Un estudio experimental sobre diferencias de género en justicia distributiva

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www.elsevier.es/cesjef

Cuadernos

de

economía

ARTICLE

An

experimental

study

of

gender

differences

in

distributive

justice

Ismael

Rodriguez-Lara

1

DepartmentofEconomicsandInternationalDevelopment,MiddlesexUniversityLondon,BusinessSchool,HendonCampus, TheBuroughs,LondonNW44BT,UnitedKingdom

Received17July2013;accepted27January2014 Availableonline13March2014

JEL CLASSIFICATION C91; D30; D64; J16 KEYWORDS Genderdifferences; Distributivejustice; Fairnessideals; Self-servingchoices; Experimental economics; Dictatorgamewith production

Abstract Thispapershowsthatwomenaremorelikelythanmentoemploythefairallocation thatmostbenefitstheirfinancialpayoff.Theexperimentalevidenceisgleanedfromadictator gamewithproduction,inwhichsubjects firstsolveaquiztoaccumulateearningsandthen dividethesurplusbychoosingoneoverfivedifferentallocations,someofwhichrepresenta fairnessideal.Thedata alsosuggestthatwomenaremoresensitivetothecontextastheir allocationchoicesdependonwhethertheyhaveaccumulatedmoreorlessmoneythantheir counterparts.Thisisnotthecaseforthemen’sallocationchoices.

CÓDIGOSJEL

C91; D30; D64; J16

Unestudioexperimentalsobrediferenciasdegéneroenjusticiadistributiva

Resumen Esteartículomuestra quelasmujereseligenconmayorfrecuencialaasignación justaquelesresultamásbeneﬁciosaasurentabilidadﬁnanciera.Laevidenciaexperimental provienedeunjuegodeldictadorconlaproducción,enelquelossujetosprimeroresuelven un cuestionariopara acumularganancias, y luegodividen estas ganancias eligiendounade

E-mailaddress:Ismael.Rodriguez@uv.es

1 _He_is_also_Research_Fellow_at_LUISS_Guido_Carli_University_(Rome).

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PALABRASCLAVE Diferenciasde género; Justiciadistributiva; Idealesdejusticia; Eleccionesegoístase interesados; Economía experimental; Juegodeldictador conproducción

las5posiblesasignacionespropuestas, algunas delascualesse fundamentanen idealesde justicia.Losdatosmuestrantambiénquelasmujeressonmássensiblesalcontexto,dadoque suseleccionesdependendesihanacumuladomásomenosdineroquesusoponentes.Estono ocurreenelcasodeloshombres.

‘‘Equityismerelyawordthathypocriticalpeopleuseto cloakself-interest’’

H.PeytonYoung(1994)

1. Introduction

Giventheassumptionthateconomicactorsarelargely moti-vated by self-interest, arguments about fairness pervade theliteratureonbehavioral economicsandarefrequently used to explain departures from equilibrium predictions.

Recent ﬁndings in the experimental literature, however,

suggest that individuals in a distributional problem such

as the dictator game might apply principles of fairness

inaself-interestedmanner (RutstromandWilliams, 2000; Rodriguez-LaraandMoreno-Garrido,2012).Further experi-mentalevidencesuggeststhattheunderlyingmotivationfor muchfair behavior might be self-interest, albeit coupled witha desiretomaintain the illusion of notbeing selﬁsh (Danaet al.,2007; Larson and Capra, 2009).Along these lines,someauthorsarguethatgivinginthedictator’sgame

might be explained by subjects wanting to be perceived

asfair(AndreoniandBernheim,2009),becausetheywant toavoid the ‘‘greedy’’tag (Boltonet al., 1998), or sim-plybecausefairnessimposesaconstraintonself-interested behavior(Kahnemanetal.,1986).

Ifself-interestmay combinewithprinciplesof fairness togeneratea behavioralpattern thatsuggeststhe

impor-tance of both, an issue remaining to be investigated is

howsubjectsvaryinthisrespectalong observable dimen-sions(e.g.,gender).Theinsightsgleanedfromthisanalysis

mightbeimportant forboth economistsandpolicymakers

in approaching the problem of distributive justice,or for agentsunderstandingtheimplicationofeconomicpolicies.2

Thispaperisanattempttostudygenderdifferencesin socialpreferencesbyelicitingwomen’sandmen’s preferen-cesoverredistributioninadictatorgamewithproduction. Althoughthere isa considerable literature ongender dif-ferencesin preferences(e.g., Eckel andGrossman, 1998; Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Cooper and Kagel, 2009) the currentpaperdepartsfromthebulkoftheliteratureas par-ticipantsintheexperimentcontributetothesurplusthatis beingdistributed.Thisfeatureisimportant,asitgenerates

2_As_pointed_out_by_Debbie_Walsh,_the_director_of_the_Center_for

AmericanWomenandPoliticsatRutgersUniversity,understanding ofgender differences mightbe particularlyimportant nowadays since‘‘womenmaybethechange[votersare]lookingfor’’.

entitlementanddisentanglestheeffectoffairnessconcerns fromproperty rightsin the ﬁnaldistribution.As noted by

Cherryetal.(2002)ifthereisnoproductionstage,then dic-tatorsmightgivemoneyawaybecausetheyarefair-minded, orsimplybecausethesurplustobedividedis‘‘mannafrom heaven’’, anddictatorsdo notfeelany right tokeep the entiresurplusforthemselves.

