Governance and governability of coastal shellfisheries in Latin America and the Caribbean: multi scale emerging models and effects of globalization and climate change

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(1)Available online at www.sciencedirect.com. Governance and governability of coastal shellfisheries in Latin America and the Caribbean: multi-scale emerging models and effects of globalization and climate change Omar Defeo1,2 and Juan Carlos Castilla3 We discuss coastal shellfisheries management and governance models in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) at different scales. Self-imposed governance with spatial property rights, internal rules and co-management resulted in successful local shellfisheries. At the national level, the longterm Chilean governability system, which included sea-zoning for artisanal and industrial fleets and exclusive allocation of rights to artisanal shellfish communities, successfully tamed wicked management problems. However, the combination of weak governance, globalization of markets, fishing pressure and climate change exacerbated depletion patterns in most LAC shellfisheries. Increasing market prices exceed the low costs of harvesting low abundance coastal shellfish, and together with illegal trade, have driven some species to levels close to extinction (anthropogenic Allee effect). Mass shellfish mortalities driven by climate variability are threatening stocks and may swamp management and governance schemes. Coastal shellfisheries urgently require the implementation of resilient management and effective long-term governance schemes under pressing conditions of change and uncertainty. Addresses 1 UNDECIMAR, Facultad de Ciencias, 11400 Montevideo, Uruguay 2 DINARA, Constituyente 1497, 11400 Montevideo, Uruguay 3 Departamento de Ecologı́a, Facultad de Ciencias Biológicas and Centro Interdisciplinario de Cambio Global, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Casilla 114-D, Santiago, Chile Corresponding author: Defeo, Omar (odefeo@dinara.gub.uy). Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 2012, 4:344–350 This review comes from a themed issue on Aquatic and marine systems Edited by R Ian Perry, Alida Bundy and Eileen E Hofmann For a complete overview see the Issue and the Editorial Received 2 February 2012; Accepted 9 May 2012 Available online 31st May 2012 1877-3435/$ – see front matter, # 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cosust.2012.05.002. Introduction Coastal shellfisheries have important socioeconomic relevance worldwide [1,2,3]. In Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), artisanal or small-scale shellfisheries constitute social-ecological systems (SES) critically important for thousands of coastal communities mostly integrated by poor and vulnerable people who draw their livelihoods Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 2012, 4:344–350. from this sector. These subsistence and/or commercial activities take place directly from the shore or from deckless boats (<8–10 m length) and generate incomes to fishers and, in some cases, export earnings for the countries [4,5]. Coastal shellfisheries sustainability in LAC has been difficult to achieve. Decades of intensive extraction, exacerbated by local (habitat loss, pollution, disease, fishers’ behavior) and global (international trade and globalization of markets, climate change) drivers have reduced many populations and, with few exceptions [6], stocks are overexploited or depleted [1,2,7,8]. Moreover, the accumulation of biophysical and socio-economic data relevant to assess shellfishery condition in these data-poor systems has been substantially more complex than previously thought [9,10]. The number of fishers cannot be readily controlled and management measures are difficult and expensive to enforce along lengthy coasts. Making things worse, openaccess regimes, coupled with economic pressures for subsistence, poverty, lack of alternative employment and easy access to stocks with low investment and operating costs have attenuated efficient resource allocation over time. Despite differences in resources, idiosyncrasies and legislation among LAC countries [11], the issues raised above can be categorized as ‘wicked fishery problems’ [sensu [12]] that undermine shellfisheries governance systems. An approach to understanding how successful collective action can avoid these problems is a study of institutions for managing and governing shellfish resources [13,14]. Here, the concepts of (1) governance (a more inclusive term than management that involves other actors in addition to governments) and (2) governability (a way to assess the governance capacity of fisheries) [15] become essential to understand the actual situation faced by LAC shellfisheries. Drawing on several case studies, we discuss some governance models and structures developed in LAC shellfisheries at different scales. We also address shellfisheries governance needs in the region, in the light of a wide range of (wicked) problems with which these SES are confronted, including local and global drivers. We also highlight which factors of the shellfishery system make them more or less governable, and the capacity of governing systems to deliver on the challenges that shellfisheries raise.. Small is beautiful: from wicked to tame local shellfishery problems In LAC there are a few examples where small-scale shellfisheries are recognized as successful at a local scale, www.sciencedirect.com.

