(2) The Social Media Basis of Youth Protest Behavior. S. Valenzuela et al.. organizers; and the widespread use of social media as means of political action (Kulish, 2011; Zúquete, 2011). It is the latter trend, of course, that is most interesting from a communication perspective. Considering their disengagement from conventional politics, the key role played by youth is also noteworthy. We examine the role of social media use as it relates to youth protest behavior as means of political change. We also map out the processes by which this relationship takes place through the analysis of mediating mechanisms. Lastly, we elaborate on the contingent conditions under which social media can become pivotal for protest behavior by examining the moderating role of postmaterialist values and ideologies. To do so, we analyze data from a representative survey of Chilean urban youth that measures protest activity, social network site use, and a host of other factors known to be related to protest. We focus on Chile because, in contrast with social movements in North America and Europe, public protest in Chile has been quite successful at accomplishing legal and policy changes. After briefly describing the Chilean experience, we review the literature on youth political engagement and social media, paying particular attention to protest activity and social network sites, and posit specific hypotheses about the relationship between protest behavior and Facebook, the dominant social network site in Chile. The Chilean experience. Chile has been portrayed as Latin America’s greatest success story ever since Chile returned to a democracy in 1990, following General Augusto Pinochet’s 17-year dictatorship. High levels of economic growth, successful social policies, low levels of corruption, and a prudent management of the political and macroeconomic processes have led the country to become a model of steady transition to democratic rule (Mainwaring & Scully, 2008; Valenzuela & Arriagada, 2011). Prosperity has also allowed the country to lead the region in terms of technology adoption. Currently, nearly 60% of the population uses the Internet, a proportion that climbs to 86% among those in the 18–24 age group (World Internet Project-Chile, 2010). Nevertheless, disparities in terms of income and other factors remain high in Chile. For instance, in national math tests, the performance of primary school students from the richest fifth of the population is one-third better than those of the poorest fifth (‘‘Blackboard battle,’’ 2010). Most importantly, following Inglehart’s (1997) value change predictions, the process of economic modernization has also translated into making inequality less acceptable in the face of public opinion. In 1990, only 16% of Chileans completely agreed with the statement: ‘‘Incomes should be made more equal.’’ By the year 2000, that proportion grew twice, to 33.5% (World Values Survey, 2000). The Chilean context thus combines successful development with high socioeconomic inequality—and growing unrest as a result. Younger citizens have led the social movements against this state of affairs and, in spite of being disengaged from electoral politics, have taken their calls for a better quality of education and protection of the environment both online and offline. 300. Journal of Communication 62 (2012) 299–314 © 2012 International Communication Association.
(3) S. Valenzuela et al.. The Social Media Basis of Youth Protest Behavior. It is in this particular context that Sebastián Piñera defeated the candidate of the center-left Concertación coalition, which ruled for 2 decades, in the 2010 elections and became president in March of that year. Despite low unemployment rates and high economic growth, in his first 2 years as head of state Piñera has confronted massive youth-led protests over educational policies and the environment. While these issues have led to street protests in the past, these protests were novel both for their success and their use of social media (Planas, 2011). A case in point was the August 2010 protest against the Barrancones power plant which would have closed a marine reserve that holds 80% of the world population of Humboldt penguins. In the two days following the environmental agency’s approval of the project, 118 Facebook Groups against Barrancones were created, which together garnered more than 25,700 ‘‘Likes’’ and 177,450 ‘‘Fans’’ (García & Torres, 2011). At the same time, 3,000-plus citizens—coordinated via Facebook and, to a lesser degree, Twitter—marched to the presidential palace in Santiago, demanding Piñera to fulfill his campaign promise that no power plants would be built in environmentally sensitive areas. The next day after, Piñera announced that he had overridden the agency’s approval and personally asked the company to relocate the plant. Barrancones, though telling, was not an isolated manifestation of the new Chilean protest movement. In January 2011, a series of citizen-led protests in Magallanes, the country’s southernmost region, against a 17% rise in the price of natural gas prices forced the government to sack the Energy ministry, limit the increase to just 3%, and give out new subsidies to 17,000 poor families. The public outrage against hydroelectric dams in Chilean Patagonia, in May 2011, along with the actions filed by environmental groups and legislators, paralyzed the project. And in June 2011, massive student demonstrations in Santiago and other cities led the government to launch a full-blown educational reform with more than $4 billion in fresh public funds. The government’s decision that same month to start tracking Facebook and Twitter ‘‘to listen to what citizens have to say’’ (Matamoros, 2011)—and the ensuing controversy it triggered over people’s right to privacy on the Internet—only reinforced the growing role of social media in protest activity in Chile. Youth, participation, and online media. Young people in Chile, as in other parts of the world, typically exhibit low rates of political participation. Between 1988 and 2009, turnout in the 18–29 age group decreased from 35% to less than 9%. Low electoral engagement may reflects changes in the conceptualization and practice of citizenship as the old ‘‘dutiful citizen’’ is replaced by the new ‘‘self-actualizing’’ citizen (Bennett, 2008; Dalton, 2008). The former is oriented toward traditional forms of political participation, such as voting, while the latter opts for civic action through community work, unconventional political activities, and digitally mediated forms of political expression. While the normative implication of these changes is contested (Graber, 2004), it is clear that digital media now plays a major role among younger citizens (Owen, 2006; Park, Kee, & Valenzuela, 2009; Raynes-Goldie & Walker, 2008). Journal of Communication 62 (2012) 299–314 © 2012 International Communication Association. 301.
