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UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DE NUEVO LEON

FACULTAD DE FILOSOFIA Y LETRAS

COLEGIO DE TRADUCCION

RECOPILACION DE TEXTOS

PARA EL CURSO DE GRAMATICA COMPARADA

RESPONSABLE: LIC. IRENE GARTZ

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UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DE NUEVO LEON

FACULTAD DE FILOSOFIA Y LETRAS

COLEGIO DE TRADUCCION

RECOPILACION DE TEXTOS

PARA EL CURSO DE GRAMATICA COMPARADA

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RESPONSABLE: LIC. IRENE GARTZ.

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C O N T R A S T I V E A N A L Y S I S , E R R O R A N A L Y S I S , AND

T R A N S F O R M A T I O N A L G E N E R A T I V E T H E O R Y :

SOME M E T H O D O L O G I C A L ISSUES IN T H E T H E O R Y

O F S E C O N D L A N G U A G E L L A R N I N G

Prajapati Sah

Le rôle de l'analyse contrastive en linguistique appliquée s'est transformé au cours de l'évolution. Les premières études contrastives avaient tout simplement pour but de prévoir les fautes. C'est surtout sous l'influence de la grammaire générative transf.Tmationnelle que l'objet de l'analyse contrastive est devenu de plus en plus une explication des fautes. C'est ainsi que l'analyse con-trastive a pris dans une large mesure la forme d'un complément de l'analyse des fautes. l'auteur de cet article voit la raison du rôle incertain de l'analyse contrastive à l'intérieur du cadre de la linguistique appliquée dans un manque de théorie bien définie pour l'apprentissage d'une deux-ième langue. Il propose d'adapter la théorie d'apprentissage valable pour la deuxdeux-ième langue à celle de la grammaire générative transformationnelle, de sorte que le modèle descriptif de la com-pétence transitoire en cause ne soit pas fondamentalement différent de celui qui vaut pour la compétence dans la théorie générative. Il est démontré comment un modèle d'analyse contras-tive qui, en même temps, prévoit et explique les fautes selon les principes méthodiques men-tionnés ici, sera à même d'intégrer les problèm -s de l'analyse des fautes dans une solution d'en-semble qui élimine l'opposition.

Die Rolle der kontrastiven Analyse in der angewandten Sprachwissenschaft hat sich im Laufe der Zeit gewandelt. Die ersten kontrastiven Studien wollten einfach Fehler voraussagen. Vor allem unter dem Einfluß der generativen Transforma,ionsgrammatik wandelte sich das Ziel der kon-trastiven Analyse in die Richtung der FehlererUärung. Dadurch wurde die kontrastive Analyse weitgehend zum Anhang der Fehleranalyse. Der Autor dieses Artikels sieht die Ursache für die unsichere Rolle der kontrastiven Analyse im Rahmen der angewandten Sprachwissenschaft in dem Fehlen einer klaren Theorie des ZweitsprLchenerlernens. F.r schlägt vor. das Modell für die Theorie des Zweitsprachenerlernens auf die Theorie der generativen Transformationsgrammatik abzustimmen, so daß das Modell zur Beschreibung der je-\ öligen Übergang-kompeienz grund-sätzlich nicht verschieden sein <oll vom generativen Modell der Sp:..chkompctcnz. Iis wird

darge-legt, wie d u r c h d a s sowohl Fehler voraussagende als auch Fehler erkLrende Modell d e r k o n t r a s t i

-ven Analyse, das den oben genannten methodischen Prinzipien folgt, die Auseinandersetzung mit der Fehleranalyse in einer integrierten Lösung aufgehoben werden kann.

I

In 1969, Carl James lamer fed that contra, live studies were in the doldrums and had lost the "bite and e n t h u s i a s m " which li id pervaded the work of Frier and Lado (James 19fW). Among the four ways for revitalizing this s t u d y , viz.. heuristic investi-gations to test its predic.ions, greater c o l l a b o r a t e with psychology, .integration with other branches of applied linguistics p a r t i c u l a r ! t h e theory of translation, and reorientation of contrastive studies in the light of Chomsky's transformational gen-erative grammar, James laid particular s :ess on the las' one. He noted t h a t some isolated a t t e m p t s had been made to base contrastive .is (CA) on the TG model

(Stockwell, KJima, Dingwall) but f o u n d them "only superficially generative." "Re-s t a t e m e n t of the familiar with the paraphernalia of rewrite rule"Re-s and tree diagram"Re-s is not e n o u g h , " he very pertinently remarked, "little is gained unless the power of the theory is e x p l o i t e d " (James 1969:84).'

How does one go a b o u t exploiting the power of the TG theory in the interest of contrastive analysis, particularly in the face of such trenchant remarks as are made by Roger Snook ( 1 9 7 1 : 1 7 ) , w h o considers transformational generative models irrel-evant to CA? His argument is simple. CA is concerned with language teaching and learning in general, and with the prediction of difficulty and errors in particular. Now, language learning and T L errors "are psychological processes or result f r o m such processes." Hence any theory "which a t t e m p t s to account for these phenomena should be couched in psychological terms or be relatable in an explicit way to the psycholinguistic d a t a " ( S n o o k , op. cit., p . 19). James then goes on t o examine the experiments c o n d u c t e d by Miller, F o d o r , and Garrett on the relationship between grammatical and perceptual complexity. As is well k n o w n , these experiments had failed to show any correlation between the performance measures of sentence com-plexity and the derivational history of the sentences. F r o m this failure F o d o r and Garrett had concluded " t h a t the problems may be n o t that our experimental proce-dures fail t o measure perceptual complexity, b u t rather that it is a mistake t o claim psychological reality for t h e operations whereby grammars generate structural de-scriptions" (Fodor and Garrett 1966:152).

As James points o u t , the failure was perhaps a foregone conclusion. Chomsky had been quite explicit on the point. A generative grammar, h e had said, was n o t a model for a speaker or a hearer. The linguist's description of how a sentence is derived belongs to tire theory of c o m p e t e n c e , whereas its actual production or interpretation is a matter of language use, or performance. There is n o necessary correlation be-tween the two. All Chomsky had claimed was that a theory of competence was part of the theory of performance in the sense that every ideal hearer-speaker was regard-ed as having the grammar at his disposal. However, the theory did n o t include an ac-count of how the grammar was used. It did n o t incorporate a model of the mecha-nism underlying the speaker-hearer's verbal performance. That belonged to the theory

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98 IRAK, VOL. XIX/2, MAY 1981

CA, EA AND TG THEORY 97

of performance which was primarily a psycholinguistic and sociolinguistic study. Questions of language learning and aberrant T L p e r f o n n a n c e , says S n o o k , belong to the theory of performance while TGG is a theory of c o m p e t e n c e . Obviously, t h e n , a TG grammar c a n n o t be relevant to these problems, and hence t o CA.