Thedictatorgamewithproductionpresentedinthe cur-rent paper consists of two different phases. In the ﬁrst phase,subjectsearnmoneybycompletingamultiple-choice

test that paysaﬁxed and arandomreward for each

cor-rect answer. In the second phase, dictators allocate the earnedsurplus afterbeinginformedastothereward lev-els(whichmightdifferacrossindividuals)andbothmembers contributetothesurplus.Inparticular,dictatorsareoffered ﬁvedifferentallocations for dividingthe surplus,some of whichrepresentafairnessideal.3

The experiment is designed to test three hypotheses.

First, we wantto test if some of thebehavioral patterns

that have been identiﬁed in the literature (e.g., women

beingmore likelytoequalizepayoffs)remain whenthere isaproductionstagethatprecedesthedictator’sdecision. Second,wewishtoinvestigatethehypothesisadvancedby

CrosonandGneezy(2009)thatsuggeststhatwomenmight bemoresensitivetotheexperimentaldesign.This isdone

by studyingwhetherwomen andmenbehave inthe same

mannerwhentheyallocate,aftercontributingmoreorless moneythantheircounterparts.Finally,thedataareusedto shedlightonhowgenderinteractswithself-interestwhen dictatorshavetochooseadivisionofthegeneratedsurplus.

Inparticular,weexaminewhethermenand/orwomenshow

anytendencytochoosefairnessprinciplesinaself-serving mannerbyselectingtheprinciplethatismostconvenientto them(i.e.,thefairallocationthatbringsthemthehighest payoff).

3_Technically_speaking,_this_is_a_{mini-dictator}_game_because

dicta-torsarenotallowedtochooseanydivisionofthesurplus,buthave tochoosefromasetofallocations.Insuchaset,theallocations thatrepresentafairnessidealaretheegalitarian,the accountabil-ityand thelibertarianallocation.Theinterested readercansee

Cappelenetal.(2007),Konow(2000),MillerandUbeda(2011)and

Rodriguez-LaraandMoreno-Garrido(2012)fortheapplicationand therationaleofthesefairnessallocationsina‘‘traditional’’ dicta-torgameinwhichdictatorsareallowedtochooseanydistribution ofthesurplus.Konow(2003)isanexcellentrevisionofthedifferent fairnessideals.

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The results supportthe hypothesis of heterogeneity in

the use of fair allocationsfor both men andwomen with

roughly70%ofsubjectschoosingafairallocationandno sig-niﬁcantdifferencesinthewaythatwomenandmenallocate thesurplus(i.e.,theunconditionaldistributionofallocation choices when subject’s production is disregarded is fairly close).Despitethesesimilaritiesinwomen’sandmen’s allo-cationchoices,somestrikingresultsemerge.Interestingly,

womendonotbehaveinthesamemannerwhenthey

allo-catethesurplusaftercontributingmoreorlessmoneythan their counterparts, whereas men’s allocation choices are invarianttotheirrelativepositionwithregardtothe accu-mulatedsurplus(thus,thedistributionofallocationchoices whenrelativeproductionisaccountedforisdifferent).The

same results hold when considering effort levels. Women

donotbehaveinthesamemanner whentheyallocatethe

surplus after being paid more or less than their

counter-part, whereas men do. These ﬁndings provide support to

thehypothesisinCrosonandGneezy(2009)suggestingthat womenaremoresensitivetotheexperimentaldesign.

Theexistenceofgenderdifferencestowardtheuseofthe mostconvenientallocationrepresentsoneofthemain con-tributionsofthepaper.Wefindthatroughly50%ofwomen (23%ofmen)dividedthesurplusaccordingtothefair allo-cationthatyieldsthemthehighestpayoff.Whenlookingat thosedictatorswhoarenotselfish,66%ofwomenwhochose afairallocationchosethepayoff-maximizingone,whereas only40%ofmenwhochosethefairallocationchoseit.To isolatethe possibleeffectsof womenandmen’s different contributionstothesurplus,alogitmodelisusedthat con-trolsthisfeature.Itwasfoundthatwomen(ceterisparibus) are27%morelikelytochoosethefairallocationthatismost convenient tothem. This behavior is consistent with the recent findingin Miller andUbeda (2011), whoshow that

(in a repeatedcontext) women aremore likely toswitch

betweenfairnessprinciples,choosingthemostconvenient oneacrossrounds.

The remainder of thepaperis organizedasfollows:in thenextsection,therelevantliteratureisbrieﬂydiscussed andtheintendedcontributionofthepapersetincontext. Section 3presents theexperimental design. The research questionnaireisdescribed inSection4.Section5contains theresults.Theﬁnalsectionconcludes.Theappendix con-tains supplementary material, includingthe experimental instructionsanddataanalysisforrobustnesschecks.

2. Literature

review

Since Rapoport and Chammah (1965) economists have

exploredtheexistenceofgenderdifferencesinbehaviorby meansofcontrolledlaboratoryexperiments.Themain ﬁnd-ingsofcontrolledlaboratoryexperiments.Themainﬁndings oftheliteratureindicatethatwomenaremoreriskaverse thanmen,havealowerpreferenceforcompetitive environ-mentsandgivemoreweighttootherspayoffsorutilities(see

CrosonandGneezy,2009forarevision).Intheﬁeldof

other-regarding preferences, the results of the dictator game

suggestthatwomenaremorelikelytobesociallyoriented,

whereas men are more likely to be selﬁsh. These

differ-encesinsocialpreferencesareexpectedbysubjects(Aguiar etal.,2009),andarefoundtobesigniﬁcantinsomestudies

(EckelandGrossman,1998;AndreoniandVesterlund,2001) butnotinothers(BoltonandKatok,1995;Dufwenbergand Muren,2006).AsCrosonandGneezy(2009)argue,thelack

of a clear-cut result might be explained because women

aremoresensitivetotheexperimentaldesign.Theextent towhich subjectsare exposedto risk canalso determine

whether the observed differences are signiﬁcant or not

(Eckel andGrossman,2008).However,themagnitudeand the direction of the gender differences are stillfar from beingthoroughlyunderstood(seeCoxandDeck,2006).