(4) The Social Media Basis of Youth Protest Behavior. S. Valenzuela et al.. Scholarly debates regarding the relationship between these tools and the type of political behavior in which young people engage continue to evolve. Strong contrasts between the so-called cyberoptimists and cyberpessimists (Norris, 2000; Xenos & Moy, 2007), have given way to more nuanced perspectives in which the effects of online media are seen to be contingent upon the specific ways in which people use digital platforms and the sociopsychological characteristics of users. In other words, the effects of online technologies on youth engagement are mediated by specific uses (e.g., informational vs. entertainment) and moderated by individuals’ political psychology and background (Bimber, 2001; Shah, Rojas, & Cho, 2009). Taking into account these considerations, the meta-analysis conducted by Boulianne (2009) using U.S. data found no evidence to suggest that using online services was related to political disengagement. On the contrary, exposure to informational content online was positively associated to participation. In the case of Chilean youth, separate cross-sectional analyses have found a strong link between using online platforms, including news sites and social network sites, on political and civic participation (Scherman & Arriagada, 2010; Scherman, Arriagada, & Valenzuela, 2011). These results are also consistent with studies conducted in other countries (e.g., Bakker & de Vreese, 2011). Social media use for protest. Social network sites have several affordances for promoting participation, particularly protest behavior among youth. They facilitate access to a large number of contacts, thereby enabling social movements to reach critical mass (Marwell & Oliver, 1993). By allowing multiple channels for interpersonal feedback, peer acceptance, and reinforcement of group norms, these sites also promote the construction of personal and group identities that are key antecedents of protest behavior (Dalton et al., 2009). Social network sites function as information hubs that allow users to remain in contact and exchange updates regarding their activities with others that share their interests. Those who belong to social movements and political groups can thus build relationships with one another, receive mobilizing information that they may not obtain elsewhere, thus expanding their opportunities to engage in political activities (Gil de Zúñiga & Valenzuela, 2011; Kobayashi, Ikeda, & Miyata, 2006). Lastly, social media are effective means for social interaction. Finding a basis for conversation and social communication, connecting with family, friends, and society, and gaining insight into the circumstances of others—all these factors can instill in young people interest in collective issues (Valenzuela, Kim, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2011). Bakardjieva (2009) coined the term ‘‘subactivism’’ to analyze the relationship between individuals’ agency and their everyday political behavior in nontraditional political contexts. For her, Subactivism involves a variety of inconspicuous processes such as identity construction through subject positioning vis-à-vis social and political discourses and relations, friend–enemy distinction and identification with collective 302. Journal of Communication 62 (2012) 299–314 © 2012 International Communication Association.
(5) S. Valenzuela et al.. The Social Media Basis of Youth Protest Behavior. formations, discursive re-enactment of debates and clashes with a political frame of reference in the private sphere (everyday political talk), as well as practical actions and choices regarding matters of daily living that have wider social and political resonance. (Bakardjieva, 2011, p. 4) Social network sites therefore emerge as resources that may create the kinds of collective experiences that are necessary conditions for successful protest movements. Having grown up with digital media, young people may be especially drawn to these collective experiences and the new forms of citizenship they entail (Bennett, 2008). In light of young Chileans’ lack of interest in traditional politics, as reflected in their low turnout in elections, examining their use of social media may amplify and organize their protest behavior. These considerations lead us to hypothesize that there is a positive relationship between Facebook use and protest behavior (H1). Frequent Facebook users are more likely to protest because they engage in activities that are essential for collective action, such as learning information, exchanging and forming opinions about social issues, and constructing a common identity. Thus, it is likely that the link between Facebook use and political activity is explained by users’ motivations and the particular way in which the site is used. We therefore hypothesize that the relationship between Facebook use and protest behavior is mediated by the extent to which the site is used for news consumption, expressing opinions, and socializing with peers (H2). Postmaterialism and ideology as moderators. There is reason to suspect that individuals’ cultural and political values may amplify or dampen the effects of social media on political activity. Work on modernization and value change theory, for example, argues that economic development leads to the diffusion of postmaterialist values that promote self-expression and elite-challenging behavior (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). Furthermore, because one’s values tend to be formed by late adolescence, there are marked generational differences in individuals’ political goals and behaviors. Thus, having been raised during a long period of steady economic growth and relative prosperity—at least by historical terms—should make Chilean youth more likely to hold postmaterialist values and thereby more likely to protest instead of engaging in traditional electoral behavior. At the same time, the participatory and outspoken nature of social media could make the use of these sites more consistent with the spirit of emancipation and disrespect for traditional authority that characterizes postmaterialism. Links between social network sites and protest behavior may also depend on users’ particular political ideology. Those at the left of the ideological spectrum are more likely to resort to protest as part of their political toolkit (Dalton et al., 2009). For example, issues such as public education and the environment are strongly associated with the left in Chile. There is some overlap between caring for postmaterialist values and the issues that people associate with social democrats and other leftist groups (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). Thus, we hypothesize that the relationship between Journal of Communication 62 (2012) 299–314 © 2012 International Communication Association. 303.