Several things are wrong with Snook's argument not the least of which is his se-lection of convenient q u o t a t i o n s f r o m Chomsky and F o d o r and G a r r e t t . It is true that a generative grammar is a model of c o m p e t e n c e and does n o t include m a t t e r s of p e r f o r m a n c e , b u t it is also true t h a t , according to C h o m s k y , c o m p e t e n c e is a necessary c o m p o n e n t of any performance model. To this e x t e n t , psychological reality is attributed t o competence by Chomsky. But b e y o n d claiming t h a t a knowledge of the rules of grammar is a prerequisite for meaningful performance in a language, the theory does n o t say m u c h o n this issue. For instance, it does n o t claim t h a t the rela-tion between c o m p e t e n c e and performance is such t h a t the rules of grammar which constitute c o m p e t e n c e represent directly psychological processes operating in 'real time' in the p r o d u c t i o n or perception of the sentences of the language. The Miller and Fodor and Garrett experiments were based on t o o strong an a s s u m p t i o n , which was never m a d e by C h o m s k y . The assumption was t h a t each PS and T rule was psy-chologically real, i.e. that competence and performance were directly related and a performance m o d e l was isomorphic with a c o m p e t e n c e model. This was t o o simple-minded an assumption. N o one w h o h a d u n d e r s t o o d the high degree of abstraction and sophistication t h a t C h o m s k y saw in the processes of language could ever at-tribute this assumption to Chomsky. Fodor and Garrett realized this and were very careful to state explicitly t h a t "...in showing t h a t predicted c o m p l e x i t y order fails to obtain, one has n o t shown t h a t the grammar is disconfirmed . . . one would best in-terpret negative data as showing that an acceptable theory of t h e relation between competence a n d performance models will have t o represent t h a t relation as abstract . . ." ( F o d o r a n d Garrett 1 9 6 6 : 1 5 2 ) . The mistake perhaps lies in assuming t h a t an abstract relationship between competence and performance is incompatible with a part-whole relationship, i.e. with a model which assumes, as C h o m s k y does, t h a t a competence grammar must part of the performance model. It is n o t at all clear that there is such an incompatibility. The complexity, or abstractness, of this relationship may equally well be due to the complicated psychological mechanisms which con-nect linguistic c o m p e t e n c e with behaviour, and it is t o these t h a t the psycholinguists need to direct their a t t e n t i o n . Sutherland's c o m m e n t s on the F o d o r a n d Garrett paper (Sutherland 1 9 6 6 : 1 6 1 ) are very pertinent in this c o n n e c t i o n :

The task of psycholinguistics is not t o confirm Chomsky's account of linguistic competence by undertaking experiments. To the extent t h a t C h o m s k y has suc-ceeded in axiomatizing grammar, his account does n o t stand in n e e d of such con-firmation. T h e task of psycholinguistics is t o my mind . . . t o find o u t what are the mechanisms which underlie linguistic c o m p e t e n c e .

2

Those contrastive analysts who have adopted the TG framework as their model have so far predicted the areas of difficulty on the basis of a comparison of models of competence, i.e. the linguistic grammars of the languages involved If any of these predictions turn out to be correct, it suggests t h a t , as James ( 1 9 6 9 : 6 5 ) points out, "some areas of performance and competence are systematically identical." It has been repeatedly said (see, e.g. DuSkova 1969, James 1971, Nickel 1971, and else-where) that CAis not committed to the view that all errors made by the foreign lan-guage learner are caused by interference f r o m the source language and that therefore not all errors are predicted by CA.2 Among the errors not predicted by CA will be some which are due to purely performance factors. These will include, e.g., Selin-ker's "transfer of training strategy", strategies of second language learning, and strat-egies of second language communication (Selinker 1972). Tin is indicates that while some errors may be predictable f r o m a comparison of competence grammars, there will be many errors not so predictable since they are due to performance factors. This confirms the view that a performance model cannot be coterminous with a com-petence model: it must include the competence model and exceed it. As James ( 1 9 6 9 ) points o u t , what still remains to be discovered is the precise nature of the re-lationship between performance and competence. The question facing psycholinguis-tics is " w h e t h e r , and if so, how the native speaker's modelled competence is project-ed o n t o his p e r f o r m a n c e " (James 1969:85). I think enough evidence is now available to answer the whether-question in the affirmative. The issue is a crucial one in the theory of TGG and has been posed in the f o r m of the claim that the rules and sys-tems which are said by the linguist to constitute the grammar of a language are also a model of the native speaker's c o m p e t e n c e , i.e. are psychologically real (Katz 1964). Recently this claim has been made more precisé by distinguishing the 'performancist' position f r o m the 'Platonic' and the 'competencist' ones (Katz 1977). The perform-ancist position is the one that the Fodor and Garrett experiments failed to confirm. Following the same position in an a t t e n u a t e d f o r m , F o d o r , F o d o r , and Garrett ( 1 9 7 5 ) discovered the unreality of semantic representations. The competencist po-sition is the one that is indicated in the quotations f r o m Fodor and Garrett and Sutherland above, viz. that "failure to predict experimental results such as complex-ity orderings does not count against representations at any grammatical level" and that "grammars are to be judged not by their success in predicting such results but

2 In a recent paper, Nóth (1979) classifies errors into monosystematic, diasystematic, and non-linguistic varieties. A similar but more comprehensive analysis is attempted in Sah (1971). Among other things, Nóth, who regards errors as providing a discovery procedure for the lin-guistic theory, makes the relevant point that though Chomsky's idealization "seems to have no place for error analysis" and treats errors as "part of the study of performance," Chomsky's theoretical position is often not in accordance with his own procedure of analysis. Chomsky very frequently gives "examples of mistaken English sentences in order to explain central concepts of his linguistic theory "

by the internal evidence in favour of the structural descriptions they generate" (Katz 1977:561). This does n o t a m o u n t to making grammar an abstract science like math-ematics, which is the Platonist position. The competencist position still makes a claim to psychological reality of the grammar but in the weaker sense in which "it represents an idealization of the knowledge t h a t speakers of the language have a b o u t its grammatical s t r u c t u r e " (Katz 1977:564). It is this Chomskian sense of "grammar as c o m p e t e n c e " t h a t makes the claim of the psychological reality of grammars equi-valent to t h e claim that competence is neither the whole of performance n o r totally absent f r o m it but forms one of its essential c o m p o n e n t s . Evidence has been f o r t h -coming f r o m such diverse fields as studies in aphasia, language acquisition, bilingual-ism, second language learning, etc. which shows n o t only t h a t the distinction be-tween competence and performance may be a correct one to make but also that the actual relationship between them may be the one that is implied in the competencist position. Studies in aphasia (e.g. Weigl and Bierwisch 1970) suggest t h a t a theory which treats of aphasic disorders as loss of performance abilities rather ;han as loss of competende is better consistent with the facts. C o m p e t e n c e , once lost, is unre-coverable; b u t performance may be impaired for reasons o t h e r than the loss of com-petence and revived later, all of which suggests a role for comcom-petence as well as per-formance. Evidence f r o m CA also suggests that competence may be an indispensable-factor in performance. The evidence is provided by what Pit Corder ( 1 9 6 7 ) calls the systematic nature of some errors. He justifiably uses these as a basis for setting u p the notion of "transitional c o m p e t e n c e . " Transitional competence contains elements f r o m b o t h LI and L2 competences and accounts for a significant number of errors. It also helps us t o distinguish between systematic and non-systematic errors, t h u s providing a more coherent account of errors thpn has been provided so far.