Thechiefissueaddressedinthispaperiswhethergender differencesindistributivejusticeoccurwhenaproduction stageprecedes thedictator’sdecision. Althoughthestudy ofdistributivejusticeinexperimentsgoesbackatleastto

Hoffmanand Spitzer (1985), the majority of experiments usedtoinvestigate social preferences considera dictator

game inwhich the surplus tobe dividedwas providedby

theexperimenterrather thanearned byparticipants (see

Cooper and Kangel, 2009 for a revision of the results).

Althougheconomistshavelongdiscussed theeffectofthe origin of wealth on individual behavior (e.g., Friedman, 1957),theideaofincorporatingtheearnedsurplusintothe

dictatorgame wasnotconsidered untilKonow (2000)and

Cherryetal.(2002), whereit isshown that 95%of dicta-torstransferrednomoneyatalltorecipients,ifdictator’s identities were anonymous and their effort levels deter-minedthesizeof thesurplus.The resultsinCherryetal. (2002)alignwiththetheoreticalpredictionforselﬁsh dic-tatorsthathasfavoredtheuseoftheproduction stageto elicitfairnessattitudestowardredistribution.Somerecent studiesinthisareaarebyFrohlichetal.(2004),Cappelen etal.(2007),OxobyandSpraggon(2008)andRodriguez-Lara andMoreno-Garrido(2012),whicharguefortheimportance oftheearned surplustoexplainsubject’s preferencesfor fairness, although none of these studies investigate the existence of gender differences in allocation choices. As

a result, we lack experimental evidence for how gender

interactswithself-interestwhen dictatorshave tochoose adivisionofthegeneratedsurplus.Oneremarkable excep-tion is Miller and Ubeda (2011), who consider a dictator gamewithproductionplayedduringtwentyperiods.Ineach period,subjectsarepaiddependingontheirperformancein areal-efforttaskthatconsistsofunscramblingasmany puz-zlesaspossible.Theauthorsshowthatwhensubjectshave todividetheearnedsurplus,menaremorelikelytobe self-ish,butconsistentacrossrounds,whereaswomenaremore likelytobefairbuthaveatendencytoswitchbetween fair-nessprinciples, choosing the most convenient one across rounds.Importantly,thescopeof MillerandUbeda(2011)

(andthereforetheirexperimentaldesign)isslightly differ-entfromtheonepresentedinthecurrentpaper,astheyare interestedintesting the hypothesisin CrosonandGneezy (2009)bymeansofawithin-subjectdesignthatanalyzethe consistencyoffairnessprinciples,whereasthecurrentpaper reliesonabetween-subjectanalysiswithnorepetition.4

4_Another_recent_paper_in_this_literature_on_social_preferences_that

usesadictatorgamewithproductiontoinvestigategender differ-encesisHeinzetal.(2012),whoconsiderthecaseinwhichdictators havetodivideasurplusthatonlydependsontherecipients’ per-formance.

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Lastly, the data in this paper also shed light on fair-nessasacontext-speciﬁcphenomenon(Walzer,1983;Young,

1994). In the ﬁeld of empirical social choice and

psy-chology, some studies (mostly questionnaires)attempt to evaluateseveraldistributionmechanismsandshowthat con-textmatters,assubjectschoosedifferentsolutionsforthe

same distribution problems depending on the prevalence

of tastes or needs in the story underlying each question (YaariandBar-Hillel,1984;Young,1994;Scottetal.,2001). The present contribution to this literature is toshow (by

means of an experiment) how men and women behave

whentheycontributetothesurplusmoreorlessthantheir counterparts.

3. Experimental

design

A total of 144 students (77 women and 67 men) were

recruitedamongtheundergraduatepopulation ofthe Uni-versityofAlicante.TheexperimentwasruninMay2008and November2008intheLaboratoryforTheoreticaland Exper-imentalEconomics(LaTEx).Eachofthesixsessionshad24 subjectsandlastedaround1h.

Theexperimentwasimplementedusingthez-Tree soft-ware (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects had to complete a

test during the ﬁrst stage of the experiment. The test

contained twenty multiple-choice questions with a time

constraint of 35min. There was only one correct answer

out of ﬁve possibilities. At the conclusion of the test,

subjects were randomly matched in pairs and assigned a

role that did not depend on their performance on the

test or any individual characteristic. Subjects received

a random reward level (pi) for each of their correct

answers. The realization of pi occurred after subjects

wereinformed about their role.Dictators (37women, 35

men) were rewarded pd=150 pesetas5 per each correct

answer. To investigate how dictators were held

respon-sible for their outcomes (Cappelen et al., 2007, 2010) and introduce variability in the data, recipients received

pr∈{100,150, 200}pesetasper eachcorrectanswer.The

number of observations is balanced by having 24

dicta-tors in each situation.Thus, thereare 24 observationsin

whichdictatorswererewarded morethanrecipients (DM:

pd=150, pr=100) and 24 in which there were rewarded

lessthanrecipients(DL:pd=150,pr=200).Inthe

remain-ingcases,dictatorsandrecipientswererewardedthesame (pd=pr=150).6

5_It_is_standard_practice_for_all_experiments_run_in_the_University_of

AlicantetouseSpanishpesetasasexperimentalcurrency.Exchange rate:1Euro=166,386pesetas.