(6) The Social Media Basis of Youth Protest Behavior. S. Valenzuela et al.. Facebook use and protest behavior will be stronger for individuals with a leftist ideology and with postmaterialist values (H3). Method Sample and procedures. Data were collected in a survey of individuals aged 18–29 living in Chile’s three largest urban areas: greater Santiago, Valparaíso-Viña del Mar, and Concepción-Talcahuano. Approximately 43.2% of the total population of the country lives in these three areas. The School of Journalism at Universidad Diego Portales and Feedback, a professional polling firm, collaborated in a multistage probability sample stratified by urban area. Within each urban area the sample was allocated proportionally by communes and within communes by the number of blocks. For each randomly selected block, five households were randomly selected to obtain a list of adult residents aged 18–29. In the last stage, one eligible youth from each household selected was randomly drawn for a face-to-face interview. The final sample of 1,000 represented an 80% completion rate. Interviews were conducted between 27 August and 10 September 2010. Measures Protest behavior. Protests can take a variety of forms, ranging from signing petitions to boycotts, including unofficial strikes and even violent activities. Because illegal protest activities tend to be quite infrequent in Chile, we focused on activities that represent a transition between conventional and unconventional modes of political behavior, as well as direct action techniques, all of which are legal. Specifically, protest behavior was measured by asking respondents if they had engaged in the following activities in the past 12 months: attended public demonstrations (14% of respondents), attended political forums and debates (11%), signed a petition to authorities (12%), and participated in meetings with authorities (8%). Positive responses were summed (range: 0–4) to create a protest index. Facebook use. Both general and specific Facebook use was assessed. The general assessment involved first asking respondents if they had a registered account on Facebook, and then asking those that did (85%) how often they used it: (a) every day, more than once a day; (b) every day, once a day; (c) at least three times a week; (d) once a week; (e) two or three times a month; and (f) once a month or less. Three specific types of uses were also assessed. First, to measure Facebook as a channel for news, respondents were asked to estimate how many hours on a typical day they used social network sites for watching, reading or listening to news. Second, Facebook use as a means for self-expression was gauged by asking respondents whether on a typical day they use the site for contacting friends and acquaintances; chatting; and expressing an opinion on personally relevant issues. These three 304. Journal of Communication 62 (2012) 299–314 © 2012 International Communication Association.
(7) S. Valenzuela et al.. The Social Media Basis of Youth Protest Behavior. items were added to create a single scale of use of Facebook for self-expression (Cronbach’s α = .77). Finally, respondents were asked to report whether they had used Facebook to plan parties, create event invitations, and confirm assistance with events. Affirmative answers to these items were summed to create an index covering Facebook’s use for social life (α = .80). Correlations among the three measures of specific Facebook uses were modest, suggesting that they could be treated as relatively independent measures. Specifically, Facebook use for news was correlated at .17 (p < .001) with Facebook for self-expression and at .23 (p < .001) with Facebook for social life, while the latter two were correlated at .30 (p < .001). Grievances. Dissatisfaction as a causal agent of protest activity can take many forms. In this study, we considered two types of grievances, economic and political. The former was gauged with the following item: ‘‘Has the economic situation of the country improved, stayed the same, or worsened?’’ Negative economic evaluations were coded higher. Political dissatisfaction, in turn, was measured with two variables. A scale of confidence in public institutions (Cronbach’s α = .63) was computed from questions asking how much trust respondents had in political parties, the justice system, their district’s representative to Congress, and their local government or municipality. Responses were recorded using a 4-point scale, with 1 = nothing and 4 = a lot. Government responsiveness was gauged with a single item about how much the respondent believes his or her actions influence the decisions made by government officials. More trusting and responsive responses were coded with higher values. Values. The influence of political and cultural values on protest behavior was operationalized using two variables. For ideology, respondents were invited to place themselves on a 10-point scale ranging from left-wing to right-wing. An index of postmaterialist values was constructed by asking respondents if they believed that (a) protecting the environment should be a priority, even if it diminishes economic growth and increases unemployment; (b) economic growth is fundamental for democracy to work (reversed); and (c) making discrimination against minorities punishable by law is fundamental for democracy to work. Responses for all three items were dummy coded 0 for no and 1 for yes. Because this variable was computed as an index, rather than a scale, internal consistency via Cronbach’s alpha was not computed. Resources. Individuals’ material, psychological, and social resources have been shown to be strongly associated with protest behavior (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). Members of dominant groups (e.g., male, rich, and college-educated) are more likely to participate in protests because they have more time and perhaps greater communicative and organizational abilities. Having a stronger interest in political matters can also increase the likelihood of being motivated to join protests. From a Journal of Communication 62 (2012) 299–314 © 2012 International Communication Association. 305.
