China’s official counterterrorism discourse as a legitimating tool

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PhD Program in Human Sciences: Geography, Anthropology and African and Asian Studies Universidad Autónoma de Madrid

DOCTORAL THESIS

CHINA’S OFFICIAL COUNTERTERRORISM DISCOURSE AS A LEGITIMATING TOOL

Author: Belén García-Noblejas Floriano Directors: Dr. Mario Esteban Rodríguez Dr. Carola García-Calvo Rosell

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RESUMEN

Dado el carácter transnacional de la cuarta ola de terrorismo y su relación con el extremismo religioso, las Naciones Unidas se han propuesto desde 2006 reforzar los esfuerzos y el consenso internacional para prevenir el extremismo violento y el terrorismo internacional. La expansión de la influencia de China, así como su cada vez más evidente implicación en amenazas globales no tradicionales, plantean cuestiones respecto al posible impacto de sus medidas contra el terrorismo internacional, por lo que, para optimizar las posibilidades y eficiencia de la cooperación internacional en esta materia, es crucial lograr una comprensión mayor de la interpretación y reacción de China a la amenaza dentro de su contexto local, y de acuerdo con sus prioridades nacionales. La representación del terrorismo en China está enmarcada dentro de una amenaza tridimensional denominada los ¨Tres Demonios¨ (compuestas por el terrorismo, el separatismo y el extremismo). De acuerdo con la conceptualización y reacción de China ante la amenaza, los Estudios Críticos del Terrorismo se aplican como marco teórico para explorar su discurso oficial sobre el terrorismo como herramienta de legitimación del Partido Comunista de China (CPC por sus siglas en inglés), tanto a nivel nacional como internacional. En este sentido, el marco conceptual responde a un estudio de la evolución de las principales fuentes de legitimación del Partido desde el liderazgo de Mao Zedong. Partiendo del conocimiento teórico recogido a través de la revisión de la literatura previa, el paradigma de los Estudios Críticos sobre Terrorismo y los estudios sobre legitimidad en China, la investigación procede con el análisis holístico del discurso oficial. A través de una metodología sinérgica cuantitativa (Corpus Linguistics) y cualitativa (Critical Discourse Analysis), esta tesis presenta los principales resultados de un examen pormenorizado de dos fuentes principales: los informes oficiales de los Congresos Nacionales del Partido Comunista de China entre 1992 y 2017; y los Libros Blancos de Xinjiang entre 2002 y 2019. En general, esta investigación tiene como objetivo final proporcionar un análisis exhaustivo del discurso oficial de China sobre el terrorismo y su relación directa con el mantenimiento y promoción de la legitimidad del Partido como prioridad principal.

Palabras clave: Estudios Críticos sobre Terrorismo; terrorismo; antiterrorismo; Partido Comunista de China; Legitimidad; Análisis Crítico del Discurso; Lingüística del Corpus.

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ABSTRACT

Given the transnational nature of the fourth wave of terrorism and its relationship with religious extremism, the United Nations has proposed since 2006 to strengthen efforts and international consensus to prevent violent extremism and international terrorism. The expansion of China's influence, as well as its increasingly evident implication in non-traditional global threats, raised questions regarding the possible impact of its measures against international terrorism. Therefore, In order to optimize the possibilities and efficiency of international cooperation in this matter, it is crucial to gain a better understanding of China's interpretation and reaction to the threat within its local context, and in accordance with its national priorities. The representation of terrorism in China is framed within a three-dimensional threat called the "Three Evil Forces" (composed of terrorism, separatism and extremism). In accordance with China's conceptualization and reaction to the threat, Critical Terrorism Studies is applied as a theoretical framework to explore its official discourse on terrorism as a legitimizing tool for the Communist Party of China (CPC), both at the national and international levels. In this regard, the conceptual framework responds to a study of the evolution of the main sources of Party legitimacy since the leadership of Mao Zedong. Starting from the theoretical knowledge gathered through the previous literature review, the Critical Terrorism Studies paradigm, and studies on legitimacy in China, the research proceeds with a holistic analysis of the official discourse. Through a synergistic quantitative (Corpus Linguistics) and qualitative (Critical Discourse Analysis) methodology, this thesis presents the main results of a detailed examination of two main sources: the official reports of the National Congresses of the Communist Party of China between 1992 and 2017; and the Xinjiang White Papers between 2002 and 2019. Overall, this research ultimately aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of China's official discourse on terrorism and its direct relationship to maintaining and promoting Party legitimacy as a top priority.

Key terms: Critical Terrorism Studies; terrorism; counterterrorism; Communist Party of Chin;

Legitimacy; Critical Discourse Analysis; Corpus Linguistics.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The conclusion of a doctoral research represents an important landmark for any scholar. A landmark that is not always easy to understand for those around us. Therefore, in this section I would like to thank all those that have accompanied me during this challenging process.

To start with, I want to thank my PhD Directors, Prof. Mario Esteban Rodríguez and Prof. Carola García-Calvo for their trust in the potential of this research, their constant support and frequent wise advice. Their thorough attention did not only directly contribute to the improvement of this thesis, but also opened several opportunities to share its development, consequently strengthening both this research and my own academic experience.

I would also like to mention the PhD Program in Human Sciences: Geography, Anthropology and African and Asian Studies at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid and its Academic Committee for their regular attention.

Furthermore, I cannot disregard the contribution of those scholars that have served as indispensable academic reference, and who have kindly offered comments on crucial elements of this research. This way, I need to thank Prof. Richard Jackson, whose work on Critical Terrorism Studies is fundamental to this thesis, for his availability and encouraging comments; Prof. Alice Martini, whose remarks helped me to better direct my investigation; Prof. Van Leeuwen, who also kindly assisted me to solve methodological questions.

This PhD represents the fruit of a prolonged process rooted in my genuine curiosity in China, nourished by actual support from Chinese institutions. Therefore, this research project would not have flourished without the opportunity offered by the Shanghai International Studies University, where I completed my master’s degree on International Relations thanks to the financial support of a Chinese Government Scholarship. Particularly, I need to emphasize my gratitude to my teachers during those years, who provided me with a better understanding of China and its context.

Also, I feel grateful to my classmates in the master, who welcomed and accepted me as part of their family in a challenging environment. There is no doubt that my seven years-stay among appreciated teachers, classmates and colleagues in Shanghai and Beijing stimulated my aspiration to contribute to a greater understanding of this country.