6_The_information_on_gender_was_collected_at_the_end_of_the

exper-iment.Sincerolesdidnotdependonanyindividualcharacteristic, wecannotcontrolforhavingexactlythesamenumberofwomen andmenineachrole.Thisprocedurewaschosensoastoguarantee equalityofopportunities,whatisimportanttoavoidcompensation andcontrolforresponsibility(FleurbaeyandManiquet,2009).The factthatroleswerenotrevealedintheexperimentisalso impor-tantbecausedictators’behaviorwasnotconditioned(e.g.,Aguiar et al.,2009) and gender stereotypes were not activated (Fryer etal.,2008).

Whensubjectswereinformedabouttheirrewardlevels andtheircontributiontothesurplus,thetotalsurpluswas dividedaccordingtothedictator’sdecision.Dictatorshadto decidebetweenﬁveallocationchoicestodividethesurplus: (1)keepingtheentiresurplus,(2)givingtheentiresurplus totheothersubject,(3)dividingthesurplusintwo identi-calparts(theegalitarianallocation),(4)dividingthesurplus accordingtothesubject’scontributionintermsofcorrect answers(theaccountabilityallocation),and(5)dividingthe surplus according to the subject’s monetary contribution (thelibertarianallocation).7

This set of allocationchoices allows dictatorsto keep theentiresurplusaswouldbepredictedbytheNash equi-libriumforselﬁshsubjects.Likewise,the‘‘fairallocations’’ (i.e.,theegalitarian,theaccountability,andthelibertarian allocation)canbeusedtocategorizethesubject’s prefer-ences for fairness, as it is illustrated in Cappelen et al. (2007).Theegalitarianallocationcorrespondstotheideaof equality(FehrandSchmidt,1999)whereasthe accountabil-ityandlibertarianprinciplesconsiderthatentitlementsto theavailablesurplusaredeterminedbythesubject’s perfor-manceinthequestionnaire.Inparticular,theaccountability allocationisbasedontheeffortexerted(i.e.,thenumber of correctanswers)andcorrespondstotheideaof equity in the sense that thosefactors that cannotbe controlled bysubjectsarenotconsideredbydictatorswhentheyare makingtheirchoice(Konow,1996;Roemer,1998).The lib-ertarian allocation,ontheother hand,takesintoaccount therewardlevelsandstatesthatsubjectsoughttoreceive

as much as their (monetary) contribution to the surplus

(Nozick,1974).

Toseehowfairnessidealsapplyinadictatorgamewith production,considerthatthecasewherethetotalsurplus tobedividedisdenotedby ¯y≥0.Weassumethatthesizeof thesurplusdependsonthedictatorandtherecipient’s mon-etarycontributions,whicharedenotedbyyd≥0andyr≥0,

respectively. Inparticular, yi=piqi whereqi≥0represents

subjecti’sperformanceinthetestandpi>0istherewardfor

eachcorrectanswer,fori∈{d,r}.Ifthedictatorchoosesthe egalitarianallocation,thenthedictatorwilldividethe sur-plusintwoidenticalparts,sothateachsubjectwillreceive ¯

y/2,regardlessofhis/herperformanceandthereward lev-els.Theaccountabilityallocationimpliesthateachsubject will receive the part that corresponds to his/her perfor-manceon the test ¯yqi/(qd+qr)), whereasthe libertarian

allocation heldsubjects responsible for the reward levels andpaysydtoeachofthesubjects.8

7_See_Appendix_A_for_the_experimental_instruction_and Rodriguez-Lara and Moreno-Garrido (2012) for further details in the procedures.Inotethatthecurrentpaperdiffersfrom Rodriguez-LaraandMoreno-Garrido(2012)becausedictatorshavetochoose fromasetofallocationchoicesinsteadofchoosinganydivisionof thesurplus.Besides,Rodriguez-LaraandMoreno-Garrido(2012)do notanalyzetheimpactofgenderdifferencesonbehavior,whichis themainfocusofthecurrentstudy.

8_For_further_discussion_on_the_relationship_between

responsibil-ityor controlover outputs and fairnessprinciples seeFleurbaey andManiquet(2009)andCappelenetal.(2010)amongothers.Of course,thereexistcasesinwhichthefairallocationsoverlap.This isdiscussedinthesupplementarymaterial(AppendixB).

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4. Research

questions

Themainquestionstobeaddressedconcerntheexistence ofgenderdifferencesinallocationchoicesandthe

possibil-itythatwomen andmenbehave differentlydepending on

context(i.e.,whentheycontributetothesurplusmoreor lessthanrecipients).Wealsowanttoinvestigatewhether subjectschoosethefairallocationthatismostconvenient (i.e.,theonethatyieldsthehighestpayoff)andtheextent towhich this choice can be determinedby the dictator’s gender,theperformanceinthetest(pi)andthereward

lev-els (qi).We now present the research questions in detail

andrelatethemwithpreviousﬁndingsintheliteratureon genderdifferences.

