Context-dependent cheating: experimental evidence from16 countries

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ContentslistsavailableatScienceDirect

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

jo u r n al ho me p ag e :ww w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / j e b o

Context-dependent cheating: Experimental evidence from 16 countries

David Pascual-Ezama

^a,∗

, Toke R. Fosgaard

^b

, Juan Camilo Cardenas

^c

,

Praveen Kujal

^d

, Robert Veszteg

^e

, Beatriz Gil-Gómez de Lia ˜ no

^f

, Brian Gunia

^g

, Doris Weichselbaumer

^h,i

, Katharina Hilken

^j

, Armenak Antinyan

^k

,

Joyce Delnoij

^l

, Antonios Proestakis

^m

, Michael D. Tira

ⁿ

, Yulius Pratomo

^o

, Tarek Jaber-López

^p

, Pablo Bra ˜ nas-Garza

^d

aDepartmentofFinancialEconomyandAccounting,UniversidadComplutenseMadrid,CampusSomosaguas,Madrid28223,Spain

bDepartmentofFoodandResourceEconomics,UniversityofCopenhagen,Rolighedsvej23,1958FrederiksbergC,Denmark

cFacultaddeEconomia,CEDE,UniversidaddeLosAndes,Calle19ANo.1-37Este,BloqueW(W-803),Bogotá,Colombia

dEconomicsDepartment,BusinessSchool,MiddlesexUniversityLondon,TheBurroughs,NW44BT,London,UK

eSchoolofPoliticalScienceandEconomics,WasedaUniversity,1-6-1NishiwasedaShinjuku-ku,Tokyo169-8050,Japan

fDepartmentofSocialPsychologyandMethodology,UniversidadAutónomadeMadrid,CampusdeCantoblancos/n,Madrid28049, Spain

gTheJohnsHopkinsCareyBusinessSchool,100InternationalDrive,Baltimore,MD21202-1099,USA

hDepartmentofEconomics,UniversityofLinz,Altenbergerstr.68,4040Linz,Austria

iDepartmentofWomen’sandGenderStudies,UniversityofLinz,Altenbergerstr.68,4040Linz,Austria

jDepartmentofAppliedEconomics,VrijeUniversiteitBrussel(VUB),Pleinlaan2,1050Brussels,Belgium

kUniversityofErlangen-Nuremberg,ChairofEconomicTheory,LangeGasse20,90403Nuremberg,Germany

lUtrechtUniversitySchoolofEconomics,UtrechtUniversity,Kriekenpitplein21-22,3584ECUtrecht,TheNetherlands

mInstituteforHealthandConsumerProtection,JointResearchCentre,EuropeanCommission,ViaEnricoFermi2749,21027Ispra(VA), Italy

nDepartmentofGeneralPsychology,UniversityofPadua,ViaVenezia12,35131Padova,Italy

oDepartmentofEconomics,FacultyofEconomicsandBusiness,SatyaWacanaChristianUniversity,JalanDiponegoro52-60,Salatiga 50711,Indonesia

pLaboratoriodeEconomíaExperimental,DepartmentofEconomics,UniversitatJaumeI,Castellón,Spain

a rt i c l e i n f o

Articlehistory:

Received25September2014

Receivedinrevisedform24February2015 Accepted25April2015

Availableonline21May2015

Keywords:

Honesty Corruption Culturaldifferences

a b s t ra c t

Policymakersuseseveralinternationalindicesthatcharacterizecountriesaccordingtothe qualityoftheirinstitutions.However,noefforthasbeenmadetostudyhowthehonestyof citizensvariesacrosscountries.Thispaperexploresthehonestyamongcitizensacross16 countrieswith1440participants.Weemployaverysimpletaskwhereparticipantsfacea trade-offbetweenthejoyofeatingaﬁnechocolateandthedisutilityofhavingathreatened self-conceptbecauseoflying.Despitetheincentivestocheat,weﬁndthatindividualsare mostlyhonest.Further,internationalindicesthatareindicativeofinstitutionalhonestyare completelyuncorrelatedwithcitizens’honestyforoursamplecountries.

∗ Correspondingauthorat:DepartmentofFinancialEconomyandAccounting,UniversidadComplutenseMadrid,CampusSomosaguas,Madrid,28223, Spain.Tel.:+34630176315;fax:+34910102708.