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My ambition to obtain a Mention as International PhD would not have been possible without the unquestionable support of Prof. Philippe Claret, Directeur de l’équipe Centre Montesquieu de Recherches Politiques (IRM-CMRP) at the University of Bordeaux. Even though it had to be finally postponed, also, I would like to thank the predisposition of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and particularly, Prof. Tim Summers, who kindly extended an invitation to join their Centre for China Studies as a visiting PhD Candidate. Such opportunity, which will hopefully be reconducted in the near future, would not have been delayed without a powerful reason, which leads to my acknowledgement of Universidad Francisco de Vitoria, and specially Victor Cortizo, Director of the Degree of International Relations. This institution has been the engine of my academic experience in the last three years, providing a safe environment for my development as a scholar. It is also in this university where I found invaluable support from other colleagues and scholars, such as Prof. Sonia Sánchez, Prof. Javier Redondo or Prof. Diego Martínez, among many others.

In addition, several other institutions have welcomed my contribution to their conferences, offering me a precious context to share the developments of my research, therefore actively fomenting its refinement. This way, I would like to emphasize the Scottish Center for China Research and its Postgraduate Newtwork, in Glasgow University, where I had the chance to have enlightening discussions with Prof. Jonathan Sullivan; also, the Institute of Asian Studies in the Faculty of Arts at Charles University, Prague, where the encouragement of Prof. Jan Sykora, Prof. Olga Lomová, Prof. Dominik Mierzejewski, Prof. Blai Guarné or Prof. Fabienne Jagou cannot be overlooked.

Finally, I cannot conclude these acknowledgements without reinforcing the emotional support provided by my mother, who has always patiently stood by my side during this process. I thank my father for his discreet but unquestionable support. My uncle, Prof. Gabriel García-Noblejas, inspiration and support both in the professional and personal domains.

To Daniel, who has loyally held my hand to the end of this process.

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vii LIST OF TABLES

- Table 1. Complete Corpus

- Table 2. Corpus of NCCPC Reports

- Table 3. 1992–2017 NCCPC: 30 Most Frequent Five-Grams - Table 4. 1992–2017 NCCPC: 30 Most Frequent Lexical Items

- Table 5. 1992–2017 NCCPC: Relative Frequency of the Most Frequent Nouns - Table 6. 1992–2017 NCCPC: Immediate Clusters of “Party”

- Table 7. 1992–2017 NCCPC: KWIC of “Party and” (10-Item Span to the Right of the Node)

- Table 8. 1992–2017 NCCPC: Collocations of “Development” to Left and Right (Two-Word Span: 20 Repetition Threshold)

- Table 9. 1992–2017 NCCPC: Collocations of “Development of”

- Table 10. 1992–2017 NCCPC: Collocations of “People”

- Table 11. 1992–2017 NCCPC: KWIC of “People” (10-Word Span to Left and Right)

- Table 12. 1992–2017 NCCPC: Chronological Application and Evolution of “Terror-,” “Separat-,” and

“Extrem-” (and Derived Terms)

- Table 13. 1992–2017 NCCPC: Collocations of “Terrorism”

- Table 14. 1992–2017 NCCPC: KWIC of “Terrorist”

- Table 15. 1992–2017 NCCPC: KWIC of “Separatist”

- Table 16. 1992–2017 NCCPC: KWIC of “Religious”

- Table 17. 1992–2017 NCCPC: KWIC of “Religions”

- Table 18. 2003–2019 Xinjiang White Papers: 10 Most Frequent Five-Grams

- Table 19. 2009 Xinjiang White Paper: Collocations to the Right of the Five-Gram “the East Turkistan Forces Have”

- Table 20. 2003–2019 Xinjiang White Papers: 10 Most Frequent Nouns

- Table 21. 2003–2019 Xinjiang White Papers: Most Common Collocations of “Government”

- Table 22. 2003–2019 Xinjiang White Papers: Most Common Nouns and Verbs to the Right of

“Central/Chinese Government” and “Local/Xinjiang Government”

- Table 23. 2003–2019 Xinjiang White Papers: Most Frequent Adjectives

- Table 24. 2003–2019 Xinjiang White Papers: Occurrences of Terms Related to Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism

- Table 25. 2003–2019 Xinjiang White Papers: Distribution of “Terroris-,” “Separatis-,” and

“Extremis-” by Chapter

- Table 26. 2003–2019 Xinjiang White Papers: Immediate Clusters to Left and Right of “Terrorism”

- Table 27. 2003–2019 Xinjiang White Papers: Collocations to the Right of “Terrorism and”

- Table 28. 2003–2019 Xinjiang White Papers: Collocations of “Extremism”

- Table 29. 2003–2019 Xinjiang White Papers: KWIC of “United Nations”

- Table 30. 2003–2019 Xinjiang White Papers: Collocations to the Left of “Extremism”

- Table 31. 2003–2019 Xinjiang White Papers: KWIC of “Extremism in”

- Table 32. 2003–2019 Xinjiang White Papers: KWIC of “Extremism is”

- Table 33. 2003–2019 Xinjiang White Papers: KWIC of “Extremism has”

- Table 34. 2003–2019 Xinjiang White Papers: KWIC of “Separatism and”

- Table 35. 2003–2019 Xinjiang White Papers: Collocations of “Separatism”

- Table 36. Comparison of Materials Selected for Qualitative Analysis.

- Table 37. 2003–2019 Xinjiang White Papers: Resulting Codes and References

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viii LIST OF FIGURES

- Figure 1. Global Terrorism Index 2022

- Figure 2. China's contributions to UN peacekeeping missions in Africa as of April 2019 - Figure 3. “Authorization”: Extracted from Van Leeuwen (2008)

- Figure 4. Classification of Lexical and Syntactic Categories Considered for Critical Discourse Analysis in this Research. (Researcher’s own)

- Figure 5. 1992–2017 NCCPC: Immediate Clusters of “Party”

- Figure 6. 1992–2017 NCCPC: 50 Most Frequent Collocations of “Party” (Five-Term Span to Left and Right)

- Figure 7. 1992–2017 NCCPC: Most Common Collocations of “Party and” (Five-Term Span to the Right: 20 Repetition Threshold)

- Figure 8. 1992–2017 NCCPC: Collocations of “Development” to Left and Right (Two-Word Span: 20 Repetition Threshold)