(8) The Social Media Basis of Youth Protest Behavior. S. Valenzuela et al.. social perspective, individuals are more likely to be recruited into political activities, including protest activities, if they are members of groups such as unions, NGOs, and professional organizations. Furthermore, organizations can provide an institutional context supportive of political action. These different sets of political resources were included in the current study as statistical controls. The respondent’s gender was dummy coded, with males coded higher. Education was operationalized as the highest level of formal education completed.1 Political interest was measured as a scale averaging respondent’s level of interest in: (a) Chilean politics and (b) staying informed about important political affairs (α = .87). Both items were coded using a 5-point scale ranging from 1 = not interested to 5 = very interested. Membership in civic groups was a counter tapping involvement in activities of organizations related to: (a) assisting the poor; (b) protecting the environment; (c) student groups; (d) defending consumers’ rights; (e) preserving public spaces; and (f) defending reproductive and sexual rights. News media use. To measure the level of exposure to political information and public affairs, respondents estimated how many hours on a typical day they used four different types of media: television news, radio news, print newspapers, and online publications. Results. Because protest behavior was assessed as a count, the hypotheses were tested with Poisson regression models.2 The variables representing grievances, values, resources, and news media use were entered simultaneously with Facebook variables, so as to isolate the unique relationship between using Facebook and protest behavior, holding all other variables constant.3 Mediation and moderation analyses, respectively, were conducted to test the second and third hypotheses. Independent variables were normalized to a 0 to 1 range before entering them into the Poisson models to facilitate comparison of the regression coefficients.4 As predicted (H1), there was a positive relationship between Facebook use and protest behavior (Table 1). Holding everything else equal, respondents with a Facebook account engaged in more protest activities than respondents without a Facebook account (b = .47, p < .01), with an average score in the protest index of .34 versus .21, a 60% difference. For those with a Facebook account, using the online social network more often was also related to higher levels of protest behavior (b = .47, p < .05). In substantive terms, and holding all other variables constant at their means, respondents who log in to Facebook several times a day scored .40 in the measure of protest behavior, while those who did so once a week scored .30, a nearly 35% difference. Consistent with previous research, resources were key predictors of protest behavior, particularly membership in civic groups. Individuals with higher interest in political affairs as well as those who spent more time reading newspapers and online 306. Journal of Communication 62 (2012) 299–314 © 2012 International Communication Association.
(9) S. Valenzuela et al.. The Social Media Basis of Youth Protest Behavior. Table 1 Poisson Regressions Predicting Protest Behavior. Grievances Negative economic evaluations Confidence in public institutions Government responsiveness Values Right-wing ideology Postmaterialist values Resources Male Education Political interest Membership in civic groups News Media TV news exposure Radio news exposure Newspaper exposure Online news exposure Social network site use With a Facebook account Frequency of Facebook use Likelihood ratio χ2 Pseudo-R2 (%) N. Total Sample. Those with a Facebook Account. B (SE). B (SE). 0.16 (0.14) −0.52∗ (0.24) 0.25∗ (0.15). 0.20 (0.15) −0.58∗ (0.25) 0.19 (0.16). −0.63∗∗∗ (0.18) 0.21 (0.21). −0.54∗∗ (0.18) 0.26 (0.22). 0.14 (0.09) 0.17 (0.32) 1.10∗∗∗ (0.15) 2.04∗∗∗ (0.16). 0.11 (0.10) 0.05 (0.33) 1.08∗∗∗ (0.16) 1.93∗∗∗ (0.17). −0.69∗ (0.37) −0.02 (0.21) 0.55∗ (0.23) 1.00∗∗ (0.32). −0.70∗ (0.40) 0.01 (0.22) 0.74∗∗ (0.25) 0.98∗∗ (0.34). 0.47∗∗ (0.17) — 447.40∗∗∗ 46.3 940. — 0.47∗ (0.21) 369.53∗∗∗ 43.0 810. Note: Cell entries are Poisson regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < .10. ∗∗ p < .01. ∗∗∗ p < .001.. news were more likely to engage in protest. Among grievance effects, lack of trust in political institutions was the most important driver of protest behavior. Those with a left-leaning orientation were far more likely to join protests than those with a right-leaning orientation. We had also hypothesized (H2) that the positive relationship between Facebook use and protest was explained by three activities performed on the network: news consumption, expressing opinions, and socializing with peers. To test these mediating relationships, we estimated a path model in which frequency of Facebook use was predictive of all three activities on Facebook, while these activities, in turn, were predictive of protest. The results of the estimation are displayed in Figure 1, showing statistically significant paths only (full results are displayed in Table 2). As could be expected, using Facebook more frequently meant engaging in all three of the Facebook activities considered more frequently as well. Most importantly, using Facebook for news (b = .51, p < .05) and socializing (b = .52, p < .001) was Journal of Communication 62 (2012) 299–314 © 2012 International Communication Association. 307.