(2) Shellfisheries management and governance models Defeo and Castilla 345. including: (1) the spiny lobster (Panulirus argus) fishery community at Punta Allen (Yucatan, Mexico) [16–18]; (2) the rock lobster (Jasus frontalis) in the Juan Fernández Archipelago (Chile) [19]; and (3) the ‘callo de hacha’ fishery in Seri territory [9,20,21]. Some of their main characteristics that facilitated a successful SES approach can be summarized as follows: (1) Spatial property rights driven by strong social cohesion. Different forms of spatial property rights have encouraged local stewardship and long-term profitability. Each fisher or family may ‘own’ a number of fishing spots, known locally as ‘marcas’ (Chilean lobster) or ‘campos’ (Yucatan spiny lobster), which are identified by alignments on land with well-recognized features. Strong social cohesion and selforganization have been critical for the allocation of coastal-parceled areas. Fishing spots used in Brazilian artisanal fisheries have also been documented as an effective tool to implement self-imposed rules for local users and to exclude outsiders [22,23]. (2) Well-defined boundaries, with a clear match among scales of operation, management and governance. These shellfisheries have operated for several decades in rather isolated sites with well-defined boundaries. The local shellfishery is considered as a functional management unit defined by discrete physical boundaries that matches the dynamics of the stock and the fishing process (‘micro-management or management of micro-stocks’, [24]). This agreement between scales facilitated collective actions, including bottom-up approaches that have regulated the size of a fishing force composed of a low number of fishers, and also built efficient monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) procedures directed to avoid illegal fishing [9,16,25]. Geographic isolation also reinforced internal community bonding [26]. Definition of boundaries and rights for fishing and incongruities between rules and local environmental/resource conditions have affected the sustainability of artisanal fisheries in LAC [27]. (3) Well-defined internal rules and long-term agreements with central governments. Local communities have agreed upon the implementation of well-defined internal rules (written or unwritten) regarding a self-imposed organization for use and transfer of rights over fishing grounds. Rules include extra penalties about illegal fishing, invasion of grounds, and harvest of individuals below the marketable size [18]. Centralized government regulations (e.g. minimum legal size, fishery seasons) have also been enforced by local communities. These cases are strong enough to be supported by central authorities, suggesting important governing interactions. The governability dynamics include agreements among authorities, scientists and fishers on the best ways to achieve ‘primary management’ goals [10]. www.sciencedirect.com. (4) Incentives for local stewardship, adaptive management and interactive governance. Local fishing practices provide incentives that fishers can use to offset the costs of organizing rules to control fishing effort. Particularly useful are the perceptions of fishers about spatiotemporal differences in fishery indicators, which allow them to rapidly learn how the resource operates, thereby becoming the main stewards of their own fishing site [25,28,29]. This is important for sessile or sedentary shellfishes harvested by ‘mining strategies’, and has allowed fishers to make calculations about how their harvests will affect the availability of shellfisheries in the future [9]. Thus, they have strong incentives to surpass the costs of the time and effort spent to devise and agree upon rules with which to self-govern their fishing system [9,21,30]. Stakeholder participation in monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) also played a key role in reinforcing cooperation [16,25]. Successful collective actions through local self-governance or cooperative co-management were reflected in an enhanced sense of ownership encouraging responsible fishing, increased compliance with regulations and better MCS by fishers. These issues have also been highlighted in Caribbean fisheries [31] and worldwide [32]. In these case studies, strong leadership has been identified as a critical attribute contributing to successful shellfisheries [16]. A recent analysis of 130 co-managed fisheries around the world also demonstrated the critical importance of prominent community leaders and robust social capital for successfully managing aquatic resources and securing the livelihoods of communities depending on them [[32], see also [26]]. A ‘livelihood approach to management’ [33,34] encouraged shellfishers to play a meaningful role. Thus, wicked coastal fishery problems appear to have been tamed at a local scale: small is beautiful.. Taming shellfishery problems at national and international spatial scales Local successful stories can spread quickly at a regional scale. However, without cross-scale linkages with higher governance levels, extended coastal systems under open access are readily accessible to outsiders that can overharvest and threaten self-governed sites [25]. Open access shellfishery systems do not work, and a way to approach this wicked problem is by rewarding local management with formal cross-scale governance recognition and support [35] through the institutionalization of fishery rights [16,30,36]. The best example of a national-scale and long-term governability system in small-scale shellfisheries in LAC has been developed in Chile during the past 20 years, beginning in 1991 through the enacting of the Fishery and Aquaculture Law (FAL). The Chilean Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 2012, 4:344–350.