The central importance of the kind of evidence Pit Corder and Selinker provide for a transitional competence lies in providing indirect verification of the Chomski-an claim t h a t competence is n o t only relevChomski-ant but basic to Chomski-any "reasonable model of language use" (Chomsky 1965:9). The crucial defect in Snook's argument is therefore the following: it forecloses the basic issue by precluding the use of evi-dence f r o m contrastive studies in verification of the postulated competence-perform-ance relationship. The basic issue surely is whether competence is essential t o per-formance, and n o t , as S n o o k makes it appear, t h a t a TG grammar is a model of lin-guistic competence. That it certainly is. What Chomsky had said was t h a t " t h e gen-erative grammar does n o t , in itself, prescribe the character or functioning of a per-ceptual model or model of speech p r o d u c t i o n " (Chomsky 1 9 6 5 : 9 ; italics mine). This q u o t a t i o n cannot be used to justify Snook's conclusions. F r o m the fact t h a t , in itself, a TG grammar is n o t a model of performance one c a n n o t argue t h a t there-fore it is irrelevant to p e r f o n n a n c e , b u t this is precisely what Snook does. And in

doing so, h e also blocks the avenues for any f u r t h e r exploration of the areas of ap-plied linguistics, such as CA, where evidence relating to the postulated relevance of competence to performance may be f o u n d .

100 1RAL, VOL. XIX/2, MAY 1981

3

If the notion of competence is to be exploited fully in CA, it is necessary not only that the goal of a precise definition of the competence-perfonnance relationship be constantly kept in view, but also that we go beyond the notion of "differential t e n c e " (see, e.g. Corder 1967; Nemser 1971) to the notion of "transitional compe-t e n c e . " Carl James remarks compe-thacompe-t "concompe-trascompe-tive scompe-tudy will be pedagogically of value proportionately to the identification of competence and performance values, that is, to the degree that its statement o f d i f f e r e n t i a l competences can predict probable obsta-cles to acceptable performance in the target language" (James 1969:85). The limita tion of such an approach is exemplified by James himself. A sentence "John is a naughty b o y " is derived in English f r o m the conjoining of two sentences " J o h n is a b o y " and " J o h n is n a u g h t y " . In another language, a f o r m isomorphic with " J o h n is a naughty b o y " may be derived f r o m " J o h n b o y s " and " J o h n naughties" by a dif-ferent t r a n s f o r a t i o n . In a case like this, a contrastive study based o n competence must predict that "this speaker will have difficulty in arriving at " J o h n is a naughty b o y " in English, whereas we attest that his performance is perfectly acceptable." The conclusion James draws f r o m this example is that " t h e scope of p e r f o r m a n c e " must be extended beyond LI performance to "what we might call ' c o n t a c t ' p e r f o m . ance.*vTo me, it seems that the example actually calls for an extension of the scope of competence f r o m "differential c o m p e t e n c e " to "transitional c o m p e t e n c e " . My reason is as follows: the prediction is based on a study of the differential compe-tence of English and the other hypothetical language and it turns o u t to be incor-rect. If instead of basing the prediction on differential competence we had examined the transitional competence of the learner as reflected in his e n o r s , t h e n , irrespective of whether this particular error was actually in the corpus or n o t , the prediction would be subject to our finding in the learner's competence a (semi-) stable system of rules generating such an error. The question of h o w the learner arrived at such a system would n o t be very relevant to t h e study of transitional competence since, as Nemser ( 1 9 7 5 : 1 0 4 ) points o u t , this transitional "approximative s y s t e m " is structur-ally i n d e p e n d e n t of t h e base and target languages. It would be reasonable to assume that an equivalence process of some sort was at work and that b o t h LI and L2 com-petences were involved. If in the present case absence of the relevant kind of error showed that the correct equivalence had been arrived at, the error would not be gen-erated (i.e. predicted). The notion of transitional competence thus helps to eliminate the large number of "misses" which are b o u n d t o occur when a comparison of com-petence grammars is used t o predict difficulties for an organism which is completely missing f r o m the picture. The notion of transitional c o m p e t e n c e brings the organism back i n t o its rightful place in the picture and makes use of its performance data to delimit f u r t h e r , and much more accurately, the areas of difficulty. There is n o cir-cularity involved h e r e , a s those familiar with Chomsky's central argument in

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C A , EA A N D T G T H F . O R Y 101

While contrastive explanations are now accepted as the final o u t p u t of HA, there is n o parallel acceptance of performance data (error and n o n c r r o r ) as input to CA. Particularly, n o n ^ r r o r data, the significance of which has been recognized by some error analysts (see, e.g. Jain 1974), have n o role t o play in C A , n o t even in a p o s t e n o n CA where at least the error data are taken into account. Although it has been pointed out by several linguists (e.g. Hamp 1968, Stockwell 1968, James 1971), who believe that CA and EA are not really to be viewed as alternatives, that they are actually prognostic and diagnostic varieties of CA, what has actually been demonstrated is that CA is a subcomponent of EA and not that EA is a variety of CA. If the sole function of CA is to provide aposteriori explanation of errors, as the exponents of EA would have us believe, then it is no more than an explanatory appendage to EA, and an ad hoc one at t h a t , as it is expected to explain, if it can, the residue of errors teft over f r o m other explanations.

Dissatisfied with this minor role for CA and "unable at the same time to see any more meaningful role for it in the field of applied linguistics, some linguists have tried to enlarge the explanatory' function of CA in the direction of theoretical linguis-tics. Beginning with statements like " T h e justification for contrastive analysis is to be f o u n d in its explanatory p o w e r " and "Explanatory power should be the ultimate "goal of all contrastive linguistics", Van Buren ( 1 9 7 4 : 2 7 9 ) goes on to conclude that "if a contrastive study fails t o explain anything a b o u t the nature of the language data, it scarcely seems worth the time and labour expended on it." The goal of con-trastive studies, according to him, is t o "contribute to our knowledge of language structure and of the relations which obtain between different language systems," while the "chain of connections between contrastive linguistic theory and what hap-pens in the classroom" is said t o be an indirect ^nd a complex one. This view of "contrastive analysis" is perhaps sufficiently different f r o m CA as it is understood in applied linguistics to justify its being called by the title of "contrastive linguis-tics". As a tool of aEpliedlingjiisjics* CA is immediately concerned with "what hap-pens in the classroom" inasmuch as it helps the teacher-linguist t o construct peda-gogic grammars f r o m scientific grammars. If the predictive power of CA is taken away, its value t o applied linguistics is considerably reduced, though its value for theoretical linguistics may proportionately increase. The original inspiration behind CA was its use as a device f o r predicting certain kinds of fairly widespread errors in the learning of a second or foreign language. This is a practical goal, as applied linguistics is a practical study (Corder 1973:137). Explanation, on the other h a n d , is a theoretical goal better served by a linguist engaged in the pursuit of linguistic universal. Contrastive study is only one of the various techniques in such a linguist's repertoire of techniques and its status is t h a t of a discovery procedure. While n o one will deny the importance of the f e e d b a c k practice provides t o theory (nothing is as theoretically provocative, says Fishman, complementing Kurt Lewin's f a m o u s remark a b o u t the usefulness of a good t h e o r y , as effective practice CA cannot be viewed afresh solely as a discovery procedure employed in the service of theoretical

linguistics which it must be if explanation is regarded as its sole raison d'etre If CA is to retain its basic relevance to language learning and tea,lung, it must also retain its traditional link with applied linguistics.' And tins implies that it must predict and not merely explain.4