- Figure 9. 1992–2017 NCCPC: Most Common Collocations of “and Development”

- Figure 10. 1992–2017 NCCPC: Collocations of “People” (Five-Word Span: 50 Repetition Threshold) - Figure 11. 1992–2017 NCCPC: Evolution of “Terror”-Derived Terms

- Figure 12. 1992–2017: Most Frequent Collocations of “Religious”

- Figure 13. 2003–2019 Xinjiang White Papers: Word Cloud of Most Frequent Terms - Figure 14. 2003–2019 Xinjiang White Papers: Clusters of “Government”

- Figure 15. 2003–2019 Xinjiang White Papers: Application and Evolution of “Terroris-,” “Separatis-,”

and “Extremis-,”

- Figure 16. 2003–2019 Xinjiang White Papers: “Terrorism”: Immediate Clusters to Left and Right - Figure 17. 2003–2019 Xinjiang White Papers: Collocations to the Right of “Terrorism and”

- Figure 18. 2003–2019 Xinjiang White Papers: Collocations of “Extremism”

- Figure 19. 2003–2019 Xinjiang White Papers: Collocations to the Left of “Extremism”

- Figure 20. 2003–2019 Xinjiang White Papers: Collocations of “Extremism in”

- Figure 21. 2003–2019 Xinjiang White Papers: Collocations of “Separatism”

- Figure 22. NVivo Print Screen During Analysis of the White Paper Titled, The Fight Against Terrorism and Extremism and Human Rights Protection in Xinjiang (Published in March 2019) - Figure 23. 2003–2019 Xinjiang White Papers: Classification of Threats (Researcher’s own creation) LIST OF ANNEXES

- Annex 1a. Participant / Agents / Providers and Protectors - Annex 1b. Participants / Agents / Threats

- Annex 1c. Participants / Recipients / Beneficiaries - Annex 1d. Participants / Recipients / Victims - Annex 2a. Goals / Legitimate / Positive - Annex 2b. Goals / Illegitimate / Negative - Annex 3a. Means / Legitimate

- Annex 3b. Means / Illegitimate - Annex 4. Legitimating Tools

- Annex 4a. Moral Evaluation / Positive - Annex 4b. Moral Evaluation / Negative

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ix LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations BRI: Belt and Road Initiative

CDA: Critical Discourse Analysis CL: Corpus Linguistics

CPC: Communist Party of China CTS: Critical Terrorism Studies ETIP: East Turkistan Islamic Party ETIM: East Turkistan Islamic Movement EU: European Union

FOCAC: Forum on China-Africa Cooperation ISIS: Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

KWIC: Keyword in Context

MENA: Middle East and North Africa

NCCPC: National Congress of the Communist Party of China OSCE: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe PRC: People’s Republic of China

SCO: Shanghai Cooperation Organization TIP: Turkistan Islamic Party

UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization XUAR: Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region

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I. INTRODUCTION

1) Relevance of this Research

During her visit to Beijing in April 2017 for the EU–China Strategic Dialogue, Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and Vice- President of the European Commission, highlighted the increasing importance of the European Union (EU) and China “work [-ing] together on challenges related to peacekeeping, counter-piracy and counterterrorism” (Mogherini, April 19, 2017). Given the transnational nature of the fourth wave of terrorism and its association with religious extremism, the UN has, since 2006, aimed to reinforce collective international efforts to prevent international terrorism and violent extremism.¹ China’s growing international influence, as well as its increasing implication in non-traditional global threats, raise questions about the potentially significant impact of its counterterrorism efforts.² Despite the importance of international cooperation in managing terrorism, efficient collaboration has been impeded by disagreements between China and liberal powers on the definition of and approach to terrorism (Richards, 2019), which stem from different ideologies, national interests, and priorities. Consequently, to optimize the opportunities for, and efficiency of, international cooperation in this regard, it is crucial to achieve a clearer understanding of China’s interpretation and response to the threat within the context of its local priorities.

On October 28, 2013, a sports utility vehicle (SUV) drove into Tiananmen Square in Beijing, killing five people and injuring 38. Government officials and Chinese state media described the attack as an act of terrorism that was linked to ethnic separatism and religious extremism in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR). This attack marked a new stage in China’s counterterrorism strategy (Gohel, 2014). It prompted several questions for the researcher, which eventually led to this thesis. The researcher has a fundamental interest in intercultural communication and how it is utilized in different disciplines—particularly international security—

1 The UN’s Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (September 8, 2006) and Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (December 24, 2015).

2 Note that this research adopts a critical approach to terrorism studies and will, therefore, ultimately expand on the knowledge of the CPC’s understanding of domestic terrorist threats as part of the international trend of religious terrorism.

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to promote more fruitful international cooperation, which is inspired by a necessity to approach the particular case of China from a domestic perspective and avoid, as much as possible, personal biases.

Initially, the researcher aimed to study China’s counterterrorism measures, as other scholars have previously done—thus, explore China’s response to its national “terrorist” threat—however, certain aspects of the matter ultimately discouraged this approach. First, given the Communist Party of China’s (henceforth CPC or “the Party”) management of controversial issues such as terrorism, descriptive research on China’s terrorism threat and its counterterrorism measures would not necessarily make a valuable or novel contribution to the field. The researcher has previously examined China’s understanding and reaction to security affairs, which inspired the exploration of China’s response to “terrorism” according to its understanding of the term (as one of the “Three Evil Forces,” alongside extremism and separatism).³ Several months of systematic research on China’s response to the Three Evil Forces confirmed the obscurity of this subject online: most native, digital sources on acts of terrorism prior to the events on September 11, 2001 (henceforth 9/11) required special permission to access or they were no longer available.

Furthermore, the sources that were accessible were not categorized coherently, which made systematic data collection extremely difficult for an individual researcher with limited resources.

Consequently, the blurred conceptualization and application of the Three Evil Forces before 9/11 obscured the Chinese government’s response and altered the researcher’s perspective. To make the most of open and public official sources, the main objective shifted toward gaining a deeper understanding of the Party’s official discourse on terrorism. Within this context, the application of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) seemed to be the most suitable theoretical framework for this research. The very conceptualization of terrorism as one of the Three Evil Forces implies a subjective interpretation of the threat: one that aligns with China’s political model and the Party’s priorities. Therefore, by using the CTS framework, the discourse analysis aims to explore China’s official counterterrorism discourse as a legitimating tool that is used at three different levels: first, to legitimate the assimilation of Xinjiang’s separatism into international terrorism; second, to legitimate the Party’s leadership in Xinjiang as a counter-separatist measure itself—depicting the Party as the only leader capable of maintaining the territorial integrity of the People’s Republic of

3 The concept of the Three Evil Forces is further explored in the literature review and problem statement of this thesis.

