Universidad de San Andrés
Organización Industrial
Segundo Semestre – 2012
Profesor: Walter Cont ([email protected])
Asistente: Fausto Spiga ([email protected])
Página web: http://sites.google.com/site/orgind2012udesa/ (en construcción).
La página http://sites.google.com/site/orgind2011udesa/ contiene la información del curso correspondiente al año 2011.
Programa
Este curso analiza la teoría moderna de la Organización Industrial que corresponde a Mercados y Competencia, y con menor énfasis aspectos de Teoría de la Firma. Durante el semestre se enseñarán fundamentos sólidos sobre el funcionamiento de los mercados y la determinación de los precios. Se estudiarán los papers y modelos más importantes y también los recientes avances en este campo. Se discutirán aplicaciones a temas de fijación de precios y competencia, colusión, fusiones, etc.
Evaluación: La evaluación del curso consta de un Primer Parcial (ponderación 35%), y un Segundo Parcial (ponderación 50%). El 15% restante proviene de los mejores 3 de 4 Problem Sets que se entregarán mensualmente. Adicionalmente hay prácticos semanales que serán de mucha utilidad para la resolución de los problemas y exámenes. La nota final saldrá como resultante de estos 3 componentes, sin excepción.
Bibliografía y Temas:
A continuación se detalla un listado de temas con los papers correspondientes. Los libros de referencia son
- Tirole, J. (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization, The MIT Press. Este libro cubre la mayoría de los tópicos del curso.
- Church, J. y R. Ware (2001), Industrial Organization: A Strategic Approach, McGraw Hill. Este libro también cubre la mayoría de los tópicos del curso. Una versión digital del libro fue puesta a disposición en Internet por los autores.
Otros libros complementarios son
- Pepall, L., D. Richards y G. Norman (2006), Organización industrial: Teoría y práctica contemporáneas, Thomson, Tercera Edición. Hay versión en castellano. - Carlton, D. y J. Perloff (1994), Modern Industrial Organization, Harper Collins, 2nd
Edition. Tiene muy buenos ejemplos de los problemas tratados en clase.
- Shy, O. (1995), Industrial Organization: Theory and Applications, The MIT Press. Realiza un análisis teórico básico.
Listado de Temas:
1) Competencia perfecta - Proceso competitivo.
(*) Nicholson, W. (1998), Microeconomic Theory: Basic Principles and Extensions, The Dryden Press, 7th Edition. Cap. 14 (este es un capítulo que cubre muy bien los aspectos de competencia perfecta en equilibrio parcial).
(*) Park, D. (1998), “The Meaning of Competition: A Graphical Exposition”, Journal of Economic Education, pp. 347-57.
(*) Varian, H., Intermediate Microeconomics, 5th Edition. El capítulo 14 tiene una excelente discusión sobre excedente del consumidor.
Parte A: Problemas de decisión.
2) Monopolio y prácticas monopólicas (pricing, discriminación de precios, extracción de excedentes).
(*) Tirole (1988), Caps. 1 y 3.
(*) Church y Ware (2001), Caps. 4 y 5.
Adams, W. y J. Yellen (1976), “Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 90, pp. 457-98.
Bulow, J. (1982), “Durable-Goods Monopolists”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 90, pp. 314-31.
Cont, W. (2012), “Price discrimination with divisible goods”, mimeo.
Maskin, E. y J. Riley (1984), “Monopoly with Incomplete Information”, Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 15, pp. 171-96.
McAfee, P., J. McMillan y M. Whinston (1989), “Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling and Correlation of Values”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 104, pp. 371-83.
Viscusi, W., J. Vernon y J. Harrington (2000), Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, The MIT Press, Third Edition, Cap. 9.
3) Prácticas monopólicas II (relaciones verticales).
(*) Tirole (1988), Cap. 4.
(*) Pepall, L., D. Richards y G. Norman (2006), Cap. 18 y 19.
Mathewson, G. y R. Winter (1984), “An Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints”, Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 15, pp. 27-38.
O’Brien, D. y G. Shaffer (1992), “Vertical Control with Bilateral Contracts”, Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 23, pp. 299-308.
4) Calidad en mercados competitivos y monopólicos.
(*) Tirole (1988), Cap. 2.
(*) Church y Ware (2001), Cap. 6.
Champsaur, P. y J. C. Rochet (1989), “Multiproduct Duopolist”, Econometrica, Vol. 57, pp. 533-557
Delipalla, S. y M. J. Keen (1999), “Product Quality and the Optimal Structure of Commodity Taxes”, mimeo, University of Kent.
Lambertini, L. (1997), “The Multiproduct Monopolist under Vertical Differentiation: An Inductive Approach”, Recherches Economiques de Louvain, Vol. 63, pp. 109-122.
Lambertini, L. (2000), “Does the Monopoly Undersupply Product Quality?”, mimeo, Universidad de Bologna.
Mussa, M. y S. Rosen (1978), “Monopoly and Product Quality”, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 18, pp. 301-17.
Spence, M. (1975), “Monopoly, Quality and Regulation”, Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 6, pp. 417-29.
Parte B: Problemas estratégicos.