(10) The Social Media Basis of Youth Protest Behavior. S. Valenzuela et al.. Facebook for news 0.51* (0.24). 0.07** (0.02) Frequency of Facebook use. 0.34*** (0.05). 0.22*** (0.03). Facebook for self-expression. Facebook for social life. Protest behavior. 0.52*** (0.14). Figure 1 Path model of Facebook use and protest behavior. Note. Paths are Poisson regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses (see Table 2 for further details). Only statistically significant paths are displayed. ∗ p < .10. ∗∗ p < .01. ∗∗∗ p < .001.. positively associated with protest levels. Although Facebook for opinion expression was not a significant predictor of protest (b = .16, ns) once all other variables were taken into account, the three Facebook activities included in the model fully mediated the direct effects of general Facebook use on protest. This conclusion stems from the significant drop in the magnitude of the direct effect of Facebook use on protest (from b = .47, p < .05 [reported in the last column of Table 1] to b = .23, ns). Thus, in line with the hypothesis, there was sufficient evidence that mediation was indeed taking place. Finally, we examined the association between protest activity and series of interactions between Facebook use and political ideologies and postmaterialist values, separately for the total sample and among those with a Facebook account. Each of these interactions was anticipated to be significant, indicating a greater engagement in protest activities among people who were left-leaning and/or held postmaterialist values (H3). The coefficients displayed in Table 3 offered no support for this hypothesis. The only significant interaction was between ideology and frequency of Facebook use, but it was in the opposite direction of what had been predicted. The relationship between Facebook use and protest behavior was not contingent upon political and/or cultural values in this study. Discussion. This article contributes to our understanding of the role of social network sites in political change in developing democracies. Our analysis of Facebook use and protest behavior among 18–29 year olds in Chile demonstrated that having a Facebook account and using it frequently were positively and significantly related to participation in protests, even after taking into account other known sources of this type of political action. Controlling for grievances, values, resources, and 308. Journal of Communication 62 (2012) 299–314 © 2012 International Communication Association.
(11) S. Valenzuela et al.. The Social Media Basis of Youth Protest Behavior. Table 2 Poisson Regressions for Mediation Analysis of Facebook Use on Protest Behavior. Grievances Negative economic evaluations Confidence in public institutions Government responsiveness Values Right-wing ideology Postmaterialist values Resources Male Education Political interest Membership in civic groups News media TV news exposure Radio news exposure Newspaper exposure Online news exposure Social network site use Frequency of Facebook use Facebook for news Facebook for self-expression Facebook for social life Likelihood ratio χ Pseudo-R2 (%) N. 2. Facebook for News B (SE). Facebook for Self-expression B (SE). −0.03 (0.02). −0.01 (0.02). Facebook for Social Life B (SE). Protest Behavior B (SE). −0.05 (0.04). 0.27 (0.15). −0.04 (0.03). 0.11∗∗ (0.04) −0.01 (0.07). −0.60∗ (0.25). −0.01 (0.02). 0.01 (0.03). −0.08 (0.09). 0.25 (0.17). −0.04 (.03) −0.02 (0.03). −0.03 (0.03) −0.03 (0.03). −0.05 (0.05) 0.03 (0.06). −0.49∗∗ (0.18) 0.28 (0.22). −0.01 (0.01) −0.01 (0.04) 0.03 (0.02) 0.07∗ (0.03). 