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China (PRC); and third, to legitimate the Party’s measures in Xinjiang as direct contributions to the global fight against terrorism and extremism. This consequently legitimates the Party’s role as a leader: nationally, as a protector of territorial integrity and security; and, internationally, as a global power. Understanding how the Chinese authorities utilize counterterrorist discourse as a legitimating tool will require deeper knowledge of the Party’s priorities (in terms of the protection of its hegemony and political stability).

Thus, this research focuses on the examination of China’s official discourse on terrorism as a legitimating tool for the CPC’s leadership, according to its own understanding of and response to the threat within its domestic context (based on its own system, priorities, norms, and strategic traditions). Discourse analysis is a suitable methodology that, by making use of easily accessible materials (open sources), allows the development of feasible, reliable, and robust research. In this regard, this research applies a synergistic methodology between quantitative Corpus Linguistics (CL) and qualitative Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which complement each other to produce stronger and more reliable interpretations.

It is important to highlight that, although this research aims to offer a deeper understanding of the legitimating role of China’s counterterrorism discourse, it does not aim to evaluate it. As Böckle (1986) asserts, “The first and most important prerequisite of dialogue is the knowledge of the thinking and motives of the other person” (Böckle, 1986, p. 264). Therefore, the aim of this study is ultimately to provide an objective analysis of China’s official discourse on terrorism and its connection to the Party’s priorities and motives, in order to offer potentially useful insight that can optimize the West’s collaboration with China in matters of international security.

a) China’s Increasing Influence: Geopolitical Concerns

International threats to security are on the rise. The term globalization implies a growing interdependence between nations, and, along with it, a necessity to cooperate in order to manage threats that affect everyone. Diminishing the impact of global threats, such as pandemics, climate change, or international terrorism, require greater coordination between nations. Within this context, different domestic priorities and international rivalry for hegemony can hinder constructive agreements. Fundamental differences (normative or pragmatic) may further impede effective international collaboration against shared threats, such as international terrorism, where

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differences in the response can be detrimental to long-term solutions.

According to Bigo (2012), the conceptualization of international security was directly influenced by 9/11, which added greater significance and urgency to the threat of international terrorism.

However, 9/11 also allowed political elites to construct a new narrative on international threats and assimilate domestic conflicts to the Global War on Terror.⁴ The veracity of this assertion (which will be discussed at a later stage in this research) aside, international policies and regional cooperation have a direct impact on international security; therefore, genuine knowledge of the foundations of particular domestic beliefs are a good starting point for any potential international cooperation. In this regard, discourse analysis can be useful in approaching security affairs from a more concrete basis, thereby revealing fundamental national motivations. Thus, the compelling element is not the veracity of this global threat, but the information on domestic interests that is obscured in counterterrorism discourse.

In addition to the increasing awareness of the impact and spread of international terrorism, this research is also important in terms of raising concerns about China’s regional and international rise, especially for the US, who views China as a substantial threat to its global economic and political hegemony (Allison, 2017). These concerns have resulted in research on the implications that China’s rise would have for international security. In this regard, it is worth highlighting both the impact of China’s rise as a global power and, especially, its influence on the development of Asian regionalism, which is becoming increasingly prominent. In the last decade, China has realized that international and regional engagement through multilateral institutions can have objective benefits beyond merely countering the US presence in the region (Chung, 2005).

Through regional institutionalization by means of different organizations and multilateral initiatives, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China is expanding its international influence. This has raised concerns in the international community, particularly the Global North. China’s influence on regional and global counterterrorism measures necessitates exploration, particularly in terms of its interpretation of and response to terrorism. This inquiry provides an epistemic foundation for prognosticating possible scenarios and advancing cooperation strategies that could benefit the sustainability of

4 A counterterrorism campaign launched by the USA and its allies after 9/11.

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international security.

Thus, this research is relevant for three reasons. First, China’s rising influence, especially in Africa and the Asia-Pacific region, has prompted international concerns among countries with strong interests in the region, such as Japan, India, and the US. The EU is particularly concerned about China’s increasing influence in Africa. Since the founding of the PRC in 1949, the CPC has had to protect its national and international legitimacy, as will be explored in the conceptual framework in this study. Therefore, its economic development, efficiency, and increasing international influence have been built on nationalism. This tendency, marked by increasing nationalism and self-interest, as well as an excessively confrontational approach, may be interpreted as threatening, negatively affecting its image as a responsible global power and, consequently, damaging its legitimacy in the international community (Westad, 2018). Therefore, China’s official discourse on terrorism, and its links to international terrorism, is a relevant case study for exploring different national and international legitimating tools as crucial elements in the Party’s leadership.

Second, from a non-traditional security perspective, Africa and Asia are the focal points of most terrorist activities in the world. China’s direct influence on these regions—through initiatives such as the BRI, the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), and organizations such as the SCO—are undeniable. Organizations and initiatives such as these have strengthened the bonds between China and certain countries in Africa and Asia through economic cooperation, and they have established an affinity in the field of non-traditional security threats such as terrorism, environmental protection, asymmetrical development, pandemics, and energy security. Regional cooperation requires a leading voice and China is aiming toward fulfilling that role, raising skepticism in the Global North and leading Asian countries. Non-traditional security threats, such as terrorism, are pointed out as a crucial cooperation field in Asia, which can improve China’s image, increase its strategic influence in the region, and reshape international norms and institutions (Gong, 2020). Therefore, this concerns liberal democracies owing to the potential rise of an alternative world order, represented by a range of different fundamental values. However, as some scholars have pointed out, a balanced multilateral world order may be beneficial for the EU (Dent, 2009). An exploration of China’s reaction to terrorism can therefore offer insight into its main priorities and provide more in-depth knowledge of its background, which could ultimately inform the EU’s approach to the region.