E-mailaddresses:[email protected](D.Pascual-Ezama),[email protected](T.R.Fosgaard),[email protected](J.C.Cardenas),

[email protected](P.Kujal),[email protected](R.Veszteg),[email protected](B.Gil-GómezdeLia ˜no),[email protected](B.Gunia), [email protected](D.Weichselbaumer),[email protected](K.Hilken),[email protected](A.Antinyan),[email protected] (J.Delnoij),[email protected](A.Proestakis),[email protected](M.D.Tira),[email protected](Y.Pratomo), [email protected](T.Jaber-López),[email protected](P.Bra ˜nas-Garza).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2015.04.020

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1. Introduction

Imagineyourselfonauniversitycampus.Youseethefollowingannouncement:“Isthisyourluckyday?Flipacoinandwin aChocolate”.YouapproachthedeskandreceivetheopportunitytowinadeliciousandbeautifullywrappedLindtLindor chocolatetrufflebyflippingacoinwithablackandawhiteside.Youflipthecoininaboxatanearbytable;theboxprotects youranonymity.Youwinachocolateifyoureportthatthewhitesidecameupandnothingifyoureportblack.Ifyouactually rolledblack,theonlythingkeepingyoufromenjoyingthetruffleisyourmoralcompass.Youfaceatradeoffbetweenthe joyofeatingafinechocolateandtheindividualdisutilityofhavingathreatenedself-conceptbecauseoflying.Thereisno socialshamingorostracism.Weranthisexperiment(threetreatments)in16countriestotesthowsomeregularcitizens aroundtheworldbehaveinsuchasituation.Interestingly,wedidnotfindanysignificantdifferencesacrossanotherwise veryheterogeneoussetofcountries.

Moststudiesaboutculturaldifferencesregardingdishonestbehaviorhaveusedthesurveymethodology.Transparency InternationalreportslargedifferencesincorruptionaroundtheworldandtheWorldValueSurveydocumentscross-cultural differencesinopinionsregardinghow“justiﬁable”itistocheatontaxesorpublictransportationfares.However,corruption indicesmeasureperceptionsandnotactualbehaviors.Further,variationsacrosscountriesinacademicdishonesty(Rawwas etal.,2004)andtaxevasion(Almetal.,1995;Cummingsetal.,2009)reinforcetheimpressionthatcheatingisbothabundant anddiversearoundtheworld.Inthesameline,recentresearchinbehavioralandexperimentaleconomicshasshownthat alargefractionofindividualsarepronetocheating(Ariely,2012;Gneezy,2005).AnexceptiontothistrendisAbeleretal.

(2014)whoreportaphone-basedincentivizedexperimentwitharepresentativesampleinGermany.Theyfindthatmost peoplereporthonestlyafterflippingacoininabsoluteprivacywitha50%chanceofgettingapayoffof15eurosincashor throughanAmazongiftcertificate.Abelerandcolleaguesalsocomplementedtheirstudywithalaboratoryexperimentand findthatthereisaslightlyhigherlevelofdishonestreportinginthissetting.

Thedominantviewintheliteratureisthatindividualsengageindishonestbehavioraslongastheycanmaintaina positiveself-imagewhileobtainingthemaximumpayoffsfromtheirdishonesty(Mazaretal.,2008).Further,researchhas shownthatcreatingajustiﬁcationofapositiveself-imagewhilebehavingdishonestlyiscontextspeciﬁc(Fosgaardetal., 2013;GinoandGalinsky,2012;Pascual-Ezamaetal.,2013).

Inthispaper,weexaminepreciselythis.Thatis,whethercheatingpersediffersacrossdifferentcountriesandwhether thecontext¹influencesthisbehavior.Weconductedanexperimentinwhichparticipantsreportedtheoutcomeofacoin tosstowinaprize.Wereplicatedtheexperimentinadiversesetof16countriesaroundtheworldwith1440subjects,90 ineachcountry(30pertreatment).WeusedasimplecheatingtaskbasedonBucciolandPiovesan(2011).Wetookgreat caretoruneachsessionundersimilarconditions.Thelocationoftheexperimentwasalwaysabusycommonareason universitycampuses(seeTable1foranoverview).Participantshadtoflipablack/whitecoin;iftheoutcomewasreported white,theyobtainedaredLindtLindorTruffle;ifreportedblack,theyobtainednothing.Asoursampleincludessubstantial culturalvariation–includingparticipantsfromAnglo-Saxon,Latin,Germanic,NordicandAsiaticcountries–onewould expectsubstantialheterogeneityincheating.Inaddition,andconsistentwithasocialconstructionistview,theeffectsof culturedependonthespecificsofthechoicecontext(Gelfandetal.,2013;KramerandMessick,1995).