(3) 346 Aquatic and marine systems. FAL detailed well-defined instruments for fisheries governance and governability, including [37]: (1) definitions of small and large scale fleets; (2) sea zoning for artisanal and industrial fishery operations, allocating the first 5 nm from shore only for the former; and (3) the implementation of shellfishery co-management and allocation of spatial property rights for organized artisanal communities, in the form of Managed and Exploitation Areas for Benthic Resources (MEABRs) [5]. The approach has been a long-term success: (1) it stopped overfishing in artisanal shellfisheries, prompted fishers’ empowerment and increased marine conservation values among fishers [38]; and (2) partially stopped the ‘olympic race’ for fish by the industrial fleets [37]. To the best of our knowledge, this legislation appears to be the top legal frame at a country level in operation worldwide, and has successfully tamed wicked management problems affecting small-scale coastal shellfisheries. In Brazil, Marine Extractive Reserves (MERs) are concessions similar to MEABRs that represent the most significant governmentsupported effort to protect fisheries resources upon which traditional small-scale fishers depend. MERs now encompass 9700 km2 and nearly 60 000 small-scale fishers in Brazil [39]. Some coastal shellfish are transboundary, particularly those structured as metapopulations with high larval dispersal (e.g. lobsters), and require collaboration for effective governance. Institutional arrangements for governing transboundary shellfish in LAC are weak or lacking, and issues of scale are most challenging for this region [35,40]. Existing regional organizations are not welladapted for governance, and in most cases lack decision-making functions. This weak governance favors the occurrence of illegal fishing, which is exacerbated by: (1) high unit prices of shellfishes; (2) weak MCS collaboration among countries; and (3) a lack of funds to cover MCS costs and to derive revenues to support regional fisheries management organizations. True cooperation among LAC countries is needed to reach solid governance arrangements at the multi-national level. In this context, adaptive co-management can promote flexible adaptation responses and can also strengthen adaptive capacities to different stressors, including climate change [41] and can facilitate solutions to complex transboundary problems that decision makers have been unable to solve. Thus, main challenges in LAC shellfisheries are to develop adaptive forms of governance at different scales and to assess the dynamics of cross-scale and cross-level governance interactions between institutions [42].. Shellfisheries governance and global change: managing the unmanageable? Humans are a major force in global change, shaping ecosystem dynamics from local environments to the biosphere as a whole [43]. Thus, managing fisheries must take into account the interactions between different Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 2012, 4:344–350. stressors affecting biophysical and social subsystems from the local to the continental level [44,45]. Globalization of international markets and climate change, as well as the potential interactions between them, are critical stressors affecting LAC shellfisheries. International markets, globalization, roving bandits and shellfishery pirates. Small scale shellfisheries in developing countries are most vulnerable to the perverse incentives generated by the globalization of markets, because shellfish are highly valued worldwide. Indeed, unsustainable harvests in LAC shellfisheries during the 1980s and 1990s were exacerbated by the exponential increase in demand, coming mostly from developed countries where their own wild shellfish were previously overexploited or collapsed [16]. At first, the opening of foreign markets increased shellfish demand and generated higher employment and income for coastal communities. However, the growing demand and long-term increase in export prices (Figure 1), and easy access to stocks and open access regimes, triggered an exponential