0.01 (0.01) −0.25∗∗∗ (0.05) 0.01 (0.02) 0.05 (0.03). 0.12∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.09 (0.09) 0.09∗ (0.04) 0.26∗∗∗ (0.06). 0.06 (0.10) 0.07 (0.34) 1.02∗∗∗ (0.15) 1.78∗∗∗ (0.17). −0.02 (0.05) −0.06 (0.06) −0.08 (0.11) −0.58 (0.40) 0.18∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.10∗∗ (0.03) 0.06 (0.06) −0.10 (0.23) 0.08∗ (0.03) 0.04 (0.04) 0.19∗∗ (0.07) 0.66∗∗ (0.25) ∗∗∗ 0.12 (0.10) 0.84∗ (0.34) 0.21 (0.05) 0.05 (0.06) 0.07∗∗ (0.02). 0.22∗∗∗ (0.03). — —. 0.51∗ (0.24) 0.16 (0.26). —. —. 0.52∗∗∗ (0.14). ∗∗∗. ∗∗∗. — —. — —. — ∗∗∗. 110.77 12.3 810. 0.34∗∗∗ (0.05) 0.23 (0.22). 102.96 11.4 810. 153.39 17.0 810. 394.24∗∗∗ 47.1 810. Note: Cell entries are Poisson regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < .10. ∗∗ p < .01. ∗∗∗ p < .001.. news media use, the strength of this relationship was comparable to the influence of political distrust and leftist ideology on triggering elite-challenging political behavior. It should be noted, however, that factors such as political interest and membership in civic groups were more closely related to protest. Facebook use is thus a significant tool for youth activism, but by no means the only or even necessarily the most important one. This is good news in our view because it would be quite troubling Journal of Communication 62 (2012) 299–314 © 2012 International Communication Association. 309.
(12) The Social Media Basis of Youth Protest Behavior. S. Valenzuela et al.. Table 3 Two-Way Interactions Between Facebook Use, Values, and Ideology. Grievances Negative economic evaluations Confidence in public institutions Government responsiveness Values Right-wing ideology Postmaterialist values Resources Male Education Political interest Membership in civic groups News media TV news exposure Radio news exposure Newspaper exposure Online news exposure Social network site use With a Facebook account Frequency of Facebook use Interactions With a Facebook Account × Values With a Facebook Account × Ideology Frequency of Facebook Use × Values Frequency of Facebook Use × Ideology Likelihood ratio χ2 Pseudo-R2 N. Total Sample. Those With a Facebook Account. B (SE). B (SE). 0.15 (0.14) −0.55∗ (0.24) 0.25∗ (0.15). 0.19 (0.15) −0.57∗ (0.25) 0.19 (0.16). −2.52∗∗ (0.76) −0.66 (0.77). −0.96 (0.66) −0.25 (0.74). 0.11 (0.09) 0.21 (0.32) 1.10∗∗∗ (0.15) 2.04∗∗∗ (0.16). 0.11 (0.10) 0.05 (0.33) 1.07∗∗∗ (0.16) 1.94∗∗∗ (0.17). −0.72∗ (0.37) 0.02 (0.21) 0.61∗∗ (0.23) 0.96∗∗ (0.32). −0.73∗ (0.40) 0.01 (0.22) 0.73∗∗ (0.25) 0.98∗∗ (0.34). −0.61 (0.55) —. — −0.08 (0.67). 0.92 (0.79) −2.01∗∗ (0.78) — —. — — 0.65 (0.93) −0.51 (0.79). 454.47∗∗∗ 47.4 940. 370.28∗∗∗ 43.2 810. Note: Cell entries are Poisson regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < .10. ∗∗ p < .01. ∗∗∗ p < .001.. if young adults’ protest behavior was determined by a single technological platform such as Facebook. What people did with Facebook mattered as well. Using Facebook for news and socializing with peers was associated with increased participation in protests, but using it for self-expression was not. These results are consistent with previous work showing that the informational and social interactive uses of media can lead to participatory behaviors, while entertainment uses can drive people away from collective action (Shah et al., 2009). These findings also indicate that Facebook can 310. Journal of Communication 62 (2012) 299–314 © 2012 International Communication Association.