Q1:In thedictator game withproduction,domen and

womendifferintheirallocationchoices?Aremenand/or womeninclinedtowardchoosingauniqueallocation?

Some evidence from previous studies that investigate

genderdifferenceshighlightthatwomenaremoresocially orientedthanmen(e.g.,EckelandGrossman,1998),andare moreconcernedwithequalizingpayoffs(e.g.,Andreoniand Vesterlund,2001;DickinsonandTiefenthaler,2002).Inthat regard,itwillbeworthanalyzingwhethermen(women)are morelikelytochoosetheselﬁsh(egalitarian)allocation.9

The data in Croson and Gneezy (2009) suggest that womenareneithermorenorlesssociallyorientedbuttheir

preferencesseemtobemoremalleable.Thesecond

ques-tionisthenrelatedtotheideaofwomen’sdecisionsbeing

more context-speciﬁc than men’s (Cox and Deck, 2006;

Croson and Gneezy, 2009) and the possibilityof behavior varyingwiththe‘‘priceofgiving’’(AndreoniandVesterlund, 2001).ThisisthemainfocusonMillerandUbeda(2011).

Q2: Do men and women choose the same allocation

choices regardless of their contributionto thesurplus? Doestheirbehaviordependontheexternalfactors(e.g., therewardlevels)?

Theﬁnalquestionisinlinewithrecentﬁndings suggest-ing that dictators are likelyto choose fairness principles ina self-interestedmanner (Rutstrom andWilliams,2000; Rodriguez-LaraandMoreno-Garrido,2012).

Q3:Do menandwomenchoosethefair allocationthat

bringsthemthehighestpayoff?

The objectiveistoshedlight onthe(possible) interac-tionbetweengenderandtheself-servingchoicesoffairness

allocations.10 _Hereafter _we _consider _that _the _dictator

9_Bolton_and_Katok₍₁₉₉₅₎_is_one_of_the_studies_that_do_not_ﬁnd

signiﬁcantdifferences.

10 _{Rodriguez-Lara}_and_{Moreno-Garrido}₍₂₀₁₂₎_provide_evidence_for

self-servingchoicesoffairnessideals.Thisisrelatedtothe dicta-tor’sgenderinMillerandUbeda(2011)inawithin-subjectanalysis. I note that theuse of themost convenientallocation mightbe related to the existenceof what Crosonand Konow (2009)call ‘‘moralbias¨(i.e.,behaviorbiasedawayfromimpartialstandards). Otherconceptsintheliteratureofdistributivejusticethatmightbe relatedtothechoiceofthemostconvenientallocationare ‘‘self-servingbias¨and ‘‘egocentric bias¨(e.g., Messick andSentis, 1983; Babcock etal.,1995; Konow, 2000),but these conceptsrequire

choosesthe most convenient allocation wheneverhe/she

choosesthefairnessideal(egalitarian,accountabilityor lib-ertarianallocation)thatbringshim/herthehighestpayoff.

5. Results

Inthissection,Ianalyzethedatagatheredduringthe exper-imentalsessions.First,Ioutlinethesubjects’performance intheﬁrst-stagequiz.Onaverage, womenhad8.64 ques-tionscorrectlywhentheyweredictators,whereasmenhad 11.77questionscorrectly(standarddeviationsare2.27and

2.77 respectively). Women faced recipients who had on

average11.32questionscorrectly,whereasmen’s counter-partshad 10.4questionscorrectly.Asimple t-testrejects

the null hypothesis that women and men had the same

number of questions correctly when they were dictators

(t=5.23,p-value<0.000).Inaddition,thet-testrejectsthe

nullhypotheses thatwomenand menhadthesame

ques-tionscorrectlythantheircounterparts(forwomen,t=4.03,

p-value<0.003;forment=2.10,p-value<0.043).We

there-foreconcludethatwomen’sandmen’sperformanceinthe

ﬁrst-stagequizissigniﬁcantlydifferent.11

Thedictators’decisionsaresummarizedinFig.1,which plotsthefrequencyofchoosingeachpossibleallocationby

considering womenand menseparately. Sincenodictator

chosetogivetheentiresurplusaway,suchanallocationis notlisted(Fig.1).

WeseeinFig.1thatroughly70%ofdictatorschoseone ofthefairallocations.Ifwelookat thechoiceoffairness allocations,weobservethatthereisnouniquefairnessideal thatcanbeusedtodescribethedictator’sbehavior.Instead, thereisheterogeneityintheuseoffairallocations,which isconsistentwithCappelenetal.(2007).12

Result1. Womenandmendonotchooseaunique

alloca-tionwhentheydividethesurplusbutexhibitheterogeneous behaviorconcerningredistribution.

In Fig. 1, we observe that women are less likely to

choosetheselfishallocationandmorelikelytochoosethe egalitarianallocation.Thetestofproportion,however, sug-gests nosignificant differencebetween the proportion of womenchoosingtheselfishoptionandtheproportionofmen doingso(Z=1.16, p-value=0.123). The sameresult holds

whentestingfortheproportionofwomenandmen

choos-ingtheegalitarianprinciple13_(Z₌_1.33,_p-value₌_0.183)_and

tocomparethedictators’allocationchoiceswiththeirchoicesas impartialjudgeswhodividethesurplusfortwoothersubjects.

