated in the GCTF’s Sahel Region Capacity Building Working Group in October in Niamey, Niger. This included Chad serving on the committee that made recommendations to strengthen capacity building of member states, and the committee on securing land borders. Chad also participated in the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), providing 2,000 troops to assist French and Malian armed forces combat terrorists in northern Mali.
Chad supports counterterrorism capacity building in other states through the GCTF. In January, Chad sent 2,000 troops to participate in the Mali intervention to help French and Malian armed forces defeat a jihadist movement that occupied the northern region. Chad conducted counterterrorist operations including the killing of Abdelhamid Abou Zeid, a senior commander of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). At year’s end, Chad was still participating in peacekeeping efforts in northern Mali, where it has deployed 1,200 troops.
Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: Chad participated in targeted projects to counter violent extremism through the TSCTP; specific activities have included building the capacity of national civil society organizations, community engagement, youth empowerment, promotion of interfaith dialogue and religious tolerance, and media and outreach work. President Deby instructs the High Council for Islamic Affairs to monitor religious activities closely in mosques to counter violent extremism and radicalization to violence.