A possible line of argument here is that there is essentially n o conflict between prediction and explanation and that they actually go together. Tins line of argument usually ends up by r e g a r d i n g explanation as the stronger goal and concluding that if this stronger goal is achieved, the subordinate goal of prediction is automatically achieved That this is not so has now been amply demonstrated in discussions on the methodology of social sciences (see, e.g. Isaac Sheffler 1960. Kaplan 1964:346 ff„ Scriven 1964:173). Scrivcn points out that explanation and prediction are logically quite different: it is possible to have explanation without prediction and vice versa. Kaplan confirms this. Scriven goes on to account for this logical possibUity by point-ing out that in some cases explanation is easier than prediction while in other cases it is more difficult. "On balance," says Scriven, "explanation in psychology is easier than prediction" (Scriven op. cit.). I think this also applies to linguistics ("a sub-field of cognitive psychology" according to Chomsky) and more specially to psycholin-guistics. The import of this statement of course cannot be realized fully so long as difficulty is held to be synonymous with difference, and predictions are based on the differences between competence grammars. It is only the notion of transitional com-petence which is capable of bringing o u t its full i m p o r t . Not until we find out more about the ways in which elements of the two competences fuse and interpenetrate in the learner's transitional competence can we make predictions which will be less free in inviting the ridicule of the critics of CA. This implies that the contemporary exponents of CA must also be less free with their predictions than theu predecessors unwisely tended t o be.

3 See, e.g. Bouton (1976), who states that it is usual for the purpose of CA to be stated com-pletely in terms of its contribution to language teaching. He quotes Sciarone (1970): "The raison d'etre of CA is the realization that in learning a second language one is confronted with interference from the native language."

As an example of the practising teacher's touching faith in the pedagogical value of CA, see Ray (1976).

4 It is in the light of these remarks that 1 view with some concern Noth's attempts (see Fn. 2) to see in error analysis also a discovery procedure for linguistic theory These attempts by ap-plied linguists to jump on the theoretical bandwagon cannot but bode ill for the future of applied linguistics and particularly for its value for the problem of language learning and teaching. It is puzzling to find these linguists totally unimpressed by Chomsky's expression of scepticism about the value of theoretical linguistics to problems of language teaching (Chomsky 1966), or perhaps they feel that though linguistics may have nothing to contrib-ute to language teaching theory, the lonUibution in the other direction is so substantial that linguistics is poorer without it. Whatever the reason, it would be a sad day for applied linguistics when its exponents are forced to seek legitimacy for their pursuits in the goals of theoretical linguistics.

CA, EA AND TG THEORY 103

This can be made possible if we impose on our predictions the condition of ex-planatory power. But this condition is nothing new: it is already implicit in the no-tion of (transino-tional) competence. Just as any competence grammar must meet the three levels of adequacy requirements imposed on it by linguistic theory in the case of the native speaker-hearer, so any grammar of transitional competence must meet these requirements in the case of the second language learner. N o t only must it de-scribe exhaustively the sets of limited data with which it is concerned (observa-tional adequacy) b u t it must d o so in a manner both explicit and predictive (descrip-tive adequacy; see, e.g. Corder 1973:86-8). In addition, the theory of CA, like a lin-guistic t h e o r y , must incorporate an evaluation metric for the grammars of the inter-language. A grammar meeting the constraints of explanatory adequacy would reflect some universal truths a b o u t the way languages are acquired and the ways in which they interact in a contact/learning situation.

The similarities between the t w o situations - the first language learner learning his native language and the linguist's model of his terminal c o m p e t e n c e , and the (first or) second language learner and the linguist's model of his transitional tence - thus run all along the line. In b o t h cases the grammar models the compe-tence. Taking u p for comparison only the first language learner's terminal competence and the second language learner's transitional competence, we find that the function served by linguistic theory in the former is served by the theory of SLL (Second Language Learning) in the latter. The input to the former is the primary linguistic data. The linguistic t h e o r y , with its set of postulated universals, produces as o u t p u t the grammar of the language concerned. If the o u t p u t of this grammar does n o t match that of the native speaker, the theory is not validated and requires modifica-tion and revision till a match is achieved. In the case of the applied linguist's model of a transitional c o m p e t e n c e , the input consists of performance data ( b o t h error and non-error) of the learner. The theory of S L L itself comprises, inter alia, the competence grammars of L I a n d L 2 , t h e mechanisms of comparison, the postulated universals (developmental, implicational, and others) of language acquisition, etc. The CA sub-component of this theory operates to compare the two grammars in the light of the input data a n d , together with the other c o m p o n e n t s of the t h e o r y , pro-duces as o u t p u t the grammar of 4he interlanguage. A m o n g the o u t p u t of this gram-mar are predictions of error. If the predictions turn o u t t o be incorrect, the theory of SLL must be m o d i f i e d . -This may mean revising anything f r o m the grammars of L I and/or L 2 , the mechanisms of comparison, to the postulated universals of lan-guage acquisition and interaction. One implication of a model of SLL theory of this kind is that grammars of interlanguage may provide a check even on the gram-mars of competence. This however is n o t the p a r a m o u n t consideration for us. The paramount consideration for us is that in a model of this kind it becomes possible to e m p l o y b o t h prediction and explanation in the service of the theory in a mutual-ly reinforcing manner w i t h o u t either getting bogged down with t h e o t h e r . Faulty predictions imply imperfections in the t h e o r y , but correct predictions do not

rteC-104 IRAL, VOL. XIX/2, MAY 1981

essarily mean that the grammar is the best one possible: the theory does n o t allow for any decision procedures. Correct predictions only imply that the grammar may be a correct one, but n o more than that. This is so because the theory imposes cer-tain internal criteria on the grammars in order to ensure that the best grammar is more than a correct grammar, i.e. that explanation does n o t remain confined t o pre-diction. However, it also means that as explanations become more refined, predic-tions become correct over a wider range, and of course that they become more meaningful. In other words, they are n o longer simple predictions but explanatory ones.

4

To sum u p , we have n o w before us four models of CA, if CA is interpreted in the wider sense in which Stockwell ( 1 9 6 8 ) and H a m p ( 1 9 6 8 ) understand it. The first model is what I call the Simple Prediction Model. This model takes the competence grammars of the t w o languages as input and produces as o u t p u t the likely errors of the learner. We can diagram this model as follows:

Fig. 1 : The Simple Prediction Model

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of the conceptual and perceptual strategies employed by the native speakers, he is either still working within the f r a m e w o r k of the Simple Prediction Model or has opted o u t of CA altogether. In either case, the basic methodological insights ot TG grammar remain totally unexploited in the service of applied linguistics and there is n o change in the conventional ways of looking at CA and EA. The assumption garding prediction of errors on the basis of grammatical comparison of languages re-mains unquestioned: only the scope of grammar is redefined and its heuristics ex-panded The basic objection raised to this model t h a t it fails to predict all and only the actually occurring errors (see Ritchie 1967, Whitman and Jackson 1972) remains unanswered, although T G G itself aimed at allowing only grammars which generated

IP all and only the grammatical sentences of a language and would therefore n o t lack

the methodology requisite f o r this purpose. As I see it, and will become clear in the sequel, what permitted T G G to constrain grammars to generate all and only the grammatical sentences was basically its non-linear nature, whereas the refurbished CA remains basically a linear model.