5) Oligopolios: precios y cantidades, competencia simultánea, liderazgo, empresa dominante-pequeños competidores.
(*) Tirole, Cap. 5.
(*) Church y Ware (2001), Cap. 8.
Kreps, D. y J. Scheinkman (1983), “Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes”, Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 14, pp. 326-37.
Shy, Cap. 6 (secciones 6.1 a 6.4) y 7 (sección 7.1). También Carlton y Perloff, Cap. 5. Mankiw, G. y M. Whinston (1986), “Free Entry and Social Inefficiency”, Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 17, pp. 48-58.
6) Diferenciación de productos.
(*) Tirole, Cap. 7.
(*) Church y Ware (2001), Cap. 11.
Anderson, S., A. de Palma y J. Thisse (1992), Discrete Choice Theory and Product Differentiation, The MIT Press, Ch. 7.
Anglin, P. (1992), “The relationship between models of horizontal and vertical differentiation”, Bulletin of Economics Research, Vol. 44(1), pp. 1-20
Dixit, A. y J. Stiglitz (1977), “Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity”, American Economic Review, Vol. 67, pp. 297-308.
Hotelling, H. (1929), “Stability in Competition”, The Economic Journal, Vol. 39, pp. 41-57.
Perloff J. y S. Salop (1985), “Equilibrium with Product Differentiation”, Review of Economics Studies, Vol. 52, pp. 107-120
Salop, S. (1979), “Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods”, Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 10, pp. 141-56.
Shaked, A. y J. Sutton (1982), “Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation”, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 49, pp. 3-13.
Spence, M. (1976), “Product Differentiation and Welfare”, American Economic Review, Vol. 66, pp. 407-14.
7) Colusión: corto plazo. Sostenibilidad: super-juegos, factores de incertidumbre (demanda, factor de descuento y costos).
(*) Tirole, Cap. 6.
(*) Church y Ware (2001), Cap. 10.
Athey, S. y K. Bagwell (2001), “Optimal Collusion with Private Information”, Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 32, pp 428-65.
Bernheim, D. y M. Whinston (1990), “Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior”, Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 21, pp 1-26.
Church, J. y R. Ware (2001), Industrial Organization: A Strategic Approach, McGraw Hill. Dal Bó, P. (2007), “Tacit Collusion under Interest Rate Fluctuations”, Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 38, pp 1-8.
Green, E. y R. Porter (1984), “Non-Cooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information”, Econometrica, Vol. 52, pp. 87-100.
Rotemberg, J. y G. Saloner (1986), “A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars during Booms”, American Economic Review, Vol. 76, pp. 390-407.
8) Economía de redes (preliminar, en preparación).
Economides, N. (1997), “Network Externalities, Complementarities and Invitations to Enter”, European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 12, pp. 211-33.
Economides, N., and S. Salop (1992), “Competition and Integration among Complements, and Network Market Structure”, Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 40, pp. 105-23. Katz, M. y C. Shapiro (1985), “Network Externalities, Competition and Compatibility”, American Economic Review, Vol. 75, pp. 424-40.
Farrell, J. y P. Klemperer (2005), “Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with switching costs and network effects”, Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. 3, Cap. 31.
Tirole, Cap. 10.6.
9) Barreras a la entrada.
(*) Tirole, Cap. 8.1.
Baumol, W., J. Panzar y R. Willig (1986), “On the Theory of Perfectly Contestable Markets”, en Stiglitz y Mathewson, Eds., New Development in the Analysis of Market Structure, The MIT Press.
9.2) Barreras la entrada.
(*) Tirole, Caps. 8.2-8.4 y 8.6.2.
(*) Church y Ware (2001), Caps. 13 a 16.
Aghion, P. and P. Bolton (1987), “Contracts as a Barrier to Entry”, American Economic Review, Vol. 77, pp. 388-401
Bain, J. (1956), Barriers to New Competition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass, USA.
Bernheim, D. y M. Whinston, (1998), “Exclusive Dealing”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 106, pp. 64-103.
Besanko, D. and M. Perry (1994), “Exclusive Dealing in a Spatial Model of Retail Competition”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 12, pp. 297-329. Demsetz, H. (1982), “Barriers to Entry”, American Economic Review, Vol. 72, pp. 47-57. Marvel, H. (1982), “Exclusive Dealing”, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 25, pp. 1-25. Dixit, A, (1980), “The Role of Investment in Entry Deterrence”, Economic Journal, Vol. 90, pp. 95-106.
Hay, G. (1976), “Sequential Entry and Entry-Deterring Strategies'”, Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 28, pp. 240-257
Gelman, J. y S. Salop (1983), “Judo Economics: Capacity Limitation and Coupon Competition”, Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 14, pp. 315-25.
Fudenberg, D. y J. Tirole (1984), “The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy and the Lean and Hungry Look”, American Economic Review, Vol. 74, pp. 361-66.
Hart, O. y J. Tirole (1990), “Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure”, Brookings Papers: Microeconomics, pp. 205-86.
Judd, K. (1985), “Credible Spatial Preemption”, Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 16, pp. 153-66.