Inthefirsttreatment(theSelf-ReportedTreatment,SRT)eachparticipantflippedacoininaprivateareawithoutthe presenceoftheresearchersorotherparticipants.Afterwardsthesubjectfilledareportsheet–indicatingsexandthe white/blackcoin-tossresult.Itwasclearlyindicatedthatthefilledformshouldbeleftintheboxnearby.Nointeractionwith theexperimentersoccurredinthistask.

Takingintoaccountthatthereareheterogenoustypesofdishonestpeople(Gneezyetal.,2013),thistaskisagood measureofdishonestyforseveralreasons.Firstly,asagrowingbodyofresearchsuggeststhatincompletelyanonymous settings,wheretheriskofbeingcaughtisinexistent,ﬁnding100%cheatingisnotunusual(Pascual-Ezamaetal.,2013;Shu etal.,2012),however,peoplemayalsorestricttheamountofcheating(AyalandGino,2011;Gneezy,2005).

Inourtaskthereisnopossibilitytorestricttheamountofcheating,thedecisionissimplytobehonestornot(report blackorwhite).Further,decisionmakingisimmediateandintuitive,insteadofdeliberativeandmeditativeinacognitive dualsystem(BazermanandTenbrunsel,2011;Kahneman,2011).Inourexperiment,cheatingisanautomaticresponseand theneedforjustiﬁcationmattersonlywhenpeoplehaveenoughtimetodeliberate(Shalvietal.,2012).Finally,thereward isasimplechocolatethatgivesinstantgratiﬁcation.

ThetwoothertreatmentsweretheWrittenandtheVerbalReportedTreatments(WRTandVRT,respectively).InWRT, participantscompletedareportsheetinprivateandsubmittedittotheexperimenter.Theexperimentermadeanoteofthe reportedoutcome,and,ifdue,handedthechocolatetotheparticipant.InVRT,participantswerenotaskedtoﬁllanyform.

Theyverballyreportedtheoutcomeofthecoinﬂiptotheexperimenter.Ifreportedwhite,theexperimentalisthandeda chocolatetothem.

Ourdifferenttreatmentsallowustounderstandhowthelevelofcheatingisshapedbycontext,i.e.thedifferencesin reportingacrosstreatments.Buildingonthetheoryofself-imagemaintenance(Mazaretal.,2008),wepredictthatour threetreatmentswillhavedifferentimplicationswithregardtothemoralprocessesofreportingincorrectoutcomes.We

1 Thecontextdeﬁnesthestrengthofthemoralcompassinourexperiment.

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Table1

Summaryofcountriesstudied.

Country City University

Austria Linz JohannesKeplerUniversityLinz

Belgium Brussels VrijeUniversiteitBrussel(VUB)

Colombia Bogotá UniversidaddelosAndes

Denmark Copenhagen CopenhagenUniversity

Finland Oulu UniversityofOulu

Germany Nuremberg UniversityofErlangen-Nuremberg

Greece Rethymno UniversityofCrete

India Delhi HansrajCollege,UniversityofDelhi

Indonesia Salatiga UniversitasKristenSatyaWacana

Italy Padova UniversitàdiPadova

Japan Tokyo WasedaUniversity

Netherlands Utrecht UtrechtUniversity

Spain Madrid UniversidadAutónomaMadrid

Turkey Istanbul Bahc¸es¸ehirÜniversitesi

USA Baltimore JohnsHopkinsUniversity

UK London MiddlesexUniversity

conjecturethatmisreportingintheSRTistheleastmorallydifﬁcultdecisionsincereportingdoesnotinvolveanykindof socialinteractionand,subsequently,nosocialpressurefromtheexperimenter.Consequently,thedecisiontobedishonestis onlyatradeoffbetweentheinternalmoralpressure(andtheconsequentguiltexperienced)againstthepleasureofenjoying aLindtchocolate.

InWRT,anadditionalmoralpressureoriginatesfromthefactthatthedecisionisdocumentedonpaperandhandedto anotherperson.Thisadditionalsocialprocessislikelytoinvolveshame(ontopofguilt)incaseofdishonesty,andhence weexpectlessdishonestyoccurringinthistreatment.Relativetoverbalreports,weconjecturethatwrittenreportsare moredistantandmakeiteasiertotakeawayinternalmoralcontrol(Shuetal.,2012).Therefore,weexpecttheVRTtobring evenstrongerself-imageerosionincaseofcheating,sincetheuntruthfuldecisionnowmustbestatedface-to-face.Inthis situationweexpectthemostmoralpressuretobepresentandhencetheleastdishonestbehavior.Thisisconsistentwith Banduraetal.(1996)whoﬁndthatverbalreportsarelikelytobelesspronetodishonestbehaviorthanwrittenreports.