The second model (Fig. 2) is a m o d a l of error analysis in t h e sense of Stockwell and Hamp, w h o regard EA as the inductive variety of CA. This conception of EA as a variety of CA arose as a result of dissatisfaction with the first model most clearly reflected in t h e remarks of James cited at the beginning of this paper. So long as the prediction of errors was the sole raison d'etre of CA in language teaching and learn-ing, it was decidedly preferable to dispense with it altogether and choose the path of EA, since the coverage of errors was more comprehensive in EA and t h e risk of non-fulfilment of predictions did n o t have t o be incurred:

Fig. 2: The Error Analysis Model

If some errors were due t o contrastive reasons, this could always be discovered after other errors had been accounted f o r . A comparison of the relevant areas of the gram-mars could then be undertaken to see if a contrastive linguistic explanation was available for t h e m . It was quite unnecessary to compare whole grammars of the lan-guages when only a limited number of errors were to be a c c o u n t e d f o r in this way.

1 0 6 I R A L . V O L . X I X / 2 , M A Y 1 9 8 1

If CA was to survive, a different raison d'être had to be found for it. Tins was found In explanation. Now it w r . ossible o admit franWy that CA did n o , claim t o a c count for all possible kinds of errors (e.g. James 1971). an t h a t , anyway, that was not the main purpose of CA. Its main value lay in the explanations it provided for the errors. This amounted to accepting a status subordinate t o that of EA as a sub-component of the more encompassing field of error analysis a Schachter 1974: 2 0 6 ) But this fall in the status of CA was accompanied by an acknowledgement of the importance o f i t s role since, without CA. EA was a mere t a x o n o m y . This nv lei, then t o o k errors as the input, and with a comparison of the competence grammars of the languages involved, sought to provide explanations for the errors. This is still a linear model since now there is no way of verifying if the explanations are corr. ct. In the Simple Prediction Model, there is at least the possibility of the predictions turning o u t to be incorrect. Now that constraint is also gone and is not replaced by any built-in constraint of the theory. As a result, the danger of a d hoc explanations becomes all the greater. To this extent, this model is even weaker than the first one.

In practice t o o this model turns out to be weaker than the Simple Prediction Model, as has been pointed out by J. Schachter (1974). The weakness arises from the fact that this model bases Itself on error data alone and consequently fails to take account of the avoidance phenomenon. Schachter correctly argues that "if a student finds a particular construction in the target language difficult it is very like-ly that he will try to avoid producing i t " (J. Schachter 1 9 7 4 : 2 1 3 ) . Unlike the Sim-ple Prediction Model, to £ A model (or ti* CA a p o w e n o n mode» as Schachter calls it) U n o t neutral between comprehension and production b u t is based on production only. As a result, at least in those parts of language where avoidance is possible (it is not possible in phonology), the coverage of errors is confined t o those occurring in production only while errors of comprehension are left u n d e t e c t e d .

The third model, which I call the Simple E r p t a n e i k m Model (Fig. 3) is the one I have criticized above as being a discovery procedure m theoretical linguistics rather tUM t serious model of CA. I find it advocated most clearly and strongly in Van Buren (1974) and suggested in Dirven ( ' 9 7 6 ) . Explanation here completely sup-plants the goal of prediction. It is almost identical with the Simple Prediction Model, and equally linear, with the difference lying in the o u t p u t . As I have already discus-sed this view earlier, I shall here do n o more than presenting the model in a diagram-matic f o r m :

Fig. 3: The Simple Explanation Model

CA, EA AND TG THEORY 107

The last model, which I call the Explanatory Prediction Model, is favoured, im-plicitly or exim-plicitly, in most recent discussions of error analysis (e.g. Corder 1967, 1971, 1973; Selinker 1972; James 1971; Hamp 1968) and contrastive analysis (Nemser 1975), b u t a clear and comparative s t a t e m e n t of the methodological issues involved is n o t yet available. The input in this model (see Fig. 4) are the learner's performance data, b o t h error and non-error. This makes it different f r o m the Error Analysis Model and also precludes the distortions arising f r o m the production bias of that model. A f u r t h e r difference is t h a t the o u t p u t in this model, as in the clas-sical CA or Simple Prediction Model, is in t h e f o r m of predictions about potential performance rather than explanations. At the same time, however, it is different f r o m the classical CA model in the role it assigns t o contrastive s t u d y . "file role of CA in this model is neither to provide direct explanations for the errors nor to make immediate predictions a b o u t potential error performance b u t t o c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e production o f a m o d e i o f the learner's transitional competence. The specific role of the theory of CA in the overall f r a m e w o r k of a theory of SLL is to provide the necessary theoretical wherewithal whereby the LI and L2 c o m p e t e n c e systems can be seen to contribute to the learner's transitional competence. The other c o m p o n e n t s of the SLL theory take care of non-error performance and error performance n o t due to contrastive reasons. Language acquisition universals help us decide on the areas where n o errors are t o be expected while et cetera provides scope for cognitive processes of the kind, n o w being widely studied, t h a t account for the non-contrast-ive variety of systematic errors:5

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T h e t h e o r y of S L L , when f o r m u l a t e d in this w a y , has certain parallels with the linguistic t h e o r y of T G G , which are quite obvious. First, just as t h e T G t h e o r y fixes i as its goal p r o d u c t i o n of g r a m m a r s which generate all and only the sentences of a language in accordance with the r e q u i r e m e n t s of e x p l a n a t o r y a d e q u a c y , so does t h e t h e o r y of S L L in this f o r m u l a t i o n Fix as the goal p r o d u c t i o n of g r a m m a r s of transi-tional c o m p e t e n c e which predict (i.e. explicitly g e n e r a t e ) b o t h error as well as non-error f o r m s likely t o o c c u r in t h e learner's p e r f o r m a n c e in a c c o r d a n c e with parallel r e q u i r e m e n t s of e x p l a n a t o r y validity as earlier e x p l a i n e d . An error is d e f i n e d as a deviation f r o m the f o r m s generated b y t h e L 2 - c o m p e t e n c e s y s t e m . Such deviations are p r e d i c t e d o n a controlled basis b y the t h e o r y of SLL. Only if the deviations pre-t»i i dieted cover all a n d o n l y those cases t h a t are actually attested in t h e learner's per-f o r m a n c e can a t h e o r y oper-f S L L m e e t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t oper-f descriptive a d e q u a c y and aspire f o r e x p l a n a t o r y a d e q u a c y .