Rasmusen, J., Ramseyer, M. and J. S. Wiley (1991), “Naked Exclusion”, American Economic Review, Vol.81, pp. 1137-1145.
Rasmusen, J., Ramseyer, M. and J. S. Wiley (2000), “Naked Exclusion: Reply”, American Economic Review, Vol. 90, pp. 310-311
Salop, S. (1979), “Strategic Entry Deterrence”, American Economic Review, Vol. 69, pp. 335-38.
Spence, M. (1977), “Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing”, Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 8, pp. 534-544
Segal, I. and M. Whinston (2000), “Naked Exclusion: Comment”, American Economic Review, Vol 90, pp. 296-309.
Whinston, M. (1990), “Tying, Foreclosure and Exclusion”, American Economic Review, Vol. 80, pp. 837-59.
(*) Tirole, Cap. 9.4-9.8.
(*) Church y Ware (2001), Caps. 13 a 16.
Kreps, D. y R. Wilson (1982), “Reputation and Incomplete Information”, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 27, pp. 253-79.
Milgrom, P. y J. Roberts (1982), “Informational Asymmetries, Strategic Behavior and Industrial Organization”, American Economic Review, Vol. 72, pp. 184-193.
Milgrom, P. y J. Roberts (1982), “Limit Pricing and Entry Deterrence under Incomplete Information”, Econometrica, Vol. 50, pp. 443-60.
Milgrom, P. y J. Roberts (1982), “Predation, Reputation and Entry Deterrence”, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 27, pp. 288-312.
10) Fusiones.
(*) Church y Ware (2001), Caps. 19 y 23.
Campbell, N. (1998), “The Economic Theory of Unilateral Effects and the Practical Reality of Differentiated Product Mergers”, presentado en la Competition Law Section Annual Conference, Canadian Bar Association.
Cont, W. y F. Navajas (2006), Fusiones Horizontales, en Coloma, G., ed., Progresos en Organización Industrial, Ed. Temas.
(*) Davidson, C. y R. Deneckere (1985), “Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition”, RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 16 Nº4, pp. 473-86.
(*) Farrell, J. y C. Shapiro (1990), “Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis”, American Economic Review, Vol. 80 Nº1, pp. 107-126.
Farrell, J. y C. Shapiro (1991), “Horizontal Mergers: Reply”, American Economic Review, Vol. 81 Nº4, pp. 1007-1011.
Levy, T. y J. Reitzes (1992), “Anticompetitive Effects of Mergers in Markets with Localized Competition”, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 8, Nº2, pp. 427-440.
Motta, M. (2003), Competition Policy: Theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press. (*) Shapiro, C. (1995), “Mergers with Differentiated Products”, Address before the American Bar Association, International Bar Association, “The Merger Review Process in the US and Abroad”.
Werden, G. (1991), “Horizontal Mergers: Comment”, American Economic Review, Vol. 81 Nº4, pp. 1002-1006.
Whinston, M. (2003), “Lectures on Antitrust Economics. Chapter 3: Horizontal Mergers”, CSIO Working Paper #0041, Northwestern University.
11) Advertising.
(*) Bagwell, K. (2005), “The Economic Analysis of Advertising”, Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. 3, Cap. 28.
(*) Church y Ware (2001), Cap. 17.
12) Tópicos de Empirical IO: Poder de mercado, diferenciación de productos y simulación de fusiones.
(*) Church y Ware (2001), Cap. 12.
Berry, S. (1994), “Estimating Discrete Choice Models of Oligopoly Product Differentiation”, Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 25, pp. 242-62.
Berry, S., J. Levinsohn y A. Pakes (1995), “Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium”, Econometrica, Vol. 63, pp. 841-90.
Bresnahan, T. (1989), “Empirical Studies of Industries with Market Power”, en Schmalensee and Willig, Eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, North Holland, Cap. 17.
Hastings, J. (2002). “Vertical Relationships and Competition in Retail Gasoline Markets”, mimeo, University of California, Berkeley.
Hausman J. y G. Leonard (1997), “Economic Analysis of Differentiated Product Mergers Using Real World Data”, George Mason Law Review, Vol. 5, pp. 321-346.
Hausman, J. y G. Leonard (2002), “The Competitive Effects of a New Product Introduction: A Case Study”, Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 50, pp. 237-263.
Hausman, J., G. Leonard y J. Zona (1994), “Competitive Analysis with Differentiated Products”, Annales D’Economie et de Statistique, Vol. 34, pp. 159-180.
Nevo, A. (2000), “Mergers with Differentiated Products: The Case of the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry”, Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 31, pp. 395-421.
Nevo, A. (2001), “Measuring Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry”, Econometrica, Vol. 69, pp. 307-42.
Schmalensee, R. (1978), “Entry Deterrence in the Ready-to-Eat Breakfast Cereal Industry”, Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 9, pp. 305-27.
Trajtenberg, M. (1989), “The Welfare Analysis of Product Innovations, with an Application to Computed Tomography Scanners”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 97, pp. 444-479
13) Organización interna de la Empresa.
Tirole (1988), Cap. 1.
Hart, O. (1995), Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure, Oxford University Press, Cap 1-3.