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Third, this thesis aims to fill a void in the field of CTS through a reflexive analysis on the very conceptualization and legitimating role of the term “terrorism” in China, an underrepresented actor in the field. Most of the contributions to the field stem from, and center around, the Global North (Jackson et al., 2019). Therefore, the researcher is also responding to the expressed need of publications about the Global South for a more precise understanding of this generally neglected perspective.

The following section examines China’s engagement in regions that are currently considered international terrorism hotspots.

b) China’s Involvement in Current Global Terrorism Hotspots

China’s growing presence in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, and South and Southeast Asia has brought it closer to the hotspots of international terrorist activity. China’s contribution to the maintenance of stability and security in these regions is not only presented as a duty that legitimates its role as a responsible power but also as a necessity to protect its own economic and strategic interests. China’s involvement in global terror hubs can be illustrated by a comparison between its foreign investments and the current principal nuclei of terrorist activity.

As seen in Figure 1 below, according to the 2022 Global Terrorism Index of the Institute for Economics and Peace, the majority of fatalities provoked by terrorism between 2007 and 2021 occurred in Southeast Asia, the MENA region, and sub-Saharan Africa. Especially since the launch of the BRI in 2013, Chinese outward direct investments (ODIs) have exponentially raised, reaching 2.2 USD trillion in 2019. Most of China’s foreign investments are in medium or high-risk countries (Yuan, 2021). China’s investments in these regions are increasingly important, especially in MENA which took the lead as the main recipient of China’s BRI in 2018 (Molavi, 2019).

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7 Figure 1. Global Terrorism Index 2022

China's investment and cooperation with Africa has been growing steadily since 1990 (Stein &

Uddhammar, 2021). In 2003, direct investment from China into Africa increased from 74.8 million to 5.4 billion in 2018, reaching 4.2 billion in 2020 (suffering a slight cut due to Covid-19) (Fu, Novemeber 22, 2021). Also, China has developed formal defense collaboration through the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)⁵, driven by its need to protect and advance its diplomatic and economic interests in the region. In this context, China’s evolving implication in the Sahel (hotspot of the worlds’s fastest growing and most deadly terrorist movements, according to the Global Terrorist Index report in 2022), may have a serious impact on the stability of the region in the mid-long term. China’s interests in the region both contribute to its economic ambitions, while are also expected to contribute to its image as a responsible international leader. During the Eighth Ministerial Conference of the China-Africa forum, held in Dakar in October the 29th, 2021, Senegalese Foreign Minister Aïssata Tall Sall asked China to get involved in the Sahel conflict.

Despite China’s traditional reluctance to get involved in internal matters, China's implication in

5 The Forum on China and Africa Cooperation, born in 2000, has increased Sino-African trade more than for times since then. Apart from its economic and security objectives, this Chinese-led cooperation hub also aims at raising the voice of developing countries in the global arena (Shelton & Paruk, December 2009).

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Africa, and particularly in the Sahel, for example, in Mali, has been increasing through peacekeeping operations.

Figure 2. China's contributions to UN peacekeeping missions in Africa as of April 2019.

Source: EPRS based on https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data and https://www.unmissions.org/

Also, China actively supports the Sahel G5⁶, sending financial support of $45.56 million in 2019.

These security and defense engagement in the region do not only provide security to its own interests in the region, but also provides China with an opportunity to test "its military apparatus, with counterterrorism and infrastructure protection remaining the two key elements of the Chinese security engagement in the Sahel" (Leigh, December 10th, 2021). Thus, China's growing influence and interest in the Sahel, and its direct growing implication in security matters in the region represent an important aspect to take into account due to its mid- and long-term impact on terrorism and counterterrorism.

6 G5 Sahel is an international institutional framework born in February 2014 composed by Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad. According to its official website, its main objectives consist on guaranteeing security and development among their member states, protecting the life conditions of their people through a sustainable and inclusive regional development (G5 Sahel official website: https://www.g5sahel.org/le-g5-sahel-2/).key

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Through the Belt and Road Initiative, China has also steadily increased its presence in the MENA Region. Energy security represents one of the main reasons behind China's growing cooperation with countries like Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Iraq, and the UAE. Furthermore, also due to their energy resources, as well as China’s strategic interests, its involvement in greatly unstable regions such as Iraq and Syria have also increased. In this context, it is also important to understand the geopolitical dynamics and tensions behind China's economic and military growth in the region.

The United States sanctions against these two countries, as well as its recent withdrawal from Afghanistan, leaves space for China to build up its alliances with crucial regions for its energy security. However, greater presence of China in the Middle East has been revealing important challenges for China's security prospects in the region. Particularly, an evolving rhetoric from the Islamic State-Khorasan (an Afghanistan-based branch of the Islamic State) has been evidenced through a published article in English in the Voice of Khorasan⁷, accusing China of imperial overreach, and comparing the Belt and Road initiative to Western colonization in the 19th century (Ma, Haiyun, Oct 19th, 2022). Therefore, even though the attention to China from Islamist movements had seemed low-profile since 2017, the tendency may be changing. Keeping track on China’s response to regional changes seems crucial considering its potential impact on the emerging regional security dynamics (Moonakal, July 09, 2022).

Finally, the impact and expansion in Southeast Asia imply greater links with unstable regions such as Myanmar which, according to the Global Terrorist Index 2022, experienced the largest increase in terrorist attacks since 2018.

Considering these figures, it becomes clear that China’s main investments are currently focused precisely on conflictive or unstable regions, where terrorist movements are remarkably active already, or on the rise. Although only a small number of attacks were explicitly directed against Chinese policies, Chinese interests and citizens abroad have been victims of terrorist activities (Duchâtel, 2016),⁸ especially in Pakistan (Basit & Pantucci, 2021) and Afghanistan (Chia & Vater,

7 The Voice of Khorasan is an online magazine produced by the Islamic State Khorasan Province, including different political and religious issues. According to Webber (May 6, 2022), it is aimed at “promot [ing] causes championed by ISKP and the broader Islamic State movement, while also maligning their respective enemies”. Therefore, it serves to promote ISKP’s priorities and attract international support to its cause.

8 To consult Duchâtel’s entire table containing the year, country, number of Chinese nationals killed in the incident, as well as further details thereon, refer to Duchâtel (2016).

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2022), leading to increasing concerns among China’s leadership regarding the country’s exposure to terrorism.