Giventhiswehypothesizethatself-reportingwithnointeraction(withtheexperimenter)increasethetemptationtobe dishonest.

2. Experimentaldesign

WereplicateasimplecointaskbyBucciolandPiovesan(2011).Asnotedbefore,participantshadtoﬂipablack/white coin.IfthereportedtosswaswhitetheyobtainedaredLindtLindorchocolateandnothingotherwise.

Atﬁrstglance,thechoiceofchocolateasanincentivemightseemasunusualcomparedtotheconventionalchoice ofmoney.Webelievethatchocolatesareagoodsolutionforstudyingdecision-makingacrosscountries,giventhatour studyisinaﬁeldsettingandnotinthelaboratory.Infact,webelievethatitisadvantageoustotellstudentsyouhave achanceofwinningachocolate,ratherthantellingthemyouhaveachancetowinadollar(oranycorrespondinglocal currency).Consumingasmallsnackinsuchasituationissimplymuchmoreofaneverydayevent,andhencefeelsmore natural.Andamorenaturalsettingenablesgreaterexperimentercontrolandexternalvalidity.Furthermore,achocolateis achocolateanywhere,andsubjectsneverhavetocalculatethemonetaryvalueofthegood,justreceiveasmalldelicious snack.Clearly,therearemanyotherpotentialincentiveapproachesonecouldapply.Amonetaryprizecouldbescaledbased onBigMacprizes,GDP,oranypurchasingpowerindex.Althoughtheremightbecountrydifferencesinchocolatepreference (asindicatedbyMesserli,2012),thechoiceofchocolateaspaymentconstitutesjustasmanyorjustasfewconcernsasany othercross-countrypaymentvehicle,includingcountry-adjustedmonetarycompensations.Anotherpossibleconcernisthe verysmallsizeoftheincentive.Weacknowledgethesmallsize,yetwewanttoemphasizethatconsideringtheextremely shortdurationoftheexperiment(perhaps1or2min),ourpaymenttranslatesintoanhourlypaymentsimilartowhatis usedinmostlaboratorystudies.

Ourparticipantsareuniversitystudents.²Thecoinwasﬂippedonlyonceandbyonepersonatatime.Thetaskwas performedinaprivateareaatasafedistancefromtheexperimentersorotherparticipants.Thelocationoftheexperiment waswithinthecollege/universitycampus,forexample,inahallwayinthecafeteriaarea,henceensuringasteadyﬂowof potentialparticipants.Toensurethatwedostudycountrydifferences,weensuredthatonlynativepeopleparticipatedin thevariouslocations.Theimportanceofensuringthisissupportedbyevidenceoftheeffectofimmigrants’originalcountry

2Recentpapersshowthattypicalexperimentalsubjectsarenotreallydifferentfromordinarypeople(seeforinstanceExadaktylosetal.,2013forsocial dilemmas).

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socialnormsinethicalbehavior(KountourisandRemoundou,2013).Theexperimentwascarriedoutinthelocalworking languageforboththeverbalandthewrittenpart.³

Thewholestudycomprisesthreedifferenttreatmentsaccordingtothelevelofproximitybetweentheparticipantand theexperimenter:

• Self-ReportedTreatment(SRT):Astudentapproachedtheexperimenter(attableA,seeFigureA1intheappendixfor details),he/shewashandedareportsheet,andwasguidedtotableB(farenoughawayfromtheresearcherarea)toflip theblack/whitecoinprivately(seeBinFig.A1).Thecoinflipwascarriedoutinsideasmallcardboardboxtomakeittruly private.ThestudentnotedgenderandtheresultofthecoinfliponthereportsheetattableB.Afterfillingoutthereport sheet,thestudentwalkedovertoathirdtable(tableCinanotherprivateareaatadistancefromtheexperimenter,seeC inFig.A1)todepositthereportsheetinabox,andtotakethechocolatehim/herselfincaseofawhitetoss.

• WrittenReportedTreatment(WRT):ExactlythesameasSRT,butnowwiththeﬁlledoutreportsheetinhand,thestudent wentbacktotableA,gavethereportsheettotheexperimenterandreceivedthechocolateifawhitetosswasreported.

TableCisthereforenotused(seeFig.A1,Appendix).

• VerbalReportedTreatment(VRT):ExactlythesameasWRT,butnowthestudentdidnothavetoﬁlloutthereportsheet (onlyreportgender)andhadtoinformtheexperimenterverballyabouttheoutcomeofthecointoss.