11_This_gender_difference_in_performance_is_consistent_with

previ-ousﬁndings(e.g.,BrownandJosephs,1999;Ginoetal.,2013)and isparticularlyimportantforunderstandingthemainresultsofthe paper(Result4).Althoughitisfoundthatmenandwomenchoose thesameallocationchoices(Result2),wewillseethatwomen’s behaviorissensitivetothecontextandwomenareinclinedtoward choosingaconvenientallocation.

12_Cappelen _et _al. ₍₂₀₀₇₎_show _that _dictators_exhibit

heteroge-neousbehavioranddonotallocatethesurplusaccordingtoaunique fairnessideal.However,theroleofgenderisdisregardedintheir analysis.

13_If_I_compute_the_women’s_and_men’s_deviations_from_equality,

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0.50 0.40 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.00

Selfish Egalitarian Accountability Libertarian

F

requency

Men Women

Figure1 Dictator’sallocationchoicesinthedictatorgame.

thereis notanysigniﬁcantcorrelation betweenthe dicta-tor’sgenderandthepossibilityofchoosingafairallocation (p-value=0.148).Comparingthedistributionofallocations

that women and men chose, the Fisher exact probability

tests cannot reject the null hypothesis that these allo-cation choices come from the same distribution (Fisher’s exact=0.351). These results are consistent withthe idea inCrosonandGneezy(2009)ofwomenbeingneithermore norlesssociallyoriented.

Result2. Womenandmen’sallocationchoicescannotbe

rejectedtocomefromthesamedistribution.

Toseewhetherdecisionsarecontext-dependentornot, thedictator’srelativepositionwithregardtothe accumu-latedsurplusasareferencepointisconsidered.InTable1, wereportthep-valuesoftheFisherexactprobabilitytest that compare the distribution of allocation choices when dictators contribute to the surplus more than recipients (yd≥yr)andwhentheycontribute less(yd<yr).Dictator’s

behavioriscomparedwhentheyarepaidmore(pd≥pr)or

less(pd<prthanrecipientsforeachcorrectanswer.

TheFisherexacttestrejectsthenullhypothesisthatthe distributionof women’sallocation choices when yd≥yr is

thesameasthedistributionofwomen’sallocationchoices when yd<yr. The test does not reject thishypothesis for

men,whoseemtobehaveinthesamemanner whenthey

areinanadvantageouspositionandwhentheyareina disad-vantageouspositionwithregardtotheaccumulatedsurplus. Thesameconclusionholdswhenconsideringdifferencesin therewardlevels.14

women’sandmen’sallocationchoicescomefromthesame distribu-tion(KS=0.250,p-value=0.15).Ishouldacknowledgethatgender differencesintheuseoftheselfishandegalitarianallocationmight notbesignificantbecauseofthesmallsamplesize.Thusifthe sam-plesizewerelarger,Iwouldexpectmentobe(significantly)more selfishasitoccursinMillerandUbeda(2011).

14 _The _interested _reader _can _see _the _distribution _of _allocation

choicesdependingonthecontextinAppendixC.InlinewithCroson and Gneezy (2009) and Coxand Deck (2006), the data suggest thatwomenmightbemoresensitivetothecontextthanmen.It seemsthatwomenaremorelikelytoequalizepayoffswhenthey contributetothesurpluslessthanrecipients;e.g.,thetestof pro-portionrejectsthenullhypothesisthatwomenareequallylikely tochoosetheegalitarianprinciplewhenyd≥yrandwhenyd<yr,

Result 3. Women’s allocation choices are sensitive to

thecontextsincechoicesdependonwhetherwomenhave

accumulatedmoreorlessmoneythanrecipients.Women’s

allocationchoicesdoalsodependontherewardlevels. ThethirdresearchquestionpresentedinSection4

con-cerns the extent to which dictators choose a convenient

allocation.To approachthisissue, we comparedthe ﬁnal distributionofpayoffs(thatresultfromdictator’schoicesin

Fig.1)withthe(hypothetical) distributionof payoffsthat wouldcorrespondtodictatorsfollowingthefairallocation thatismost-convenienttothem(i.e.,thepayoff maximiz-ingone).15_The_Wilcoxon_signed-rank_test_cannot_reject_the

null hypothesis that these distributions are the same for women(W=0.75,p-value=0.449),butit rejectsthesame null hypothesis for men’s allocation choices (W=2.36,

p-value=0.018).

Attheindividuallevel,8outofthe35men(i.e.,roughly 23%)chosetoallocatethesurplusaccordingtothefair

allo-cation that gave them the highest payoff, whereas18 of

the 37 women (i.e., 49%) did so. The test of proportion

indicatesthatthisdifferenceintheproportionofmenand

women allocating the surplus according tothe most

con-venient allocation is signiﬁcant (Z=2.28, p-value=0.023). When theanalysisfocuses ondictatorswhowerenot self-ish,itwasfoundthat27womenchosetogivemoneyaway, and18 ofthem (i.e.,roughly 66%)chose themost conve-nientallocation.Thereare20menwhochosetogivemoney away,and8ofthem(i.e.,40%),chosethemostconvenient allocation.Again,thetestofproportionindicatesthatthe differenceissigniﬁcant(Z=1.52,p-value=0.063).

Overall,itseemsthatwomenandmen’sbehaviorisfairly closewhentheproductionofthesurplusisdisregarded,but

infavorofthealternativethattheegalitarianprincipleischosen morefrequentlywhenyd<yr(p-value=0.056).