S e c o n d l y , t h e r e q u i r e m e n t of descriptive a d e q u a c y also m e a n s t h a t a grammar of transitional c o m p e t e n c e m u s t b e e q u i p p e d with recursive p r o p e r t i e s like any such grammar of c o m p e t e n c e . Just as t h e native speaker is capable of p r o d u c i n g and in-terpreting any n e w , w e l l f o r m e d s e n t e n c e in the language, so is t h e learner capable of c o m m i t t i n g n e w errors ( t h o u g h n o t n e w types of errors) of p r o d u c t i o n and per-c e p t i o n . In b o t h per-cases t h e m o d e l of grammar must allow for infinite generation by a finite set of rules. A n y a t t e m p t t o provide a finite state grammatical a c c o u n t of learner's errors must fail f o r the same reasons as finite state grammars for natural languages. F u r t h e r , t h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l p o i n t t h a t C h o m s k y ( 1 9 5 7 : 2 3 ) m a k e s a b o u t grammars of languages also h o l d s t r u e of g r a m m a r s of interlanguages: " t h e assump-tion t h a t languages are infinite is m a d e in o r d e r to simplify the descripassump-tion of these languages."

One i m p o r t a n t qualification however must b e made explicit. In labelling the o u t -put of "Transitional C o m p e t e n c e " as " P o t e n t i a l P e r f o r m a n c e " in t h e absence of a b e t t e r d e s c r i p t i o n , t h e i n t e n t i o n is t o allow f o r errors caused b y purely p e r f o r m a n c e f a c t o r s . These are n o t p r e d i c t e d b y a m o d e l of transitional c o m p e t e n c e b u t they d o o c c u r in actual p e r f o r m a n c e . T h i s implies t h a t w h e n checking the p r e d i c t i o n s against actual d a t a , the " p e r f o r m a n c e filter" has already o p e r a t e d t o sift t h e errors a t t r i b u t -able t o f a c t o r s of universal a p p l i c a t i o n f r o m t h o s e a t t r i b u t e d t o f a c t o r s of local ap-plication. For i n s t a n c e , Selinker's " t r a n s f e r of t r a i n i n g " strategy o p e r a t e s a c c o r d i n g t o t h e specific f e a t u r e s of training peculiar t o a given situation and n o generaliza-tions of universal validity are likely. His strategies of second language learning and c o m m u n i c a t i o n seem t o be a m e n a b l e t o generalization t o a greater e x t e n t b u t as conceived b y Selinker are t o o d e p e n d e n t o n t h e individual's past e x p e r i e n c e t o per-mit universal c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n . O n the o t h e r h a n d , overgeneralization follows con-crete ways w h i c h m a y be universally c h a r a c t e r i z e d . T h e same m a y also b e t r u e of s i m p l i f i c a t i o n , w h i c h Selinker discusses in t h e c o n t e x t of second language learning b u t w h i c h also o p e r a t e s in t h e child learning his first language (Bellugi 1 9 7 1 ) .

• n o 1RAL, VOL. XIX/2. MAY 1981

T h e central f e a t u r e o f t h i s m o d e l , which sets it apart f r o m the o t h e r s is

represent-ed by the re.urning arrows. They indicate that the validity of a particular theory of second language learning, and of die models of transitional c o m p e t e n c e which it produces, d e p e n d s on our observational verification of the p e r f o r m a n c e predicted by the m o d e l , in particular, the error p e r f o r m a n c e . If t h e p e r f o r m a n c e is verified, the grammars as well as the t h e o r y meet the r e q u i r e m e n t of observational adequacy; if f u r t h e r the grammars are also generative, b o t h also meet the r e q u i r e m e n t of de-scriptive adequacy and we can raise the question of e x p l a n a t o r y a d e q u a c y in a mean-ingful sense.

Even the f a c t that it is possible t o raise these q u e s t i o n s in the c o n t e x t of SLL and CA must be considered adequate justification for the E x p l a n a t o r y Prediction Model at present But when we consider that this m o d e l actually i n c o r p o r a t e s the other two serious models, those of CA and EA, t h u s bringing the CA vs. EA controversy to an integrated s o l u t i o n , its claims f o r s e n o u s consideration b y applied linguists become indisputable. It is perhaps not unreasonable t o conclude t h a t it was some such solu-tion that Schachter had in m i n d when she argued t h a t " o n l y by a c o m b i n a t i o n of approaches, say CA apriori predictions, error analysis, and c o m p r e h e n s i o n testing, will we begin t o amass some reasonably unassailable i n f o r m a t i o n o n what the second language learning process is all a b o u t " ( J . Schachter 1 9 7 4 : 2 1 3 ) .

Prajapati Sah

D e p a r t m e n t of Humanities and Social Sciences

Indian I n s t i t u t e of Technology K a n p u r 2 0 8 0 1 6

. India

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G A R T Z , I « E N E . " A N A P P R O A C H T O A C O N T R A S T , V E A N A L Y S I S o r E N G L I S H A N D S P A N I S H , B A S E D ON S U P P O S E D U N D E R L Y . N G U N I V E R S A L S . " M . A . D I S S E R T A T I O N , I . T . E . S . M . , 1 9 7 8 , P P . M I ' I T

-P R E F A C E

I t i s w e l l - k n o w n t h a t l i n g u i s t i c s , a y o u n g s t e r a m o n g s c i e n t i f i c ,

( o r a l m o s t s c i e n t i f i c ) d i s c i p l i n e s , s u f f e r s f r o m s y n d r o m e s of a d o l e s

-c e n -c e . D u r i n g t h i s t i m e o f -c r i s i s , t r a d i t i o n a l -c o n -c e p t s a r e b e i n g s w e p t

a w a y , n e w v a l u e s h a v e t o b e f o u n d . E v e r y d a y b r i n g s a b o u t n e w d i s

-c o v e r i e s . D i s -c u s s i o n s o f -c o n t r o v e r s i e s -c o n s i s t o f s p e a k i n g u p r a t h e r

t h a n l i s t e n i n g . . .;

T h e r e l a t i v e l y n e w f i e l d o f c o n t r a s t i v e a n a l y s i s1 i s o n e o f t h e b a t t l e f i e l d s w h e r e o p p o s i t e ^ m e ' e t a n d ' t ^ t o d e f e a t e a c h o t h e r . T h e p r e s e n t

p a p e r d o e s n o t c l a i m t o c o n t r i b u t e t o o n e o r t h e o t h e r ' s v i c t o r y . It w i l l

p i c k o u t f r o m d i f f e r e n t o f f e r i n g s in l i n g u i s t i c t h e o r y t h o s e t h a t p r o m i s e a f e a s i b l e a p p r o a c h t o w a r d t h e c o n t r a s t i v e a n a l y s i s of E n g l i s h a n d

S p a n i s h , r e g a r d l e s s of l o y a l i t i e s t o a n y t h e o r e t i c a l c o n v i c t i o n . T h e s t r e s s

i s o n ' a p p r o a c h ' r a t h e r t h a n o n f i n d i n g s . It i s d e d i c a t e d t o t h e s t u d e n t w h o

^ C o n t r a s t i v e a n a l y s i s w i l l b e a b b r e v i a t e d i n t h e f o l l o w i n g a s C A .

i v

w o r k s w i t h b o t h l a n g u a g e s a n d h a s a b a s i c t r a i n i n g i n l i n g u i s t i c s . H e

w i l l b e t h e f u t u r e l a n g u a g e t e a c h e r , t h e f u t u r e t e x t b o o k w r i t e r , t h e

f u t u r e t r a n s l a t o r , w h o m i g h t p r e f e r t o b a s e h i s w o r k o n a n a l y t i c a l

m e t h o d r a t h e r t h a n o n e m p i r i c i s t p r o c e e d i n g s .