Werantheexperimentwith90participantsineachcountry.Therewere10studentsforeachtreatmentandthiswas repeatedthreetimes:10(WRT),10(VRT),10(SRT),10(WRT),10(VRT),10(SRT),10(WRT),10(VRT),10(SRT).Westarted eachtreatmentwithtenchocolatesonaplateontableB(VRTandWRT)ortableC(SRT).Whenwechangedthetreatmentwe reﬁlledthechocolatestakenbytheparticipantsandregisteredtheexactnumberofchocolatesreplaced⁴.Atthebeginning ofeachtreatmentwestartedwithtenchocolatesintheplate.Attheendoftheexperimentwecomparedthenumbersin ourrecordswiththereportsbytheparticipants.InWRTandSRTparticipantswrotethecoloronthereportsheet.InVRT participantsonlywrotethegender.Inthiscase,whenparticipantsgaveusthereportsheetandtoldusthecolorwetore alittlecornerofthereportsheetwhentheytoldusblacksoattheendwecouldknowhowmanyblacksandwhiteswere declared.

Notethat,aswekeptnonamesorindividual-speciﬁcrecords,wehadtobeverycarefulaboutwhethersomeonereturned.

Experimenterswereinstructedtoinformanyonewhotriedtoreturntoﬂipthecoinagainthatitwasonlypossibleto participateonce.Incase,facultymembersshowedupforparticipation,itwasemphasizedthatitwasintendedtobea studentevent.Completingtheexperimenttookaboutaminuteortwo.

3. Results

3.1. Differencesbytreatments

Toourgreatsurprise,overallonly57%oftheparticipantsreportedwhiteacrossallthreetreatmentsandcountries.Since theprobabilityofobtainingwhiteis50%,thisresultindicatesthat86%resistedthetemptationtolie[100%−2(57%–50%)].

Weconcludethatlittledishonestyisobservedacrossallcountriesandtreatments.Lookingatthedifferenttreatments,the degreeofdishonestbehavior,listedasthepercentageofwhiteoutcomes,conﬁrmsourinitialconjectures.Weobservea greateramountoflyingintheSRT,withWRTinthemiddle,andwithVRThavingthesmallestamountoflying.

62%(SelfRT)>57%(WrittenRT) >53%(VerbalRT)

ThedifferencesbetweenSRTandWRTarenotstatisticallysigniﬁcant(²=.316;p-value=.574),althoughtheaverage acrossthesixteensocietieswere5percentagepointshigherfortheformer.However,usingacontingencytable(Pearson

²)thedifferencebetweenSRTandVRTwaslarger(9percentagepoints)andsignificantatthe5%level(²=4.479;p- value=0.034).Further,wedonotfindanysignificantdifferencesbetweenWRTandVRT(²=2.422;p-value=0.120).Thus, comparingthedifferenttreatmentswefindthattheverbalreportsarelikelytobelesspronetodishonestbehaviorthan writtenreportsinlinewithpreviousliterature(Banduraetal.,1996;FestingerandCarlsmith,1959;Mazaretal.,2008)and wefurtherfindthatself-reportingtheanswers(andnothavingtodeliverittotheexperimenter)increasesthiseffect.

3 Afewstudentsaskedwhythecoin-chocolateeventwascarriedout.Ourpreparedexplanationwasthatthepurposewastounderstandthestudents’

interestforchocolates.Thisstatementwasintentionallymadeimprecise,suchthatstudentsdidnotthinkthiswasatestbutrathersawitasachocolate promotion(weneversaiditwasaLindtpromotion).

4 Notethathavingmoreorlesschocolatesontheplatesisnotanissueforparticipantsastheynevergettoknowthetotal.Whattheysee(ontheplate) istheonlyreferencetheyhave.

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Table2

Resultsbyconditionandcountry.

Country Self-Report(SRT)

(n=30p/t)

WrittenReported (WRT)

(n=30p/t)

VerbalReported (VRT) (n=30p/t)

All (n=90)

Austria 40% 77%^*** 60% 59%^*

Belgium 57% 47% 53% 52%

Colombia 57% 67%^** 43% 56%

Denmark 70%^** 43% 40% 51%

Finland 63%^* 67%^** 53% 61%^**

Germany 73%^*** 50% 53% 59%^*

Greece 60% 60%^** 37% 52%

India 47% 67% 50% 54%

Indonesia 60% 57% 40% 52%

Italy 60% 47% 57% 54%

Japan 57% 60% 57% 58%*

Netherlands 67%^** 60% 50% 59%*

Spain 77%^*** 67%^** 63%^* 69%^***

Turkey 53% 67%^** 57% 59%^*

USA 70%^** 53% 63%^* 62%^**

UK 63%^* 33% 70%^** 56%

Notes:Columnsshowthepercentagesofparticipantswhohavetakenchocolatesineachtreatment(denoted“p/t”).