The growing economic interests of China in these regions naturally implies the need to promote a security strategy to protect such interests, which may imply the Chinese military presence (Kooshki and Ramenazi, 2022). Therefore, on the one hand, China’s investments can promote mutually beneficial economic outcomes for all counterparts, and, from a Chinese perspective, it also contributes to its geopolitical influence (which may lead to increasing concerns in liberal democracies); and, on the other hand, it is more exposed to terrorist attacks, which requires greater security measures in the region. The political systems of China’s most relevant partners in the MENA region (Pakistan, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia), as well as in Africa, share certain fundamental values and interests with China, which eases the implementation of bilateral and multilateral counterterrorist measures that directly influence the evolution of terrorist groups. China’s interests and influence in the MENA region, Southeast Asia, and Africa make it a crucial partner in combating the expansion of existing terrorist groups, as well as the emergence of new ones.

In 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) encouraged the direct involvement of Uyghur militants, thereby blending China’s domestic Uyghur separatism and international terrorism and increasing China’s concerns about the impact of international terrorism on its interests, both domestically and abroad. Despite the greater international visibility of ISIS, the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP)⁹ is, in fact, a greater recruitment hub for Uyghur militants (Soliev, 2017), which indicates that Uyghurs’ militants relate more to separatist ambitions against the PRC under the leadership of the CPC in Xinjiang, instead of global jihad. However, ISIS’s recruitment of Uyghur militants, as well as its direct threat to China in 2017 in the propaganda video titled, “Children of the Caliphate,” proved that China was a direct target of international terrorism (Soliev, 2017).

Consequently, China’s involvement in countering transnational terrorism has become increasingly important, not only because of its increased exposure to attacks in particularly vulnerable regions, which directly affects its economic and strategic interests, but also due to the links between

9 The Turkistan Islamic Party, formerly known as the East Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIP), was listed by the Chinese government as the most prominent Uyghur terrorist group aiming at the secession of the XUAR and the establishment of an independent East Turkistan (Li Wei et al., 2019).

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international terrorism and domestic insurgency in Xinjiang.¹⁰ In this regard, as this study will indicate, China’s focus on both domestic and international terrorism increases again from 2013, when terrorist attacks in China became more prevalent and the Uyghur cause in Xinjiang drew the attention of ISIL (ISIS as per 2014).

Thus, increasing attention to China as a key power, especially in those regions where terrorism is most active, has become imperative. China’s increasing exposure to terrorism, as well as the global implications of China’s increasing foreign investment and geopolitical moves have caught the world’s attention, particularly the evolution of the situation and its impact on international security.

Several scholars have already explored this subject, conducting a wide range of research on China’s response to terrorism, especially after 2015 (Chan et al., 2011; Choudhary, 2002; Clarke, 2017; Duchâtel & Ekman, 2015; Evron, 2007; Greitens et al., 2020; Holmes, 2014; Jai, 2016;

Murphy, 2017; Naarajärvi, 2012; Pokalova, 2015; Roberts, 2012; Smith Finley, 2019; Tanner &

Bellacqua, 2016;Tredaniel & Lee , 2017; Zhao & Hu, 2013; Zhou, 2017; Zhu, 2011). However, most of them focus on China’s response to the threat, while few explore China’s counterterrorism rhetoric for deeper insight (Clarke, 2018; Dwyer, 2005; Jai, 2016; Roberts, 2012; Trédaniel & Lee, 2017). Becoming familiar with China’s main priorities through a comprehensive study of its counterterrorism discourse allows for the objective prediction of potential international scenarios that may have a direct impact on international security.

2) Research Design

a) Main hypotheses

While the entire analysis ultimately aims to prove a primary hypothesis, related to China’s official counterterrorism as a legitimating tool, this investigation explores a collection of secondary hypotheses and questions. As explained in the methodology chapter in this thesis (Chapter V), the analysis gradually deciphers China’s counterterrorism discourse, discovering within it a variety of legitimating tools. While the literature review (chapter II), theoretical (chapter III), and conceptual

10 Note that the bonds between Uyghurs from the southern Xinjiang region and foreign Islamic militants date back to 1986, when some of them joined the anti-communist jihad in Afghanistan (Bhattacharya, 2003). China’s preventive measures gained momentum after 2013, coinciding with a peak in Uyghur terrorist attacks (e.g., the Tiananmen attack in 2013 and Kunming attack in 2014) and ISIS’s recruitment of Uyghur militants in 2014 (and eventual direct threat in 2017) (Greitens et al., 2020; Li et al., 2019; Roberts, 2012; Xinjiang white papers, 2015–2019; Zhou, 2017).

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(chapter IV) frameworks in this thesis raised a set of preliminary expectations, the actual analysis did not only expect to provide empirical evidence to prove or refute those, but also contributed to a more comprehensive understanding of the Party’s counterterrorism discourse, its motivations, and key elements. Thus, secondary hypotheses and research questions not only confirm and strengthen the primary hypothesis, but they also provide detailed answers that enrich the results of this study. Overall, it is expected that the official counterterrorism discourse will reflect the opportunity that the crisis presents to reframe the Party as the most capable leader in China, thus gaining further trust and support (Dickson, 2016; Holbig & Gilley, 2010). However, the level of support depends on the priorities of the audience and, consequently, the discourse is expected to reveal a blend of suited elements aimed at gaining the trust of internal Party elites¹¹, as well as popular audiences in the regional, national and, overall, international¹² spheres. Thus, this section expands on the questions explored throughout this research with the aim of proving the primary hypothesis and providing further information on the specific rhetorical elements that legitimate the Party and its counterterrorism measures in front of different audiences.

To clarify the complex set of hypotheses in this research, they have been distributed in the hierarchical map at the end of this section. To start with, this research could be divided into two main groups of original secondary hypotheses, related to two main audiences: first, (I) the Party’s official counterterrorism discourse will aim at boosting its legitimacy in front of the international audience; and second, (II) the Party’s official counterterrorism discourse will aim at boost its legitimacy in front of a national audience. At an international level, the discourse will frame the Party’s struggle in Xinjiang as part of the international struggle against terrorism (hypothesis I.1) (Dwyer, 2005; Roberts, 2012; Tanner & Bellacqua, 2016; Trédaniel & Lee, 2017; Zhou, 2017). In this regard, the analysis expects to prove the legitimating effect of 9/11 (hypothesis I.1.a). The objective is to find empirical evidence of how 9/11 represents a turning point in China’s conceptualization of terrorism also in China, with the expectation of discovering a shift in the Global War on Terror, promoted by the Bush administration after 9/11. Therefore, after 9/11, the

11 Note how, despite being aware of the importance of Party legitimacy among its own elites (internal Party legitimacy), the researcher is overall focused on popular legitimacy (international and national). Nevertheless, throughout the analysis, the researcher will aim at pointing out those legitimating elements that may particularly be directed towards Party members. Future research could be specially focused on the analysis of internal legitimacy tools.