15 _I_am_not_aware_of_any_statistical_test_that_compares_{distributions}

ofcategoricaldatawhenmorethantwooutcomesarepossibleand observationsarenotindependent.Forthatreason,Idecidedtouse thedistributionofpayoffs.Tocontrolfor theeffectofdifferent rewardlevels(thatwouldyieldahighersizeofthesurplusinthe DMtreatmentevenifperformancewereunaffected),Itransform thedataandconsidertheproportionofthesurplusthatdictators decided tokeep soas tocompare it withtheproportionofthe surplustheywouldkeepiftheyusedfairnessallocationsina self-servingmanner.

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Table1 Dictator’sbehaviordependingonthecontext.

Women Men

Behaviorwhenyd≥yristhesameasbehaviorwhenyd<yr 0.033** 0.382

Behaviorwhenpd≥pristhesameasbehaviorwhenpd<pr 0.007*** 0.412

p-ValuesfortheFisherExacttest.

*_{Significance}_at_10%_level. ** _{Significance}_at_5%_level. *** _{Significance}_at_1%_level.

Table2 Logitregressiontostudybiasedbehavior.

Model(1) Model(2) Coefficient ME Coefficient ME Intercept _−0.923* (0.55) −1.216*** (0.40) Women 1.241** 0.60 0.27** _1.162** (0.52) 0.26** DL −0.137 (0.62) −0.03 DM −0.888 (0.66) 0.19 Qdif 0.019 (0.06) 0.004 PseudoR2 _0.08 _0.06 LR-test 7.37* _5.29** * _{Significance}_at_10%_level. ** _{Significance}_at_5%_level. *** _{Significance}_at_1%_level. Numberofobservations=72.

womenaresomehowinclinedtowardchoosingthefair

allo-cation that is most convenient to them. This ﬁnding can

beaffected bysubject’s performancein thetest. Assume

that women and men do have exactly the same

prefer-ences over redistribution so that they would choose the

sameallocations.Ifwomendocontributetothesurplusless

than menbut choosethe sameallocations, women would

appearas beingmore convenient than men (eventhough

theyboth have exactly thesame preferences). Thus, the

fact that women appear tobe more likely tochoose the

convenient allocation could beexplained by their gender or simplyby their relativeperformance inthe quiz (e.g.,

Qdif=qd−qr).This is particularlyimportant inour

experi-mentgiventhatwomencontributesigniﬁcantlylesstothe surplus.Thetreatmentconditions(i.e.,therewardlevels) couldalsoaffectthefrequency ofchoosingthemost con-venientallocation,sincedictatorsmayfeelgoodorbadfor beingpaidmoreorlessthanrecipients.Todisentanglethe effectofthesevariables,a logitregressionwasestimated inwhichthedependentvariableistheprobabilityof choos-ing the fair allocationthat gives the dictator the highest payoff.Theexplanatoryvariablesarethedictator’sgender

(i.e., adummy variableWOMEN that takesthe value 1 if

the dictator is a woman), the treatment conditions (i.e., thedummyvariablesDMandDLtakethevalue1ifdictators arepaidmoreorlessthanrecipients)andthedifferencein

subject’scorrectanswers(Qdif=qd−qr).Theestimatesand

themarginaleffects(ME)ofthisspecificationarepresented inthefirstcolumnsofTable2(Model(1)).Thesecond spec-ification(Model(2))isbasedonastepwisemodelinwhich thechoice of the independentvariables is carriedout by backwardelimination;i.e.,thosevariablesthatarenot sig-nificantaccordingtothet-testaredeletedineachstep.The standarderrorsofbothmodelsarepresentedinbrackets.16

16_The_regression_results_are_robust_to_a_number_of_other

speciﬁca-tions.Inparticular,themarginaleffectsdonotchangequalitatively ifratherthanusingQdifIconsideradummyvariableDQdifthattakes

thevalue1ifQdif≥0,orifIincludeinthemodeltheproductof

thedummyvariables‘‘Women’’andQdifasexplanatoryvariable.

TheinterestedreadercanfindtheseregressionsinAppendixC.One limitationofthedataisthatwomendoallocateasmallersurplus thanmen(p-value=0.017),butcontrollingforthesizeofthesurplus (¯y≥0)couldbeproblematic,especiallyonceIcontrolforthe rela-tiveperformanceandtherewardlevels.Asarefereepointedout, itcouldbethecasethatresultsareduetoawealtheffect,with subjectswhodivideasmallersurplus(women)beingmorelikely tobeself-serving.AlthoughIfindthatthisisaplausible assump-tion,thepairwisecorrelationcoefficientsuggestsnorelationship betweenthesizeofthesurplusandtheuseofthemost-convenient allocation(correlationcoefficient=−0.152,p-value=0.204).

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Table3 Biasedbehaviorandearningsintheproductionstage.

Women Men

Ifyd<yrdictatorsdividethesurpluschoosingthemostconvenientallocation 0.962 0.332

Ifyd≥yrdictatorsdividethesurpluschoosingthemostconvenientallocation 0.230 0.017**

p-ValuesfortheWilcoxonsigned-ranktest.

*_{Significance}_at_10%_level. **_{Significance}_at_5%_level. ***_{Significance}_at_1%_level.

Neitherthe treatment conditionsnor thedifferencein correct answers seems to have a statistically significant effectonthefrequencyofchoosingthebiasedallocation. Thedictator’s gender, however,has asignificant effectas womenare27%morelikelytochoosethebiasedallocation thanmen(ceteris paribus).Infact,if weperforma step-wiseregression,wewillconcludethatthedictator’sgender istheonlysignificant variableinexplainingthefrequency ofchoosingthemostconvenientallocation.17

Result4. Womenaremorelikelythanmentoemploythe

fairallocationthatmostbeneﬁtstheirﬁnancialpayoff.