*p-value<0.10.

**p-value<0.05.

***p-value<0.01.

3.2. Differencesbycountries

Asecondimportantresultisthatweﬁndnostatisticallysigniﬁcantdifferencesacrossthe16countriesacrossanytreat- ment:SRT(²=16.953;p-value=0.322);VRT(²=15.691;p-value=0.403)andWRT(²=22.674;p-value=0.091).This suggeststhatthereisahighlevelofhomogeneityinbehavioracrossoursamplecountries.

Additionalinterestingresultsshowupfromacloserexaminationofthedata.Sincetossingacoinfollowsabinomial distribution,welookedforthosecountrieswherethereisananomalousnumberofwhite(awarded)coinsreported.Table2 reportsdetailedinformationbycountryandtreatments.⁵Atthecountrylevel,theshareofwhitesreportedinexcessof50%

(acrossalltreatments),issigniﬁcant(ata5%signiﬁcancelevel)inthreeoutofsixteencountries.Yet,theoverallcountry leveleffectscanmaskunderlyingeffectsatthetreatmentlevel.Wethereforefocusonthetreatmenteffectsatthecountry level.Obviouslyasamplesizeof30pertreatmentallowsusonlytomakeroughassessmentofthedegreeofcheating,but westillbelievethisroughmeasureprovidesausefulcomparisonacrosscountriesandtreatments.⁶

ResultfromtheSelf-reporttreatment(SRT)isdisplayedinFig.1.InSRTweﬁndthatthenullhypothesisofhonestbehavior isrejectedforanumberofcountries.ThisﬁgureshowsthatUKandFinlandrejectthenullat˛=10%(dottedlinelabeledwith

*).Mostimportantly,GermanyandSpainrejectat˛=1%(continuouslinelabeledwith***).Finally,Netherlands,Denmark andtheUSrejectfor1%<˛<10%.

Fig.2displaysdatafromTable2forthewrittenandtheverbaltreatments.Blue(leftside)barsinFig.2refertoWRT (written).ThenumberofcountriesthatrejectthenullisreducedtosixandtheyarenotthesameasinSRT:Colombia, Finland,TurkeyandIndiarejectat1%<˛<10%whileAustriadoessoat˛=1%.Spainweaklyrejects(˛=10%).DatafromVRT (verbal)areshownintheredbars(rightside)ofFigure2.Onlytwocountriesappearsigniﬁcant:Spainrejectsat1%<˛<10%

whiletheUKrejectsatthe1%level.TheUSweaklyrejects(˛=10%).

Therearesomeinterestingissuestoemphasize:Spainalsorejectedthenullinalltreatments.UnexpectedlyUKappears undertheverbalandtheself-reportedtreatmentbutnotinthewritten.Thelattercaseisexactlythecomplementaryof Austriawhichappearsinthewrittencaseonly.AlsotheUSandFinlandappearintwotreatments.Itisalsoimportantto remarkthatBelgium,Greece,Italy,IndonesiaandJapanneverappearasdishonest.⁷Althoughitisinterestingtonotethat thesedifferenceattheconditionleveldonotaimatexplainingeachcountry-speciﬁceffects,wesimplywanttohighlight thatbesidesouroverallconclusionofnosigniﬁcantacross-countryeffects,wedoobservesomevariationinthedata.

5WehavealsoconductedaLogitanalysistoexplaintheoutcomeofindividualcointosses.Intheregression,amongotherfactors,wecontrolledfor differentincomelevelsacrosscountries(withthehelpofper-capitaGNI)andforcountry-levelper-capitacocoaconsumption.Whileincomedoesnot seemtohaveasigniﬁcantimpact,per-capitacocoaconsumptionhasanegativeeffectoncheating,i.e.thehighertheper-capitaconsumptiontheloweris cheating.

6WealsoconducttheanalysisbyusingInglehart-Welzelculturalcategories(basedontheWorldValueSurveys).Againwedonotﬁndanyrobusteffect ofcultureoncheatingbehavior.

7ItisalsointerestingthecaseofDenmark.SigniﬁcantdifferencesforSRTvs.WRT(²=4.344;p-value=0.037)andVRT(²=5.445;p-value=0.020)are found.

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Fig.1. PercentageofchocolatestakenintheSRT.*p-value<0.10;***p-value<0.01.

Fig.2.PercentageofchocolatestakenintheWRTandVRT.*p-value<0.10;***p-value<0.01.