(13) S. Valenzuela et al.. The Social Media Basis of Youth Protest Behavior. successfully allow youth to interweave the private world of family, friends, and personal life with the public sphere of politics, social movements, and protests, in line with ‘‘subactivist’’ practices (Bakardjieva, 2009). Both as a technology and as a space where people mediate their political interests, Facebook is a resource for creating a collective agency. Furthermore, by illustrating how Facebook serves multiple functions, including surveillance, social integration, and deliberative practice, our findings counter simple notions of technological determinism. Considering Chile’s economic development and the diffusion of postmaterialist values among youth, as manifested by students’ demands around quality-of-life issues like education and the environment, we expected that the mobilizing potential of Facebook would be particularly salient for users who share postmaterialist or leftist political values. However, this was not the case, perhaps suggesting that individuals need not share a particular cultural or political outlook to benefit from the participatory potential of the online network site. Online tools such as Facebook are not so much creating new forms of protest as amplifying traditional forms of protest, such as street demonstrations. In other words, activism does not confine itself to separate online and offline spheres, but instead online interactions can aid offline forms of citizen participation. Governments and political parties, in turn, must take into account what is available on social network sites as they gauge public opinion and knowledge. The positive links between Facebook use and protest behavior reported here represent both an opportunity and a challenge. On the one hand, social network sites seem to reduce the costs of collective action, enabling citizens to organize themselves more easily and to voice their concerns more publicly. On the other, there is the risk of furthering inequality if the population of social media users is skewed toward the technologically savvy and those with high human, social, and economic capital. Although our study was conducted a year earlier from the massive student-led protests that put Chile in the headlines worldwide in 2011, the findings reported here provide some clues to understand the surprising impact of the student-led protests. Political grievances, leftist orientations, political interest, and participation in civic groups were all found to be strong predictors of protest activity. It is safe to assume that all of these attributes are more likely to characterize college-bound youth than other segments of Chilean society, and thus it should not come as a surprise that students have led the current movement for economic and social reform. On the other hand, the unique contribution of social network site use for protest that was extensively probed with 2010 data suggests that growth in usage of these platforms between 2010 and 2011 could be related to an increase in protest behavior. Despite the new insights shed by this study, the analysis has several limitations. By employing survey data, we are constrained to self-reports of protest activity and Facebook use, which may yield inaccurate measures due to social desirability bias. Although Facebook is the dominant social network site in Chile, our findings are limited to a single social network application. Additional research is needed to Journal of Communication 62 (2012) 299–314 © 2012 International Communication Association. 311.
(14) The Social Media Basis of Youth Protest Behavior. S. Valenzuela et al.. produce more detailed findings that extend across a range of social media. Although a number of factors could be controlled statistically, the cross-sectional nature of our data limits our ability to infer causal relationships. Limitations notwithstanding our study provides an initial foundation for research on the role of social media and protest behavior in consolidating democracies.. Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. Income was excluded from the analysis because it was found to be highly collinear with education (r = .44). When replacing income for education in the multivariate analysis, the results were the same as those reported in the results section. To ensure that Poisson regression was appropriate, negative binomial models were estimated and contrasted with the Poisson specifications. In all cases, the dispersion coefficient of the negative binomial models was insignificant. We calculated correlations between all the independent variables used in the regressions to check for collinearity. Nearly all were relatively uncorrelated (mean r = .07, median r = .04). Descriptive statistics of all variables and replication data are available from the first author upon request.. References Adimark GfK. (2011). Encuesta: Evaluación gestión del gobierno [Survey: Evaluation of government performance]. Retrieved from http://www.adimark.cl/es/estudios/ documentos/0_9_ev_gob_sept2011_.pdf Bakardjieva, M. (2009). Subactivism: Lifeworld and politics in the age of the Internet. The Information Society, 25(2), 91–104. doi: 10.1080/01972240802701627 Bakardjieva, M. (2011). Reconfiguring the mediapolis: New media and civic agency. New Media & Society. Prepublished June 23, 2011. doi: 10.1177/1461444811410398 Bakker, T. P., & de Vreese, C. H. (2011). Good news for the future? Young people, Internet use, and political participation. Communication Research, 38, 451–470. doi: 10.1177/0093 650210381738 Barrionuevo, A. (2011, August 4). With kiss-ins and dances, young Chileans push for reform. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/05/world/ americas/05chile.html Bennett, W. L. (2008). Changing citizenship in the digital age. In W. L. Bennett (Ed.), Civic life online: Learning how digital media can engage youth (pp. 1–24). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Bimber, B. (2001). Information and political engagement in America: The search for effects of information technology at the individual level. Political Research Quarterly, 54, 53–67. doi: 10.1177/106591290105400103 Boulianne, S. (2009). Does Internet use affect engagement? A meta-analysis of research. Political Communication, 26, 193–211. doi: 10.1080/10584600902854363 Dalton, R. J. (2008). Citizenship norms and the expansion of political participation. Political Studies, 56, 76–98. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00718.x 312. Journal of Communication 62 (2012) 299–314 © 2012 International Communication Association.
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(17) 青年抗议行为的社会媒体依据：以智利为例 Sebastián Valenzuela 智利天主教大学 Arturo Arriagada Andrés Scherman Diego Portales大学 【摘要：】 抗议活动已成为智利政治变革的一个核心手段。本文通过 2010 年在智利收集的调 查数据，研究社交媒体使用和青年抗议行为之间的关系以及调解和调和这种关系的机 制。本文发现，即使考虑了政治不满、物质和精神资源、价值观和新闻媒体使用等因素 后，Facebook 的使用与抗议活动仍呈显著相关。 如果 Facebook 被用于新闻和社交目的 时，二者之间的关联则比被用于自我表达时要强。“后唯物主义价值观”和政治意识形态 都不能调和 Facebook 使用和抗议之间的关联。.