12 Note how counterterrorism discourse will aim at legitimating the Party and its measures in front of (potentially) dissenting voices, particularly liberal democratic audiences.

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discourse is expected to become increasingly assertive, frequent, and homogeneous, focused mainly on Xinjiang. Furthermore, this focus on Xinjiang is expected to be legitimated by the UN’s and US’s recognition of ETIM as a terrorist organization in 2002 (Becquelin, 2004; Eshanova &

Pannier, 2002;Giglio, 2004; Millward, 2004; Roberts, 2012, 2018), as well as the group’s alleged connections to Al-Qaeda (Xinhuanet, December 15, 2003) (hypothesis I.1.b).

Subsequently, under the same secondary hypothesis (I), the discourse analysis is expected to reveal national and international turning points (hypothesis I.2), such as the 2008/2009 unrest (Famularo, 2018; Smith Finley, 2019; Greitens et al., 2020; Julienne, 2021; Roberts, 2012; Rodríguez-Merino, 2016), the establishment of the Islamic State in 2013, and the 2013/2014 attacks in China (Famularo, 2018; Smith Finley, 2019; Greitens et al., 2020; Julienne, 2021; Klimeš, 2018; Zhou, 2017). In this regard, Smith Finley (2019) and Klimeš (2018) highlight the increased emphasis on

“stability” since 2014. The analysis is expected to provide evidence of these shifts within the discourse.

Furthermore, the official discourse is expected to emphasize those elements that are common in the international discourse (hypothesis I.3). With regard to the Three Evil Forces (separatism, terrorism, and extremism), terrorism and extremism are expected to be prominent in the discourse (hypothesis I.3.a) (Famularo, 2018; Greitens et al., 2020; Li et al., 2019). Considering the increased interpretation of religious extremism as the root cause of separatism, the discourse is expected to focus specifically on religion, particularly during Xi’s leadership (Famularo, 2018; Greitens et al., 2020; Li et al., 2019). Conversely, for reasons of legitimacy and the potential polemic that an explicit terrorist-separatist relationship could give rise to, especially in liberal democracies, the researcher expects (particularly within the context of Xinjiang) that the interrelation between terrorism and separatism would be relatively discreet. This thesis further explores the conceptualization of “separatism” and how it is related to terrorism and extremism within the official discourse. Furthermore, the discourse is expected (hypothesis I.4) to emphasize the Party’s compliance to international norms, thereby protecting the legitimacy of the Party and its measures in front of liberal democracies. Considering the increasing emphasis on religious extremism as a differentiating mark of identity (Giglio, 2004; Rodríguez-Merino, 2016) and a root cause of terrorism (Famularo, 2018; Greitens et al., 2020; Li et al., 2019)—as well as its link to the root of international terrorism—the discourse is expected to reveal significant emphasis on religious

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extremism, both to mitigate threatening identity markers and promote international support for counterterrorism, therefore contributing to the Party’s international legitimacy. Nonetheless, a thorough analysis of the threat categorization is expected to serve as justification for certain measures. Particularly, the analysis will aim to explore (hypothesis I.4.a) the elements that legitimate and justify controversial measures, such as the officially named “vocational education and training centers”¹³ in Xinjiang. In this regard, the researcher expects to find an emphasis on preventive measures through a categorization of the threat as extremism (Becquelin, 2004;

Bovingdon, 2002; Clarke, 2018; Dwyer, 2005; Famularo, 2018; Giglio, 2004; Greitens et al., 2020;

Purbrick, 2017; Rodríguez-Merino, 2016; Tanner & Bellacqua, 2016; Trédaniel & Lee, 2017;

Wayne, 2009; Zhou, 2018).

Despite these euphemisms and official justifications, the Party has been accused of implementing discriminatory and repressive measures to assimilate ethnic groups in Xinjiang to the Han majority (Becquelin, 2004; Chung, 2005; Dwyer, 2006; Giglio, 2004; Greitens et al., 2020; Zhang & Du, 2010). Thus, to protect the Party’s image, the official counterterrorism discourse is expected to (hypothesis I.5) deliberately counter these through an emphasis on freedom and equal rights centered around identity, especially with regard to aspects such as language or religion (Becquelin, 2004; Bovingdon, 2002; Clarke, 2018; Dwyer, 2005; Famularo, 2018; Giglio, 2004; Greitens et al., 2020; Purbrick, 2017; Rodríguez-Merino, 2016; Tanner & Bellacqua,2016; Trédaniel & Lee, 2017; Wayne, 2009; Zhou, 2017).

Since a positive international image can help boosting national popular and internal Party legitimacy, some of these tools will also contribute to the second set of secondary hypotheses, consisting on (II) the Party’s official counterterrorism discourse as a national legitimating tool, and divided into two secondary hypothesis. In the first place, China’s counterterrorism discourse is expected to directly reflect certain parallelism to legitimating tools shown in the broader national discourse of NCCPC. Thus, the researcher expects to find certain similarities between variations in national legitimating tools (shifting emphases on elements such as development, the rule of law, and ethnic unity, among others) and variations within counterterrorism discourse (hypothesis II.1).

13 Nearly 40 scholars, in the context of UN High Commissioner Michelle Bachelet visit to Xinjiang, recently denounced in an official letter to the UN, her acceptance and adoption of the Party’s counterterrorism discourse, applying official euphemisms such as “preventive means” and “vocational education and training centers”, to refer to what scholars consider a repressive “mass internment program”. (Bloomberg News, June 8, 2022).