3.3. Genderdifferences

Onanexploratorybasis,wealsoanalyzedtheeffectofgender(seeCrosonandGneezy,2009,forareview).Although previousstudieshavefoundcorrelationsbetweengenderandcheating(e.g.,DreberandJohannesson,2008;Fosgaardetal., 2013),nostatisticallysigniﬁcantdifferencesbetweenthecountrieswerefoundforthemale(²=15.898;p-value=0.389)or forfemale(²=10.679;p-value=0.775)participantsinlinewithveryrecentstudies(Abeleretal.,2014).Analyzingbytreat- ment,nodifferenceswerefoundintheSRT[(²=16.374;p-value=0.358)(²=17.051;p-value=0.316)],WRT[(²=19.872;

p-value=0.177)(²=19.341;p-value=0.199)]ortheVRT[(²=8.581;p-value=0.898)(²=12.618;p-value=0.632)]treatments.Clearly,studyinggenderfurtherreducesdatasizeandourlackofresultscouldbeduetothis.Ourresultsindicate thatthatmalesandfemalesdonotbehavedifferentlyinoursample.

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Table3

Pearsoncorrelationsofthefourindexeswiththethreetreatments.

BSI2011 (11countries)

PCI2012 (16countries)

GCB2013 (14countries)

AOC2014 (16countries)

SRT 0.057 −0.334 −0.590^** −0.096

p-value 0.868 0.205 0.026 0.725

WRT 0.232 0.317 0.340 0.115

p-value 0.492 0.231 0.235 0.673

VRT −0.483 −0.381 −0.339 −0.336

p-value 0.132 0.146 0.236 0.203

Notes:(.)indicatesthenumberofcountriesinthesample.SomecountriesofoursamplearemissingintheBSI(Austria,Colombia,Denmark,Finland, Greece)andintheGCB(Austria,Netherlands);p-valueis2-tailed.

**p-value<0.05.

3.4. Comparisonwithotherevidenceofunethicalbehavior

Theanalysisofourresultcanbecomplementedwithacomparisonofthe(published)rankingsofcorruption.Notethatthe linkbetweencheatingandcorruptionhasbeenreportedasstrong(Magnusetal.,2002).Therefore,wehavetestedwhether ourexperimentaldatacorrelatewithanyofthefollowinginternationalcorruptionindexesfromTransparencyInternational andWJRRuleofLawIndex:i.e.theBSI2011:BriberyPayingIndex(fromTransparencyInternational);thePCI2012:Perception ofcorruptionIndex;theGCB2013:GlobalCorruptionBarometer(averageofallsectors)andAOC2014:Absenceofcorruption.⁸ Table3summarizesallthecorrelations(12comparisons:4indices×3treatments),forthecountriesinoursamplethatare alsorepresentedintheindices.

AsshowninTable3,onlyonecorrelationisstatisticallysigniﬁcant(GCB2013vs.SRT;p<0.05).Ontopofthat,thesignof thecorrelationsdonotfollowanypattern:weget7negativesand5positives.Wecansafelysaythatinternationalindices indicativeofinstitutionalhonestyarenotcorrelatedwithourexperimentaldata.

Asafurtherrobustnesscheckwealsoanalyzedtherelationbetweenthebehaviorintheexperimentsandanswerstothe worldvaluesurveysquestionsaboutmoralityattitude.⁹Weﬁndthatneithertheanswerofindividualitem(allp>0.100) northeaverage(p=0.179)ofthemiscorrelatedwithourexperimentalevidence.

4. Conclusions

Whypeoplecheatand howitvariesacrossculturesisanimportantpolicyquestion.Mostofthestudiesregarding thishavefocusedoninstitutionaldishonesty(orcorruption).However,whetherinstitutionalhonestydirectlymapsinto itscitizens(innate)honestyhasnotbeenexplored.Notethat,whileinstitutionalhonestyisafunctionofits(self)rules, individualhonestyismuchmoreprimal,andhencedifferentfromitsmorepopularcounterpart,i.e.institutionalhonesty.

Interestingly,thereislittleworkinthisregard.Thispapersattemptstostudycitizen’shonestyinamulti-countrystudy.To ourknowledgethisistheﬁrststudyofthiskindduetothespanofcountriesandtheincentivizedmechanismused.

Moststudiesoninstitutionalhonestyrelyonnon-incentivizedself-reportedsurveys.Inourstudy,weusechocolatesas anincentiveandtemptationdevice.Therewardisannouncedandisthemainmotivatortoprospectiveparticipantsinour experiment.Theyhopetowinachocolatebytakingpartintheexperiment.Thisselfselectionalsoimpliesthattheyhave apreferencefortherewardandhavefallenforthe“temptationofwinningachocolate.”Byusingthismechanismwethus studytheinnatetendencytolieamongstcitizensof16countries.