increase in fishing effort (even under diminishing catch rates), because of low operating costs. Therefore, shellfisheries were depleted much faster than the weak responses generated by regulatory agencies. Additionally, the ability of mobile agents to access unmanaged coasts, taking advantage of the open access systems and the poverty and vulnerability of communities, generated a sequential depletion pattern in LAC coastal shellfisheries in space and time [16,17] and the occurrence of the roving bandits’ phenomenon [46]: (1) depletion of formerly high-valued species caused a shift of effort onto formerly low-value species; (2) spatially expanding depletion of a single species, where traders pushed towards the selection of individual sizes below legal marketable sizes. These cascade effects caused several shellfishery collapses during the past three decades [17]. Nowadays, a new variety of roving bandit, the coastal shellfishery pirates, has come from abroad to trade directly and illegally with coastal shellfishers, taking advantage of the high intertemporal preferences in resource use and the willingness to pay high prices for shellfish. This illegal trade has accelerated changes in resource use motivated by profit, leading to stock depletion. The exponential increase in prices at low abundance levels observed in several LAC shellfisheries has generated an anthropogenic Allee effect, in which exploitation rates increase with decreasing population size [47]. This phenomenon is noticeable (yet difficult to document) in coastal shellfisheries in developing countries, because high unit prices associated with rarity largely exceed the low exploitation costs [48,49]. The loss of local shellfish creates long-term social and economic hardship, while profits flow from impoverished countries to luxury markets. Lessons learned from local policy www.sciencedirect.com.

(4) Shellfisheries management and governance models Defeo and Castilla 347. 2.0. 250. 150 100 50. Solid governance Co management. 1.0. 0.5. 0 1981. 1983. 1985. 1987. 1989. 1991. 1993. 1995. ENSO. 16 14. Mass mortalities. (b). 10 9 8. 12. 7. 10. 6. 8. 5 6. 4. 4. 3. 2. Density (ind/300 m2). 200. CPUE (ind/diver/h). 0. 80. Price per ton exported (US$ 103). 11. 18. 2 1 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009. Before governance transformation. Co-management. 1.7. (c). 160 1.2 120. 0.7. Price per unit (US$). Catch (t.103). 1.5. Price (US$ per kg). Weak governance. Mass mortalities. 200. (a). Fishery closure Governance transformation. Catch (t). CPUE (kg 10/fisher/h). Figure 1. 40. 0 1998. 0.2 2000. 2002. 2004. 2006. 2008. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability. Trends of some small-scale LAC coastal shellfisheries that summarize the main concepts discussed in this paper. Biophysical and economic responses to governance, market globalization and climate change in: (a) the yellow clam Mesodesma mactroides in Uruguay (adapted from [16]); (b) the surf clam Mesodesma donacium in Chile; (c) the sea cucumber in Galapagos (modified from [48,49]). In (b), the weak governance plus the occurrence of a strong warm ENSO event (1997–1998) that caused mass mortalities, drastically affected the surf clam fishery in Chile and Peru, where the fishery is still closed since 1999. In (a), the yellow clam had a strong recovery after a change in governance that resulted in a comanagement approach. However, the occurrence of mass mortalities as a result of increasing sea surface temperatures decimated populations throughout its range and determined a closed season that has been in place for more than 15 years. In (c), the sea cucumber from Galapagos has not recovered despite the implementation of co-management, denoting that there is not a blueprint for a single type of governance system that can be applied to all fisheries. In this case, lack of social cohesion, leadership and enforcement rules, together with illegal poaching and a willingness to pay high prices for the product affected the stock and the fishery.. www.sciencedirect.com. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 2012, 4:344–350.