Although the regression analysis suggests that there

is no effect of the relative performance on the

proba-bility of being self-serving, recent evidence suggest that disadvantagedindividuals might have a tendency to over-cometheirdisadvantagebycheating(e.g.,Schwierenand Weichselbaumer, 2010; Gino et al., 2013). This, in turn, couldexplainwhywomenaremorelikelytobeself-serving in the experiment. As theycontribute to the surplus less thantheircounterparts,theymightfeelentitledtotakea largerpartofthesurplus,showingthenatendencytoappear self-interested.Ifthiswerethecase,weshouldobservethat

womenwhohaveaccumulatedmoremoneythantheir

coun-terpartsshouldforgousingthemostconvenientallocation. InTable3wereportthep-valuesofaWilcoxonsigned-rank testtoseeifthedistributionofpayoffsassociatedto dicta-tors’allocationchoices(Fig.1)istheonethatyieldsthem

the highest payoff. Men and women are considered

sep-aratelyand performthe test for cases in which dictators areindisadvantage(advantage)positionwithregardtothe accumulatedsurplus,yd<yr(yd≥yr).

Interestingly,thereexistsatendencyfordictatorstobe

self-serving when they have accumulated less than their

counterparts.Thisoccursboth formenandwomen.18

Stri-kingly enough, women whoaccumulated more than their

17 _In_Appendix_D,_the_interested_reader_can_see_a_robustness_check

ofthisresultusingthedatainRodriguez-LaraandMoreno-Garrido (2012).

18 _This_ﬁnding_is_in_line_with_the_{interpretation}_of_Gino_et_al.₍₂₀₁₃₎_,

whoﬁndthatwomentendtomisreportinacompetitive environ-ments(i.e.,aproblem-solvingtask)inwhichtheyperformworse thanmen butdo misreporttheir score innon-competitive envi-ronments(i.e., rollingadice andinformtheexperimenterabout theresult).Intheauthors’opinion,itisnotthecasethatwomen cheatmoreincompetitivetasks,butthatdisadvantagedindividuals tendto overcometheirdisadvantage bycheatingincompetitive tasks(seealsoSchwierenandWeichselbaumer,2010forasimilar interpretation).

counterparts still show this tendency to be self-serving,

whereasmendonot.

6. Conclusions

Thispaperstudiesgenderdifferencesindistributivejustice bymeansofacontrolledlaboratoryexperiment.Intheﬁrst phase,subjectssolveaquestionnairetoearnmoney.Inthe secondphase,dictatorsdividethesurplusaccordingtoﬁve different allocations,some of whichrepresents afairness ideal.

Thereisevidencethatwomenaremorelikelythanmen toemploythefairallocationthatmostbeneﬁtstheir

ﬁnan-cial payoff. The data also suggest that women are more

sensitivetothecontextastheirallocationchoicesdepend onwhethertheyhaveaccumulatedmoreorlessmoneythan theircounterparts.Thisisnotthecaseformen’sallocation choices.

Overall, these ﬁndings suggest a subtle but signiﬁcant

change in our understanding of what other studies have

foundwithrespecttotheeffectofgenderonproblems of distributivejustice.Theexistence oftheproductionstage hasprobablycontributedthesenewﬁndingsongender dif-ferences.Althoughthisfeatureoftheexperimentaldesign

has been shown to bea key component tostudy fairness

(Cherryetal.,2002;Konow,2000;Cappelenetal.,2007)it hasbeen widelyignoredin papersthatinvestigategender differencesinbehavior.

Still, there are some things to be done. Although this paperprovidesacorrelationbetweenthedictator’sgender andtheself-servinguseofjusticeprinciples,thesamplesize (72dictators)isrelativelysmallgiventhattherearethree differenttreatmentconditions.Inthatregard,itwouldbe beneﬁcialtoreplicatethecurrent studywithmore obser-vations.Turningtoadiscussionofarationaleforthemain result,onepossibleexplanationmightbeofferedbythedual interesttheory (Lynne, 1999;Czapetal.,2012).This sug-geststhatthereisanatural,inherentcognitivedissonance in the brain,which is reﬂectedin theegoistic---hedonistic

based self-interest. This tendency needs to be tempered

by the tendency to empathy-sympathy based on other

interests which refers to the subject’s capacity to step

into someoneelse’s shoes(empathy) and his/herconcern

for others’ welfare (sympathy). The idea of designing an

experiment that investigatesthe extent towhich women

andmendifferinthesedimensionswouldbean excellent areaforfutureresearch.19_The_possibility_of_considering_the

19 _The_evidence_gleaned_from_this_experiment_would_also_be_useful

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produc-dictator’s behavior asa third-party view (i.e., comparing

their choices when they are involved in the problem and

their choices for other subjects) or extending the game

to the possibility of taking (List, 2007; Bardsley, 2008; Cappelen etal., 2013)seem also fruitfulareas for future researchintogenderdifferencesindistributivejustice.

Funding

FinancialsupportfromtheSpanishMinistryofScienceand Innovation(ECO2011-29230)isgratefullyacknowledged.

Appendix

A. Supplementary

data

Supplementary data associated with this article can be

found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.

1016/j.cesjef.2014.01.001.

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