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In this regard, taking into account the central role of eudemonic legitimacy, (hypothesis II.1.a) the discourse analysis also expects it to be reflected within counterterrorism discourse (Chen, 2004;

Chu, 2013; Dickson, 2016; Holbig & Gilley, 2010; Kwok, 2021; Nathan, 2020; Tang, 2006, 2016;

Zeng, 2014; Zhai, 2021; Zhao, 2016). Party legitimacy is expected to be promoted within the counterterrorism discourse through an emphasis on the Party’s rational-legal, moral, and performance capacities. However, (hypothesis II.1.b) an emphasis on ideology is expected, especially under Xi’s leadership, to promote nationalist sentiments to counter the negative effects of socioeconomic inequality, changing values, and corruption (Zeng, 2014). Therefore, (hypothesis II.1.c) the Party will likely be portrayed as the provider of people’s needs and the leader of a common, unifying ideology (Chung, 2005; Holbig & Gilley, 2010b; Nathan, 2020;

Zheng, 2010; Zhai, 2021).

Within this context, stability is expected to be portrayed as a prerequisite for development and, consequently, both concepts are expected to be highlighted within China’s official counterterrorism discourse, where the Party is framed as the protector of stability and, thus, driver of development. This emphasis on stability represents a second line of hypothesis related to the legitimating role of the Party’s counterterrorism discourse in front of national audiences. In this vein, some authors have referred to China’s “stability discourse” as a means to portray the Party positively (Dickson, 2016; Holbig & Gilley, 2010; Purbrick, 2017; Sandby-Thomas, 2014; Wayne, 2009; Zhai, 2021), especially in times of crisis. Therefore, the researcher expects (hypothesis II.2) the official counterterrorism discourse in China to be an example of such stability discourse, where stability is framed as a precondition for development. In this context, crisis presents an opportunity to frame the Party as the best and only guarantor of that stability (Dickson, 2016; Holbig & Gilley, 2010).

Thus, considering the central role of stability in the counterterrorism discourse as a legitimating tool, (hypothesis II.2.a) social unity is expected to be emphasized as a tool for stability and, therefore, a precondition for development. From 2013, under Xi Jinping’s leadership, the discourse is expected to reflect what Zhai (2021) has referred to as an “ideological campaign” to promote Party legitimacy. In this regard, the legitimacy of the Party’s leadership in Xinjiang (as opposed to illegitimate alternative discourses) could be considered a counter-insurgent measure in itself, justified by the need for stability. Given the central role of identity in the Party’s interpretation and

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reaction to terrorism (Becquelin, 2004; Bovingdon, 2002; Clarke, 2018; Dwyer, 2005; Giglio, 2004; Greitens et al., 2020; Rodríguez-Merino, 2016; Trédaniel & Lee, 2017) the researcher expects that it will occupy a central role in the discourse as well. Particularly, following Clarke’s (2018) assertion of ethnic identity as a source of dissidence in Xinjiang, the analysis of the Xinjiang white papers is expected to reveal a particular focus on ethnicity as a source of separatist grievances Thus, given the core role of identity in garnering support for the Party (Edney, 2015), and the differentiating effect of religion and other ethnic identity markers, (hypothesis II.2.a.1) these are expected to be emphasized within counterterrorism discourse as well. Conversely, in order to further boost support to the Party, (hypothesis II.2.a.2) the discourse is expected to boost a common identity (Bianco, 1994; Kubat, 2018; Zhang & Du, 2010; Zhai, 2021).

These hypotheses predict a polarization of actors as part of the stability discourse (hypothesis II.2.b). The official counterterrorism discourse is expected to reveal a systematic polarization between good and rational versus evil and irrational actors and their goals, where the Party (and its followers) would be the main beneficiaries. A deep analysis (through CDA) is therefore expected (hypothesis II.2.b.1) to reveal the different actors and their particular categorization. A codification and analysis of these participants are expected to provide greater insight and understanding of the CPC’s perception of the threat and its construction to delegitimate certain actors while legitimating the Party. In relation to this, following a CTS approach and considering China’s conceptualization of the terrorist threat as one of the Three Evil Forces (Clarke, 2018;

Famularo, 2018; Smith Finley, 2019; Li et al., 2019; Gunaratna et al., 2010; Purbrick, 2017;

Trédaniel & Lee, 2017), this research explores the logic that legitimates the interrelation between separatism, terrorism, and extremism. The aim of this analysis is to identify patterns in the contextualization of these threats that contribute to protecting the Party’s legitimacy and political stability.

Additionally, as part of the stability discourse and its related polarization of actors, the discourse is expected (hypothesis II.2.b.2) to promote a sense of fear against the “other” that aims to destabilize the CPC (Callahan, 2006; Holbig & Gilley, 2010) and certain anti-foreign sentiments (Dickson, 2016). Thus, separatism, terrorism, and extremism are expected to be portrayed as direct threats to the CPC’s leadership, which consequently threatens Chinese citizens’ development and

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prosperity in Xinjiang as an integral part of China. In this regard, the analysis is also expected (hypothesis II.2.b.3) to reveal the victimization of China and the Chinese people.

Still contributing to the stability discourse, and in relation to the work of Famularo (2018), the researcher expects (hypothesis II.2.c) to discover the politicization of ethnicity and religion, which promote patriotism among these groups to increase trust in the Party and, consequently, counter insurgence. Therefore, the researcher expects ethnic groups and religious believers to be represented as contributors to or beneficiaries of the development of the region, within the greater Chinese nation. In the same vein, the discourse is expected to boost social unity through the implication of the people in the struggle against separatism, as contained in the concept of the people’s war (Li et al., 2019; Tanner & Bellacqua, 2016; Wayne, 2009).

To prove this complex set of hypotheses and provide deeper insight into the legitimating elements of China’s official counterterrorism discourse, a combination of CL and CDA is used. As mentioned, to achieve an overall depiction of the Party’s consideration of the issue of “terrorism,”

the researcher first selected all digitally available NCCPC official reports.¹⁴ Although the NCCPC does not focus specifically on security affairs, it is an important source of information in understanding the priorities of the government. Operating on the assumption that these reports are the best source for reviewing the CPC’s priorities (Esteban, 2014), this research first focuses on an analysis of these reports (from 1992 to 2017) as an explorative phase to acquire a preliminary understanding of the CPC’s priorities with regard to the promotion of its legitimacy. Subsequently, these reports will provide a chronological glimpse into China’s consideration of terrorism, separatism, and extremism within the context of its national priorities. From a comparative perspective, this allowed the researcher to explore items that were consistent, as well as changing patterns, which indicate potential changes in the Party’s priorities.

14 The NCCPC is a congress that takes place every five years in which the priorities for the subsequent five years are determined.

China’s official counterterrorism discourse as a legitimating tool

DOCTORAL THESIS