(5) 348 Aquatic and marine systems. responses detailed earlier in this paper could be useful for coping with ‘roving bandits’ and ‘shellfishery pirates’: (1) at the local and national levels, self-enforced communities, supported by solid long-term state policies, could play a critical role in strengthening MCS capabilities; and (2) at the continental level, agencies are needed to provide real-time and regional-scale MCS of international trade [43,46].. Climate change and synergistic effects with fishing pressure. Climate change is a critical stressor for shellfish at multiple temporal and spatial scales [45,50,51]. Climate change may favor certain species over others and thereby modify the biogeography of shellfish stocks, their abundance and demographics, feeding, growth and behavioral patterns [50,52–54]. Rising temperatures may have different implications at different latitudes and for shellfish with different dispersive abilities and ranges [2,50,52]. Pelagic larval stages may be impacted directly by largescale, climate-driven changes to oceanographic systems. However, narrow-range endemic species without dispersive larval stages are particularly vulnerable to climate change. Interannual (e.g. El Niño Southern Oscillation: ENSO) and multidecadal (e.g. Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation) environmental variability associated with broad-scale oceanic climatic variations influence ocean features, impacting LAC shellfishes [50,54,55]. Synergistic effects between climate and fishing, particularly when coupled with weak governance under open access policies and a difficult governance capacity (governability), exacerbate climate-induced changes on shellfish. For example, ENSO events caused mass mortalities in the surf clam Mesodesma donacium in sandy beaches of Peru and Northern Chile (Figure 1b), which was exacerbated by unsustainable harvest levels and weak governance. In Peru, the fishery was closed in 1999, but the stock has still not recovered, suggesting that the ecosystem may have exceeded critical thresholds (tipping points) and shifted abruptly from one state to a contrasting state [56]. Mass shellfish mortalities driven by climate variability, which have been increasingly documented in South America [55,57], may swamp solid management measures and governance schemes, as in the yellow clam Mesodesma mactroides in Uruguay (Figure 1a). These events have been attributed to sustained temperature increments, harmful algal blooms and parasitism [55,58] and generated variations in community composition, simplification of food webs, a major occurrence of non-native species and distributional shifts [2,50]. Interactions between fishing and climate change affect ecosystems and governance structures at different scales [41,51,59]. Therefore, sustaining shellfish resources will require the implementation of resilient management and governance Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 2012, 4:344–350. systems under pressing conditions of global change and uncertainty.. Conclusions Most successful coastal shellfisheries in LAC occur in rather isolated sites with well-defined boundaries. However, Chile provides an example of long-term governability of coastal fisheries at a national-scale. The main problem in LAC is how to improve fisheries governability in less than ideal situations. Open access does not work, and this wicked problem needs to be addressed by rewarding local management with formal cross-scale governance recognition and support through the institutionalization of fishery rights. Adaptive co-management is needed to enforce operational regulations (e.g. quotas and minimum sizes) and to drive shellfish marketing, thus mitigating the deleterious effects of roving bandits and shellfishery pirates. The social valuation of coastal shellfisheries should be boosted by an active participation of all community members, notably including the empowerment of women, which in turn strengthens co-management arrangements [60]. Local administrations have a pivotal role in enhancing the capacity of user groups and civil society to cope with the tasks involved in shellfisheries governance and governability. At larger scales, the weak institutional arrangements for governing shellfish stocks in LAC need to be reinforced by developing adaptive forms of co-governance, including the dynamic assessment of cross-scale and cross-level governance interactions between institutions and stakeholders. This will also be essential to provide solid mitigation and adaptation measures to cope with the increasing uncertainty given by two critical stressors affecting LAC coastal shellfisheries: globalization of international markets and climate change.. Acknowledgements We thank the Pew Fellows Program in Marine Conservation for support. E. Celentano kindly helped us in the editorial process. JCC acknowledges financial support from ‘‘Arauco Chair in Ecology and Environmental Ethics’’.. References and recommended reading Papers of particular interest, published within the period of review, have been highlighted as: of special interest of outstanding interest 1.. Anderson SC, Flemming JM, Watson R, Lotze HK: Serial exploitation of global sea cucumber fisheries. Fish Fisher 2011, 12:317-339.. 2. . Beck MW, Brumbaugh RD, Airoldi L, Carranza A, Coen LD, Crawford C, Defeo O, Edgar GJ, Hancock B, Kay MC et al.: Oyster reefs at risk and recommendations for conservation, restoration and management. Bioscience 2011, 61:107-116. This review assesses the condition of oyster reefs across 144 bays and 44 ecoregions of the world, showing that more than 90% of them have been lost in bays and ecoregions. Overall, the paper estimates that 85% of oyster reefs have been lost globally. The paper identifies many costeffective solutions for conservation, restoration and fisheries management. www.sciencedirect.com.

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