Ourmainfindingisthattherearenostatisticallysignificantdifferencesacrossoursamplecountriesregardingtheir honestylevels.Infactweobserveahighlevelofhonestyandsomeimportantculture-specificinteractions.Recallthatin ourtaskwecomparehonestbehavioracrosscountrieswhensubjectscanreporttheoutcomeunderthreeconditions,i.e.

Self,WrittenorVerbal.Wearguethatthesethreeconditionsdifferintermsofthemoralweightoflying.Thatis,underSelf reportingandnointeractionwiththeexperimenter,themoralweightoflyingistheleast,meanwhile,itincreasesaswe movefromtheVerbaltotheWrittencondition.

Overall,wedoﬁndsupportforourinitialhypothesisinthatthereisgreaterdeceptionundertheSelfreportingcondition followedbyWrittenandVerbal.However,weobservenodifferencesacrosscountries.Ourlackofresultsinthisregardcould beduetothesmallerdatasizeatthetreatmentlevelineachcountry.Wehaveadditionallylookedwhetherweobserve signiﬁcantdifferencesacrosscountriesbygroupingtheaccordingtocommoncharacteristics(i.e.European,Asian,etc.).

Againwefindnosignificantdifferencesacrossoursamplecountries.Finally,thoughhandicappedbyevensmallernumber ofobservations,wedonotfindanygenderdifferencesacrossthethreeconditionsorcountries.

Asmentionedearlierwemeasuretheinnatetendencyofcitizenstocheatandwouldliketostressthatthisisverydifferent fromstudyinginstitutionalhonesty.Ourresultsshouldnotbeconfoundedwiththosestudyinginstitutionalhonestyasthe

8Notethat,countrieswereorderedfromleasttomostcorruptforallindicesfortheanalysis.

9Justifiable:Someoneacceptingabribeinthecourseoftheirduties;Justifiable:Claiminggovernmentbenefitstowhichyouarenotentitled;Justifiable:

Cheatingontaxesifyouhaveachance;Justiﬁable:Avoidingafareonpublictransport;Justiﬁable:Stealingproperty.

(8)

factorsthatdetermineonearedifferentfromtheother.Further,thekindofcheatingwestudyisinstinctive.Thatis,subjects donotgettimetodeliberatetheiractions.Thesameappliestotheirparticipationintheexperiment.Thatis,weexplicitly statetherewardandhenceexpectthatweattractparticipantsthathaveanafﬁnitytowardchocolateconsumption.Given this,thehighlevelsofhonestyweobserveacrosscountriesisindeedsurprising.Further,ourresultsshowthatapparently thisistrueacrossoursamplecountries.

Welookatthesideofcitizensandnotatthesupplysideofcorruptionintheprivateandpublicsectoroftheeconomy.

Surveystudiessufferfromempiricalissuessuchasconfoundingfactorsandhypotheticalbiasesthatareinherentinques- tionnaires(FalkandHeckman,2009).Further,reliabledataonissuessuchascorruption,dishonesty,cheating,etc.arehard tocomeby.Itisinthiscontextthattheexperimentalmethodologyisveryuseful.Wetestedordinarycitizens’behavior, asopposedtosubjectiveperceptionsofnationalinstitutions.Importantly,however,ourdatasuggestthatordinarycitizens aremuchmorehonestthanimpliedbysurveysfocusedonnationalinstitutions.Perhapsitisthecorruptingnatureofthese institutionsthatisreﬂectedinthesesurveystudies,butnotthecorruptionoftheaveragecitizen.Thelackofconnection betweenthesupplyofcorruptionandthehonestyofindividualcitizensalsorequiresfurtherinquiry.Ourresultssuggest thatthevariationinhonestyacrosscountriesisnotcorrelatedwithcorruptionindices,openingquestionsabouttheaccount- abilityofprivateandpublicinstitutionsandthepoorconnectionwiththecitizens’behaviorandpreferencesforhonestyin theirprivatedecision.Ourresultsclearlyshowtheneedforfurtherincentivizedandcontrolledexperimentstoexplorethe issueofordinarycitizens’honestyacrosscountries.

Acknowledgements

Financialsupportfromthefollowing:MinistryofSciencefromSpain:ECO2013-44879-RandJuntadeAndaluciaExcelllent GroupsP12-SEJ-1436(Spain).

AppendixA. Supplementarydata

Supplementarydata associated with this article can be found, in theonline version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/

j.jebo.2015.04.020.

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