(18) L’ancrage dans les médias sociaux des comportements de protestation des jeunes : le cas du Chili Sebastián Valenzuela, Arturo Arriagada & Andrés Scherman La protestation est devenue un moyen central de changement politique au Chili. Nous examinons l’association entre l’utilisation des médias sociaux et la protestation des jeunes, ainsi que les mécanismes de médiation et de modération de cette association, en utilisant des données d’enquête recueillies au Chili en 2010. Nous avons découvert que l’utilisation de Facebook était associée de façon significative aux activités de protestation, même une fois que les doléances politiques, les ressources matérielles et psychologiques, les valeurs et l’utilisation des médias d’information sont prises en compte. Le lien entre l’utilisation de Facebook et les activités de protestation était plus fort quand Facebook était utilisé pour les nouvelles et la socialisation que quand il l’était pour l’expression individuelle. Les « valeurs postmatérialistes » et l’idéologie politique n’ont pas modéré l’association entre l’utilisation de Facebook et les protestations.. Mots clés : protestation, jeunesse, Facebook, médias sociaux, participation politique, Chili.
(19) Soziale Medien als Basis jugendlichen Protestverhaltens: Der Fall Chile Protestaktivitäten sind in Chile ein wichtiges Mittel, politische Veränderungen herbeizuführen. Wir untersuchen den Zusammenhang zwischen der Nutzung sozialer Medien und Jugendprotesten, sowie die Mediator- und Moderator-Mechanismen für diesen Zusammenhang und nutzen dafür Umfragedaten, die 2010 in Chile erhoben wurden. Wir fanden heraus, dass die Nutzung von Facebook signifikant mit Protestaktivitäten zusammenhing und das dieser Zusammenhang auch dann noch Bestand hatte, wenn politische Nöte, materielle und psychische Ressourcen sowie Werte und Nutzung von Nachrichtenmedien kontrolliert wurden. Die Beziehung zwischen Facebook-Nutzung und Protestaktivität war dann stärker, wenn es für Nachrichten und Sozialbeziehungen Verwendung fand und nicht für die Eigendarstellung genutzt wurde. „Postmaterialistische Werte“ und politische Ideologie moderierten die Beziehung zwischen Facebook-Nutzung und Protest nicht. Schlüsselbegriffe: Protest, Jugendliche, Facebook, soziale Medien, politische Partizipation, Chile.
(20) 젊은이들의 항의 행태의 소셜미디어 기초: 칠레 사례연구 Sebastián Valenzuela Catholic University of Chile Arturo Arriagada and Andrés Scherman Diego Portales University 요약 항의 행위는 칠레에서의 정치적 변화를 위한 주요한 수단이다. 우리는 2010년 칠레에서 취합된 서베이 데이터를 이용하여, 소셜미디어 사용과 젊은이들의 항의 사이의 연계와 중재 구조에 대하여 연구하였다. 우리는 페이스북 사용이 항의 행위에 중요하게 연계되어 있다는 것을 발견하였는데, 이는 정치적 불만들, 물질적 심리적 소스들, 가치들과 뉴스 미디어 사용들을 고려한 이후에도 마찬가지였다.. 페이스북사용과 항의행위사이의. 연계는,이 연계가 자기 표현을 위해 사용할때보다 뉴스와 사회화를 사용할때 더욱 강해졌다. 탈 물질적 가치들과 정치적 이론은 페이스북사용과 항의사이의 연계를 중재하는데 있어 발견되지 않았다..
(21) La Base del Comportamiento de Protesta de la Juventud en los Medios Sociales: El Caso de Chile Sebastián Valenzuela Catholic University of Chile Arturo Arriagada and Andrés Scherman Diego Portales University Resumen. La actividad de protesta se ha convertido en central para el cambio político en Chile. Examinamos la asociación entre el uso de los medios sociales. y la protesta de la. juventud, así como también los mecanismos de mediación y moderadores de esta relación, usando una encuesta de datos colectada en Chile en el 2010. Encontramos que el uso de Facebook fue asociado significativamente con la actividad de protesta, aún después de haber tenido en consideración las quejas políticas, los recursos materiales y sicológicos, los valores y el uso de las noticias de los medios. Esta conexión entre el uso de Facebook y la actividad de protesta fue más fuerte cuando fue usado para las noticias y para socializar que para cuando fue usado como auto-expresión. Los “valores posmateriales” y la ideología política no fueron encontrados que moderen la asociación entre el uso de Facebook y la protesta..