C o n t r a s t i v e a n a l y s e s of E n g l i s h a n d S p a n i s h h a v e b e e n p u b l i s h e d

f r o m t h e v i e w p o i n t o f s t r u c t u r a l a s w e l l a s e a r l y t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l

g r a m m a r , a l l of t h e m b e g i n n i n g w i t h a n d e m p h a s i z i n g t h e s o u n d

s y s t e m s of b o t h l a n g u a g e s . A g r e a t d e a l o f v e r y g o o d r e s u l t s h a v e

b e e n f o u n d a n d a c c u m u l a t e d . I w i l l o n l y m e n t i o n t h e c o n t r a s t i v e s u d i e s

d o n e b y W i l l i a m E . B u l l ( 1 9 6 5 ) , R o b e r t L . B s l i t z e r a n d C h a r l e s N .

S t a u b a c h ( 1 9 6 5 ) , R o b e r t P . S t o c k w e l l a n d D o n a l d B o w e n ( 1 9 6 5 ) , a n d

S t o c k w e l l , B o w e n , a n d J o h n W . M a r t i n ( 1 9 6 5 ) . A l l of t h e m s t a r t e d

f r o m t h e s p o k e n l i n g u i s t i c f o r m s a n d c o m p a r e d t h e s u r f a c e s t r u c t u r e s

of E n g l i s h a n d S p a n i s h ( i . e . , s o u n d s i n t h e i r e n v i r o n m e n t , m o r p h e m e s ,

w o r d s , p h r a s e s , a n d / o r s e n t e n c e s ) i n t h e i r s i m i l a r i t i e s a n d d i f f e r

-e n c -e s .

D u r i n g t h e N i n e t e e n t h A n n u a l R o u n d t a b l e M e e t i n g o n U n g u i s t i e s

a n d L a n g u a g e S t u d i e s , in 1 9 6 8 a t G e o r g e t o w n U n i v e r s i t y i n W a s h i n g

-t o n , D . C . , in f i f -t e e n l e c -t u r e s , g i v e n b y w e l l - -t h o u g h -t - o f l i n g u i s -t s , -t h e

v v i

f o l l o w i n g q u e s t i o n s a r o s e : W h a t a c t u a l l y i s C A ? W h a t i s i t g o o d o r

n e c e s s a r y f o r ? W h a t a r e i t s p e d a g o g i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s ? - O n e

t h i n g b e c a m e o b v i o u s : In o r d e r t o a n s w e r t h e p r e c e d i n g q u e s t i o n s

s a t i s f a c t o r i l y , C A m u s t b e a c t u a l i z e d a n d l o o k e d a t f r o m t h e v i e w

p o i n t o f r e c e n t l i n g u i s t i c t h e o r y . S i n c e i t w a s in t h o s e a n d t h e f o l l o w

-i n g y e a r s t h a t t h e c o n c e p t s o f l -i n g u -i s t -i c u n -i v e r s a l -i s m , a s w e l l a s t h e

- g e n e r a t i v e a p p r o a c h t o s e m a n t i c a n a l y s i s , f o u n d a w i d e r a c c e p t a t i o n ,

t h e s e i d e a s h a d t o b e d e a l t w i t h i n c o n t r a s t i v e s t u d i e s .

In 1 9 7 1 , R o b e r t J . D i P i e t r o p u b l i s h e d h i s b o o k L A N G U A G E

S T R U C T U R E S I N C O N T R A S T1. H e o u t l i n e s w a y s of h o w t o c o m p a r e

d i f f e r e n t l a n g u a g e s , e a c h of w h i c h i s c o n c e i v e d o f a s a d i f f e r e n t s u r

-f a c e p r o j e c t i o n -f r o m o n e a n d t h e s a m e d e e p s t r u c t u r e2. T h e b o o k p r o

-v o k e d c o n t r o -v e r s i a l c r i t i q u e s . O n e n e g a t i -v e r e -v i e w - s t a t e s t h a t i t i s

t h e a u t h o r ' s v i e w o n l a n g u a g e r a t h e r t h a n a c o n t r a s t i v e a n a l y s i s :

' • T h e m a i n i d e a s o f t h e b o o k h a d a l r e a d y b e e n s k e t c h e d o u t i n D i P i e t r o ' s l e c t u r e a t t h e R o u n d T a b l e M e e t i n g : " C A a n d t h e N o t i o n s of D e e p a n d s u r f a c e g r a m m a r " , G . U . M o n o g r a p h S e r i e s # 2 1 , 1 9 6 8 .

2 A d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f ' d e e p s t r u c t u r e ' a s t w o v e r y d i f f e r e n t c o n c e p t s a n d i t s d e l i m i t a t i o n f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e p r e s e n t p a p e r w i l l b e g i v e n i n C h a p t e r 1 .

T h e c o r e o f t h e p r e s e n t v o l u m e i s a s k e t c h of D i P i e t r o ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f l a n g u a g e d e s i g n . . .

In s u m , D i P i e t r o ' s b o o k i s n e i t h e r t h e s t u d y of c o n t r a s t -i v e l -i n g u -i s t -i c s t h a t w -i l l h e l p a n s w e r s o m e of t h e q u e s t -i o n s

b a s i c t o a t h e o r y o f s e c o n d l a n g u a g e p e d a g o g y , n o r a u s e a -b l e i n t r o d u c t i o n t o t h e t e c h n i q u e s of c o n t r a s t .1

I h a d t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o r e g i s t e r i n o n e of D r . D i P i e t r o ' s c o u r s e s o

o n C A a t t h e G e o r g e t o w n U n i v e r s i t y . T h e a b o v e q u o t e d d e f i c i e n c y ,

if t h e r e i s o n e , d i d n o t s h o w d u r i n g tiki c o u r s e . L A N G U A G E S T R U C T U R E S

I N C O N T R A S T w a s o u r t e x t b o o k , m a i n l y r e a d f o r h o m e w o r k a s s i g n m e n t s .

M o s t o f t h e t i r r e in c l a s s s e s s i o n s w a s d e d i c a t e d t o a c t u a l l y r e a l i z i n g t h e

s u g g e s t i o n s , o u t l i n e d t h e o r e t i c a l l y i n t h e b o o k , w i t h r e a l p r o b l e m s

f r o m t w e l v e d i f f e r e n t l a n g u a g e s a n d l a n g u a g e f a m i l i e s , r e p r e s e n t e d

i n t h e c l a s s .

I t h e n f e l t c h a l l e n g e d b y t h e i d e a t o m o d i f y a n d t r a n s f o r m t h e i n

s p i r a t i o n s f r o m t h a t c o u r s e i n t o a p r o c e d u r e , a p p l i c a b l e t o o u r u n d e r

g r a d u a t e s t u d e n t s ' n e e d , s t u d e n t s w h o a r e r e c e i v i n g t h e n e c e s s a r y t r a i n

-* S | > o l s k y , p . 7 4 4

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i n g i n l i n g u i s t i c s i n o r d e r t o b e c o m e c a p a b l e E n g l i s h a n d S p a n i s h

t e a c h e r s a n d / o r t r a n s l a t o r s .

T h e p a p e r , p r e s e n t e d h e r e , t r i e s t o m e e t t h e c h a l l e n g e . C h a p t e r

1 w i l l p r o p o s e a n o n l a n g u a g e s p e c i f i c , s e m a n t i c o s y n t a c t i c d e e p

-s t r u c t u r e m o d e l w i t h d i -s c u -s -s i o n -s of i t -s t h e o r e t i c a l f r a m e w o r k . T h e

l a t t e r m a i n l y r e l i e s o n i d e a s of C h a r l e s F i l l m o r e ( 1 9 6 8 ) a n d W a l l a c e

C h a f e ( 1 9 7 0 ) . A s e r i e s of e q u i v a l e n t s e n t e n c e s f r o m E n g l i s h a n d S p a n

-i s h w -i l l b e e x p o s e d -i n t h e s t e p s -i t t a k e s t o p r o j e c t t h e m f r o m t h e d e e p

s t r u c t u r e o n t o t h e l a n g u a g e s p e c i f i c s u r f a c e s t r u c t u r e s . T h e c o n

-t r a s -t s b e -t w e e n -t h e l a n g u a g e s , -t h e n , a p p e a r a -t -t h e d i f f e r e n -t l e v e l s of

t h e p r o j e c t i o n . T h e y c a n b e e a s i l y s p o t t e d a n d b e t t e r e x p l a i n e d t h a n by

a c o m p a r i s o n of t h e r e s u l t i n g s u r f a c e s t r u c t u r e s , o n l y . T h e p r o j e c t i o n

r u l e s , o r r e a l i z a t i o n r u l e s , a r e a k i n d of t r a n s f o r m a t i o n r u l e s . In

C h a p t e r 2, f o l l o w i n g m a i n l y t h e t e c h n i q u e s of c o m p o n e n t i a l a n a l y s i s ,

a n a p p r o a c h i s p r e s e n t e d , h e l p f u l f o r t h e s e l e c t i o n of t h e l e x i c a l c o m

-p o n e n t s of t h e d e e -p s t r u c t u r e , e s -p e c i a l l y f o r l e x i c a l i t e m s t h a t d o n o t

s h o w a o n e - t o - o n e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e i n b o t h l a n g u a g e s . A r e l a t i v e l y

l a r g e p a r t of t h e c h a p t e r o n l e x i c a l e l e m e n t s i s d e d i c a t e d t o t h e a n a

-l y s i s of i d i o m a t i c e x p r e s s i o n s . C h a p t e r 3 d e a -l s w i t h c o n t r a s t s a t t h e

s o u n d l e v e l . I t s a p p r o a c h i s g e n e r a t i v e ( C h o m s k y a n d H a l l e , 1 9 6 8 )

r a t h e r t h a n d e s c r i p t i v e . A l a s t , m u c h s h o r t e r , c h a p t e r i s d e d i c a t e d

t o c u l t u r a l- s i t u a t i o n a l c o n t r a s t s t h a t m i g h t j e o p a r d i z e t h e e f f e c t of

c o m m u n i c a t i o n , e v e n if t h e l i n g u i s t i c f o r m s a r e a d e q u a t e .

A l l c h a p t e r s c o n t a i n v a r i o u s p r o b l e m s , r e s o l v e d o n e s a s w e l l a s

s u g g e s t e d o n e s f o r e x e r c i s e s . T h e l a t t e r a r e p r o v i d e d w i t h h i n t s t h a t

m i g h t f a c i l i t a t e t h e i r a n a l y s i s . F o r s p e c i f i c d i f f i c u l t i e s , s p e c i a l l y at

t h e s o u n d a n d t h e m o r p h o - s y n t a c t i c l e v e l , b i b l i o g r a p h i c a l r e f e r e n c e s

a r e g i v e n t o s o u r c e s w h i c h a l r e a d y p r o p o s e w e l l e l a b o r a t e d a n s w e r s

t o s u r f a c e p r o b l e m s .

W h e n I t a l k e d t o D r . D i P i e t r o a b o u t m y i d e a , h e e n c o u r a g e d m e

t o s t a r t w i t h t h e p r o j e c t . I o w e a lot of g r a t i t u d e t o h i m a s w e l l a s t o

D r . M i c h a e l Z a r e c h n a k ( C . U . ) w h o g a v e m e a n i n s i g h t i n t o s e m a n t i c

a n a l y s i s .

I a m a l s o d e e p l y in d e b t w i t h t h e D e p a r t a m e n t o d e H u m a n i d a d e s del

I n s t i t u t o T e c n o l ó g i c o y d e E s t u d i o s S u p e r i o r e s d e M o n t e r r e y ( I T E S M ) ,

s p e c i a l l y i t s D e a n , L i c . R o s a u r a B a r a h o n a , a n d t o m y a d v i s e r s D r .

E y l e e n M c E n t e e d e M a d e r o a n d M i c h a e l S c o t t ( M . A .) , f o r a d m i t t i n g

t h e i d e a of p r e s e n t i n g t h i s p a p e r a s a r e q u i r e m e n t f o r m y M a s t e r o f

-A r t sd e g r e e in E n g l i s h L a n g u a g e , a n d f o r t h e i r g u i d a n c e a n d s u p p o r t .

L a s t but n o t l e a s t , I w a n t t o t h a n k t h e s e n i o r s t u d e n t s f r o m both

I T E S M ( l i c e n c i a t u r a e n L e n g u a i n g l e s a ) a n d t h e U A N L ( U n i v e r s i d a d

A u t ó n o m a d e N u e v o I x ó n F a c u l t a d d e F i l o s o f í a y L e t r a s L i c e n c i a

t u r a e n T r a d u c c i ó n ) , w h o d u r i n g t h e f a l l s e m e s t e r 1 9 7 7 p a r t i c i

-p a t e d i n m y c o u r s e s . H e r e t h e i d e a of ' a -p -p r o a c h i n g CA a n o t h e r w a y '

w e r e c a r r i e d o u t . All s t u d e n t s s h o w e d h i g h i n t e r e s t a n d m a d e v a l u a b l e

c o n t r i b u t i o n s in t h e p e r f o r m a n c e of a n a l y s e s a s w e l l a s i n n a t i v e

-i n t u -i t -i v e s t a t e m e n t s a b o u t c o n t r a s t -i n g f o r m s . T h e -i r q u e s t -i o n s a n d

d o u b t s , o f t e n , m a d e m e b e c o m e a w a r e of f a l l a c i e s a n d d e f i c i e n c i e s

in l e v e l a d a p t a t i o n a n d m e t h o d o l o g y .

M i s t a k e s a n d w e a k n e s s e s , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , w h i c h , I a m s u r e ,

a r e c o n t a i n e d i n t h e p a p e r , a r e m y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o n l y . N o b o d y e l s e

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